Welcome to the SIMP documentation!¶

This is the documentation for the 4.3.1-0 release of SIMP, which is compatible with the UNKNOWN.MAPPING release of CentOS and Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL). This guide will walk a user through the process of installing and managing a SIMP system. It also provides a mapping of security features to security requirements, which can be used to document a system’s security conformance.

The System Integrity Management Platform (SIMP) is an Open Source framework designed around the concept that individuals and organizations should not need to repeat the work of automating the basic components of their operating system infrastructure.

Expanding upon this philosophy, SIMP also aims to take care of routine policy compliance to include NIST 800-53, FIPS 140-2, the DISA STIG, and the SCAP Security Guide.

By using the Puppet automation stack, SIMP is working toward the concept of a self-healing infrastructure that, when used with a consistent configuration management process, will allow users to have confidence that their systems not only start in compliance but remain in compliance over time.

Finally, SIMP has a goal of remaining flexible enough to properly maintain your operational infrastructure. To this end, where possible, the SIMP components are written to allow all security-related capabilities to be easily adjusted to meet the needs of individual applications.

Contents:

1. For The Impatient¶

1.1. What is SIMP?¶

The System Integrity Management Platform (SIMP) is an Open Source framework designed around the concept that individuals and organizations should not need to repeat the work of automating the basic components of their operating system infrastructure.

Expanding upon this philosophy, SIMP also aims to take care of routine policy compliance to include NIST 800-53, FIPS 140-2, the DISA STIG, and the SCAP Security Guide.

By using the Puppet automation stack, SIMP is working toward the concept of a self-healing infrastructure that, when used with a consistent configuration management process, will allow users to have confidence that their systems not only start in compliance but remain in compliance over time.

Finally, SIMP has a goal of remaining flexible enough to properly maintain your operational infrastructure. To this end, where possible, the SIMP components are written to allow all security-related capabilities to be easily adjusted to meet the needs of individual applications.

1.2. Diving Right In¶

The fastest way to get started with SIMP is to use the following guides, in this order:

2. SIMP 5.2.1-0 ¶

Contents

SIMP 5.2.1-0

This release is known to work with:

RHEL 7.2 x86_64

CentOS 7.0 1511 x86_64

This update is backwards-compatible for the SIMP 5.2 releases.

2.1. SIMP 6 is Coming ¶

Due to Puppet 3.X going EOL in December of 2016, the SIMP stack will be releasing SIMP 6 as the next major release. Among major changes:

SIMP 6 will use Puppet 4, which is distributed as a single RPM by the Puppet all-in-one (AIO) installer.

Starting with 6.0.0, the SIMP numbering scheme will follow Semantic Versioning 2.0.0.

6.0.0 and will support all operating systems under that numbering scheme henceforth.

2.2. Manual Changes Required for Pre-5.1.0 Upgrades ¶

Note

This only affects you if you did not have a separate partition for /tmp!

There were issues in the secure_mountpoints class that caused /tmp and /var/tmp to be mounted against the root filesystem. While the new code addresses this, it cannot determine if your system has been modified incorrectly in the past.
To fix the issue, you need to do the following:
- Unmount /var/tmp (may take multiple unmounts)
- Unmount /tmp (may take multiple unmounts)
- Remove the 'bind' entries for /tmp and /var/tmp from /etc/fstab
- Run puppet with the new code in place

2.2.1. SSSD¶

Warning

SSSD enforces password strength at login time! This means that, should you have old passwords that do not meet the present password policy on the host, you will not be able to authenticate with your old password!

2.3. Deprecations ¶

The simp-sysctl module will be deprecated in the 6.0.0 release of SIMP. Current users should migrate to using the augeasproviders_sysctl module provided with SIMP going forward.

2.4. Breaking Changes ¶

There were no breaking changes in this release.

2.5. Significant Updates ¶

2.6. Upgrade Guidance ¶

Detailed upgrade guidance can be found in the HOWTO Upgrade SIMP portion of the SIMP User Guide.

Warning

You must have at least 2.4GB of free RAM on your system to upgrade to this release.

Note

Upgrading from releases older than 5.0 is not supported.

2.7. Security Announcements ¶

2.7.1. CVEs Addressed¶

CVE-2016-5195
- Dirty COW - A privilege escalation vulnerability in the Linux Kernel

2.8. RPM Updates ¶

Package	Old Version	New Version
pupmod-cristifalcas-journald	N/A	0.2.2-2016
pupmod-elasticsearch-logstash	0.6.4-2016	0.6.5-2016
pupmod-simp-acpid	0.0.2-2016	0.0.3-2016
pupmod-simp-activemq	3.0.0-2016	3.0.1-2016
pupmod-simp-aide	4.1.1-2016	4.1.2-2016
pupmod-simp-apache	4.1.5-2016	4.1.7-2016
pupmod-simp-auditd	5.0.4-2016	5.1.1-2016
pupmod-simp-autofs	4.1.2-2016	4.1.4-2016
pupmod-simp-clamav	4.1.1-2016	4.1.2-2016
pupmod-simp-compliance_markup	1.0.0-0	1.0.2-2016
pupmod-simp-dhcp	4.1.1-2016	4.1.2-2016
pupmod-simp-dirtycow	N/A	1.0.1-2016
pupmod-simp-foreman	0.2.0-2016	0.2.2-2016
pupmod-simp-freeradius	5.0.2-2016	5.0.3-2016
pupmod-simp-ganglia	5.0.0-2016	5.0.1-2016
pupmod-simp-haveged	0.3.1-2016	0.3.2-2016
pupmod-simp-iptables	4.1.4-2016	4.1.5-2016
pupmod-simp-jenkins	4.1.0-2016	4.1.1-2016
pupmod-simp-krb5	5.0.6-2016	5.0.8-2016
pupmod-simp-libreswan	0.1.0-2016	0.1.2-2016
pupmod-simp-libvirt	4.1.1-2016	4.1.2-2016
pupmod-simp-logrotate	4.1.0-2016	4.1.1-2016
pupmod-simp-mcafee	4.1.1-2016	4.1.2-2016
pupmod-simp-mcollective	2.3.2-2016	2.4.0-2016
pupmod-simp-mozilla	4.1.1-2016	4.1.2-2016
pupmod-simp-named	4.3.1-2016	4.3.3-2016
pupmod-simp-network	4.1.1-2016	4.1.3-2016
pupmod-simp-nfs	4.5.2-2016	4.5.3-2016
pupmod-simp-nscd	5.0.1-2016	5.0.2-2016
pupmod-simp-ntpd	4.1.0-2016	4.1.1-2016
pupmod-simp-oddjob	1.0.0-2016	1.0.1-2016
pupmod-simp-openldap	4.1.8-2016	4.1.9-2016
pupmod-simp-openscap	4.2.1-2016	4.2.2-2016
pupmod-simp-pam	4.2.5-2016	4.2.6-2016
pupmod-simp-pki	4.2.3-2016	4.2.5-2016
pupmod-simp-polkit	4.1.0-2016	4.1.1-2016
pupmod-simp-postfix	4.1.3-2016	4.1.5-2016
pupmod-simp-postgresql	4.1.0-2016	4.1.2-2016
pupmod-simp-pupmod	6.0.5-2016	6.0.9-2016
pupmod-simp-rsync	4.2.2-2016	4.2.3-2016
pupmod-simp-rsyslog	5.1.0-2016	5.1.2-2016
pupmod-simp-selinux	1.0.3-2016	1.0.4-2016
pupmod-simp-simp	1.2.7-2016	1.2.10-2016
pupmod-simp-simp_elasticsearch	3.0.1-2016	3.0.3-2016
pupmod-simp-simp_grafana	0.1.0-2016	0.1.1-2016
pupmod-simp-simpcat	5.0.1-2016	5.0.2-2016
pupmod-simp-simplib	1.3.1-2016	1.3.4-2016
pupmod-simp-site	2.0.1-2016	2.0.2-2016
pupmod-simp-snmpd	4.1.0-2016	4.1.1-2016
pupmod-simp-ssh	4.1.10-2016	4.1.13-2016
pupmod-simp-sssd	4.1.3-2016	4.1.4-2016
pupmod-simp-stunnel	4.2.7-2016	4.2.9-2016
pupmod-simp-sudo	4.1.2-2016	4.1.3-2016
pupmod-simp-sudosh	4.1.1-2016	4.1.2-2016
pupmod-simp-svckill	1.1.3-2016	1.1.4-2016
pupmod-simp-sysctl	4.2.0-2016	4.2.1-2016
pupmod-simp-tcpwrappers	4.1.0-2016	4.1.1-2016
pupmod-simp-tftpboot	4.1.2-2016	4.1.3-2016
pupmod-simp-tpm	0.1.0-2016	0.2.0-2016
pupmod-simp-upstart	4.1.2-2016	4.1.3-2016
pupmod-simp-vnc	4.1.0-2016	4.1.1-2016
pupmod-simp-vsftpd	5.0.4-2016	5.0.7-2016
pupmod-simp-windowmanager	4.1.2-2016	4.1.3-2016
pupmod-simp-xinetd	2.1.0-2016	2.1.1-2016
pupmod-simp-xwindows	4.1.1-2016	4.1.2-2016
rubygem-simp-cli	1.0.20-0.el7	1.0.20-0.el7.centos
rubygem-simp-cli-doc	1.0.20-0.el7	1.0.20-0.el7.centos
simp	5.2.0-0	5.2.1-0
simp-bootstrap	5.3.2-0	5.3.4-0
simp-doc	5.2.0-0	N/A
simp-gpgkeys	2.0.0-3.el7	2.0.0-3.el7.centos
simp-rsync	5.1.0-3.el7	5.1.0-3.el7.centos
simp-rsync-clamav	5.1.0-3.el7	5.1.0-3.el7.centos
simp-utils	5.0.1-1	5.0.1-2

2.9. RPM Deprecations ¶

None

2.10. Fixed Bugs ¶

2.10.1. pupmod-simp-auditd¶

Updated to use a specific configuration parameter instead of the presence of configured syslog servers to determine whether or not to enable log forwarding

2.10.2. pupmod-simp-autofs¶

Updated the ::autofs::map::entry and ::autofs::map::master code to work safely with the simp cat module as well as properly ensuring that the autofs service is restarted when the content of one of the map files is changed.

2.10.3. pupmod-simp-ganglia¶

Fixed an invalid concat dependency for the $auth_user_file

2.10.4. pupmod-simp-named¶

Fixed chroot compatibility with EL 7

2.10.5. pupmod-simp-network¶

Updated to fix issues with Puppet 4

2.10.6. pupmod-simp-nfs¶

Changed the permissions on /etc/exports to 644 which was validated to meet existing security requirements
- Vagrant was dying if it could not read this file as a regular user

2.10.7. pupmod-simp-openldap¶

Multiple URIs in Hiera entries were not written into ldap.conf
The DEREF configuration value in ldap.conf was not populated correctly

2.10.8. pupmod-simp-pupmod¶

Properly redirect STDERR in puppetagent_cron.erb
Fully expanded the pupmod::ssldir parameter so that $vardir no longer causes issues when showing up in an auditd configuration file
Corrected an issue where the gem-home parameter in puppetserver.conf was malformed

2.10.9. pupmod-simp-rsyslog¶

Enabled forwarding of journald messages to syslog since EL 7.2 disabled this by default
Fixed an issue where rules that were no longer managed by the module were not correctly purged

2.10.10. pupmod-simp-simp¶

Ensure that the netlabel_tools package is installed for the netlabel service
Added the Elasticsearch and Grafana GPG keys to the YUM configuration

2.10.11. pupmod-simp-simplib¶

Fixed the validate_net_list() function when using regex strings against IPv6 addresses
Added support for nss-myhostname which fixes issues with hostname lookups on EL 7+ systems
Added a puppet_settings Fact that returns a Hash of all settings on the Puppet client system
Fix issues with calls to the Service['named'] resource

2.10.12. simp-bootstrap¶

Changed trusted['clientcert'] to trusted['certname'] in hiera.yaml

2.10.13. simp-cli¶

Ensure that STDERR is properly discarded during shell redirects

2.10.14. simp-core¶

Ensured that unpack_dvd and migrate_to_environments properly squashed STDERR
Corrected the pupmod-simp-mcollective version that was being built

2.10.15. simp-utils¶

Removed the dependency on pssh

2.10.16. DVD¶

Removed the first call to fips=1 from the kickstart file since it was causing issues with some systems

2.11. New Features ¶

2.11.1. pupmod-cristifalcas-journald¶

Added an upstream journald management module since EL7 needs tweaking to the journal on many systems.

2.11.2. pupmod-simp-auditd¶

Added the syslog priority and facility options to auditd::config::audisp::syslog

2.11.3. pupmod-simp-dirtycow¶

Adds a notification message if your system is affected by the Dirty COW CVE
Will not attempt to automatically upgrade your kernel!

2.11.4. pupmod-simp-rsyslog¶

Enabled forwarding of journald logs to syslog

2.11.5. pupmod-simp-simplib¶

Added a puppet_settings Fact that returns a Hash of all settings on the Puppet client system

2.11.6. pupmod-simp-tpm¶

Changed the default Storage Root Key password default to null for PKCS#11 and Trusted Boot
Added a fact ima_log_size that returns the byte size of the IMA hash log in securityfs
Added the ability to edit the default IMA policy
- Be very careful if using this in production

2.11.7. simp-bootstrap¶

Mapped NIST 800-171 and ISO/IEC 27001 into the SIMP compliance_map baseline

2.11.8. simp-doc¶

Added TPM management documentation
Updated the ELG stack documentation
Another set of usability updates to the documentation, mostly around building the system from scratch

2.11.9. DVD¶

Added iversion to the default ISO mountpoints that make sense for IMA measurement

2.12. Known Bugs ¶

If you are running libvirtd, when svckill runs it will always attempt to kill dnsmasq unless you are deliberately trying to run the dnsmasq service. This does not actually kill the service but is, instead, an error of the startup script and causes no damage to your system.

3. SIMP Getting Started Guide¶

Welcome to SIMP!

3.1. Introduction¶

3.1.1. What is SIMP?¶

The System Integrity Management Platform (SIMP) is an Open Source framework designed around the concept that individuals and organizations should not need to repeat the work of automating the basic components of their operating system infrastructure.

Expanding upon this philosophy, SIMP also aims to take care of routine policy compliance to include NIST 800-53, FIPS 140-2, the DISA STIG, and the SCAP Security Guide.

By using the Puppet automation stack, SIMP is working toward the concept of a self-healing infrastructure that, when used with a consistent configuration management process, will allow users to have confidence that their systems not only start in compliance but remain in compliance over time.

Finally, SIMP has a goal of remaining flexible enough to properly maintain your operational infrastructure. To this end, where possible, the SIMP components are written to allow all security-related capabilities to be easily adjusted to meet the needs of individual applications.

3.1.2. Getting Started¶

This document provides a quick overview of how to get started with building and setting up your SIMP environment.

Please be aware that this is a snapshot in time and, while it should remain accurate, if you find any issues, please check the SIMP How-To Articles on the SIMP Confluence Page.

Once you’re done setting up your environment, you should proceed to the SIMP User Guide for utilizing SIMP to its full potential.

If issues still remain, please drop us a line on the SIMP Development Mailing List.

Note

The fastest method for getting started with SIMP is to follow the Installing SIMP From A Repository guide.

This is the method that you want to use if you are installing on any sort of existing system.

Note

If you need to build an ISO, you should follow the Building SIMP From Tarball guide.

3.2. Known OS Compatibility¶

SIMP 5.2.1-0
- CentOS 7.0
  - ISO #1: CentOS-7-x86_64-DVD-1511.iso
  - Checksum: 907e5755f824c5848b9c8efbb484f3cd945e93faa024bad6ba875226f9683b16
- RedHat 7.2
  - ISO #1: rhel-server-7.2-x86_64-dvd.iso
  - Checksum: 03f3a0291634335f6995534d829bd21ffaa0d000004dfeb1b2fb81052d64a4d5
SIMP 4.3.0-0
- CentOS 6.8
  - ISO #1: CentOS-6.8-x86_64-bin-DVD1.iso
  - Checksum: 1dda55622614a8b43b448a72f87d6cb7f79de1eff49ee8c5881a7d9db28d4e35
  - ISO #2: CentOS-6.8-x86_64-bin-DVD2.iso
  - Checksum: 0aba869427b4ce04e100d72744daf7fea1f7be2e4be56b658095bd9e99e04e6d
- RedHat 6.8
  - ISO #1: rhel-server-6.8-x86_64-dvd.iso
  - Checksum: d35fd1af20f6adef9b11b46c2534ae8b6e18de7754889e2b51808b436dff2804
SIMP 5.1.X
- CentOS 7.0
  - ISO #1: CentOS-7-x86_64-DVD-1511.iso
  - Checksum: 907e5755f824c5848b9c8efbb484f3cd945e93faa024bad6ba875226f9683b16
- RedHat 7.2
  - ISO #1: rhel-server-7.2-x86_64-dvd.iso
  - Checksum: 03f3a0291634335f6995534d829bd21ffaa0d000004dfeb1b2fb81052d64a4d5
SIMP 4.2.X
- CentOS 6.8
  - ISO #1: CentOS-6.8-x86_64-bin-DVD1.iso
  - Checksum: 1dda55622614a8b43b448a72f87d6cb7f79de1eff49ee8c5881a7d9db28d4e35
  - ISO #2: CentOS-6.8-x86_64-bin-DVD2.iso
  - Checksum: 0aba869427b4ce04e100d72744daf7fea1f7be2e4be56b658095bd9e99e04e6d
- RedHat 6.8
  - ISO #1: rhel-server-6.8-x86_64-dvd.iso
  - Checksum: d35fd1af20f6adef9b11b46c2534ae8b6e18de7754889e2b51808b436dff2804

3.3. Installing SIMP From A Repository¶

Using the official SIMP YUM repositories is the simplest method for getting up and running with a SIMP system. If you are using a virtual infrastructure, such as AWS, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud, or your own internal VM stack, this is the method that you will almost definitely want to use.

Note

This method does not modify your system’s partitioning scheme or encryption scheme to meet any regulatory policies. If you want an example of what that should look like either see the SIMP Server ISO Installation Guide or check out the Kickstart files in the simp-core Git repository.

3.3.1. Enable EPEL¶

$ sudo yum install epel-release -y
$ sudo yum install pygpgme yum-utils

3.3.2. Install The SIMP-Project Repository¶

Add the following to /etc/yum.repos.d/simp-project.repo, replacing 7 with the appropriate version of EL and 5 with the appropriate version of SIMP. EL 7 with SIMP 5.X is shown below.

If you don’t know what versions map together, please see the SIMP Version Guide.

[simp-project_5_X]
name=simp-project_5_X
baseurl=https://packagecloud.io/simp-project/5_X/el/7/$basearch
gpgcheck=1
enabled=1
gpgkey=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/NationalSecurityAgency/SIMP/master/GPGKEYS/RPM-GPG-KEY-SIMP
sslverify=1
sslcacert=/etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt
metadata_expire=300

[simp-project_5_X-source]
name=simp-project_5_X-source
baseurl=https://packagecloud.io/simp-project/5_X/el/7/SRPMS
gpgcheck=1
enabled=0
gpgkey=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/NationalSecurityAgency/SIMP/master/GPGKEYS/RPM-GPG-KEY-SIMP
sslverify=1
sslcacert=/etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt
metadata_expire=300

3.3.3. Install The SIMP-project_dependencies Repository¶

Note

The repository may contain items from external vendors, most notably Puppet, Inc. and EPEL but may also contain non-SIMP project files that have been compiled for distribution.

Add the following to /etc/yum.repos.d/simp-project_dependencies.repo, replacing 7 with the appropriate version of EL and 5 with the appropriate version of SIMP. EL 7 with SIMP 5.X is shown below.

If you don’t know what versions map together, please see the SIMP Version Guide.

Note

The whitespace and alignment shown before the additional gpgkey values must be preserved

[simp-project_5_X_dependencies]
name=simp-project_5_1_X_dependencies
baseurl=https://packagecloud.io/simp-project/5_X_Dependencies/el/7/$basearch
gpgcheck=1
enabled=1
gpgkey=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/NationalSecurityAgency/SIMP/master/GPGKEYS/RPM-GPG-KEY-SIMP
       https://yum.puppetlabs.com/RPM-GPG-KEY-puppetlabs
       https://getfedora.org/static/352C64E5.txt
sslverify=1
sslcacert=/etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt
metadata_expire=300

[simp-project_5_X_dependencies-source]
name=simp-project_5_X_dependencies-source
baseurl=https://packagecloud.io/simp-project/5_X_Dependencies/el/7/SRPMS
gpgcheck=1
enabled=0
gpgkey=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/NationalSecurityAgency/SIMP/master/GPGKEYS/RPM-GPG-KEY-SIMP
       https://yum.puppetlabs.com/RPM-GPG-KEY-puppetlabs
       https://getfedora.org/static/352C64E5.txt
sslverify=1
sslcacert=/etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt
metadata_expire=300

3.3.4. Rebuild The Yum Cache¶

$ sudo yum makecache

3.3.5. Install SIMP¶

$ sudo yum install -y simp

3.3.6. Modify Yum URLs¶

Set the following variables to repositories of your choosing in /etc/puppet/environments/production/hieradata/default.yaml

# Full URL to a YUM repo for Operating System packages
simp::yum::os_update_url: 'http://mirror.centos.org/centos/$releasever/os/$basearch/'
# Full URL to a YUM repo for SIMP packages
simp::yum::simp_update_url: 'https://packagecloud.io/simp-project/5_X/el/7/$basearch'

3.3.7. SIMP Config¶

Run simp config:

$ simp config

Note

If you intend to use FIPS, set use_fips=true during simp config and follow the Enable FIPS instructions after config is complete. Otherwise, set it to false and skip Enable FIPS.

3.3.8. Enable FIPS¶

$ rm -rf /var/lib/puppet/ssl
$ yum-config-manager --enable base
$ yum install dracut-fips
$ dracut -f
$ reboot now

3.3.9. SIMP Bootstrap¶

$ simp bootstrap

3.3.10. Clients¶

Use the runpuppet script from the newly created SIMP server to bootstrap your clients.

Note

This would be the general technique that you would use to auto-bootstrap your clients via user-data scripts in cloud environments.

Be ready to sign your client credentials as systems check in with the server!

$ curl http://<puppet.server.fqdn>/ks/runpuppet | bash

3.4. Building a SIMP ISO¶

If you want the full SIMP experience where you maximize compliance with the widest selection of targeted standards, you’ll want to build and install from a SIMP ISO.

The following guides provide an overview of the supported build methods.

Warning

Prior to starting any build method, you will need to ensure that you follow the instructions in Environment Preparation.

3.4.1. Environment Preparation¶

3.4.1.1. Getting Started¶

Note

You can skip setting up mock if you are generating an ISO from a release tarball!

3.4.1.1.1. Required Packages¶

Before we proceed, you’ll want to make sure that you have a few RPM packages installed on your system and that your build system has access to the Internet. If you’re using Enterprise Linux as your build system, you will need to enable EPEL for your system prior to proceeding.

3.4.1.1.1.1. Required RPMs¶

# Installing from EL 6:

  $ sudo yum install -y https://dl.fedoraproject.org/pub/epel/epel-release-latest-6.noarch.rpm
  $ sudo yum install -y augeas-devel createrepo genisoimage git gnupg2 \
      libicu-devel libxml2 libxml2-devel libxslt libxslt-devel \
      mock rpm-sign rpmdevtools clamav gcc gcc-c++ ruby-devel

# Installing from EL 7:

  $ sudo yum install -y https://dl.fedoraproject.org/pub/epel/epel-release-latest-7.noarch.rpm
  $ sudo yum install -y augeas-devel createrepo genisoimage git gnupg2 \
      libicu-devel libxml2 libxml2-devel libxslt libxslt-devel \
      mock rpm-sign rpmdevtools clamav-update gcc gcc-c++ ruby-devel

# Installing from Fedora 23/24:

  $ sudo dnf install -y augeas-devel createrepo genisoimage git gnupg \
      libicu-devel libxml2 libxml2-devel libxslt libxslt-devel \
      mock rpm-sign rpmdevtools clamav-update gcc gcc-c++ ruby-devel

Warning

Please use a non-root user for building SIMP!

Note

The SIMP build generates various keys and does quite a bit of package signing. As such, your system mustto be able to keep its entropy pool full at all times. If you check /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail and it shows a number below 1024, then you should either make sure that rngd is running and pointed to a hardware source (preferred) or install and use haveged.

3.4.1.2. Set Up Ruby¶

We highly recommend using RVM to make it easy to develop and test against several versions of Ruby at once without damaging your underlying Operating System.

3.4.1.2.1. RVM Installation¶

The following commands, taken from the RVM Installation Page can be used to install RVM for your user.

$ gpg2 --keyserver hkp://keys.gnupg.net --recv-keys \
    409B6B1796C275462A1703113804BB82D39DC0E3
$ \curl -sSL https://get.rvm.io | bash -s stable --ruby=2.1.9
$ source ~/.rvm/scripts/rvm

3.4.1.2.2. Set the Default Ruby¶

You’ll want to use Ruby 2.1.9 as your default RVM for SIMP development.

$ rvm use --default 2.1.9

Note

Once this is done, you can simply type rvm use 2.1.9.

3.4.1.2.3. Bundler¶

The next important tool is Bundler. Bundler makes it easy to install Gems and their dependencies. It gets this information from the Gemfile found in the root of each repo. The Gemfile contains all of the gems required for working with the repo. More info on Bundler can be found on the Bundler Rationale Page and more information on Rubygems can be found at Rubygems.org.

$ rvm all do gem install bundler

3.4.1.3. Configure Mock¶

Note

If you plan on just building from a tarball, you can skip this section.

Building SIMP from scratch makes heavy use of Mock to create clean packages. As such, you need to ensure that your system is ready.

3.4.1.3.1. Add Your User to the Mock Group¶

$ getent group mock > /dev/null || sudo newgrp mock
$ sudo usermod -a -G mock $USER

You may need to run newgrp or logout and back in for the group settings to take effect.

3.4.1.4. Prepare to Work¶

You are now ready to begin development!

Clone simp-core:

$ git clone https://github.com/simp/simp-core
$ cd simp-core

Check out your desired branch of SIMP:

To check out a stable SIMP release, check out a tag:

$ git fetch --tags
$ git checkout tags/5.2.0-0

To check out an unstable SIMP release, check out the latest 5.X or 4.X HEAD:

$ git checkout 5.1.X
$ git checkout 4.2.X

Note

SIMP >= 5.2.X, >= 4.3.X are still developed on the 5.1.X and 4.2.X branches, respectively. All future development will be made on the master branch.

Warning

Any branch that is not tagged with a git tag should be treated as unstable.

Grab gem dependencies:

$ bundle install

3.4.2. Building SIMP From Tarball¶

Note

Building SIMP from a pre-built tarball is the fastest method for getting a known stable build of a SIMP ISO and should be preferred over other methods.

3.4.2.1. Getting Started¶

Warning

Please have your environment prepared as specified by Environment Preparation before continuing.

Note

You do not need mock on your system if you are generating an ISO based on the SIMP Tarball!

Download the CentOS/RedHat installation media:

SIMP_5.X: CentOS-7-x86_64-DVD-1511.iso

SIMP_4.X: DVD1 and DVD2 of the CentOS 6.8 release. For example, CentOS-6.8-x86_64-bin-DVD1.iso

Download the SIMP release tarball, found on our BinTray artifacts repository.

Download the latest tarball according to your needs. If you are not sure what version you need, check the SIMP Version Guide.

The latest 5.2.0-0 release (for CentOS 7)

The latest 4.3.0-0 release (for CentOS 6)

3.4.2.2. Generating The ISO!¶

Change into the simp-core directory and make sure you are on the correct branch for your target SIMP version:

$ cd simp-core
$ git checkout 5.1.X # for SIMP 5 and CentOS 7
$ git checkout 4.2.X # for SIMP 4 and CentOS 6

Run bundle install to make sure that all of the build tools and dependencies are installed and up to date:

$ bundle install

Make sure all of the source materials that were downloaded above are in your current working directory.

Run the build:auto rake task to create a bootable ISO:

Note

Do not add any whitespace before or after the commas. This is an artiface of using rake.

$ bundle exec rake build:auto[<SIMP version>,<directory containing source ISOs>,<path to tarball>]

For example:

$ # for SIMP 5 and CentOS 7
$ bundle exec rake build:auto[5.1.X,.,SIMP-DVD-CentOS-5.2.0-0.tar.gz]

$ # for SIMP 4 and CentOS 6
$ bundle exec rake build:auto[4.2.X,.,SIMP-DVD-CentOS-4.3.0-0.tar.gz]

Once the process completes, you should have a bootable SIMP ISO ready for installation!

3.4.3. Building SIMP From Source¶

3.4.3.1. Getting Started¶

Please have your environment prepared as specified by Environment Preparation before continuing.

Download the CentOS/RedHat installation media:

SIMP_5.X: CentOS-7-x86_64-DVD-1511.iso

SIMP_4.X: DVD1 and DVD2 of the CentOS 6.8 release. For example, CentOS-6.8-x86_64-bin-DVD1.iso

3.4.3.2. Generating The ISO!¶

Change into the simp-core directory.

$ cd simp-core

Check out your desired branch of SIMP:

To check out a stable SIMP release, check out a tag:

$ git checkout tags/5.2.0-0

To check out an unstable SIMP release, check out the latest 5.X or 4.X HEAD:

$ git checkout 5.1.X
$ git checkout 4.2.X

Note

SIMP >= 5.2.X, >= 4.3.X are still developed on the 5.1.X and 4.2.X branches, respectively. We have not migrated our development to new branches.

Run bundle to make sure that all of the build tools and dependencies are installed and up to date:

$ bundle install

Make sure all of the source materials that were downloaded above are in your current working directory.

Run the build:auto rake task to create a bootable ISO using the following template:

$ bundle exec rake build:auto[<SIMP version>,<Directory containing install media>]

For example:

$ # for SIMP 5 and CentOS 7
$ bundle exec rake build:auto[5.1.X,.]

$ # for SIMP 4 and CentOS 6
$ bundle exec rake build:auto[4.2.X,.]

Once the process completes, you should have a bootable SIMP ISO ready for installation!

3.4.4. Building SIMP via Rake¶

The simp-core acceptance tests provide a method for building the SIMP ISOs directly from online resources and is the method that the SIMP team uses to ensure clean ISO builds.

Note

This method is slow but requires the least amount of modification to your build system.

Warning

This method will only work on simp-core repositories that respond to rake build:auto.

3.4.4.1. Getting Started¶

Warning

Please have your environment prepared as specified by Environment Preparation before continuing.

Note

You do not need mock on your system if you are using this method.

Important

You must have Internet accessibility for this method to work!

3.4.4.2. Install Either Docker or VirtualBox¶

This build method relies on Beaker from Puppet, Inc. and can use either Docker or VirtualBox as the build back-end. The Docker method is faster but the VirtualBox method is far easier to debug if issues arise.

You must have a working Vagrant installation to use this method.

Note

Make sure that you use the Vagrant installation directly from the Vagrant Homepage.

3.4.4.3. Download the Appropriate EL ISO¶

You will need to download the correct EL ISO for the version of SIMP that you are trying to build. If you have doubts, check the build/release_mappings.yaml file.

The ISOs should be downloaded into the spec/fixtures/ISO directory (that you create).

3.4.4.4. Required Environment Variables¶

If you simply run the rake commands, the system will attempt to build all versions of SIMP that are coded into the tests.

If you want to build a specific version of SIMP, you must use the following environment variables.

SIMP_BEAKER_build_version: The git branch or tag that you want to build
SIMP_BEAKER_build_map: The release_mapper.yaml key that you want to use. Defaults to SIMP_BEAKER_build_version if not specified.

3.4.4.5. Build Using Docker¶

The Docker method is the faster of the two methods but can make debugging quite difficult if something goes wrong.

To build the suite via Docker run the following command:

$ rake beaker:suites[default]

3.4.4.6. Build Using VirtualBox¶

If you wish to build using VirtualBox simply run the following command:

$ rake beaker:suites[iso_vbox]

3.4.4.7. Results¶

The ISOs from the rake commands will be placed under a SIMP_ISO/rake_generated/<branch>/<timestamp> directory structure.

3.5. SIMP Server ISO Installation Guide¶

Contents:

3.5.1. Introduction¶

This chapter will walk a user through the process of installing the SIMP server.

For client installation, please see the SIMP User Guide.

Warning

There are default passwords present on the system that should be changed prior to deploying the system.

Please make sure that you change these passwords!

For a list of the passwords, see SIMP Default Passwords and Settings

3.5.2. SIMP Server Installation¶

This chapter provides guidance on installing, configuring, and bootstrapping the SIMP server using the SIMP Utility, simp.

3.5.2.1. System Requirements¶

SIMP scales well, but how much depends on a number of factors, including the number of nodes, the processor speed, the total memory, and the complexity of the manifests. The following are the minimal system requirements for the SIMP server:

Central Processing Unit (CPU) : 2 Cores
Random Access Memory (RAM) : 2.2 GB
Hard Disk Drive (HDD) : 50 GB

3.5.2.2. Using the SIMP Utility¶

In these instructions we will be using the config and bootstrap commands of the SIMP Utility, simp. The SIMP Utility does not assist users through the entire configuration process; however, it does make the initial configuration easier and more repeatable.

Note

For a list of the commands simp provides, type simp help. Type simp help <Command> for more information on a specific command.

3.5.2.3. SIMP Default Passwords and Settings¶

Below is a table containing the default passwords found on a basic SIMP server upon install.

Important

All default passwords must be changed during the initial configuration process.

Utility	Password
Grub	GrubPassword
Root User	RootPassword
Simp User	UserPassword

Table: SIMP Default Passwords

A table of variables that can be changed/defined during installation is located in Installation Variables. Review this if you are unfamiliar with SIMP, as you will be prompted for the values for these variables during the SIMP server installation.

3.5.2.4. Preparing the SIMP Server Environment¶

Boot the system and ensure the SIMP ISO is selected.

If you do not have a SIMP ISO, see HOWTO Build a Bootable DVD from the SIMP tarball.

Press Enter to run the standard SIMP install, or choose from the customized options list.
- For a detailed description of the the disk encryption enabled via the simp_disk_crypt boot option, see Disk Encryption.
When the installation is complete, the system will restart automatically.
Change the root user password
1. At the console, log on as root and type the default password shown in Table 2.1.
2. Type the default password again when prompted for the (current) UNIX password.
3. Type a new password when prompted for the New Password. Retype the password when prompted.
Change the simp user password
1. At the console, log on as simp and type the default password shown in Table 2.1.
2. Type the default password again when prompted for the (current) UNIX password.
3. Type a new password when prompted for the New Password. Retype the password when prompted.

3.5.2.5. Installing the SIMP Server¶

Important

Correct time across all systems is important to the proper functioning of SIMP and Puppet in general.

If a user has trouble connecting to the Puppet server and errors regarding certificate validation appear, check the Puppet server and client times to ensure they are synchronized.

Warning

Keep in mind as the installation process begins that Puppet does not work well with capital letters in host names. Therefore, they should not be used.

Log on as simp and run su - to gain root access.
Type simp config

Type simp config -a <Config File> to load a previously generated configuration, instead of being prompted for settings. This is the option to run for systems that will be rebuilt often.

For a list of additional options, type simp help config.

Configure the system as prompted.

simp config will present you with a recommendation for each variable that may be derived from existing OS settings. To keep a recommended value, press Enter. Otherwise, enter your desired value.

A list of the variables that are set by simp config is contained in Installation Variables.

A description of the installation preparation actions taken by simp config, in addition to the generation of a SIMP configuration file, is contained in simp config Actions.

Note

Once simp config has been run, a SIMP configuration file with all your settings is written to /etc/puppet/environments/simp/hieradata/simp_def.yaml and also archived in /root/.simp/simp_conf.yaml.

Type simp bootstrap

Note

If progress bars are of equal length and the bootstrap finishes quickly, a problem has occurred. This is most likely due to an error in SIMP configuration. Refer to the previous step and make sure that all configuration options are correct.

Type reboot

3.5.2.6. Performing Post-installation Setup on the SIMP Server¶

Log on as root
Run puppet for the first time. Errors will appear for DHCP. These can be safely ignored at this stage.

Type: puppet agent -t
Copy CentOS RHEL_MAJOR_MINOR_VERSION ISO(s) to the server and unpack using the unpack_dvd utility. This creates a new tree under /var/www/yum/CentOS.

Type: unpack_dvd CentOS-RHEL_MAJOR_MINOR_VERSION- *####*-x86_64-Everything.iso
Update your system using yum. The updates applied will be dependent on what ISO you initially used.

Type: yum clean all; yum makecache
Run puppet. Ignore the same DHCP errors:

Type: puppet agent -t
Reboot your system:

Type reboot

3.5.3. Disk Encryption¶

The default ISO and kickstart files in SIMP now encrypt the first physical volume if the simp_disk_crypt option is provided at the boot command line.

Warning

The system is set to automatically decrypt at boot! This means that the password is embedded in the initrd file.

Note

The /boot directory is not encrypted, since that would prevent the system from booting automatically.

3.5.3.1. Method¶

When enabled, SIMP implements disk encryption, with automatic decryption, so that users have the option to use their own keys in the future. Alternatively, users may remove the system local keys and require that a password be entered at each boot.

The primary goal of providing automatic decryption was to give users a clean and seamless experience when using the initial system. It is understood that this is not best practice since automatic decryption of the disks requires the system to embed the password files in the system initrd.

Disk encryption was not enabled by default for two reasons. The first is that it can take an unacceptable amount of time to build a system if enough entropy is not present. The second is that a lot of hardware contains the ability to encrypt the disk at that level. If this is present, the utility of a second layer of disk encryption is not necessarily warranted or a good idea.

3.5.3.2. Implementation¶

The system keys are referenced in /etc/crypttab and, by default, reside at /etc/.cryptcreds. At build time, these files are copied into all initrd files present on the system. This ensures that all kernels can successfully boot the system.

The /etc/dracut.conf file is also updated to ensure that any new kernel loads will be able to boot successfully.

Warning

The /etc/.cryptcreds file is encrypted when the system is off. However, a copy is in the unencrypted initrd files in /boot and should not be considered secure from physical access to the raw disk image.

Note

Please be aware that all characters in the /etc/.cryptcreds file are part of the password. The lack of a trailing newline is very important.

3.5.3.3. Replacing the Current Password¶

Note

The underlying system uses LUKS, so any usage outside of this document should refer to the LUKS implementation that matches your system version.

To change the password, you will need to perform the following steps.

Back up the original password file

If something goes amiss, you’re seriously going to need this

Get the UUID of your partition

This will be in the /etc/crypttab file. You’ll want the entire UUID=<uuid> string

Create the new password

Remember that this needs to be exactly what you will use. If you ever expect to type this at the command line, don’t forget to strip your trailing spaces.

#!/usr/bin/python

import sys
import random
import string

# The length of the new password
length = 1024

# What the password should consist of
charset = string.lowercase+string.uppercase+string.digits

passfile = open('/etc/.cryptcreds.new','w')

passfile.write("".join(random.choice(charset) for i in range(length)))

Update the key

There is a faster way to do this in EL 7, but this method works on both systems

$ cryptsetup luksAddKey --key-slot 1 --key-file /etc/.cryptcreds UUID=<uuid> /etc/.cryptcreds.new
$ cryptsetup luksKillSlot --key-file /etc/.cryptcreds 0

$ cryptsetup luksAddKey --key-slot 0 --key-file /etc/.cryptcreds.new UUID=<uuid> /etc/.cryptcreds.new
$ cryptsetup luksKillSlot --key-file /etc/.cryptcreds.new 1

# Only do this step if the previous steps succeeded!
$ mv /etc/.cryptcreds.new /etc/.cryptcreds

Update your initrd files

You want to make sure to update all of your initrd files since you’ll want to be able to boot from any kernel.
for x in `ls -d /lib/modules/*`; do
  installed_kernel=`basename $x`
  dracut -f "/boot/initramfs-${installed_kernel}.img" $installed_kernel
done

3.5.3.4. Removing the Password File¶

If you wish to remove the password file from your system, you will need to perform the following steps:

Back up the password file!

If you lose this, you won’t be able to get into your system after reboot

Using your favorite text editor, remove the install_items line in /etc/dracut.conf that contains the reference to /etc/.cryptcreds
Remove the /etc/.cryptcreds file from the system
Update your initrd files

You want to make sure to update all of your initrd files since you’ll want to be able to boot from any kernel.
for x in `ls -d /lib/modules/*`; do
  installed_kernel=`basename $x`
  dracut -f "/boot/initramfs-${installed_kernel}.img" $installed_kernel
done

3.6. Installation Miscellany¶

3.6.1. Installation Variables¶

This section describes the list of variables that are configurable during the install. These variables are written to /etc/puppet/environments/simp/hieradata/simp_def.yaml by simp config and are derived from user input.

Description	Variable	Category
Enable FIPS-140-2 compliance; true or false	use_fips	FIPS
Network interface to use	network::interface	NETWORK
Whether to set up the network interface; true or false	network::setup_nic	NETWORK
Whether to use DHCP for the network; dhcp to enable DHCP, static otherwise	dhcp	NETWORK
FQDN of server	hostname	NETWORK
IP address of server	ipaddress	NETWORK
Netmask of the system	netmask	NETWORK
Default gateway	gateway	NETWORK
List of DNS servers for the managed hosts	dns::servers	DNS
Search domain for DNS	dns::search	DNS
Subnet used for clients managed by the puppet server	client_nets	PUPPET
NTP servers	ntpd::servers	NTP
IP address of primary log server	log_servers	RSYSLOG
IP address of failover log server	failover_log_server	RSYSLOG
Yum server for simp modules	simp::yum::servers	YUM
Whether to use the audit daemon; true or false	use_auditd	SYSTEM
Whether to use the iptables daemon; true or false	use_iptables	SYSTEM
Default system run level; 1-5	simplib::runlevel	SYSTEM
SELINUX mode to use; enforcing, permissive, or disabled	selinux::ensure	SYSTEM
Whether to set a GRUB password on the server; true or false	set_grub_password	GRUB
GRUB password hash	grub::password	GRUB
Whether puppet server will be a yum server; true or false	is_master_yum_server	YUM
FQDN of the puppet server	puppet::server	PUPPET
Puppet servers IP address	puppet::server::ip	PUPPET
FQDN of Puppet Certificate Authority (CA)	puppet::ca	PUPPET
Port Puppet CA will listen on	puppet::ca_port	PUPPET
DNS name of puppet database server	puppetdb::master::config::puppetdb_server	PUPPET
Port used by the puppet database server	puppetdb::master::config::puppetdb_port	PUPPET
Whether to use LDAP; true or false	use_ldap	PUPPET
LDAP Server Base Distinguished Name	ldap::base_dn	LDAP
LDAP Bind Distinguished Name	ldap::bind_dn	LDAP
LDAP Bind password	ldap::bind_pw	LDAP
LDAP Bind password hash	ldap::bind_hash	LDAP
LDAP Sync Distinguished Name	ldap::sync_dn	LDAP
LDAP Sync password	ldap::sync_pw	LDAP
LDAP Sync password hash	ldap::sync_hash	LDAP
LDAP root Distinguished Name	ldap::root_dn	LDAP
LDAP root password hash	ldap::root_hash	LDAP
LDAP master URI	ldap::master	LDAP
List of OpenLDAP server URIs	ldap::uri	LDAP
List of SSSD domains	ldap::master	SYSTEM
Root location of files to be distributed via rsync	rsync::base	RSYNC
Rsync server; typically 127.0.0.1 for rsync over stunnel, which is the default protocol stack for this capability	rsync::server	RSYNC
Maximum rsync timeout in seconds	rsync::timeout	RSYNC

3.6.2. simp config Actions¶

In addition to creating simp_defs.yaml, simp config also performs a limited set of actions in order to prepare the system for bootstrapping.

Category	Actions Performed
FIPS	When the user selects to enable FIPS, `simp config` will set the Puppet digest algorithm to sha256 to prevent any Puppet-related actions executed by `simp config` from using MD5 checksums. Note that this is not all that must be done to enable FIPS. The complete set of actions required to to enable FIPS is handled by `simp bootstrap`.
Network	When the user selects to configure the network interface, `simp config` uses Puppet to set the network interface parameters in system networking files and to bring up the interface. `simp config` sets the hostname.
GRUB	When the user selects to set the GRUB password `simp config` will set the password in `/etc/grub.conf`.
Certificates	If no certificates for the host are found in `/etc/puppet/environments/simp/keydist`, `simp config` will use the FakeCA to generate certificates needed by SIMP for the host. These certificates are independent of the certificates managed by Puppet, itself.
System Hiera	If a hosts yaml file in `/etc/puppet/environments/simp/hieradata/hosts` does not already exist, `simp config` will create one from a SIMP template.
YUM Update	`simp config` updates the appropriate YUM Updates repository contained at `/srv/www/yum/OSTYPE/MAJORRELEASE/ARCH`.
Puppet	Updates `/etc/puppet/autosign.conf`. Updates `/etc/puppet/puppet.conf`, after creating a backup of the existing file. This update will include FIPS-related settings, as appropriate. Updates `/etc/hosts` to ensure puppet server entries exist.
LDAP	`simp config` adds or removes the `simp::ldap_server` setting from the hosts YAML file in `/etc/puppet/environments/simp/hieradata/hosts`, based on whether the user opts to use or not use LDAP, respectively.

4. SIMP User Guide¶

Contents:

4.1. Introduction¶

This chapter will walk a user through instructions on administering a SIMP system, including the processes for managing clients and users.

4.1.1. Level of Knowledge¶

SIMP is designed for use by system administrators or users with a strong background using Linux operating systems. The core applications that make up SIMP and require prerequisite knowledge are:

Puppet - 3.7 or later
Domain Name System (DNS) - BIND 9
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) - Internet Systems Consortium (ISC) DHCP
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) - OpenLDAP
RedHat Kickstart (including all tools behind it) - Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP), PXELinux, etc.
Apache
Yellowdog Updater, Modified (YUM)
Rsyslog Version 3+
Internet Protocol Tables (IPtables) (Basic knowledge of the rules)
Auditd (Basic knowledge of how the daemon works)
Advanced Intrusion Detection Environment (AIDE) (Basic knowledge of the rules)
Basic X.509-based PKI Key Management

SIMP does as much initial setup and configuration of these tools as possible. However, without at least some understanding, you will be unable to tailor a SIMP system to fit the desired environment. A general understanding of how to control and manipulate these tools from the command line interface (CLI) will be necessary, as SIMP does not come stock with a graphical user interface (GUI).

Knowledge of scripting and Ruby programming will also help to further customize a SIMP install but is not required for routine use.

4.1.2. SIMP Defined¶

The System Integrity Management Platform (SIMP) is an Open Source framework designed around the concept that individuals and organizations should not need to repeat the work of automating the basic components of their operating system infrastructure.

Expanding upon this philosophy, SIMP also aims to take care of routine policy compliance to include NIST 800-53, FIPS 140-2, the DISA STIG, and the SCAP Security Guide.

By using the Puppet automation stack, SIMP is working toward the concept of a self-healing infrastructure that, when used with a consistent configuration management process, will allow users to have confidence that their systems not only start in compliance but remain in compliance over time.

Finally, SIMP has a goal of remaining flexible enough to properly maintain your operational infrastructure. To this end, where possible, the SIMP components are written to allow all security-related capabilities to be easily adjusted to meet the needs of individual applications.

4.2. Client Management¶

This chapter provides guidance to install and configure SIMP clients based on the standard SIMP system installed using the SIMP DVD.

4.2.1. System Requirements¶

Before installing clients, the system should consist of the following minimum requirements:

Hardware/Virtual Machine (VM) : Capable of running RHEL 6 or 7 ; 64-bit compatible
RAM: 512 MB
HDD: 15 GB

4.2.2. Configuring the Puppet Master¶

Perform the following actions as root on the Puppet Master system prior to attempting to install a client.

4.2.2.1. Configure DNS¶

In SIMP most managed, system configuration files are pulled over rsync by Puppet for network efficiency. These managed files include DNS configuration files and can be found at /srv/rsync/bind_dns/default.

It is possible to use an existing DNS setup; however, the configuration steps that follow are for a local setup:

Navigate to /srv/rsync/bind_dns/default

Modify the named files to correctly reflect the environment.
- The relevant files under bind_dns/default are as follows:
  - named/etc/named.conf
  - named/etc/zones/your.domain
  - named/var/named/forward/your.domain.db
  - named/var/named/reverse/0.0.10.db

Review named/etc/named.conf and check/update the following:

Update the IP for allow-query and allow-recursion

Delete any unnecessary zone stanzas (i.e. forwarding) if not necessary

Substitute in the FQDN of your domain for all occurrences of your.domain

Add clients to named/var/named/forward/your.domain.db and named/var/named/reverse/0.0.10.db and then rename these files to more appropriately match your system configuration.

Type puppet agent -t --tags named on the Puppet Master to apply the changes.
Validate DNS and ensure the /etc/resolv.conf is updated appropriately.
If an error about the rndc.key appears when starting bind, see Bind Documentation for more information. Once you have resolved the problem, re-run the puppet command puppet agent -t --tags named on the Puppet Master to apply.

Important

You can adjust the list of clients in your named/var/named/forward/<your.domain>.db and named/var/named/reverse/<your reverse domain>.db files at any time. Just remember to run puppet agent -t --tags named on the Puppet Master to propagate these updates.

4.2.2.2. Configure DHCP¶

Perform the following actions as root on the Puppet Master system prior to attempting to install a client.

Open the /srv/rsync/dhcpd/dhcpd.conf file and edit it to suit the necessary environment.

Make sure the following is done in the dhcpd.conf :

The next-server setting in the pxeclients class block points to the IP Address of the TFTP server.

Create a Subnet block and edit the following:

Make sure the router and netmask are correct for your environment.

Enter the hardware ethernet and fixed-address for each client that will be kickstarted. SIMP environments should not allow clients to pick random IP Address in a subnet. The MAC address must be associated with and IP Address here. (You can add additional ones as needed.)

Enter the domain name for option domain-name

Enter the IP Address of the DNS server for option domain-name-servers

Save and close the file.

Run puppet agent -t on the Puppet Master to apply the changes.

4.2.2.3. Configure PXE Boot¶

Sample kickstart templates have been provided in the /var/www/ks directory on the SIMP server and on the SIMP DVD under /ks. Pre-boot images are locate in the DVD under /images/pxeboot. If you have an existing Preboot Execution Environment (PXE) setup you can use these to PXE a SIMP client. Follow your own sites procedures for this.

In this section we describe how to configure the Kickstart and TFTP servers to PXE boot a SIMP client. (The DHCP server setup, also required for PXE booting, is discussed in and earlier chapter.)

Note

This example sets up a PXE boot for a system that is the same OS as the SIMP Server. If you are setting up a PXE boot for a different OS then you must make sure that the OS packages are available for all systems you are trying to PXE boot through YUM. There are notes through out the instructions to help in setting multiple OS but they are not comprehensive. You should understand DHCP, KS, YUM and TFTP relationships for PXE booting before attempting this.

4.2.2.3.1. Setting Up Kickstart¶

This section describes how to configure the kickstart server.

Locate the following files in the /var/www/ks directory
- pupclient_x86_64.cfg
- diskdetect.sh
Open each of the files and follow the instructions provided within them to replace the variables. You need to know the IP Addresses of the YUM, Kickstart, and TFTPserver. (They default to the simp server in simp config).
- pupclient_x86_64.cfg: Replace the variables noted at the top and generate and enter the passwords.
- diskdetect.sh: The diskdetect.sh script is responsible for detecting the first active disk and applying a disk configuration. Edit this file to meet any necessary requirements or use this file as a starting point for further work. It will work as is for most systems as long as your disk device names are in the list.
Type chown root.apache /var/www/ks/* to ensure that all files are owned by root and in the apache group.
Type chmod 640 /var/www/ks/* to change the permissions so the owner can read and write the file and the apache group can only read.

Note

The URLs and locations in the file are setup for a default SIMP install. That means the same OS and version as the SIMP server, all servers in one location (on the SIMP server) and in specific directories. If you have installed these servers in a different location then the defaults, you may need to edit URLs or directories.

Note

If you want to PXE boot more than this operating system, make a copy of these files, name them appropriately and update URLS and links inside and anything else you may need. (You must know what you are doing before attempting this.) If you are booting more than one OS you must also make sure your YUM server has the OS packages for the other OSs. By default the YUM server on SIMP has the packages only for the version of OS installed on the SIMP server.

4.2.2.3.2. Setting up TFTP¶

This section describes the process of setting up static files and manifests for TFTP.

4.2.2.3.2.1. Static Files¶

Verify the static files are in the correct location:

Type cd /srv/rsync/tftpboot and

Verify there is a linux-install directory and cd to this directory.

Under the linux-install directory you should find a directory named OSTYPE-MAJORRELEASE.MINORRELEASE-ARCH and a link to this directory named OSTYPE-MAJORRELEASE-ARCH.

Under OSTYPE-MAJORRELEASE.MINORRELEASE-ARCH your should find the files:

initrd.img
vmlinuz

If these are not there then you must create the directories as needed and copy the files from /var/www/yum/OSTYPE/MAJORRELEASE/ARCH/images/pxeboot or from the images directory on the SIMP DVD.

Important

The link is what is used in the TFTP configuration files.

4.2.2.3.2.2. Manifest¶

Create a site manifest for the TFTP server on the Puppet server.

Create the file /etc/puppet/environment/simp/modules/site/manifests/tftpboot.pp. Use the source code example below.
- Replace KSSERVER with the IP address of Kickstart server (or the code to look up the IP Address using Hiera).
- Replace OSTYPE, MAJORRELEASE and ARCH with the correct values for the systems you will be PXE booting.
- MODEL NAME is usually of the form OSTYPE-MAJORRELEASE-ARCH for consistency.

class site::tftpboot {
  include '::tftpboot'

  tftpboot::linux_model { 'el7_x86_64':
    kernel => 'OSTYPE-MAJORRELEASE-ARCH/vmlinuz',
    initrd => 'OSTYPE-MAJORRELEASE-ARCH/initrd.img',
    ks     => "https://KSSERVER/ks/pupclient_x86_64.cfg",
    extra  => "inst.noverifyssl ksdevice=bootif\nipappend 2"
  }

  ::tftpboot::assign_host { 'default': model => 'el7_x86_64' }
}

# Note the difference in the `extra` arguments here.
class site::tftpboot {
  include '::tftpboot'

  tftpboot::linux_model { 'el6_x86_64':
    kernel => 'OSTYPE-MAJORRELEASE-ARCH/vmlinuz',
    initrd => 'OSTYPE-MAJORRELEASE-ARCH/initrd.img',
    ks     => "https://KSSERVER/ks/pupclient_x86_64.cfg",
    extra  => "noverifyssl ksdevice=bootif\nipappend 2"
  }

  ::tftpboot::assign_host { 'default': model => 'el6_x86_64' }
}

Add the tftpboot site manifest on your puppet server node via Hiera. Create the file (or edit if it exists): /etc/puppet/environments/simp/hieradata/hosts/<tftp.server.fqdn>.yaml. (By default the TFTP server is the same as your puppet server so it should exist.) Add the following example code to that yaml file.

---
classes:
  - 'site::tftpboot'

After updating the above file, type puppet agent -t --tags tftpboot on the Puppet server.

Note

To PXE boot more OSs create, in the tftpboot.pp file, a tftpboot::linux_model block for each OS type using the extra directories and kickstart files created using the notes in previous sections. Point individual systems to them by adding assign_host lines with their MAC pointing to the appropriate model name.

4.2.2.4. Apply Certificates¶

All clients in a SIMP system must have Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) keypairs generated for the server. These keys reside in the /etc/puppet/environments/simp/keydist directory on the SIMP server and are served to the clients over the puppet protocol.

Note

These keypairs are not the keys that the Puppet server uses for its operation. Do not get the two confused.

This section provides guidance on installing official certificates or, as an interim measure, generating certificates from the Fake (self-signing) Certificate Authority provided by SIMP.

4.2.2.4.1. Installing Official Certificates¶

Below are the steps to install official certificates for a SIMP client on the SIMP server:

Copy the certificates received from a proper CA to the SIMP server.
Add the keys for the node to /etc/puppet/environments/simp/keydist.

Type mkdir /etc/puppet/environments/simp/keydist/***<Client System FQDN>***
Type
mv ***<Certificate Directory>***/***<FQDN>***.[pem|pub] \
/etc/puppet/environments/simp/keydist/***<FQDN>***
Type chown -R root.puppet /etc/puppet/environments/simp/keydist

Type chmod -R u=rwX,g=rX,o-rwx /etc/puppet/environments/simp/keydist

Create and populate the /etc/puppet/environments/simp/keydist/cacerts directory.

Type cd /etc/puppet/environments/simp/keydist

Type mkdir cacerts and copy the root CA public certificates into cacerts in Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) format (one per file).

Type cd cacerts

Type for file in *.pem; do ln -s $file `openssl x509 -in $file -hash -noout`.0; done

4.2.2.4.2. Generating Certificates from the Fake CA¶

If server certificates have not or could not be obtained at the time of client installation, SIMP provides a way to create them for the system, so that it will work until proper certificates are provided.

Note

This option should not be used for any operational system that can use proper enterprise PKI certificates.

Below are the steps to generate the certificates using the SIMP-provided, Fake CA.

Type cd /etc/puppet/environments/simp/FakeCA
Type vi togen
Remove old entries from the file and add the Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) of the systems (one per line) for which certificates will be created.

Note

To use alternate DNS names for the same system, separate the names with commas and without spaces. For example, .name,alt.name1,alt.name2.

Type wc cacertkey

Note

Ensure that the cacertkey file is not empty. If it is, enter text into the file; then save and close the file.

Type ./gencerts_nopass.sh auto

Note

To avoid using the default Fake CA values, remove the auto statement from the ./gencerts_nopass.sh command.

Warning

If the clean.sh command is run after the certificates have been generated, the running system will break. To troubleshoot certificate problems, see the Troubleshooting Certificate Issues section.

If issues arise while generating keys, type cd /etc/puppet/environments/simp/FakeCA to navigate to the /etc/puppet/environments/simp/FakeCA directory, then type ./clean.sh to start over.

After running the clean.sh script, type ./gencerts_nopass.sh to run the script again using the previous procedure table.

4.2.3. Setting Up the Client¶

The following lists the steps to PXE boot the system and set up the client.

Set up your client’s BIOS or virtual settings to boot off the network.
Make sure the MAC address of the client is set up in DHCP (see Configure DHCP for more info.)
Restart the system.
Once the client installs, reboots, and begins to bootstrap, it will check in for the first time.
Puppet will not autosign puppet certificates by default and waitforcert is enabled. The client will check in every 30 seconds for a signed cert. Log on to the puppet server and run puppet cert sign <puppet.client.fqdn>.

Upon successful deployment of a new client, it is highly recommended that LDAP administrative accounts be created.

4.2.4. Troubleshooting Puppet Issues¶

If the client has been kickstarted, but is not communicating with the Puppet server, try the following options:

Check the forward and reverse DNS entries on the client and server; both must be correct.
Check the time on the systems. More than an hour’s difference will cause serious issues with certificates.
Remove /var/lib/puppet/ssl on the client system; run puppet cert --clean ***<Client Host Name>*** on the Puppet server; and try again.

4.2.5. Troubleshooting Certificate Issues¶

If host certificates do not appear to be working and the banner is not getting rsync’d to the clients, ensure that all certificates verify against the installed CA certificates.

The table below lists the steps to determine which certificates are working and which are not.

Navigate to /etc/puppet/environments/simp/keydist
Run find . -name “****<Your.Domain>*.pub” -exec openssl verify -CApath cacerts {} \;

Important

The screen displays ./<Host Name>.<Your.Domain>/<Host Name>.<Your.Domain>.pub: OK If anything other than OK appears for each host, analyze the error and ensure that the CA certificates are correct.

If the TXT_DB error number 2 appears, revoke the certificate that is being regenerated. The table below lists the steps to revoke the certificate.

Navigate to /etc/puppet/environments/simp/keydist;

Run

OPENSSL_CONF=default.cnf openssl ca -revoke \
keydist/*<Host to Revoke>*/*<Host to Revoke>*.pub

4.3. Maximum Number of Nodes¶

The maximum number of clients reasonable per each system is dependent on many variables, including number of processors and size of memory. Although it is impossible to predict exactly how many clients a specific server may be able to handle, a simple algorithm can give the user an estimate.

Servers with different hardware have been tested at worst case scenario. This means that all of the server’s clients will run Puppet at the exact same time. The most important information collected during these runs was the compile time, which shows the increase in seconds that it takes for each node to compile when another node is added. After a certain number of nodes, nodes begin to drop to compile times lower than 30 seconds. These nodes are not actually completing their Puppet runs. This data can be seen in the following graph:

4.3.1. Number of Nodes vs. Compile Time¶

The queue size can be found by looking at the maximum number of clients running Puppet at once before any are dropped. According to the SIMP team’s data, a server with two cores has a queue size of four; a server with three cores has a queue size of six; however, a server with four cores has a queue size of six. Although it may appear that the queue size is plateauing as cores are increased, the SIMP team predicts that this is due to the limited memory. However, the team is confident that a system with four cores and 4GB of ram will indeed have a queue size of eight clients. From this, it can be concluded that, given enough memory, Queue_Size = 2*Cores.

Also using this data, the compile times for other systems can be predicted given the amount of processors, memory, and nodes. This is done using ordinary least squares in Octave.

In addition, the maximum number of clients can also be predicted with the use of the following equation:

Max_Num_Of_Total_Clients = (Run_Time_In_Sec / Comp_Time) * Queue_Size

Where Run_Time_In_Sec is the number of seconds per half an hour (1800), Queue_Size is the maximum number of clients in the worst case scenario (queue size), and Comp_Time is the average compile time of the clients when there are Max_Num_Worstcase clients.

4.4. General Administration¶

This chapter provides basic guidance on how to administer a SIMP environment.

Warning

While working with the system, keep in mind that Puppet does not work well with capital letters in host names. Therefore, they should not be used.

4.4.1. Nightly Updates¶

All SIMP systems are configured, by default, to do a YUM update of the entire system on a nightly basis.

The configuration pulls updates from all repositories that the system is aware of. To change this behavior, refer to the HOWTO Exclude YUM Repositories HOWTO section. This configuration is also helpful because it is easier to manage symlinks in YUM repositories than it is to manage individual package minutia for every single package on every system.

The general technique is to put packages that all systems will receive into the Updates repository provided with SIMP. Any packages that will only go to specific system sets will then be placed into adjunct repositories under /srv/www/yum and the user will point specific systems at those repositories using the yumrepo Puppet type. Any common packages can be symlinked or hard linked between repositories for maximum space utilization.

4.4.1.1. Extending the Native Framework¶

By default, SIMP stores YUM information in the following directories:

/srv/www/yum

The base SIMP repository is in /srv/www/yum/SIMP and it is highly unlikely that you would want to modify anything in this directory.

With the standard configuration, access to the yum repository is restricted to the networks contained in the $client_nets variable in Hiera. For this section, we will assume that this is sufficient for your needs.

4.4.1.2. The Operating System Repos¶

The default location for the OS repositories is /var/www/yum/${::operatingsystem}/7/x86_64.

The default location for the OS repositories is /var/www/yum/${::operatingsystem}/6/x86_64.

An Updates repository has been configured in this space. All OS updates should be placed within this directory.

You should run the following in the Updates directory after any package addition or removal within that directory.

$ createrepo .
$ chown -R root.apache ./*
$ find . -type f -exec chmod 640 {} \;
$ find . -type d -exec chmod 750 {} \;
$ yum clean all
$ yum makecache

4.4.1.3. Adding a Custom Repository¶

For this example, we are going to assume that you have a repository named foo that you would like to expose to your systems. You would perform the following commands to enable this repository on the server:

$ cd /srv/www/yum
$ mkdir foo
$ cd foo
$ -- copy all RPMs into the folder
$ createrepo .
$ chown -R root.apache ./*
$ find . -type f -exec chmod 640 {} \;
$ find . -type d -exec chmod 750 {} \;

By placing the basepath of the repository within the default path served by Apache, it will be exposed to all networks in $client_nets. To modify the package set in any repository at any time, re-run:

$ cd /some/repository/
$ cp /some/packages /some/repository/
$ createrepo .
$ chown -R root.apache ./*
$ find . -type f -exec chmod 640 {} \;
$ find . -type d -exec chmod 750 {} \;
$ yum clean all
$ yum makecache

4.4.1.4. Configuring the Clients¶

Now that you’ve added this directory, you’re obviously going to want to add it to one or more client nodes.

The best way to do this is to make it part of your site configuration. You can make it part of your module, but you will need to wrap it in a define so that the server can be modified. This ends up being not too much better than just adding it to each node manually.

To add it to the client node, you should use the puppet yumrepo native type. You can find more information on the type on the Puppet Type Reference on the Internet.

At a glance, it would look like the following (assuming you are doing this one on the server configured as $yum_server in Hiera):

yumrepo { foo:
  baseurl => "http://your.server.fqdn/yum/foo",
  enabled => 1,
  enablegroups => 0,
  gpgcheck => 0,
  keepalive => 0,
  metadata_expire => 3600,
  tag => "firstrun"
}

4.4.1.5. Working Outside the SIMP Framework¶

The SIMP framework fully supports Puppet Environments and, by default, installs into an environment named simp. This environment is symlinked to the production environment by default but that symlink will not be overwritten on update so you may freely update the environment to meet your needs.

4.4.2. Sudosh¶

By default, a SIMP system uses Sudosh to enable logging of sudo sessions to Rsyslog. To open a sudo session as root (or any other user), type su - as simp, or sudo sudosh as anyone else, instead of sudo su.

The logs are stored in /var/log/sudosh.log. Sessions can be replayed by typing sudosh-syslog-replay.

4.4.3. User Accounts¶

By default, users can add local users to a system or use LDAP to administer users.

It is recommended that LDAP is used for adding all regular users so that there is no conflict with multiple system updates and synchronization. For more information on managing LDAP users, refer to the User Management chapter.

It is also possible that there will be users that are local to the system. To have these users follow the normal password expiration conventions set on the system, use the native Puppet user and group types.

To have a user that does not expire, look at the /etc/puppet/environments/simp/localusers file to enable these users across the systems. The comments in the file provide instructions on generating entries for the desired systems. It is hoped that future versions of Puppet will support the modification of password expiration values via the native types and that the localusers file will be retired.

4.4.4. Certificate Management¶

This section describes the two different types of certificates used in a SIMP system and how to manage them. For information on initial certificate setup, refer to the Apply Certificates section of the Client Management chapter.

4.4.5. Server Certificates¶

Server certificates are the standard PKI certificates assigned either by an official CA or generated using the FakeCA utility offered by SIMP. They can be found in the /etc/pki/ directory of both the client and server systems. These certificates are set to expire annually. To change this, edit the following files with the number of days for the desired lifespan of the certificates:

Note

This assumes that the user has generated Certificates with the FakeCA provided by SIMP. If official certificates are being used, these settings must be changed within the official CA, not on the SIMP system.

/etc/puppet/environments/simp/Config/FakeCA/CA
/etc/puppet/environments/simp/Config/FakeCA/ca.cnf
/etc/puppet/environments/simp/Config/FakeCA/default\_altnames.cnf
/etc/puppet/environments/simp/Config/FakeCA/default.cnf
/etc/puppet/Config/FakeCA/user.cnf

In addition, any certificates that have already been created and signed will have a config file containing all of its details in /etc/puppet/environments/simp/Config/FakeCA/output/conf/.

Important

Editing any entries in the above mentioned config files will not affect the existing certificates. To make changes to an existing certificate it must be re-created and signed.

Below is an example of how to change the expiration time from one year (the default) to five years for any newly created certificate.

for file in $(grep -rl 365 /etc/puppet/environments/simp/Config/FakeCA/)
do
  sed -i 's/365/1825/' $file
done

4.4.6. Puppet Certificates¶

Puppet certificates are issued and maintained strictly within Puppet. They are different from the server certificates and should be managed with the puppet cert tool. For the complete documentation on the puppet cert tool, visit the Puppet Labs cert manual detailing its capabilities. On a SIMP system, these certificates are located in the /var/lib/puppet/ssl/ directory and are set to expire every five years.

4.4.7. The SIMP Utility¶

The SIMP server provides a command line utility called simp that is a simple interface into some SIMP-specific settings and subsystems.

The best source of information on the capabilities of this tool are the man page which can be accessed via man simp.

4.4.7.1. simp passgen¶

Throughout the SIMP codebase, you may find references to the passgen() function. This function will auto-generate passwords and store them in the simp_autofiles/gen_passwd space in the root of the using Environment on the Puppet server. For more information, see the passgen() documentation.

4.4.8. Integrating Applications¶

This section describes how to add services to the servers. To perform this action, it is important to understand how to use IPTables and what the svckill.rb script does on the system.

4.4.8.1. IPTables¶

By default, the SIMP system locks down all incoming connections to the server save port 22. Port 22 is allowed from all external sources since it is expected that the user will want to be able to SSH into the systems from the outside at all times.

The default alteration for the IPTables start-up script is such that it will “fail safe”. This means that if the IPTables rules are incorrect, the system will not open up the IPTables rule set completely. Instead, the system will deny access to all ports except port 22 to allow for recovery via SSH.

There are many examples of how to use the IPTables module in the source code; the Apache module at /etc/puppet/environments/simp/modules/apache is a particularly good example. In addition, look at the definitions in the IPTables module to understand their purpose and choose the best option. Refer to the IPTables page of the Developers Guide for a good summary and example code (HTML version only).

4.4.8.2. svckill.rb¶

To ensure that the system does not run more services than are required, the svckill.rb script has been implemented to stop any service that is not properly defined in the Puppet catalogue.

To prevent services from stopping, refer to the instructions in the My Services Are Dying! Troubleshooting section.

4.4.8.3. GUI¶

SIMP was designed as a minimized system, but it is likely that the user will want to have a GUI on some of the systems. Refer to the HOWTO Manage Workstation Infrastructures section for information on setting up GUIs for the systems.

4.5. User Management¶

This chapter explains how to manage users in the default SIMP environment.

4.5.1. Managing Users with Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)¶

Prepare SIMP ldifs
Add a User
- Add a User with a Password
- Add a User without a Password
Remove a User
Additional Common LDAP Operations
Troubleshooting Issues

4.5.1.1. Prepare SIMP ldifs ¶

SIMP natively uses OpenLDAP for user and group management. Actionable copies of the LDAP Data Interchange Format (.ldif) files can be found on the system in the /usr/share/doc/simp-doc-<Version>/ldifs directory. Copy these files into /root/ldifs and fix their Distinguished Names:

mkdir /root/ldifs
cp /usr/share/doc/simp-doc-*/ldifs/* /root/ldifs
cd /root/ldifs
sed -i 's/dc=your,dc=domain/<your actual DN information>/g' \*.ldif

Warning

Do not leave any extraneous spaces in LDIF files!

# Use `:set list` in vim to see hidden spaces at the end of lines.

# Use the following to strip out inappropriate characters

sed -i \
  's/\\(^[[:graph:]]\*:\\)[[:space:]]\*\\ ([[:graph:]]\*\\) \\[[:space:]]\*$/\\1\\2/' \
  file.ldif

Note

Use the [ and ] characters to scroll right when using ELinks.

4.5.1.2. Add a User ¶

Users can be added with or without a password. Follow the instructions in the following sections.

Note

Every user must belong to a unique, primary group, but can optionally belong to one or more, secondary groups.

Warning

This process should not be used to create users or groups for daemon processes unless the user has experience.

4.5.1.2.1. Add a User with a Password ¶

To add a user with a password to the system, along with a unique group for that user:

Login to the LDAP server as root.
Use the slappasswd command to generate a password hash for a user.
Edit the /root/ldifs/adduser_with_password.ldif shown below.

dn: cn=<username>,ou=Group,dc=your,dc=domain
objectClass: posixGroup
objectClass: top
cn: <username>
gidNumber: <Unique GID Number>
description: "<Group Description>"

dn: uid=<username>,ou=People,dc=your,dc=domain
uid: <username>
cn: <username>
givenName: <First Name>
sn: <Last Name>
mail: <e-mail address>
objectClass: inetOrgPerson
objectClass: posixAccount
objectClass: top
objectClass: shadowAccount
objectClass: ldapPublicKey
shadowMax: 180
shadowMin: 1
shadowWarning: 7
shadowLastChange: 10701
sshPublicKey: <some SSH public key>
loginShell: /bin/bash
uidNumber: <some UID number above 500>
gidNumber: <some GID number above 500>
homeDirectory: /home/<username>
userPassword: <slappasswd generated SSHA hash>
pwdReset: TRUE

Type the following, substituting your DN information for dc=your,dc=domain:

ldapadd -Z -x -W -D "cn=LDAPAdmin,ou=People,dc=your,dc=domain" \
-f /root/ldifs/adduser_with_password.ldif

Ensure that an administrative account is created as soon as the SIMP system has been properly configured. Administrative accounts should belong to the administrators LDAP group (gidNumber 700). Members of this LDAP group can utilize sudo sudosh for privilege escalation.

Note

The pwdReset: TRUE command causes the user to change the assigned password at the next login. This command is useful to pre-generate the password first and change it at a later time.

This command appears to be broken in some versions of nss_ldap. Therefore, to avoid future issues set shadowLastChange to a value around 10000.

Warning

The initial password set for a user must confform to the password policy or the user will not be able to login and change his/her password, even though the password reset has been enabled by pwdReset: TRUE.

4.5.1.2.2. Add a User without a Password ¶

To add a user without a password to the system, along with a unique group for that user

Login to the LDAP server as root.
Edit the /root/ldifs/adduser_no_password.ldif shown below.

dn: cn=<username>,ou=Group,dc=your,dc=domain
objectClass: posixGroup
objectClass: top
cn: <username>
gidNumber: <Unique GID Number>
description: "<Group Description>"

dn: uid=<username>,ou=People,dc=your,dc=domain
uid: <username>
cn: <username>
givenName: <First Name>
sn: <Last Name>
mail: <e-mail address>
objectClass: inetOrgPerson
objectClass: posixAccount
objectClass: top
objectClass: shadowAccount
objectClass: ldapPublicKey
sshPublicKey: <some SSH public key>
loginShell: /bin/bash
uidNumber: <some UID number above 500>
gidNumber: <GID number from above>
homeDirectory: /home/<username>

Type the following, substituting your DN information for dc=your,dc=domain:

ldapadd -Z -x -W -D "cn=LDAPAdmin,ou=People,dc=your,dc=domain" \
-f /root/ldifs/adduser_no_password.ldif

4.5.1.3. Remove a User ¶

To remove a user to the system, along with a unique group for that user:

Login to the LDAP server as root.
Edit the /root/ldifs/del_user.ldif shown below.

dn: cn=<User UID>,ou=Group,dc=example,dc=domain
changeType: delete

dn: uid=<User UID>,ou=People,dc=example,dc=domain
changeType: delete

Type the following, substituting your DN information for dc=your,dc=domain:

ldapmodify -Z -x -W -D "cn=LDAPAdmin,ou=People,dc=your,dc=domain" \
-f /root/ldifs/del_user.ldif

4.5.1.4. Additional Common LDAP Operations ¶

As described below, other useful operations can be executed using the remaining LDIF files.

4.5.1.4.1. Add a Group ¶

SIMP systems are preconfigured with two groups:

administrators (700): Group that has both sudosh and ssh privileges
users (100): Group that does not have sudosh or ssh privileges

To add another group:

Login to the LDAP server as root.
Edit the /root/ldifs/add_group.ldif shown below.

dn: cn=<groupname>,ou=Group,dc=your,dc=domain
objectClass: posixGroup
objectClass: top
cn: <groupname>
gidNumber: <Unique GID number>
description: "<Some useful group description>"

Type the following, substituting your DN information for dc=your,dc=domain:

ldapadd -Z -x -W -D "cn=LDAPAdmin,ou=People,dc=your,dc=domain" \
-f /root/ldifs/add_group.ldif

4.5.1.4.2. Remove a Group ¶

To remove a group:

Login to the LDAP server as root.
Edit the /root/ldifs/del_group.ldif shown below.

dn: cn=<Group Name>,ou=Group,dc=your,dc=domain
changetype: delete

Type the following, substituting your DN information for dc=your,dc=domain:

ldapmodify -Z -x -W -D "cn=LDAPAdmin,ou=People,dc=your,dc=domain" \
-f /root/ldifs/del_group.ldif

4.5.1.4.3. Add Users to a Group ¶

To add users to a group:

Login to the LDAP server as root.
Edit the /root/ldifs/add_to_group.ldif shown below.

dn: cn=<Group Name>,ou=Group,dc=your,dc=domain
changetype: modify
add: memberUid
memberUid: <UID1>
memberUid: <UID2>
...
memberUid: <UIDX>

Type the following, substituting your DN information for dc=your,dc=domain:

ldapmodify -Z -x -W -D "cn=LDAPAdmin,ou=People,dc=your,dc=domain" \
-f /root/ldifs/add_to_group.ldif

4.5.1.4.4. Remove Users from a Group ¶

To add users to a group:

Login to the LDAP server as root.
Edit the /root/ldifs/del_to_group.ldif shown below.

dn: cn=<Group Name>,ou=Group,dc=your,dc=domain
changetype: modify
delete: memberUid
memberUid: <UID1>
memberUid: <UID2>
...
memberUid: <UIDX>

Type the following, substituting your DN information for dc=your,dc=domain:

ldapmodify -Z -x -W -D "cn=LDAPAdmin,ou=People,dc=your,dc=domain" \
-f /root/ldifs/del_from_group.ldif

4.5.1.4.5. Update a User’s SSH Public Key ¶

To update an SSH public key:

Login to the LDAP server as root.
Edit the /root/ldifs/mod_sshkey.ldif shown below.

dn: uid=<User UID>,ou=People,dc=your,dc=domain
changetype: modify
replace: sshPublicKey
sshPublicKey: <User OpenSSH Public Key>

Type the following, substituting your DN information for dc=your,dc=domain:

ldapmodify -Z -x -W -D "cn=LDAPAdmin,ou=People,dc=your,dc=domain" \
-f /root/ldif/mod_sshkey.ldif

4.5.1.4.6. Force a Password Reset ¶

To force a password reset for a user:

Login to the LDAP server as root.
Edit the /root/ldifs/force_password_reset.ldif shown below.

dn: uid=<username>,ou=People,dc=your,dc=domain
changetype: modify
replace: pwdReset
pwdReset: TRUE
-
replace: shadowLastChange
shadowLastChange: 10101

Type the following, substituting your DN information for dc=your,dc=domain:

ldapmodify -Z -x -W -D "cn=LDAPAdmin,ou=People,dc=your,dc=domain" \
-f /root/ldifs/force_password_reset.ldif

Note

The ldapmodify command is only effective when using the ppolicy overlay. In addition, the user’s shadowLastChange must be changed to a value prior to the expiration date to force a PAM reset.

4.5.1.4.7. Lock an LDAP Account ¶

To lock an LDAP account:

Login to the LDAP server as root.
Edit the /root/ldifs/lock_user.ldif shown below.

dn: uid=<username>,ou=People,dc=your,dc=domain
changetype: modify
replace: pwdAccountLockedTime
pwdAccountLockedTime: 000001010000Z
-
delete: sshPublicKey
-
replace: userPassword
userPassword: !!

Type the following, substituting your DN information for dc=your,dc=domain:

ldapmodify -Z -x -W -D "cn=LDAPAdmin,ou=People,dc=your,dc=domain" \
-f /root/ldifs/lock_user.ldif

Note

The ldapmodify command is only effective when using the ppolicy overlay.

4.5.1.4.8. Unlock an LDAP Account ¶

To unlock an LDAP account:

Login to the LDAP server as root.
Edit the /root/ldifs/unlock_account.ldif shown below.

dn: uid=<User UID>,ou=People,dc=your,dc=domain
changetype: modify
delete: pwdAccountLockedTime

Type the following, substituting your DN information for dc=your,dc=domain:

ldapmodify -Z -x -W -D "cn=LDAPAdmin,ou=People,dc=your,dc=domain" \
 -f /root/ldifs/unlock_account.ldif

Note

The ldapmodify command is only effective when using the ppolicy overlay.

4.5.1.5. Troubleshooting Issues ¶

If a user’s password is changed in LDAP or the user changes it shortly after its initial setup, the “Password too young to change” error may appear. In this situation, apply the pwdReset:TRUE option to the user’s account as described in Add a User with a Password.

4.5.2. Managing Local/Service Users¶

Though the SIMP team highly recommends using LDAP to centrally manage your users, you may occasionally need to set up a service account or specific local users on your systems.

This section walks you through doing this in a way that is compatible with SIMP.

The following examples assume that you are using the site module to set up your users. The examples may easily be extrapolated into defined types if you wish but are presented as classes for simplicity.

If you are not familiar with setting up SSH keys, you may want to follow the relevant GitHub documentation.

4.5.2.1. Service Account¶

class site::service_account {
  include '::ssh'

  $_svc_account_user           = 'svcuser'
  $_svc_account_group          = 'svcgroup'
  $_svc_account_id             = '1777'
  $_svc_account_homedir        = "/var/local/${_svc_account_user}"

  # Since this is a service account, automatically generate an SSH key for
  # the user and store it on the Puppet master for distribution.
  $_svc_account_ssh_private_key = ssh_keygen($_svc_account_user, '2048', true)
  $_svc_account_ssh_public_key = ssh_keygen($_svc_account_user, '2048')

  group { $_svc_account_group:
    gid       => $_svc_account_id,
    allowdupe => false,
  }

  user { $_svc_account_user:
    uid        => $_svc_account_id,
    allowdupe  => false,
    gid        => $_svc_account_group,
    home       => $_svc_account_homedir,
    managehome => true,
    shell      => '/bin/bash'
  }

  file { "${_svc_account_homedir}/.ssh":
    ensure => directory,
    owner  => $_svc_account_user,
    group  => $_svc_account_group,
    mode   => '0600'
  }

  ssh_authorized_key { $_svc_account_user:
    type    => 'ssh-rsa',
    key     => $_svc_account_ssh_public_key,
    target  => "${_svc_account_homedir}/.ssh/authorized_keys",
    require => [
      File["${_svc_account_homedir}/.ssh"],
      User[$_svc_account_user]
    ]
  }

  file { "${_svc_account_homedir}/.ssh/id_rsa":
    mode    => '0600',
    owner   => $_svc_account_user,
    group   => $_svc_account_group,
    content => $_svc_account_ssh_private_key
  }

  file { "/etc/ssh/local_keys/${_svc_account_user}":
    owner  => 'root',
    group  => $_svc_account_group,
    mode   => '0644',
    source => "puppet:///site/ssh_autokeys/${_svc_account_user}.pub"
  }

  sudo::user_specification { $_svc_account_user:
    user_list => $_svc_account_user,
    host_list => [$::fqdn],
    runas     => 'root',
    cmnd      => ['/bin/cat /var/log/app.log'],
    passwd    => false
  }

  # Allow this service account from everywhere
  pam::access::manage { "Allow ${_svc_account_user}":
    users   => $_svc_account_user,
    origins => ['ALL']
  }
}

4.5.2.2. Local User Account¶

class site::local_account {
  include '::ssh'

  $_local_account_user           = 'localuser'
  $_local_account_group          = 'localgroup'
  $_local_account_id             = '1778'

  # You'll probably want this in /home unless you're using NFS
  $_local_account_homedir        = "/home/${_local_account_user}"

  # You'll need to get this from the user as it is their public key.
  $_local_account_ssh_public_key = 'AAA...=='

  group { $_local_account_group:
    gid       => $_local_account_id,
    allowdupe => false,
  }

  user { $_local_account_user:
    uid        => $_local_account_id,
    allowdupe  => false,
    gid        => $_local_account_group,
    home       => $_local_account_homedir,
    managehome => true,
    shell      => '/bin/bash'
  }

  # If you want your local user to have a password (no key),
  # omit this block and manually assign a password to the user
  # after creation (passwd <user>)
  file { "/etc/ssh/local_keys/${_local_account_user}":
    owner  => 'root',
    group  => $_local_account_group,
    mode   => '0644',
    source => $_local_account_ssh_public_key
  }

  sudo::user_specification { $_local_account_user:
    user_list => $_local_account_user,
    host_list => [$::fqdn],
    runas     => 'root',
    cmnd      => ['/bin/cat /var/log/app.log'],
    passwd    => false
  }

  # Allow this account from everywhere
  pam::access::manage { "Allow ${_local_account_user}":
    users   => $_local_account_user,
    origins => ['ALL']
  }
}

4.5.2.3. Testing¶

The table below lists the steps to test that the configuration was applied correctly.

Log on to a server that has the template code configuration applied.
Type su - ***<USERNAME>***
Type exec /usr/bin/ssh-agent /bin/bash to ensure that ssh-agent has a shell running.
Type /usr/bin/ssh-add to attach the user’s certificates.
Optional: Type /usr/bin/ssh-add -l to double check that the user’s certificates were added successfully.
Type ssh ***<HOST>*** to SSH to a target machine that has the template code configuration applied.

If successful, the user should be authenticated and gain access to the target machine without entering a password.

If the user is prompted for a password, check to see if the permissions are set up properly and that the certificate keys are in the correct locations. In addition, check the /etc/security/access.conf file to ensure that it contains the user or user’s group in an allow statement. See access.conf(5) for details.

4.5.3. Managing SSSD LOCAL Domain And Users¶

Though the SIMP team highly recommends using LDAP to centrally manage your users, you may wish to create users within the SSSD LOCAL provider domain. Note that you can run LOCAL and LDAP domains concurrently!

This section walks you through doing this in a way that is compatible with SIMP.

The following examples assume that you are using the site module to set up your users. The examples may easily be extrapolated into defined types if you wish but are presented as classes for simplicity.

4.5.3.1. SSSD LOCAL Domain¶

Set up a LOCAL domain in SSSD. If one already exists in /etc/sssd/sssd.conf, you can optionally skip this step. If the LOCAL domain is not managed with SIMP, you may experience difficulties.

class site::sssd_local {

  sssd::provider::local { 'LOCAL': }

  sssd::domain { 'LOCAL':
    description   => 'Default Local Domain',
    id_provider   => 'local',
    auth_provider => 'local'
  }
}

In Hiera, you will need to add the LOCAL sssd domain to sssd::domains if it does not already exist. If you wish to include the LOCAL domain in all of $::client_nets, simply modify the existing sssd::domains variable in simp_def.yaml. Include site::sssd_local in default.yaml, and set local as the domain id_provider.

In simp_def.yaml:

sssd::domains:
  - 'LOCAL'
  - <existing domains, ex. LDAP>

In default.yaml:

sssd::domain::id_provider: 'local'
classes:
  - 'site::sssd_local'

Run puppet. A LOCAL domain should be created and referenced in /etc/sssd/sssd.conf. The sssd service should be running.

4.5.3.2. Adding an SSSD Local User¶

Create a local user, using sss_useradd. See the sss_useradd man page for more options.

sss_useradd <user> -h </path/to/home/dir> -u <uid> -m -k /etc/skell

To update an EL6 system, perform the following step

vipw
<user>:x:<uid>:<gid>::</path/to/home/dir>:/bin/bash

Next, set the user’s password. As root, run:

passwd <user>

4.5.3.3. Giving The User Access¶

pam::access::manage { '<user> access':
  permission => '+',
  users      => '<user>',
  origins    => ['ALL'],
  order      => '1000'
}

sudo::user_specification { '<user> privs':
  user_list => ["<user>"],
  host_list => [$::fqdn],
  runas     => 'root',
  cmnd      => ['/bin/cat /var/log/app.log'],
  passwd    => false
}

You’re done! You should be able to id <user>, su - <user>, and run commands allowed by sudo rules.

Test authentication by ssh-ing as the user onto the host machine, with the password specified after user creation. If you want to set up an ssh key, you may want to follow the relevant GitHub documentation.

4.6. Hiera Overview¶

SIMP now uses Hiera natively instead of Extdata. From Puppet Labs website: Hiera is a key/value lookup tool for configuration data, built to set node-specific data without repeating yourself. It is an attempt to make SIMP more configurable to you, the end user. It configures Puppet in two ways: automatic parameter lookup/hiera lookup functions, and assigning classes to nodes. The former allows you to generate reusable code and concentrates parameter assignment to one directory. The latter is a supplement to the failed inheritance model.

4.6.1. Setting Parameters¶

Automatic Lookup You can now safely declare any class on any node with ‘include’, even if the class is parameterized. Before Hiera, this was not possible. Puppet will automatically retrieve class parameters from Hiera using keys. Add a key with a value pair to an appropriate yaml file, say default.yaml, as such:

Adding a Key/Value Pair to Hiera Examples

---
classfoo::parameter_bar: "Woo"
classfoo::parameter_baz: "Hoo"

You can then ‘include classfoo’ on any node, with parameter_bar and parameter_baz defaulting to Woo and Hoo, respectively.

Lookup Functions You are not required to set up your hierarchy for automatic variable lookup. Using three functions, you can query Hiera for any key.

The first is hiera. This uses standard priority lookup and can retrieve values of any data type from Hiera. If no key is found, a default should be included. $myvar = hiera('parameter_bar', 'Woo')

The second is hiera_array. This uses an array merge lookup. It retrieves all array values for a given key throughout the entire hierarchy and flattens them into a single array.

The third is hiera_hash. This uses a hash merge lookup. It retrieves all hash values for a given key throughout the entire hierarchy and merges them into a single hash.

4.6.2. Assigning Classes to Nodes¶

Assigning classes to nodes is done with the hiera_include function. Hiera does an array merge lookup on ‘tags’ to retrieve classes which should be included on a node. In SIMP, we place hiera_include('classes') in /etc/puppet/environments/simp/manifests/site.pp. Since site.pp is outside of any node definition and below all top scope variables, every node controlled by puppet will get every class tagged with ‘classes’ in its hierarchy. Additionally, simp_def.yaml in is the hierarchy of every node, so every node will receive those classes (by default).

4.6.3. Assigning Defined Types to Nodes¶

Defined types do not have the ability to receive parameters via Hiera in the traditional sense. To include a defined type on a node, one could use create_resources, but this is messy and discouraged. Instead, make a site class /etc/puppet/environments/simp/modules/site/manifests/my_site.pp. For example, to include tftpboot linux_model and assign_host on your puppet server, puppet.your.domain:

Add the following code to a file tftpboot.pp in your site/manifests directory:

# in /etc/puppet/environments/simp/modules/site/manifests/tftpboot.pp
# Set KSSERVER statically or use Hiera for lookup

class site::tftpboot {
  include 'tftpboot'

  tftpboot::linux_model { 'EL_MAJOR_VERSION':
    kernel => 'EL_MAJOR_VERSION_x86_64/vmlinuz',
    initrd => 'EL_MAJOR_VERSION_x86_64/initrd.img',
    ks     => "https://KSSERVER/ks/pupclient_x86_64.cfg --noverifyssl inst.noverifyssl",
    extra  => 'ipappend 2'
  }

  tftpboot::assign_host { 'default': model => 'EL_MAJOR_VERSION' }
}

Then add the following code to your servers Hiera file,: /etc/puppet/environments/simp/hieradata/hosts/puppet.your.domain.yaml

---
classes:
  - 'site::tftpboot'

4.6.4. SIMP Hiera File Structure¶

/etc/puppet/hiera.yaml Hiera’s config file, used to control the hierarchy of your backends.
/etc/puppet/environments/simp/hieradata/ Default location of the yaml files which contain your node data
/etc/puppet/environments/simp/hieradata/simp_classes.yaml The list of default classes to include on any SIMP system.
/etc/puppet/environments/simp/hieradata/simp_def.yaml Contains the variables needed to configure a working SIMP system. Modified by simp-config.
/etc/puppet/environments/simp/hieradata/hosts/ By populating this directory with some.host.name.yaml file, you can assign parameters to host some.host.name
/etc/puppet/environments/simp/hieradata/domains/ Same principal as hosts, but domain names.
/etc/puppet/manifests/ Contains site.pp and all other node manifests. BE CAREFUL when modifying this directory, site.pp contains your globals. This directory can be used to supplement or even REPLACE Hiera, with nodes. Note that Hiera cannot regex hostnames to apply manifests, so a node manifest will have to be created here if you wish to have that ability.

4.7. Troubleshooting Common Issues¶

How to troubleshoot common problems that occur when installing and using SIMP.

4.7.1. My Services Are Dying!¶

The following section describes how to mitigate issues relating to destructive reasoning and avoiding destruction of the SIMP system.

4.7.1.1. Destructive Reasoning with svckill.rb¶

Most security guides that have been published on the Internet strongly suggest disabling all services that are not necessary for system operation. However, to list every possible service that may be controlled by the chkconfig type on a given system in a manifest would not be useful and would bloat the memory space of the running Puppet process.

As an alternative solution, the SIMP Team implemented the svckill.rb script that runs with every Puppet run.

The svckill.rb script:

Collects a list of all services on the system. These are the same services that the user sees after typing chkconfig --list
Ignores certain critical services, including Puppet, IPtables, and the network.
Collects a list of all services that are defined in the manifests and modules.
Ensures that every service that is defined in the manifests and modules is excluded from the list of services to kill.
Kills and disables everything else.

4.7.1.2. Avoiding Destruction¶

If certain services should not be killed, declare them in the node manifest space.

Note

The key is to declare the services and not set them to any other option. By adding them to the manifest, the svckill.rb script will ignore them.

The example below demonstrates this action, assuming that the keepmealive service is added to the chkconfig.

preventing a service from being killed by svckill.rb

service { "keepmealive": }

4.7.2. Why Can’t I Login?!¶

If you’ve reached this page, you’re having issues logging into your system with a newly created account.

In almost all cases, this is because either your user has not been placed in a group allowed to access the system, your DNS is setup incorrectly, or your PKI certificates are invalid.

4.7.2.1. SSSD Password Checks¶

SSSD has been made the default name service caching service in SIMP. During this process, we discovered that SSSD will enforce password complexity restrictions upon login. This means that, if your password does not meet the system password complexity requirements, you will not be able to login until an administrator changes your password to something stronger.

For the default complexity rules, see the What is the Password Complexity for SIMP? FAQ.

4.7.2.2. PAM Access Restrictions¶

By default, SIMP uses the pam_access.so PAM module to restrict access on each individual host. While this may not seem as flexible as some methods, it is the most failsafe method for ensuring that you don’t accidentally interrupt services due to network issues connecting to your LDAP server.

To allow a user to access a particular system, you need to use the pam::access::manage define as shown below.

pam::access::manage { 'Allow the security group into the system':
  users   => ['(security)'],
  origins => ['ALL'],
  comment => 'The core security team'
}

pam::access::manage { 'Allow bob into the system from the proxy only':
  users   => ['bob'],
  origins => ["proxy.${::domain}"],
  comment => 'Bob the proxied'
}

4.7.2.3. Faillock¶

If a user fails to authenticate properly in 5 consecutive tries (the default pam::deny), PAM will lock the account.

To see a list of user authentication attempts, run faillock.

If a user is marked as invalid (I) or reaches the max number of attempts, you will need to reset faillock before authentication can occur. To do so, run

faillock --reset --user <user>

4.7.2.4. LDAP Lockout¶

If your account is in LDAP, you may have locked yourself out. Like PAM, LDAP has a maximum number of logins, 5 by default. See openldap::server::conf::default_ldif::ppolicy_pwd_max_failure.

To determine if the account is locked, run the following on the LDAP server:

slapcat -a uid=<user>

If you see pwdAccountLockedTime then the account is locked, and you will need to follow the instructions in Unlock an LDAP Account to unlock it.

4.7.2.5. Troubleshooting DNS¶

If PAM is not the issue, you may be having DNS issues. This can evidence itself in two ways.

First, per the ‘Bob’ example above, you may be using an FQDN to identify a host on your network. If DNS is not properly configured, then there is no way for the host to understand that you should have access from this remote system.

Second, the default PKI settings in SIMP ensure that all connections are validated against the FQDN of the client system. In the case of an LDAP connection, a misconfiguration in DNS may result in an inability to authenticate against the LDAP service.

In the following sections, we will assume that we have a host named system.my.domain with the IP address 1.2.3.4.

4.7.2.5.1. Testing a Forward Lookup¶

The following should return the expected IP address for your system.

$ nslookup system.my.domain

4.7.2.5.2. Testing a Reverse Lookup¶

The following should return the expected hostname for your system. This hostname must be either the primary name in the PKI certificate or a valid alternate name.

$ nslookup 1.2.3.4

4.7.2.6. PKI Issues¶

If both PAM and DNS appear to be correct, you should next validate that your PKI certificates are both valid and functional.

See Checking Your SIMP PKI Communication for additional guidance.

4.7.3. Checking Your SIMP PKI Communication¶

SIMP comes with a fully functional Public Key Infrastructure in the guise of an aptly named Fake CA.

The Fake CA can be very useful for getting your environment running prior to obtaining proper certificates from an official CA.

Warning

The Fake CA is not hardware backed by default and should not be used for sensitive cryptographic operations unless there is no other alternative

Each Puppet environment contains its own Fake CA and, therefore, you must know which environment is serving the systems that are having issues prior to proceeding.

For this section, we will assume that it is the ‘simp’ environment located at the active environment path.

Note

Just as with Puppet certificates, the time on your system must be correct and your DNS must be fully functional. Check that these are correct before proceeding.

For the remainder of this section, we will assume that the FQDN of the system with issues is ‘system.my.domain’ and the LDAP server to which it is attempting to connect is ‘ldap.my.domain’.

Navigate to the environment keydist directory and validate the system certificates.

When validating certificates, you want to make sure that there are no errors regarding your certificate or CA. Ideally, the command will simply return the string ‘OK’.

$ cd `puppet config print environmentpath`/simp/keydist

# Validate the client system
$ openssl verify -CApath cacerts system.my.domain

# Validate the LDAP system
$ openssl verify -CApath cacerts ldap.my.domain

If there are any issues, you may need to follow the steps in Apply Certificates to generate new certificates for one or more of your hosts.

4.7.4. Puppet Certificate Issues¶

4.7.4.1. Puppet Client Certificate Issues¶

Most of the time, clients will have certificate issues due to the system clock not being properly set. Before taking any other measures, make sure that your system clock is correct on both the mmaster and the clients!

If you need to fix client certificate issues outside of time, first make sure that you don’t have a certificate already in place on your Puppet server.

$ puppet cert list --all

If you do have a certificate in place, and need to register a client with the same name, remove that client’s certificate from the system.

$ puppet cert clean <fqdn.of.the.client>

Warning

If you delete the Puppet server’s certificate, you will need to re-deploy Puppet certificates to all of your nodes!

Warning

NEVER RUN ``puppet cert clean –all``

4.7.4.1.1. Puppet Client Re-Registration¶

If, for some reason, you need to re-register your client with a new server, simply run the following on your client once the server is ready.

$ rm -rf `puppet config print ssldir`
$ puppet agent -t

4.7.4.2. Puppet Server Certificate Issues¶

Warning

This is destructive to your Puppet communications. This should only be used if you have no other options.

If the Puppet server has certificate issues, regenerate the server CAs. To do this, remove the contents of the ssl folder and regenerate those .pem files.

The following table lists the steps to regenerate the server CAs:

$ service puppetserver stop
$ rm -rf /var/lib/puppet/ssl
$ puppet cert list --all
$ puppet cert --generate ***<fqdn>***
$ service puppetserver start
$ puppet agent --test

4.8. SIMP HOWTO Guides¶

This chapter provides guidance on configuration various common capabilities in the SIMP system.

4.8.1. HOWTO Setup Central Log Collection¶

This section covers methods of centralized log collection supported by SIMP.

4.8.1.1. Centralized Rsyslog¶

SIMP provides a pre-built set of classes within the rsyslog module for enabling centralized logging within the infrastructure.

There are no provisions here for setting up shared storage or deduplication. This is inherently not a use case that Rsyslog is well designed for and we suggest that you look at an alternative. We have incorporated the combination of Elasticsearch, Logstash, and Grafana (ELG) into the SIMP ecosystem as a well-known, Open Source, software collection.

4.8.1.1.1. Enable the Server¶

To enable the pre-built log server, add the following example code to the designated centralized logging node.

Code to Enable the Server Logging Examples

classes :
  - 'simp::rsyslog::stock'

4.8.1.1.2. Enable the Clients¶

To have clients send data to the server, make the following changes to the /etc/puppet/environments/simp/hieradata/simp_def.yaml file.

Code to Enable the Client Logging Examples:

log_server="fqdn.of.your.log.server"

4.8.1.2. Elasticsearch, Logstash, and Grafana¶

This chapter provides instruction for getting a basic configuration of Logstash working in a SIMP environment.

If these instructions don’t work for you, please take a look at the README in the SIMP Logstash module, particularly the acceptance tests in the spec/acceptance directory.

4.8.1.2.1. Obtaining the Required Packages¶

As an optional component in the SIMP infrastructure, the ELG packages are not included in the SIMP distribution.

You will need to proceed to the vendor sites to obtain the require RPMs and put them in an accessible YUM repository. The SIMP modules were designed with the assumption that you would be using a repository for all of your installations.

The following versions have been tested against the SIMP ELG Stack:

Elasticsearch : 2.3

Logstash : 2.3

Grafana : 3.1

4.8.1.2.2. Logstash¶

Logstash is an Open Source tool that provides a means for SIMP implementations to have logs and events collected, filtered, and forwarded to another host. SIMP comes with three separate but related modules. The modules are:

Logstash: Installs the RPMs and configuration needed for log inputs, filters, and outputs.
Grafana: Installs the RPMs and configuration needed for the Grafana web interface.
Elasticsearch: Installs the RPMs and configuration needed for Elasticsearch.

Warning

The Logstash class is incompatible with the SIMP rsyslog::stock::server class!

You cannot enable both of them on the same sever.

4.8.1.2.3. Logstash Architecture¶

The Logstash architecture is quite straightforward. It takes inputs from various sources, optionally applies filters, and outputs the results to a specified target. It’s likely that you can already forward logs to Logstash and output them in a useful format as part of your existing architecture.

Logstash filters can manipulate logs after ingest and before output. Examples of existing filters include fixing logs to split/combine lines, adding fields, normalizing time stamps, and adding GeoIP fields. Depending on the type of log manipulation that is desired, there is likely a filter and Logstash documentation that already exists.

4.8.1.2.4. SIMP Logstash Architecture¶

Combining the SIMP Logstash, Elasticsearch, and Grafana modules provides a functioning log collection, reduction, and search capability. Unless scale dictates otherwise, these three modules can easily be applied to a single host.

The intent of providing Logstash in SIMP is to replace the default Centralized Rsyslog server with a capability that is easier to search and analyze over time. Once your Logstash server is set up, you simply need to direct your hosts to forward logs to your Logstash server. In a default SIMP configuration, this can be done by setting the $log_server variable in Hiera.

It is up to each implementation to define and apply filters that meet their local requirements. While multiple output targets may be defined, SIMP only defines the Elasticsearch output by default. Please see the Elasticsearch Puppet module for details on how to define additional output targets.

The following diagram depicts the standard SIMP data flow through the Logstash system.

4.8.1.2.5. SIMP Logstash Deployment¶

4.8.1.2.5.1. Logstash, SIMP, and Security¶

The provided SIMP modules for Logstash, Elasticsearch, and Grafana have been built with connection security in mind. Overriding these settings could adversely affect the security of the logging infrastructure. The following list describes the security features in place with the default SIMP module settings:

Warning

The native (Java) Elasticsearch connections are not encrypted!

This will be remedied in the future as sufficient methods are found. Presently, you can look at the SIMP IPSec implementation to encrypt communication between your Elasticsearch nodes.

User Name and Password Protection for Grafana: The Grafana web can be exposed to a defined list of hosts. If you are connecting to Grafana from anything other than the localhost, a user name and password is required for authentication. Both LDAP and local database users are supported. By default, only an admin account is created. SIMP will automatically generate that password.

Syslog over Stunnel: The default behavior in SIMP is to encrypt syslog traffic using native :term`TLS` in rsyslog. The logstash syslog configuration is setup to listen on a stunnel port, which then forwards to the local logstash syslog listener. Unencrypted traffic is also supported for network devices.
Limiting Web Actions: The Grafana module restricts what HTTP commands a user can perform on the Elasticsearch data store. Full POST action must be given to the Logstash nodes and some nodes may require DELETE capabilities. Logstash hosts should be tightly controlled so that administrative users cannot modify data inside of Elasticsearch with carefully crafted commands. This is one reason that we use syslog on the local hosts.

Important

The Puppet modules for Logstash, Grafana, and Elasticsearch contain dozens of variables that may be manipulated.

You should read each product’s documentation and ensure you understand any setting that is changed from the default SIMP values. Changes can affect both security and functionality of the system.

4.8.1.2.6. Logstash Setup¶

4.8.1.2.6.1. Logstash System Requirements¶

The storage requirements for Logstash and Elasticsearch vary depending on how long you plan on keeping logs. When using Elasticsearch, the logs are formatted for Elasticsearch and stored in /var/elasticsearch. You can also configure how many days of data you wish to keep in Elasticsearch (keep_days => '99'). Therefore, you should ensure you have enough space on /var to keep your defined number of days worth of logs.

As you grow your Elasticsearch cluster to handle increasing log loads, you will want to ensure that your keep_days is set to handle your entire cluster appropriately.

Note

You should have at least 4G of memory available on any Elasticsearch node.

Important

It is not advised to install the ELG stack on your Puppet management infrastructure as both tend to use large amounts of system resources.

4.8.1.2.6.2. Recommended SIMP Logstash Setup¶

The following example can be applied to a single host with a large /var volume and 4GB of memory.

You can extend and replicate this setup on as many systems as necessary to provide ingest and dashboard redundancy. Alternatively, you can split Grafana and Logstash to do allow greater resource dedication.

We do recommend that you have an Elasticsearch node on the Logstash system to reduce the likelihood that Logstash will hang when trying to find a non-existent storage node.

Optimization of your Elasticsearch infrastructure depends on many factors and should be handled once you decide how far your systems is going to expand. Please be aware that scaling is highly dependent on how your actually use your cluster in production.

We would recommend a search on Elasticsearch Scaling prior to setting up your initial cluster.

---
# Add these settings to your Logstash node

## Set up Logstash ##

# This is required due to a bug in the 'elastic' logstash module
logstash::logstash_user : 'logstash'
logstash::logstash_group : 'logstash'

# Listen on unencrypted UDP for legacy network devices

simp_logstash::input::syslog::listen_plain_udp

# Send all output to the local Elasticsearch instance

simp_logstash::outputs :
  - 'elasticsearch'

# Keep 30 days of logs

simp_logstash::clean::keep_days: '30'

## Set up Elasticsearch ##

# Make this unique per cluster!

simp_elasticsearch::cluster_name : 'some_unique_cluster_name'

# We're assuming that you only have one interface here. If you don't, set
# this to the appropriate value for your system

simp_elasticsearch::bind_host : "%{::ipaddress}"

# This needs to be a list of *all* of the Elasticsearch nodes in the cluster.
# This is done to restrict communications to only trusted nodes
#
# Any node not entered here will not be connected to and will not be allowed
# to communicate with this host.
#
# SIMP does not support multicast connectivity for security reasons.

# You need to add your grafana hosts to the apache ACL
simp_elasticsearch::http_method_acl :
  'limits' :
    'hosts' :
      'grafana.%{::domain}' : 'defaults'

simp_elasticsearch::unicast_hosts :
  - "%{::fqdn}:9300"
  - "es1.%{::domain}:9300"
  - "es2.%{::domain}:9300"

## Classes that you need to include for this setup

classes:
  - 'simp_elasticsearch'
  - 'simp_logstash'
  # Include this if you wish to auto-purge your Elasticsearch records
  - 'simp_logstash::clean'

4.8.1.2.6.3. Deploying Additional Elasticsearch Nodes¶

In the case of the Elasticsearch node setup below, it may be better to use a group match to pull your Hiera settings. To do this, you should add the following to your site.pp file for your environment.

if $trusted['certname'] =~ /es\d+\.your\.domain/ {
  $hostgroup = 'elasticsearch'
}

Then, ensure that a file called ‘elasticsearch.yaml’ is present in the /etc/puppet/hieradata/hostgroups/ directory and contains the following content.

---
# All nodes running elasticsearch in your cluster should use
# these settings.

simp_elasticsearch::cluster_name: 'some_unique_cluster_name'

# The replicas can be no more than the total number of Elasticsearch nodes
# that you have in your cluster.

simp_elasticsearch::replicas: '2'

simp_elasticsearch::unicast_hosts :
  - "%{::fqdn}:9300"
  - "es1.%{::domain}:9300"
  - "es2.%{::domain}:9300"

classes:
  - 'simp_elasticsearch'

Make sure you point your clients to the Logstash server by setting the log_server variable to the fqdn of the Logstash server in Hiera. You will also need to set rsyslog::enable_tls_logging: true to ensure logs are sent to Logstash stunnel listener.

4.8.1.2.6.4. Deploying Grafana¶

Now that you have a functional logging setup, you’ll probably want to deploy a GUI to provide the ability to generate user dashboards as well as dynamic log analysis.

The SIMP team chose to support the Open Source Grafana project due to its builtin authentication and access control support. While the Grafana is great at visualizing data, it can be challenging to explore your logs. You could easily point Kibana or another tool of your choosing at your Elasticsearch cluster. You could also install Kibana alongside Grafana. Since Kibana does not offer (free and open source) access control, you can configure Kibana to listen to local host only and tightly control who can SSH to your Kibana node.

Note

By default, the Grafana administrative password is randomly set using simplib passgen(). You can use the simp passgen command to obtain the password for your environment.

Note

The rubygem-toml package must be present on your puppet compile servers for the Grafana puppet module to function properly.

On your puppet master, you can install the toml gem by i executing puppetserver gem install toml.

If you do not install this via Kickstart, you will need two runs of Puppet to complete the Grafana installation since the TOML Ruby Gem will not be able to be installed prior to Puppet loading.

Warning

Do not point Grafana directly at your Elasticsearch node unless you have a single-node deployment.

Grafana has the ability to put extreme loads on your Elasticsearch infrastructure with poorly formed queries and should be connected to a node that is not used for ingest. This is also helps prevent any vulnerabilities in Grafana from providing direct access to your Elasticsearch infrastructure.

Targeting your Grafana host or hostgroup, apply the following Hiera settings.

---
# Array of networks that are allowed to access your Grafana dashboard. Uses
# the standard SIMP 'client_nets' semantics.
#
# In this case, we're allowing everyone in and trusting that Grafana will do
# its job properly.

simp_grafana::client_nets:
  - 'ALL'

classes:
  - 'simp_grafana'

After your Puppet run, you should be able to connect to port 8443 on your Grafana host and authenticate with the administrative user.

4.8.1.2.6.4.1. Grafana LDAP Integration¶

SIMP uses Grafana roles and maps them to LDAP groups to provide access control.

When you apply the SIMP Grafana class, Grafana will be configured for LDAP authentication (if you are using SIMP LDAP). The table below describes the Grafana roles.

Grafana Roles¶
Grafana Role	SIMP LDAP Role	Permissions
Viewer	simp_grafana_viewers	Can only view dashboards, not save / create them.
Read Only Editors	simp_grafana_editors_ro	Can edit graphs and queries but not save dashboards.
Editor	simp_grafana_editors	Can view, update and create dashboards.
Admin	simp_grafana_admins	Everything an Editor can plus edit and add data sources and organization users.

All that remains is to create the LDAP groups and assign users to those groups. An example of creating the viewers group would be:

dn: cn=simp_grafana_viewers,ou=Group,dc=your,dc=domain
objectClass: posixGroup
objectClass: top
cn: simp_grafana_viewers
gidNumber: <Unique GID number>
description: "Grafana Viewers"

You would then add users to that group using:

dn: cn=simp_grafana_viewers,ou=Group,dc=your,dc=domain
changetype: modify
add: memberUid
memberUid: <UID1>
memberUid: <UID2>
...
memberUid: <UIDX>

More information on managing LDAP users can be found in the User Management section. Refer to the simp_grafana module for additional information on using the puppet module to manage Grafana LDAP configuration.

4.8.1.2.6.4.2. Grafana Dashboards¶

SIMP can optionally install default Grafana dashboards. To install the dashboards, use hiera to apply simp_grafana::simp_dashboards: true to your grafana node. They will be installed in /var/lib/grafana/dashboards. The dashboards are read-only. If you want to modify them, save each one with a different name.

4.8.2. HOWTO Change Puppet Masters¶

It may be necessary to change the Puppet Master. To point a particular client to a new Puppet Master, follow the steps in the sections below.

4.8.2.1. On the Client¶

Enter the following changes into the /etc/puppet/puppet.conf file.

Code Changes on Client to Switch Puppet Masters

server = new.puppet.master.fqdn
ca_server = new.puppet.master.fqdn
ca_port = 8141

To remove all files and sub-directories in the /var/lib/puppet/ssl directory, type cd /var/lib/puppet/ssl. Then type rm -rf ./*.

Assuming the new Puppet Master has been set up to properly accept the client, type puppet agent --test to run a full Puppet run while pointing to the new server.

If all goes well, the client will now be synchronized with the new Puppet Master. If not, refer to the SIMP Server Installation section of the SIMP Install Guide and ensure that the new Puppet Master was set up properly.

4.8.2.2. On the Old Puppet Master¶

Remove or comment out all items for the client node in the /etc/puppet/environments/simp/hieradata/hosts space.

To run puppet agent in noop mode to ensure that there are no inadvertent errors, type puppet agent --test --noop.

4.8.3. HOWTO Disable DHCP¶

If you have an existing infrastructure and do not want to use SIMP as a DHCP server, here is how to disable it:

In the host yaml file for your SIMP server, set the following variable in Hiera:

simp::kickstart_server::manage_dhcp: false

Alternatively, if you don’t want SIMP to be a kickstart server, either, just remove simp::kickstart_server from your SIMP host’s yaml file.

4.8.4. HOWTO Disable Named¶

If you already have an authoritative DNS server on your network, make sure your DNS server list in hieradata/simp_def.yaml doesn’t include your machine’s local IP address. SIMP should automatically turn off the named service.

However, if you are running an alternative DNS provider on SIMP and need to keep your IP address in resolve.conf, set simplib::resolv::named_autoconf: false in Hiera.

4.8.5. HOWTO Discard Mail to Root¶

In many environments, you may have a central log collection facility, such as Logstash, for analyzing your log data. In this case, you may want to disable the default behavior of sending all e-mail to root.

The simplest method of discarding root’s e-mail is to redirect it to /dev/null on the system using the following Puppet code.

Warning

This is a very brute force approach and should only be used if you are absolutely sure that you want to discard all of root’s e-mail on your systems.

::postfix::alias { 'root':
  values => '/dev/null'
}

4.8.6. HOWTO Build a Bootable DVD from the SIMP tarball¶

SIMP is an overlay on top of Enterprise Linux, not a complete distribution. As such, you must build a bootable DVD if provided with the SIMP source code or tar file following the steps below.

4.8.6.1. Build the DVD¶

The table below lists the steps to build a SIMP DVD, assuming that you have copied the DVD to a location with enough space to house and unpack the ISO (around 10G).

Starting from the directory with the ISO, complete the steps outlined below. These steps are based on an example ISO of rhel-server-6.7-x86_64-dvd.iso.

Type

for file in `isoinfo -Rf -i rhel-server-6.7-x86_64-dvd.iso | \
  tac`; do mkdir -p RHEL6.7-x86_64`dirname $file`; \
  isoinfo -R -x $file -i rhel-server-6.7-x86_64-dvd.iso > RHEL6.7-x86_64$file; done

Type tar -C RHEL6.7-x86_64 -xzf ***<SIMP tarball>***
Type

mkisofs -o SIMP-6.7-***<SIMP Version>-x86_64.iso \***
  -b isolinux/isolinux.bin -c boot.cat -no-emul-boot -boot-load-size 4 \
  -boot-info-table -R -m TRANS.TBL -uid 0 -gid 0 RHEL6.7-x86_64

The fully bootable SIMP DVD is ready to install on a new system. Replace the RHEL version and architecture to fit the user’s needs. See the Changelog for compatible RHEL versions.

4.8.6.2. Use the Alternative Method¶

If the Ruby rake utility is installed, use the Rakefile provided in the Docs/examples directory of the tar file.

4.8.7. HOWTO Exclude YUM Repositories¶

By default, SIMP applies updates from all available repositories on a nightly basis. This ensures that bug fixes and security updates are applied to all systems without minute management in Puppet manifests. This section provides guidance on how to include or exclude specific repositories from nightly YUM updates.

4.8.7.1. Methodology¶

The common::yum_schedule::repos and common::yum_schedule::disable variables in the pupmod-common module control which repositories are enabled for nightly updating. Both variables must be specified in array format.

common::yum_schedule::repos is used to specify an array of repositories from which updates are provided; no other repositories will be used.

common::yum_schedule::disable is used to specify an array of repositories from which updates are not provided; all other repositories will be used.

4.8.8. HOWTO Enable The Foreman¶

This chapter gives instruction for getting a basic configuration of Foreman working in a SIMP environment for monitoring purposes.

Note

The existance of this module does not mean SIMP recommends Foreman above any other monitoring tool for use with SIMP.

4.8.8.1. The pupmod-simp-foreman Module¶

The simp-foreman module is intended to install Foreman onto an existing and configured SIMP puppet master. Unlike the Foreman installation tool, it will not erase your Puppet configuration. It provides a functioning Foreman web UI and is capable of handling smart-proxies, LDAP authentication, and Foreman user management. Puppet reports are sent to the foreman reporting tool where they are displayed in the default dashboard.

Note

For this release, only the monitoring-based services are supported. Foreman’s provisioning software has not been incorporated.

Note

All aspects of this module are known to work with SELinux in enforcing mode.

Warning

The Foreman does not run with FIPS mode enabled due to the use of the MD5 libraries by ActiveRecord. You can track the associated bug report as Issue 3511 in the Foreman Redmine.

4.8.8.2. Foreman Setup¶

Before installing the simp-foreman module, make sure you have read the Foreman documentation: Foreman. You will need to understand how to configure and use its monitoring feature. This documentation will also provide the current system requirements for Foreman.

This installation and the instructions install Foreman on the Puppet server and configured it to use one Puppet server. You will have to change the installation to get it working on larger systems or if you want to install it on another server. Read the Foreman Documentation for help with that.

4.8.8.2.1. Configure and Install repositories¶

Some repositories and software collections must be imported to use the Foreman module. They are as follows.

Foreman - http://yum.theforeman.org/releases/

Foreman-plugins - http://yum.theforeman.org/plugins/

V3814 - https://www.softwarecollections.org/en/scls/rhscl/v8314/

Httpd24 - https://www.softwarecollections.org/en/scls/rhscl/httpd24/

Ruby 193 - https://www.softwarecollections.org/en/scls/rhscl/ruby193/

For RedHat and CentOS systems

EPEL - http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/EPEL/FAQ#How_can_I_install_the_packages_from_the_EPEL_software_repository.3F

4.8.8.2.2. Configure SIMP to install Foreman¶

In order to setup the Foreman web UI, you’ll want to set the following in Hiera:

In hosts/<puppet-server>.<your-domain>.yaml, add the following:

# By default, the admin user password will be autogenerated and nonsensical looking.
# Set that here if you wish to have control over it.
foreman::admin_password : 'No one will never hack this!'
# These are the hosts that will connect to your Foreman proxy. You'll want to make sure
# all hosts who are reporting to Foreman appear here.
foreman::proxy::trusted_hosts :
  - your.first.host
  - your.second.host
  - your.nth.host

 # Make sure reporting is turned on in Puppet!
 pupmod::report : true

 # Include the classes to install foreman. (Obviously include all other necessary classes
 # for this host.
 classes:
   - foreman
   - site::foreman

4.8.8.2.3. Configuring Foreman to use LDAP¶

If you have LDAP configured in your SIMP and want to use it to access Foreman, add something like the following to a a site manifest (i.e. /etc/puppet/environments/production/modules/site/manifest/foreman.pp):

class site::foreman {
  foreman::auth_source { 'my_awesome_ldap_server':
     ldap_server =>  'LDAPserver.your.domain',
     onthefly_register => true
  }
  foreman::user { 'amazing.user':
    auth_source => 'my_awesome_ldap_server',
    web_admin   => true,
    firstname   => 'Amazing',
    lastname    => 'User',
    password    => 'MyPassword'
  }
}

This class assumes foreman has already been included somewhere. Add ‘include foreman’ as the first line inside of the class if that is not true

The first section, foreman::auth_source, will configure Foreman to use your LDAP server. The setting “onthefly_register” configures Foreman to create a user from the user’s LDAP entry when they log into the web site the first time. By default a user is assigned the role of “ANONYMOUS,” which will give them an error when they log in. To prevent this you should use the Foreman administration interface to create User Groups. You link these groups to “Roles” and LDAP Groups. Then users in the appropriate LDAP group will get role linked to that group. See the Foreman users guide “Linking User Groups to LDAP” section for more information.

The second section, foreman::user, can be used to create foreman users in the Foreman database (if you are using LDAP, you don’t need this). If you add a user here and they are in LDAP, the password setting will be over written by the password in LDAP. It will error out if you don’t have a value for password. It will set it to the password value only if can not contact LDAP.

4.8.8.2.4. Finish the install¶

The three steps above should get you a working instance. Puppet must run several times to complete the install. Once Puppet runs cleanly, refer to the Foreman Documentation at http://www.theforman.org/ for information on further configuration options.

4.8.8.3. Troubleshooting¶

4.8.8.3.1. Rubygem errors during installation¶

If you get errors during installation that rubygems are the wrong version, you probably forgot to set up the epel repository. Foreman installs its own version of ruby and needs access to epel repositories.

4.8.8.3.2. Collecting Facts¶

If you want to collect facts, you will need to get a copy /etc/puppet/nodes.rb from the forman site (see the facts section of the foreman documentation) edit the foreman cron job under /etc/cron.d and uncomment out the collection and give puppet the right to run cron jobs. To give puppet the right to run cronjobs add the following code to your forman.pp manifest under site:

pam::access::manage { 'foreman-puppet':
   users   => 'puppet',
   origins => ['cron']
}

4.8.8.3.3. Foreman Not Running¶

If you get the error

Error: Could not send report: Error 400 on SERVER: Could not autoload foreman: Class Foreman is already defined in Puppet::Reports

This is due to the foreman report module crashing and not unloading properly. Puppet won’t let it reload. This is a problem in Puppet 3.8. The only way you can fix it is to restart puppet. See: https://tickets.puppetlabs.com/browse/PUP-1189

4.8.8.3.4. Reports Not Collecting¶

If your reports are not collecting and you get an error like this in the /var/log/foreman/production.log:

“No smart proxy server found on [“puppet.your.domain”] and is not in trusted_puppetmaster_hosts”

Then you will need to set the trusted_puppetmaster_hosts setting in /etc/foreman/settings.yaml to point to your puppet server. (it should default to your puppet server but if you have more than one or have moved the foreman to another server it may error out.

You can set this variable by adding:

foreman::trusted_puppetmaster_hosts : "<your puppet server>"

to the hiera yaml file for the foreman server.

4.8.9. HOWTO Configure NFS¶

This chapter describes multiple configurations of NFS including:

Exporting Non-Home Directories
Exporting home directories
Enabling Stunnel
Enabling krb5

All implementations are based on pupmod-simp-nfs and pupmod-simp-simp.

4.8.9.1. Exporting Non-Home Directories ¶

Goal: Export /srv/nfs_share on the server, mount as /mnt/nfs on the client.

4.8.9.1.1. default.yaml ¶

nfs::server:            "your.server.fqdn"
nfs::server::client_ips: "%{alias('client_nets')}"
nfs::simp_iptables:      true
nfs::simp_krb5:          false

4.8.9.1.2. Server ¶

In site/manifests/nfs_server.pp:

class site::nfs_server {
  include '::nfs'

  file { '/srv/nfs_share':
    ensure => 'directory',
    owner  => 'root',
    group  => 'root',
    mode   => '0644'
  }

  nfs::server::export { 'nfs4_root':
    client      => ['*'],
    export_path => '/srv/nfs_share',
    sec         => ['sys'],
  }

  File['/srv/nfs_share'] -> Nfs::Server::Export['nfs4_root']
 }

In hosts/<your_server_fqdn>.yaml:

nfs::is_server: true

classes:
  - 'site::nfs_server'

4.8.9.1.3. Client ¶

In site/manifests/nfs_client.pp:

class site::nfs_client {
  include '::nfs'

  file { '/mnt/nfs':
    ensure => 'directory',
    mode => '755',
    owner => 'root',
    group => 'root'
  }

  mount { "/mnt/nfs":
    ensure  => 'mounted',
    fstype  => 'nfs4',
    device  => '<your_server_fqdn>:/srv/nfs_share',
    options => 'sec=sys'
  }

  File['/mnt/nfs'] -> Mount['/mnt/nfs']
 }

In hosts/<your_client_fqdn>.yaml:

nfs::is_server: false

classes:
  - 'site::nfs_client'

4.8.9.2. Exporting home directories ¶

Goal: Export home directories for LDAP users.

Utilize three stock classes from pupmod-simp-simp:

simp::export_home : Configures an NFS server to share centralized home directories using NFSv4

simp::home_client : Configures an NFS client to point at the server created by simp::export_home.

simp::create_home_dirs : Optional hourly cron that binds to a LDAP server, ldap::uri by default, and creates a NFS home directory for all users in the LDAP server. Also expires any home directories for users that no longer exist in LDAP.

Note

The NFS deamon may take time to reload after module application. If your users do not have home directories immediately after application or it takes a while to log in, don’t panic!

Note

Any users logged onto a host at the time of module application will not have their home directories re-mounted until they log out and log back in.

4.8.9.2.1. default.yaml ¶

nfs::server:             "your.server.fqdn"
nfs::server::client_ips: "%{alias('client_nets')}"
nfs::simp_iptables:      true
nfs::simp_krb5:          false

4.8.9.2.2. Server ¶

nfs::is_server: true
simp::nfs::export_home::create_home_dirs: true

classes:
  - 'simp::nfs::export_home'
  - 'simp::nfs::home_client'

4.8.9.2.3. Client ¶

nfs::is_server: false

classes:
  - 'simp::nfs::home_client'

4.8.9.3. Enabling Stunnel ¶

If you wish to encrypt your NFS data using stunnel, set the following in default.yaml:

nfs::use_stunnel : true

4.8.9.4. Enabling krb5 ¶

Warning

This functionality is incomplete. See ticket SIMP-1400 in our JIRA Bug Tracking . Until that ticket is resolved, it is HIGHLY recommended you continue to use stunnel for encrypted nfs traffic.

4.8.9.4.1. default.yaml ¶

classes:
  - 'krb5::keytab'

nfs::server:             "your.server.fqdn"
nfs::server::client_ips: "%{alias('client_nets')}"
nfs::simp_iptables:      true
nfs::secure_nfs:         true
simp_krb5:               true


krb5::kdc::auto_keytabs::global_services:
  - 'nfs'

4.8.9.4.2. Server ¶

nfs::is_server: true
simp::nfs::export_home::create_home_dirs: true

classes:
  - 'simp::nfs::export_home'
  - 'simp::nfs::home_client'
  - 'krb5::kdc'

4.8.9.4.3. Client ¶

nfs::is_server: false

classes:
  - 'simp::nfs::home_client'

4.8.10. HOWTO Configure IPTables NAT Rules¶

See the IPtables Module Reference for notes on using the basic IPtables Module.

4.8.10.1. Add NAT Rules¶

The user may be required to add Network Address Translation (NAT) rules to the IPtables ruleset. To achieve this using the IPtables module, SIMP 1.1.3 or later is required and the iptables::add_rules input statement should be used to affect the appropriate changes.

The example below shows an IPtable NAT rule.

Example of an IPtable NAT Rule

 iptables::add_rules { "nat_global":
    table => "nat",
    first => "true",
    absolute => "true",
    header => "false",
    content => "
    :PREROUTING ACCEPT [0:0]
    :POSTROUTING ACCEPT [0:0]
    :OUTPUT ACCEPT [0:0]
    "
  }

iptables::add_rules { "nat_test":
    table   => "nat",
    header  => "false",
    content => "
    -A PREROUTING --physdev-in
    eth1 -j DROP
    "
  }

4.8.11. HOWTO Enable Kerberos¶

For the latest documentation, see the documentation in the SIMP KRB5 Puppet Module.

The module helps administrators get a working KDC in place and clients configured to use the KDC.

The module, by default, sets up a fully functional KDC in your environment and generates keytabs for one admin user, and all of your hosts that it can discover via keydist.

Note

The keydist discovery only works if the KDC is on the same system as your Puppet Server!

4.8.11.1. Beginning with krb5¶

The following sections give a brief guide on how to get started, for more information, please see the official Red Hat documentation.

Note

You can skip this section if you’re using the default settings. These will complete the following for you with randomly generated passwords for all keytabs and the master password.

4.8.11.2. Usage¶

4.8.11.2.1. Creating Admin Principals¶

4.8.11.2.1.1. ACL Configuration¶

The following Puppet code snippet will create an ACL for your admin user that is probably appropriate for your organization.

krb5_acl{ "${::domain}_admin":
 principal       => "*/admin@${::domain}",
 operation_mask  => '*'
}

4.8.11.2.1.2. Create Your Admin Principal¶

Your first principal will be an admin principal and will be allowed to manage the environment since it is in the admin group. This must be created on the KDC system.

Run the following command, as root, to create your principal:

# /usr/sbin/kadmin.local -r YOUR.DOMAIN -q "addprinc <username>/admin"

You can now do everything remotely using this principal. Load it using

$ /usr/bin/kinit <username>/admin

4.8.11.2.2. Creating Host Principals¶

Before you can really do anything with your hosts, you need to ensure that the host itself has a keytab.

SIMP uses the /etc/puppet/keydist directory for each host to securely distribute keytabs to the clients.

On the KDC, generate a principal for each host in your environment using the following command:

# /usr/sbin/kadmin.local -r YOUR.DOMAIN -q 'addprinc -randkey host/<fqdn>'

4.8.11.2.2.1. Create Your Keytabs¶

Then, create a separate keytab file for each of your created hosts using the following command:

# /usr/sbin/kadmin.local -r YOUR.DOMAIN -q 'ktadd -k <fqdn>.keytab host/<fqdn>'

4.8.11.2.3. Propagate the Keytabs¶

Move all of the resulting keytab files SECURELY to <environment_dir>/keydist/<fqdn>/keytabs on the Puppet server as appropriate for each file.

Note

Make sure that all of your keytab directories are readable by the group puppet and not the entire world!

Then, update your node declarations to include ‘::krb5::keytab’.

Once the Puppet Agent runs on the clients, your keytabs will copied to /etc/krb5_keytabs. The keytab matching your fqdn will be set in place as the default system keytab.

4.8.12. HOWTO Manage Workstation Infrastructures¶

This chapter describes how to manage client workstations with a SIMP system including GUIs, repositories, virtualization, Network File System (NFS), printing, and Virtual Network Computing (VNC).

4.8.12.1. User Workstation Setup¶

Below is an example class, /etc/puppet/environments/simp/modules/site/manifests/workstation.pp, that could be used to set up a user workstation.

class site::workstation {
  include 'site::gui'
  include 'site::repos'
  include 'site::virt'
  include 'site::automount'
  include 'site::print::client'

  # Make sure everyone can log into all nodes.
  # If you want to change this, simply remove this line and add
  # individual entries to your nodes as appropriate
  pam::access::manage { "Allow Users":
    comment => 'Allow all users in the "users" group to access the system from anywhere.',
    users   => '(users)',
    origins => ['ALL']
  }

  # General Use Packages
  package { [
    'pidgin',
    'git',
    'control-center-extra',
    'gconf-editor',
    'evince',
    'libreoffice-writer',
    'libreoffice-xsltfilter',
    'libreoffice-calc',
    'libreoffice-impress',
    'libreoffice-emailmerge',
    'libreoffice-base',
    'libreoffice-math',
    'libreoffice-pdfimport',
    'bluefish',
    'gnome-media',
    'pulseaudio',
    'file-roller',
    'inkscape',
    'gedit-plugins',
    'planner'
  ]: ensure => 'latest'
  }
}

4.8.12.2. Graphical Desktop Setup¶

Below is an example manifest called /etc/puppet/environments/simp/modules/site/manifests/gui.pp for setting up a graphical desktop on a user workstation.

class site::gui {
  include 'xwindows::gdm'
  include 'windowmanager::gnome'
  include 'vnc::client'

   # Compiz Stuff
  package { [
    'fusion-icon',
    'emerald-themes',
    'compiz-fusion-extras',
    'compiz-fusion-extras-gnome',
    'vinagre'
  ]:
    ensure => 'latest'
  }
}

4.8.12.3. Workstation Repositories¶

Below is an example manifest called /etc/puppet/environments/simp/modules/site/manifests/repos.pp for setting up workstation repositories.

class site::repos {
  # Whatever local yumrepo statements you need for installing
  # your packages and keeping your systems up to date
}

4.8.12.4. Virtualization on User Workstations¶

Below is an example manifest called /etc/puppet/environments/simp/modules/site/manifests/virt.pp for allowing virtualization on a user workstation.

# We allow users to run VMs on their workstations.
# If you don't want this, just don't include this class.
# If this is installed, VM creation and management is still limited by PolicyKit

class site::virt {
  include 'libvirt::kvm'
  include 'libvirt::ksm'
  include 'network::redhat'

  network::redhat::add_eth { "em1":
    bridge => 'br0',
    hwaddr => $::macaddress_em1
  }

  network::redhat::add_eth { "br0":
    net_type => 'Bridge',
    hwaddr => $::macaddress_em1,
    require => Network::Redhat::Add_eth["em1"]
  }

  common::swappiness::conf { 'default':
    high_swappiness => '80',
    max_swappiness => '100'
  }

  # If 80% of memory is used, flush caches.
  exec { 'flush_cache_himem':

    command => '/bin/echo 1 > /proc/sys/vm/drop-caches',
    onlyif => inline_template("/bin/<%= memoryfree.split(/\s/)[0].
    to_f/memorysize.split(/\s/)[0].to_f < 0.2 ? true : false %>")
  }

  package { 'virt-manager': ensure => 'latest' }
}

4.8.12.5. Network File System¶

Below is an example manifest called /etc/puppet/environments/simp/modules/site/automount.pp for Network File System setup.

#If you are not using NFS, you do not need to include this.

class site::automount {
  include '::autofs'

  file { '/net':
    ensure => 'directory',
    mode   => '0755'
  }

  #A global share
  Autofs::map::master { ‘share’:
    mount_point => ‘/net’,
    map_name    => ‘/etc/autofs/share.map’
  }

  #Map the share
  autofs::map::entry { ‘share’:
    options  => ‘-fstype=nfs4, port=2049.soft’,
    location => “${::nfs_server}:/share’,
    Target   => ‘share’
  }
}

4.8.12.6. Printer Setup¶

Below are example manifests for setting up a printing environment.

4.8.12.6.1. Setting up a Print Client¶

Below is an example manifest called /etc/puppet/environments/simp/modules/site/manifests/print/client.pp for setting up a print client.

class site::print::client inherits site::print::server {
  polkit::local_authority { 'print_support':
    identity                 => ['unix_group:*'],
    action                   => 'org.opensuse.cupskhelper.mechanism.*',
    section_name       => 'Allow all print management permissions',
    result_any            => 'yes',
    result_interactive => 'yes',
    result_active         => 'yes'
  }

  package { 'cups-pdf': ensure => 'latest' }
  package { 'cups-pk-helper': ensure => 'latest' }
  package { 'system-config-printer': ensure => 'present' }
}

4.8.12.6.2. Setting up a Print Server¶

Below is an example manifest called /etc/puppet/environments/simp/modules/site/manifests/print/server.pp for setting up a print server.

class site::print::server {

  # Note, this is *not* set up for being a central print server.
  # You'll need to add the appropriate IPTables rules for that to work.
  package { 'cups': ensure => 'latest' }

  service { 'cups':
    enable     => 'true',
    ensure     => 'running',
    hasrestart => 'true',
    hasstatus  => 'true',
    require    => Package['cups']
  }
}

4.8.12.7. VNC Setup¶

Virtual Network Computing (VNC) is a tool that is used to manage desktops and workstations remotely through the standard setup or a proxy.

4.8.12.7.1. VNC Standard Setup¶

Note

You must have the pupmod-simp-vnc RPM installed to use VNC on your system!

To enable remote access via VNC on the system, include vnc::server in Hiera for the node.

The default VNC setup that comes with SIMP can only be used over SSH and includes three default settings:

Setting Type

Setting Details

Standard

Port: 5901

Resolution: 1024x768@16

Low Resolution

Port: 5902

Resolution: 800x600@16

High Resolution

Port: 5903

Resolution: 1280x1024@16

Table: VNC Default Settings

To connect to any of these settings, SSH into the system running the VNC server and provide a tunnel to 127.0.0.1:<VNC Port>. Refer to the SSH client’s documentation for specific instructions.

To set up additional VNC port settings, refer to the code in /etc/puppet/environments/simp/modules/vnc/manifests/server.pp for examples.

Important

Multiple users can log on to the same system at the same time with no adverse effects; however, none of these sessions are persistent.

To maintain a persistent VNC session, use the vncserver application on the remote host. Type man vncserver to reference the manual for additional details.

4.8.12.7.2. VNC Through a Proxy¶

The section describes the process to VNC through a proxy. This setup provides the user with a persistent VNC session.

Important

In order for this setup to work, the system must have a VNC server (vserver.your.domain), a VNC client (vclnt.your.domain), and a proxy (proxy.your.domain). A vuser account must also be set up as the account being used for the VNC. The vuser is a common user that has access to the server, client, and proxy.

4.8.12.7.2.1. Modify Puppet¶

If definitions for the machines involved in the VNC do not already exist in Hiera, create an /etc/puppet/environments/simp/hieradata/hosts/vserv.your.domain.yaml file. In the client hosts file, modify or create the entries shown in the examples below. These additional modules will allow vserv to act as a VNC server and vclnt to act as a client.

VNC Server node

# vserv.your.domain.yaml
classes:
  - 'windowmanager::gnome'
  - 'mozilla::firefox'
  - 'vnc::server'

VNC client node

# vclnt.your.domain.yaml
classes:
  - 'windowmanager::gnome'
  - 'mozilla::firefox'
  - 'vnc::client'

4.8.12.7.2.2. Run the Server¶

As vuser on vserv.your.domain, type vncserver.

The output should mirror the following:

New ‘vserv.your.domain:<Port Number> (vuser)’ desktop is vserv.your.domain:<Port Number>

Starting applications specified in /home/vuser/.vnc/xstartup Log file is /home/vuser/.vnc/vserv.your.domain:<Port Number>.log

Note

Remember the port number; it will be needed to set up an SSH tunnel.

4.8.12.7.2.3. Set up an SSH Tunnel¶

Set up a tunnel from the client (vclnt), through the proxy server (proxy), to the server (vserv). The table below lists the steps to set up the tunnel.

On the workstation, type ssh -l vuser -L 590***<Port Number>*:localhost:590***<Port Number>***proxy.your.domain**

Note

This command takes the user to the proxy.

On the proxy, type ssh -l vuser -L 590***<Port Number>*:localhost:590***<Port Number>***vserv.your.domain**

Note

This command takes the user to the VNC server.

Table: Set Up SSH Tunnel Procedure

Note

The port number in 590<Port Number> is the same port number as previously described. For example, if the <Port Number> was 6, then all references below to 590<Port Number> become 5906.

4.8.12.7.2.4. Set Up Clients¶

On vclnt.your.domain, type vncviewer localhost:590\ ***<Port Number>*** to open the Remote Desktop viewer.

4.8.12.7.3. Troubleshooting VNC Issues¶

If nothing appears in the terminal window, X may have crashed. To determine if this is the case, type ps -ef | grep XKeepsCrashing

If any matches result, stop the process associated with the command and try to restart vncviewer on vclnt.your.domain.

4.8.13. HOWTO Kickstart the Initial Server¶

This section provides guidance to install the initial SIMP server via an existing kickstart infrastructure.

4.8.13.1. Prepare the Kickstart¶

To kickstart the initial server, copy the netboot.cfg file into the kickstart location from ks/ at the root level of the extracted DVD.

Replace the KS_SERVER and KS_BASE variables in the netboot.cfg file to match the system settings.

4.8.13.2. Kickstart the System¶

Kickstart the system against the netboot.cfg file; this will build a functional SIMP server identical to the one that the user would have received from the DVD.

4.8.13.3. Post-Installation¶

This section describes the post installation procedures to use the server.

4.8.13.3.1. Setting up the new YUM repo¶

All of the SIMP systems must be able to reference two YUM locations after install. The first is the Local repo, which is spawned from the Local directory at the top of the DVD. This is expected to be referenced as http://yum_server/yum/SIMP/<Architecture> by the clients.

The second location is the Updates repo, which contains a repo with all of the base operating system RPMs. This is expected to be referenced as http://yum_server/yum/(RedHat|CentOS)/<Version>/<Architecture>/Updates by the clients.

The user is responsible for adjusting these locations in the pre-existing system; however, the table below lists the steps to adjust these locations on the newly built SIMP server.

Note

These steps assume that the SIMP DVD material is copied in its unpacked form to the /srv/SIMP directory and that the version unpacked is RHEL 5.8. Adjust the paths appropriately if the CentOS or 5.7 version is being used.

Copy the entire SIMP DVD material to the SIMP server.
Type cd /srv;
Type mkdir -p www/yum/RedHat/5.8/x86_64;
Type mv /srv/SIMP/SIMP www/yum;
Type mv /srv/SIMP/ks www;
Type cd www/yum/RedHat
Type ln -s 5.8 6; and then cd 5.8/x86_64; to be able to move to newer versions more easily.
Type mkdir Updates;
Type cd Updates;
Type find .. -type f -name “*.rpm” -exec ln -s {} \;
Type createrepo -p .
Type cd /var/www/yum/SIMP;
Type updaterepos;
Type chown -R root.apache /var/www;
Type chmod -R u+rwX,g+rX,o-rwx /var/www;
Enter the following commands into the command line to adjust the file.

cat << EOF >> /etc/yum.repos.d/filesystem.repo
[flocal-x86_64]
name=Local within the filesystem
baseurl=file:///var/www/yum/SIMP/x86_64
enabled=1
gpgcheck=0
EOF

Enter the following commands into the command line to adjust the file.

cat << EOF >> /etc/yum.repos.d/filesystem.repo
[frhbase]
name=$ostype $rhversion base repo
baseurl=file:///var/www/yum/RedHat/6/x86_64/Server
enabled=1
gpgcheck=0
EOF

Follow the instructions in the Client Management for additional assistance.

4.8.14. HOWTO Perform One-Shot Operations¶

This section introduces the options provided for performing one-shot commands on all Puppet-managed systems without using Puppet. This is useful when the user needs to perform an action one time in every location, but does not want to enforce that action over time.

4.8.14.1. Use the PSSH Utility¶

Parallel Secure Shell (PSSH) has been included in SIMP for some time, but has not been installed by default.

The table below lists the steps to use PSSH.

Table: Use PSSH Procedure

Note

There is no manual page provided with PSSH; type pssh --help for further explanation.

4.8.14.1.1. Other SSH Options¶

Using the -f option forces TTY for SSH, which allows the user to run sudo commands via PSSH.

Using the -OStrictHostKeyChecking=no option connects the user to the target servers via SSH even if there is an issue with ~/.ssh/known_hosts.

4.8.15. HOWTO Back up the Puppet Master¶

This section details all of the steps required for backing up the Puppet Master.

Note

SIMP, by default, provides two ways to back up data. They are BackupPC and Git. If there is a different preferred method, the user may install it and configure it first.

Warning

BackupPC may, or may not, work properly for you on RHEL7+ systems. The SIMP team is currently evaluating other options for an inbuilt backup system.

Backup /var/lib/puppet/ssl
Backup /etc/puppet
Backup /srv/rsync and/or /var/simp/rsync
Optional: Backup /var/www

Table: SIMP Upgrade Process

4.8.16. HOWTO Configure a Puppet Server Behind a NAT¶

This section provides guidance for when the Puppet server is behind a NAT but is managing hosts outside the NAT.

Your puppet server certificate must have all names in it that are used by any client. To update your certificates follow the guidance:

Add the alternative certificate names (in a comma-seperated list) in /etc/puppet/puppet.conf

[main]

dns_alt_names = hostname.your.domain,hostname.your.other.domain
Regenerate ALL certificates on Puppet:

http://docs.puppetlabs.com/puppet/3.8/reference/ssl_regenerate_certificates.html

In Section 2 of the web page above that says update your Puppetdb certificates follow the instructions in Step 3, option A at this location:

http://docs.puppetlabs.com/puppetdb/2.3/install_from_source.html#step-3-option-a-run-the-ssl-configuration-script

4.8.17. HOWTO Enable Redundant LDAP¶

This section describes how to set up redundant OpenLDAP servers in SIMP. These servers are also referred to as “slave” servers.

4.8.17.1. Set up the Master¶

The easiest way to setup an ldapmaster is to set it up on the puppet master using simp config during the initial configuration of the Puppet server. This is done by answering “YES” to “use ldap?” query when you run simp config and answering the basic questions it asks you. If it is not desirable to have the ldap server on the Puppet server a redundant LDAP server can be set up on an alternate server and promoted to master using the directions below.

How ever if there is already a working infrastructure and you want to move to openldap you can do the following:

Configure the following settings in simp_def.yaml in the hiera directory:

# === use_ldap ===
# Whether or not to use LDAP on this system.
# If you disable this, modules will not attempt to use LDAP where possible.
use_ldap: true

# === ldap::base_dn ===
# The Base DN of the LDAP server
"ldap::base_dn": "dc=your,dc=domain"

# === ldap::bind_dn ===
# LDAP Bind Distinguished Name
"ldap::bind_dn": "cn=hostAuth,ou=Hosts,%{hiera('ldap::base_dn')}"

# === ldap::bind_pw ===
# The LDAP bind password
"ldap::bind_pw": "MyRandomlyGeneratedLargePassword"

# === ldap::bind_hash ===
# The salted LDAP bind password hash
"ldap::bind_hash": "{SSHA}9nByVJSZFBe8FfMkar1ovpRxJLdB0Crr"

# === ldap::sync_dn ===
#
"ldap::sync_dn": "cn=LDAPSync,ou=Hosts,%{hiera('ldap::base_dn')}"

# === ldap::sync_pw ===
# The LDAP sync password
"ldap::sync_pw": "MyOtherRandomVeryLargePassword"

# === ldap::sync_hash ===
# The SSHA hash for ldap::sync_pw
"ldap::sync_hash": "{SSHA}VlgYUmRzyuuKZXM3L8RT28En/eqtuTUO"

# === ldap::root_dn ===
# The LDAP root DN.
"ldap::root_dn": "cn=LDAPAdmin,ou=People,%{hiera('ldap::base_dn')}"

# === ldap::root_hash ===
# The LDAP root password hash.
#  If you set this with simp config, type the password and the hash will be
# generated for you.'
"ldap::root_hash": "{SSHA}GSCDnNF6KMXBf1F8eIe5xvQxVJou3zGu"

# === ldap::master ===
# This is the LDAP master in URI form (ldap://server)
"ldap::master": "ldap://ldap_server1.your.domain"

# === ldap::uri ===
# List of OpenLDAP servers in URI form (ldap://server)
"ldap::uri":
  - "ldap://ldap_server1.your.domain"

# === sssd::domains ===
# A list of domains for SSSD to use.
# `simp config` will automativcally populate this field with `FQDN` if
# `use_fqdn` is true, otherwise it will comment out the field.
#
"sssd::domains":
  - LDAP

Add the simp::ldap_server class into the yaml file for the ldap server in Hiera (hieradata/hosts/ldap_server1.your.domain.yaml):

classes :
  - 'simp::ldap_server'

Leave any other classes that are there if they are needed. Run the puppet agent on the ldap server until it runs cleanly. Run the agent on the puppet server. Once all the other clients update against the Puppet server, they will be able to authenticate against the LDAP server. Adding users and groups is described in the User Management.

Note

Information on how the create salted ({SSHA}) passwords can be found at the OpenLDAP site.

4.8.17.2. Set up the Redundant(Slave) Servers¶

4.8.17.2.1. Default Settings¶

Once the master is ready, LDAP slave nodes can be configured to replicate data from the master. These servers are read-only, and modifications cannot be made to LDAP entries while the master is down.

Slave nodes can be configured via hiera by using simp::ldap_server::is_slave, setting the replication id, and adding the simp::ldap_server class. This will set up your redundant server using the defaults. To do these three things, add the following lines to the hieradata/hosts/ldap_server2.your.domain.yaml file:

simp::ldap_server::is_slave : true
simp::ldap_server::rid  : "888"

classes :
   - 'simp::ldap_server'

To make other clients aware of this server, add the redundant server’s URI to lists of URIs in the hieradata/simp_def.yaml file:

# === ldap::uri ===
# List of OpenLDAP servers in URI form (ldap://server)
"ldap::uri":
  - "ldap://ldap_server1.your.domain"
  - "ldap://ldap_server2.your.domain"

Note

To see the defaults for LDAP replication in SIMP, review the parameters passed to the module openldap/manifests/server/syncrepl.pp. These parameters are used to add the replication settings to the syncrepl.conf file. Definitions can be found in the syncrepl.conf (5) man page.

4.8.17.2.2. Custom Replication Settings¶

If settings other than the defaults are needed, create a manifest under site:: and use the openldap::server::syncrepl class with the necessary parameters.

In this example, the site profile is called site::ldapslave and the RID of the server is 999 (these can be changed). One setting, sizelimit, is being overwritten but you can overwrite any number of them.

class site::ldapslave {

  include 'simp::ldap_server'

  # custom settings:
  openldap::server::syncrepl { '999':
    sizelimit  => '5000',
  }
}

The name of the openldap::server::syncrepl instance must be a unique replication id.

Place this file in the site:: module’s manifests/ directory using the name ldapslave.pp. Include this class from the slave server’s hiera .yaml file:

classes :
- 'site::ldapslave'

Lastly, add the server to the URI listing in simp_def.yaml so all the clients know about it once they have updated from the puppet master.

4.8.17.3. Promote a Slave Node¶

Slave nodes can be promoted to act as the LDAP master node. To do this, change the node classifications of the relevant hosts. For a node with the default settings, just remove the simp::ldap_server::is_slave : true from the server’s hiera .yaml file and change the setting for the master ldap in the simp_def.yaml.

# === ldap::master ===
# This is the LDAP master in URI form (ldap://server)
"ldap::master": "ldap://ldap_server1.your.domain"

For a redundant server set up using custom settings, remove the call to the custom class and replace it with the call to the site::ldap_server class in the servers yaml file and set the master setting in the simp_def.yaml file as shown above.

In both cases, if the current master is not down, make sure it has completed replication before changing the settings. Once the settings are changed, run puppet agent -t on the ldap server. After the next Puppet run on all the hosts the server will be promoted to master and all the slaves will point to it.

4.8.17.4. Remove a Node or Demote a Master¶

To demote a master, simply configure it as slave in either of the configurations above after the new master has been configured and put in place, then run the puppet agent. Lastly, manually remove the active database from the server. (Check the setting openldap::server::conf::directory setting for the location of the files.)

To remove an LDAP server, first remove the server from the URI settings in simp_def.yaml. Give the clients time to update from the puppet server so they do not attempt to call it. Then remove relevant settings from it’s hiera .yaml file and run the puppet agent.

4.8.17.5. Troubleshooting¶

If the system is not replicating, it is possible that another user has updated the $ldap_sync_passwd and $ldap_sync_hash entries in the /etc/puppet/environments/simp/simp_def.yaml file without also updating the value in LDAP itself; this is the most common issue reported by users.

Currently, SIMP cannot self-modify the LDAP database directly; therefore, the LDAP Administrator needs to perform this action. Refer to the User Management chapter for more information on manipulating entries in OpenLDAP.

The example below shows the changes necessary to update the $ldap_sync information in LDAP.

Update $ldap_sync Information in LDAP Examples

dn: cn=LDAPSync,ou=People,dc=your,dc=domain
changetype: modify
replace: userPassword
userPassword: <Hash from $ldap_sync_hash>

4.8.17.6. Further Information¶

The OpenLDAP site contains more information on configuring and maintaining Open LDAP servers.

4.8.18. HOWTO Enable SFTP Restricted Accounts¶

This section describes the method for restricting an account to SSH File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) access only.

4.8.18.1. Add a User¶

Create a user account based on the following example.

user { "foo":
  uid => <UID>,
  gid => <GID>,
  shell => <Path to SFTP Server>
}

On a SIMP system, shell would be: "/usr/libexec/openssh/sftp-server"

4.8.18.2. Modify `/etc/shells`¶

To modify /etc/shells to include the shell information provided in the previous user account example, add common::shells in Hiera, and add /usr/libexec/openssh/sftp-server to the list.

4.8.19. HOWTO Setup SSH Authorized Keys¶

This section provides guidance on managing SSH keys within the SIMP environment.

4.8.19.1. LDAP Enabled¶

When enabled, ssh keys are both stored and retrieved directly from LDAP.

4.8.19.2. Without LDAP¶

If not using LDAP, or in addition to LDAP, SSH authorized keys can be placed in /etc/ssh/local_keys/<USERNAME>. This location can be changed by setting the ::ssh::server::conf::authorizedkeysfile parameter in Hiera or your ENC.

4.8.20. HOWTO Upgrade SIMP¶

Warning

Please refer to the Migrating To Environments section if you are upgrading from a version of SIMP before we started using Puppet Environments. If you have an /etc/puppet/environments/simp directory and no record of /etc/puppet/extdata on your system, then you do not need to migrate your code to environments.

This section provides information on how to upgrade a running instance to the latest codebase.

Pre-Upgrade Recommendations
Upgrading SIMP from an ISO
Migrating To Environments

4.8.20.1. Pre-Upgrade Recommendations ¶

The following process should be followed prior to upgrading:

Run puppet agent --disable to disable puppet.

Note

If you think you will need more than 4 hours to complete this task, also disable puppet in root’s crontab by running crontab -e root.
You may wish to block all communications with agents while updating the server. This is not required but could spare you some headaches if something doesn’t work properly.

The simplest way to do this is to set the catalog retrieval capability to 127.0.0.1 in /etc/puppet/auth.conf as shown below.
```
path ~ ^/catalog/([^/]+)$
method find
# Uncomment this when complete and delete the other entries
#allow $1
allow 127.0.0.1
```

Using the syntax above, you can add fully qualified domain names, one at a time, to the ‘allow’ list and only those hosts will be able to retrieve their catalog from the running server. 127.0.0.1 serves as a placeholder so that no host can actually retrieve their catalog.

4.8.20.2. Upgrading SIMP from an ISO ¶

Copy the release ISO to the simp server that is being upgraded

Backup the existing environment:

cd /etc/puppet/environments
cp -r simp simp.old

Unpack the new ISO using the unpack_dvd utility:
```
/usr/local/bin/unpack_dvd -d /var/www/yum <path-to-new-ISO>
```
This should update the existing YUM repos on the system to include updated system packages and updated SIMP packages.

Note

If there is a operating system release in between SIMP releases (for example, CentOS 6.7 to 6.8), the /etc/yum.repos.d/filesystem.repo file needs to be modified to look for the new version of the OS.
Update the system!
```
yum update
```
Note

If there are issues with gpg keys, try running yum reinstall simp-gpgkeys as root.
Read the Changelog carefully and see what you may need to change in your infrastructure. For example, there have been some changes to our default SIMP server Hiera file. You will need to compare the new puppet.your.domain.yaml to the existing SIMP host Hiera file.
Run puppet on the SIMP server:
```
puppet agent -t
```
That’s it! Updates should propagate automatically throughout all clients as puppet and yum runs.

4.8.20.3. Migrating To Environments ¶

SIMP 4.1 and 5.0 used the deprecated, Rack-based, Puppet Master. Starting with 4.2 and 5.1, SIMP now uses the Clojure-based Puppet Server.

Unfortunately, there are some conflicts with directly upgrading from the legacy Puppet Master to the new Puppet Server since some of the RPM package prerequisites conflict.

The new Puppet Server can properly utilize Puppet Environments. To provide our users with this capability, and to facilitate more dynamic workflows in the future, the SIMP team has migrated all existing material to a native simp environment. To help facilitate your migration, the SIMP team has created two migration scripts that both upgrade your Puppet Server and migrate your existing data into the new simp environment.

Warning

You must have at least 2.4G of free memory to run the new Puppet Server.

4.8.20.3.1. Migration Script Features¶

The migration script will perform the following actions on your system:

Remove the puppet-server package from your system
Install the puppetserver package onto your system
Update all packages from your repositories
Create a backup folder at /etc/puppet/environments/pre_migration.simp
Create a Git repository in the backup folder under a timestamped directory
Commit all current materials from /etc/puppet into the backup Git repository
Checkout the backup Git repository under the timestamped directory as backup_data for ease of use
Migrate all existing data into the new simp environment under /etc/puppet/environments/simp

Note

All future upgrades will only affect the new simp environment. You may create new environments and/or modify the contents of /etc/puppet/modules without fear of the SIMP packages overwriting your work.

4.8.20.3.2. Migration Script Execution¶

Copy the new SIMP ISO onto your system. For the purposes of these instructions, we will refer to this as SIMP_Update.iso. Please ensure that you are in the directory with the ISO prior to proceeding. Extract the new simp-utils package using the following command:
```
isoinfo -i SIMP_Update.iso -R -x `isoinfo -i SIMP_Update.iso -Rf | \
  grep noarch/simp-utils` > simp-utils-update.rpm
```
Install the new simp-utils RPM:
```
yum -y localupdate simp-utils*.rpm
```

Unpack the DVD onto the system:

/usr/local/bin/unpack_dvd SIMP_Update.iso

Run the migration script (this may take some time, do NOT hit CTRL-C!):
```
/usr/share/simp/upgrade_script/migrate_to_environments
```
Run the puppet agent:
```
puppet agent -t
```
Stop the new puppetserver service (it may not be running):
```
service puppetserver stop
```
Remove any left over PID files:
```
rm /var/run/puppetserver/puppetserver
```
Kill any running puppet master processes:
```
pkill -f 'puppet master'
```
Wait for 10 seconds to let things finalize if necessary:
```
sleep 10
```
Start the new Puppet Server:
```
service puppetserver start
```

Your new Puppet Server should now be running and a run of puppet agent -t should complete as usual.

4.8.20.3.3. Converting from Extdata to Hiera¶

SIMP now uses Hiera natively instead of Extdata. Tools have been put into place by Puppet, Inc. and SIMP to make the conversion as easy as possible. Two scripts have been provided to automatically convert generic csv files and simp_def.csv to yaml. The first example shows how to convert an Extdata csv file called foo.csv into a Hiera yaml file called bar.yaml:

extdata2hiera -i foo.csv -o bar.yaml

The second example shows how to convert an Extdata csv simp_def file called simp_def.csv into a Hiera yaml file called simp_def.yaml.

simpdef2hiera --in simp_def.csv --out simp_def.yaml

Puppet will automatically retrieve class parameters from Hiera, using lookup keys like myclass::parameter_one. Puppet classes can optionally include parameters in their definition. This lets the class ask for data to be passed in at the time that it’s declared, and it can use that data as normal variables throughout its definition.

There are two main ways to reference Hiera data in puppet manifests. The first, and preferred way, is to use the automatic class variable lookup capability. For each class that you create, the variables will be automatically discovered in hiera should they exist. This is quite powerful in that you no longer need to provide class parameters in your manifests and can finally properly separate your data from your code.

Note

For more information on the lookup functions, see the official Hiera documentation

# Some class file in scope...
class foo (
  $param1 = 'default1'
  $param2 = 'default2'
) { .... }

# /etc/puppet/hieradata/default.yaml
---
foo::param1: 'custom1'

The second is similar to the old Extdata way, and looks like the following:

$var = hiera("some_hiera_variable", "default_value")

The following is from the Puppet, Inc. documentation, and explains the reason for switching to Hiera.

Automatic parameter lookup is good for writing reusable code because it is regular and predictable. Anyone downloading your module can look at the first line of each manifest and easily see which keys they need to set in their own Hiera data. If you use the Hiera functions in the body of a class instead, you will need to clearly document which keys the user needs to set.

Note

For more information on hiera and puppet in general, see http://docs.puppetlabs.com/hiera/1/complete_example.html.

4.8.20.3.4. Scope Functions¶

All scope functions must take arguments in array form. For example in /etc/puppet/modules/apache/templates/ssl.conf.erb:

<%=scope.function_bracketize(l) %>
becomes
<%=scope.function_bracketize([l]) %>

4.8.20.3.5. Commands¶

Deprecated commands mentioned in Puppet 2.7 upgrade are now completely removed.

4.8.20.3.6. Lock File¶

Puppet agent now uses the two lock files instead of one. These are the run-in-progress lockfile (agent_catalog_run_lockfile) and the disabled lockfile (agent_disabled_lockfile). The puppetagent_cron file (made by the pupmod module) must be edited to suit this change.

4.8.21. How to Manage a TPM Device With SIMP¶

A great effort has been placed on automating the usage of TPM 1.2 devices in SIMP. This document will serve as a guide on how to enable a TPM and use it in EL 6/7.

Supported TPM features in SIMP:

Taking ownership (but not clear ownership)

Enable basic IMA measuring

Setting custom IMA policy (broken)

Enable a TPM-based PKCS#11 interface

(Future) Intel TXT and Trusted Boot

We do not support EVM or measured boot at this time. The tools (ima-evm-utils) are not available on our supported platforms and the kernel provided doesn’t support it at this time.

4.8.21.1. Overview¶

4.8.21.1.1. General hardware requirements:¶

A host with a TPM chip on the motherboard

4.8.21.1.2. Trusted Boot hardware requirements:¶

A CPU with Intel Trusted Execution Technology (TXT)

A chipset with Intel Trusted Execution Technology (TXT)

4.8.21.1.3. Other non-puppet requirements:¶

A legacy, non-UEFI bootloader

A BIOS password (it should require one to enable the TPM)

Physical access to the machine to enter the BIOS password

4.8.21.2. Enable and take ownership¶

You can see if you have a TPM by either checking with the has_tpm fact, the status section of the tpm structured fact, or by checking the sys path manually. You can also look for the character device at /dev/tpm0.
```
$ facter -p has_tpm
true
$ facter -p tpm.status
...
owned: 0,
enabled: 1,
active: 1,
...
$ cat /sys/class/tpm/tpm0/device/active
1
$ file /dev/tpm0
/dev/tpm0: character special (10/224)
```
A TPM would be muct less useful if the boot process can’t be protected. A BIOS password must be set to make sure no thirds parties can boot the host. Please set the admin password and the user password in the BIOS. If there is an option to require password at boot time, enable it. Do not enable Intel Platform Trust Techonology (PTT) or Intel TXT at this time.
Before a TPM can be accessed by the operating system, it must first be enabled. This has to be done in the BIOS. Refer to the documentation provided with the hardware.
At this point, the TPM module can take over management of the device. Add tpm to the host’s hieradata according the the example below or use the tpm_ownership type directly.
```
classes:
  - tpm

tpm::take_ownership: true
tpm::ownership::advanced_facts: true
```
Note

The tpm_ownership type does not support clearing the TPM. The process could possibly be destructive and has been left to be a manual process.
Run puppet!

4.8.21.3. Enable basic IMA measuring¶

This section assumes the previous section is complete, the TPM in the host is owned, and it is being managed with Puppet.

IMA is a neat tool that hashes the contents of a system, and stores that hash in the TPM. IMA is a kernel-level tool, and needs a few kernel parameters and reboots to be completely set up.

Follow the above steps ensure the tpm is owned
Modify the hieradata and add just one line:
```
tpm::use_ima: true
```
Run puppet, then reboot.

4.8.21.3.1. Managing IMA policy¶

Warning

This automated management of IMA policy is disabled for now. The policy generated tends to cause systems to become read only.

This module can also support modifying what files IMA watching by editing the /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy. Reference the module source file, located at <environment path>/modules/tpm/manifests/ima/policy.pp for further details on what can and cannot be measured.

Warning

Pushing poorly configured policy can result in a read-only system. A reboot will fix the issue, but with a TPM you will have to enter the password again. Be very careful not to push bad policy. That being said, the module itself should generate proper policy and simultaneously make it difficult to generate malformed policy.

4.8.21.3.2. IMA Appraisal¶

IMA Appraisal is the process that actually measures the state of the file and will stop changes to the filesystem if there is a issue detected.

Run puppet once with tpm::use_ima: true, like it was set up earlier.
Disable the puppet agent on the host
```
$ puppet agent --disable
```
Make sure / and /home are mounted with the i_version option. They are created by default with these options enabled.

Add the ima_appraise=fix kernel parameter temporarily

$ puppet resource kernel_parameter ima_appraise ensure=present value=fix

Reboot
The files on the system must now be measured and saved. In order to do this, every files owned by root and included in the policy must be touched. This step will take some time.
```
$ find / $ -fstype rootfs -o -fstype ext4 $ -type f -uid 0 -exec head -n 1 '{}' > /dev/null \;
```
After that process finishes, set the ima_appraise kernel parameter to enforce.

Note

In kernels above 4.0, we would opt for the log parameter instead of enforce. For now, enforce is all we have. Be aware, this may cause your system not to boot.

$ puppet resource kernel_parameter ima_appraise ensure=present value=enforce
$ # or add it to a puppet manifest

Reboot

4.9. Package Data¶

4.9.1. SIMP 4.3.0 RPMs¶

This provides a comprehensive list of all SIMP RPMs and related metadata. Most importantly, it provides a list of which modules are installed by default and which are simply available in the repository.

SIMP 4.3.0 RPMs¶
Name	Version	Optional
pupmod-simp-compliance_markup	1.0.0-0	false
simp-doc	4.3.0-0	true

4.9.2. SIMP 5.2.0 RPMs¶

This provides a comprehensive list of all SIMP RPMs and related metadata. Most importantly, it provides a list of which modules are installed by default and which are simply available in the repository.

SIMP 5.2.0 RPMs¶
Name	Version	Optional
pupmod-simp-compliance_markup	1.0.0-0	false
simp-doc	5.2.0-0	true

4.9.3. SIMP 4.3.0 CentOS External RPMs¶

This provides a list of RPMs, and their sources, for non-SIMP components that are required for system functionality and are specific to an installation on a CentOS system.

4.9.4. SIMP 4.3.0 RHEL External RPMs¶

This provides a list of RPMs, and their sources, for non-SIMP components that are required for system functionality and are specific to an installation on a RHEL system.

4.9.5. SIMP 5.2.0 CentOS External RPMs¶

This provides a list of RPMs, and their sources, for non-SIMP components that are required for system functionality and are specific to an installation on a CentOS system.

4.9.6. SIMP 5.2.0 RHEL External RPMs¶

This provides a list of RPMs, and their sources, for non-SIMP components that are required for system functionality and are specific to an installation on a RHEL system.

4.10. Indices and tables¶

5. Contributing to SIMP¶

5.1. Introduction¶

Thank you for taking interest in contributing to the SIMP project!

We firmly believe that this type of project can’t be accomplished by a single team and that everything matters from bug reports to documentation patches.

5.2. Contribution Procedure¶

Fork the project on GitHub
Make a new feature branch for your changes
- Suggestion: name the branch after the issue (e.g., ‘SIMP-999’)
Make your changes!
- SIMP contributions should observe the Puppet Language Style Guide conventions where feasible
- Contributions should ideally include relevant spec and/or acceptance tests
Save your changes in a single commit
- Use the following commit message conventions:
```
(SIMP-999) Fix the broken thing [50 chars max]

Discussion about the fix (if needed) [each line: 72 chars max]

SIMP-998 #comment Comment on a related issue [72 chars max]
SIMP-999 #close
```
- The commit message should be the following format:
  - First line:
    - Start with the Issue name in parentheses [e.g., SIMP-999], followed by a summary of the change
    - No longer than 50 characters
    - Followed by a line of white space
  - Subsequent lines:
    - Each line should be no longer than 72 characters
  - Issue references:
    - JIRA issues can be referenced at the end of the commit message
    - It is recommended to only use the commands #comment and #close
    - Avoid #resolve and #time as it will not update JIRA until after the issue is merged
Push your changes up to your forked repo on GitHub
Create a pull request (“PR”) on GitHub using your new branch
- The pull request should contain a single new commit
  - Use git rebase -i to squash commits (use git rebase -i HEAD~n to go back n commits)
Travis-CI will notice the pull request and run CI tests
- Travis-CI will run tests based on the .travis.yml file in the repository’s top-level directory
- Travis-CI results can be seen in the PR on GitHub and are posted to the project’s HipChat channel
After passing Travis-CI tests, the GitHub pull request must be picked up in GerritHub for code review
- NOTE: Currently, this is a manual process and requires a project administrator
Pull requests are code reviewed on GerritHub
- If you need to update an existing pull request, amend the pull request’s commit using the following commands:
  - git add or delete (this stages the build with the relevant changes; add --all will add all the new changes, otherwise add or delete to tailor your changeset)
  - git commit --amend (this amends the previous commit)
    - NOTE: The final line of the amended commit message must include the Gerrit review’s Change-ID (example: Change-Id: Ie536768505a1baff45d6ad3ae4de9e7501ffb53c)
    - git push --force (this sends back to the master branch)
  - If you prefer to amend your change in Gerrithub, you can use the git-review package to make submitting patch sets easier
    - Install the git-review package
    - Add the remote: git remote add gerrit <url>
    - Run: git-review -r gerrit
After the GerritHub review is approved, the changes will be automatically merged into the original GitHub repository

5.3. Useful Resources¶

6. SIMP Security Concepts¶

Contents:

6.1. Introduction¶

This manual describes the security concepts of the SIMP system. The system was originally designed to meet a specific set of technical security controls using industry best practices and has been modified recently to meet as many of the security controls provided by the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) special publication 800-53 as possible.

This manual outlines three categories of security:

Technical Architecture: discusses the technical approaches to securing the system
Operational Security: discusses the security of SIMP in an operational setting
Information System Management: discusses how SIMP helps achieve security in terms of system management

A brief discussion of how the SIMP system helps achieve categories of controls is provided; additional technical details regarding each control can be found in the SIMP Security Control Mapping.

When possible, the NIST security control identifier will be found at the end of a concept to provide the reader with a reference to the specific control that is being discussed. The identifier is written as [AB-X(Y)], where A is the control family, X is the control section, and Y is the control enhancement.

Note

At present, this document will not be mapped to any additional standards since there are available mappings of the 800-53 to various other security frameworks.

If you believe that we are missing anything in particular, please file a bug!

6.2. Technical Security¶

This chapter contains SIMP security concepts that are related to the technical security controls described in NIST 800-53.

6.2.1. Identification and Authentication¶

This section addresses the identification and authentication of users and devices.

6.2.2. User Identification and Authentication¶

Identification and authentication of system and service users can occur at either the Operating System level or globally in the SIMP architecture. While local accounts and groups can be created manually, the SIMP team suggests adding users via the /etc/puppet/localusers file or by using the native Puppet user and group types. System users can authenticate their access using Secure Shell (SSH) keys or passwords. For more centralized control, identify and authenticate users by using the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP). [IA-2]

The SIMP team recommends using LDAP as the primary source for user management and provides a functional default OpenLDAP configuration for this purpose. LDAP and Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) work together closely and, with the default SIMP configuration, the PAM settings are enforced on top of the LDAP settings for two layers of control. Due to this partnership, items such as account lockouts may need to be reset on both the local system and the LDAP server. If the suggested settings in the SIMP-provided default LDAP Directory Interchange Formats (LDIF) are not used, implementations must ensure that security is maintained through manual procedures. Use of group accounts for users is strongly discouraged. System services may need to have accounts, but all of these should be managed by Puppet using the user and group native types. [IA-2 (5)].

6.2.3. Device Identification and Authentication¶

Devices are identified by a Media Access Control (MAC) address prior to receiving an IP address via the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP). In the default SIMP architecture, IP addresses are fixed mappings to their associated MAC address (i.e., not assigned dynamically). There is no authentication for the binding of MAC addresses to IP addresses due to the nature of the DHCP protocol.

Device authentication occurs through the mapping of the MAC to the IP through the internally controlled DHCP and the mapping of the IP to the host name through the internally controlled Domain Name System (DNS) service for each individual Puppet client. After kickstart, each client system generates an internal cryptographic identifier and communicates that information with the Puppet server to be approved by an administrator at a later time. All further communication between the Puppet server and the clients over the Puppet protocol is encrypted subsequently and authenticated with this identifier. Automatic approval can be set up in tightly controlled environments; however, this option is not suggested for open environments. [IA-3, IA-3 (3)]

6.2.4. Identifier Management¶

Managing user identifiers (also known as user names) involves administrative procedures that are unique for each implementation. Disabling unused local accounts is the only control that SIMP can enforce technologically. In this case, if an account has an expired password that has not been changed 35 days after expiration, the account will be disabled. If a user does not have a password (e.g., he or she only authenticates with SSH keys), then there is no inherent technological mechanism for enforcement due to the nature of the software. [IA-4e.]

6.2.5. Authenticator Management¶

Authenticators for users are passwords and/or SSH keys; the management of each is implementation specific. SSH keys do not expire; therefore, implementations must provide a procedure for removing invalid keys. Removing public keys from LDAP is one practical solution.

When using passwords, local and LDAP passwords provided for users should be set to change at first login. This is the default in the SIMP-provided LDIFs. Once a user attempts to change a password, the settings in PAM and LDAP enforce complexity requirements.

For the default password complexity rules see the What is the Password Complexity for SIMP? FAQ.

[IA-5, IA-5 (1), IA-5 (4)]

Password aging and history is enforced through a combination of PAM and LDAP. By default, the previous 24 passwords cannot be reused.

[IA-5 (1)(e)]

There are a number of default passwords in SIMP that are required for installation. Each implementation requires the user to change the default passwords and protect the new passwords. In addition, there are embedded passwords within the SIMP system that are used due to a lack of software-supported alternatives.

Please see the SIMP User Guide for additional information.

6.2.6. Access Control¶

This section describes the various levels of access control, including account management, access enforcement, information flow enforcement, separation of duties, least privilege, session controls, permitted actions without identification and authentication, security attributes, and remote access.

6.2.7. Account Management¶

Account management procedures should be created and maintained for each implementation of SIMP. The procedures should include the information listed in NIST 800-53 control AC-2. SIMP has the mechanisms in place to enforce most account management policies. The mechanisms for account management have several default settings including:

Central account management using OpenLDAP. [AC-2 (1)]
Password expiration.
- Local accounts expire 35 days after password expiration. [AC-2 (3)]
- LDAP accounts do not expire automatically due to inactivity; implementations should audit LDAP accounts regularly.
Auditing of administrative actions to capture local account creation and modifications to LDAP accounts is done via the /var/log/slapd_audit.log file and /var/log/audit/audit.log for local accounts. [AC-2 (4)]
Shell sessions timeout after 15 minutes of inactivity. [AC-2 (5)]
- This can be circumvented by running a command that opens an endless pipe such as /bin/cat. However, this command cannot be enforced more heavily due to the high likelihood of breaking system applications. If the optional gnome module is used, the GNOME screen saver will lock the screen after 15 minutes of inactivity.
Assignment of users into groups locally or centrally via LDAP. [AC-2 (7)]
- By default, SIMP will have an administrators groups that has the ability to run sudosh. Implementations should further define administrators or user groups and limit them with the Puppet sudo class.

6.2.8. Access Enforcement¶

SIMP uses the implementation of Discretionary Access Control (DAC) that is native to Linux. Specific file permissions have been assigned based on published security guidance for Red Hat, CentOS, and UNIX.

Default permissions on files created by users are enforced with user file access mask settings (using the umask command) that allow only the owner to read and write to the file. Implementations may further extend the access control in UNIX by restricting access to application files or using the file Access Control List (ACL) commands getfacl and setacl. Users of SIMP should not change file permissions on operating system files as it may decrease the overall security of the system. If a group needs access to a particular file or directory, use the setfacl command to allow the necessary access without lessening the permissions on the system. [AC-3]

6.2.9. Information Flow Enforcement¶

IPTables on each SIMP system is controlled by the IPTables Puppet module. When developing a new module, the IPTables rules needed for an application should be included with the module by calling the appropriate methods from the IPTables module. The end result should be a running IPTables rule set that includes the default SIMP rules and any rules needed for applications. The default communications allowed are included in Default Server Ports and Default Client Ports. [AC-4]

6.2.9.1. Default Server Ports¶

Application	Direction	Protocol	Transport	Ports	Comment
Puppet	Localhost	HTTP	TCP	8140	The port upon which the Puppet master listens for client connections via Apache
Puppet CA	In	HTTPS	TCP	8141	This is used to ensure that Apache can verify all certificates from external systems properly prior to allowing access to Puppet.
Apache/YUM	In	HTTP	TCP	80	This is used for YUM and is unencrypted, since YUM will not work otherwise.
DHCPD	In	DHCP/BOOTP	TCP/UDP	546,547	DHCP pooling is disabled by default and should only be used if the implementation requires the use of this protocol.
TFTP	In	TFTP	TCP/UDP	69	This is used for kickstart. It could also be used to update network devices. TFTP does not support encryption.
rsyslog	Out	syslog	TCP/UDP	6514	This is encrypted when communicating with a SIMP syslog server (not installed by default).
named	In/Out	DNS	TCP/UDP	53	Inbound connections happen to the locally managed hosts. Outbound connections happen to other domains per the normal operations of DNS.
NTPD	Out	NTP	TCP/UDP	123	Only connects to an external time source by default.
SSHD	In	SSH	TCP	22	SSH is always allowed from any source IP by default.
stunnel	In	TLS	TCP	8730	Stunnel is a protected connection for rsyncing configuration files to Puppet clients.
rsync	Localhost	RSYNC	TCP	873	This accepts connections to the localhost and forwards through Stunnel.
LDAP	In	LDAP	TCP	389	Connections are protected by bi-directional, authenticated encryption.
LDAPS	In	LDAPS	TCP	636	Used for LDAP over SSL.

6.2.9.2. Default Client Ports¶

Application	Direction	Protocol	Transport	Ports	Comment
Puppet	Out	HTTPS	TCP	8140	Communications to the Puppet server.
rsyslog	Out	syslog	TCP/UDP	6514	This is encrypted when communicating with a SIMP syslog server.
DNS Client	Out	DNS	TCP/UDP	53	Normal name resolution.
NTPD	Out	NTP	TCP/UDP	123	Only connects to an external time source by default.
SSHD	In	SSH	TCP	22	SSH is allowed from any source IP by default.
LDAP	Out	LDAP	TCP	389	Connections are protected by bi-directional authenticated encryption.

6.2.10. Separation of Duties¶

SIMP enforces separation of duties using account groups. Groups are created with each implementation to separate roles or duties properly. The SIMP team recommends that this management be done using the posixGroup object in LDAP for full OS support. [AC-5]

6.2.11. Least Privilege¶

SIMP does not allow root to directly SSH into a system. Direct access to the root user must occur via a console (or at a virtual instance of the physical console) to log on. Otherwise, users must log on as themselves and perform privileged commands using sudo or sudosh. [AC-6]

NIST 800-53 least privilege security controls give people access to objects only as needed. SIMP provides only the needed software, services, and ports to allow the system to be functional and scalable. The system then relies on a given implementation to perform proper account management and user role assignments. [AC-6]

6.2.12. Session Controls¶

SIMP provides a number of security features for sessions. These features include:

Accounts are locked after five invalid log on attempts over a 15 minute period. The account is then locked for 15 minutes. No administrator action is required to unlock an account. [AC-7]
System banners are presented to a user both before and after logging on. The default banner should be customized for each implementation. [AC-8]
After a successful log on, the date, time, and source of the last log on is presented to the user. The number of failed log on attempts since the last log on is also provided. [AC-9 and AC-9 (1)]
A limit of 10 concurrent SSH sessions are allowed per user. This can be further limited if an implementation decides it is set too high. Given the way SSH is used in most operational settings, this default value is reasonable. [AC-10]
Session lock only applies if the windowmanager::gnome module is used. Sessions lock automatically after 15 minutes of inactivity. Users must authenticate their access with valid credentials to reestablish a session. [AC-11]

6.2.13. Permitted Actions Without Identification and Authentication¶

SIMP has a number of applications that do not require both identification and authentication. These services are listed below along with an explanation of why these aspects are not required. Implementations should include any additional services that do require identification and/or authentication. [AC-14]

Service/Application	Rationale
TFTP	TFTP is a simple file transfer application that, in the SIMP environment, does not allow for writing to the files being accessed. This application is primarily used to support the Preboot Execution Environment (PXE) booting of hosts and the updating of network devices. There is no option to authenticate systems at this level by protocol design. TFTP is limited to a user’s local subnet using IPtables and is enforced additionally with TCPWrappers.
DHCP	By default, system IP addresses are not pooled, but are rather statically assigned to a client, which is identified by the MAC address. DHCP is limited to the local subnet.
Apache/YUM	RPMs are stored in a directory for systems to use for both kickstart and package updating. Sensitive information should never be stored here. Apache/YUM is limited to the local subnet.
DNS	The DNS protocol does not require identification nor authentication. DNS is limited to the local subnet.

Table: Actions Without Identification and Authentication

6.2.14. Security Attributes¶

SELinux is fully enforcing, in targeted mode, in SIMP. SELinux is an implementation of Mandatory Access Control. It can be set to enforcing mode during the SIMP configuration or turned on at a later time. All of the SIMP packaged modules have been designed to work with SELinux set to enforcing. [AC-16]

6.2.15. Remote Access¶

Remote access in SIMP is performed over SSH, specifically using the OpenSSH software. OpenSSH provides both confidentiality and integrity of remote access sessions. The SSH IPTables rules allow connections from any host. SSH relies on other Linux mechanisms to provide identification and authentication of a user. As discussed in the auditing section, user actions are audited with the audit daemon (auditd) and sudosh. [AC-17]

6.2.16. Systems and Communications Protection¶

The following sections provide information regarding application partitioning, shared resources, and various levels of protection for systems and communications.

6.2.17. User and Administration Application Separation (Application Partitioning)¶

SIMP can be used in a variety of ways. The most common is a platform for hosting other services or applications. In that case, there are only administrative users present. Users with accounts will be considered as a type of privileged user.

SIMP can also be used as a platform for workstations or general users performing non-administrative activities. In both cases, general users with accounts on an individual host are allowed access to the host using the pam::access module, so long as they have an account on the target host. No user may perform or have access to administrative functions unless given sudo or sudosh privileges via Puppet.

6.2.18. Shared Resources¶

There are several layers of access control that prevent the unauthorized sharing of resources in SIMP. Account access, operating system DAC settings, and the use of PKI collectively prevent resources from being shared in ways that were not intended. [SC-4]

6.2.19. Denial of Service Protection¶

SIMP has limited ability to prevent or limit the effects of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. The primary measures in place are to drop improperly formatted packets using IPTables and Kernel configurations such as SYN cookies. [SC-5]

6.2.20. Boundary Protection¶

SIMP does not provide boundary protection. [SC-7]

6.2.21. Transmission Security¶

SIMP traffic is protected with protocols that provide confidentiality and integrity of data while in transit. The tables in Information Flow Enforcement describe the protocols used to encrypt traffic and explain the protocols that cannot be protected at the transmission layer. SSH, and TLS all provide data transmission integrity and confidentiality. The software that controls them on Red Hat and CentOS are OpenSSH and OpenSSL. The SIMP team takes industry guidance into consideration when configuring these services. For example, the list the cryptographic ciphers available is limited to the highest ciphers that SIMP needs. All others are disabled. [SC-8, SC-9, SC-23, SC-7]

6.2.22. Single User Mode¶

SIMP systems have a password requirement for single user mode. In the event maintenance needs to be performed at a system console, users must be in possession of the root password before they can be authenticated. Bootloader passwords are also set to prevent unauthorized modifications to boot parameters. [SC-24]

6.2.23. PKI and Cryptography¶

SIMP has two native certificate authorities. The first is known as Fake CA. A local certificate authority is used to create properly formed server certificates if an implementation does not have other means of obtaining them. Many SIMP services require certificates; therefore, SIMP provides this tool for testing or for situations where other certificates are not available. The second certificate authority, Puppet CA, is built into Puppet. Puppet creates, distributes, and manages certificates that are specifically for Puppet.

The Fake CA certificates should be replaced with your own hardware-generated certificates if at all possible. The Puppet CA may be replaced but please understand all ramifications to the infrastructure before doing so.

More information on the Puppet CA can be found in the Puppet Labs security documentation. [SC-17, SC-13]

Warning

Fake CA certificates should not be used in an operational setting unless no better options are available.

6.2.24. Mobile Code¶

SIMP does not use mobile code; however, there are not any particular tools that will prevent its use. [SC-18]

6.2.25. Protection of Information at Rest¶

SIMP provides the capability to enable Full Disk Encryption (FDE) by default. However, in the interest of automated reboots, the initial randomly generated key is baked into the initrd. Please see the Disk Encryption section of the Installation Guide for details. [SC-28]

6.2.26. Audit and Accountability¶

This section discusses the content, storage, and protection of auditable events.

6.2.27. Auditable Events¶

Auditd and Rsyslog provide the foundation for SIMP auditing. Auditd performs the majority of the security-related events; however, other Linux logs also have security information in them and are captured using rsyslog.

The default auditable events for SIMP were developed based on several industry best practices including those from the SCAP Security Guide and several government configuration guides. The suggested rules by those guides were fine-tuned so the audit daemon would not fill logs with useless records or reduce performance. These guides should be referenced for a detailed explanation of why rules are applied. Additional justification can be found in the comments of the SIMP audit rules found in the appendix of this guide. [AU-2]

The SIMP development team reviews every release of the major security guides for updated auditable events suggestions. Each of those suggestions is reviewed and applied if deemed applicable. [AU-2 (3)]

Privileged commands are audited as part of the SIMP auditing configuration. This is accomplished by monitoring sudo commands with auditd. Session interaction for administrators that use sudosh are also logged. Each sudosh session can be reviewed using sudosh-replay and are also sent to rsyslog. [AU-2 (4)]

6.2.28. Content of Audit Records¶

Audit records capture the following information [AU-3]:

Date and Time
UID and GID of the user performing the action
Command
Event ID
Key
Node Hostname/IP Address
Login Session ID
Executable

6.2.29. Audit Storage¶

Audit logs are stored locally on a separate partition in the /var/log directory. The size of this partition is configurable. Other default audit storage configurations include:

A syslog log is written when the audit partition has 75MB free. (This can be changed to e-mail, if an e-mail infrastructure is in place.) [AU-5a., AU-5 (1)]
The log file rotates once it reaches 30MB.

6.2.30. Audit Reduction and Response¶

SIMP provides a means to capture the proper information for audit records and stores them centrally. Each implementation must decide and document how it reduces, analyzes, and responds to audit events. [AU-5]

Auditd, like all services in SIMP, is controlled by Puppet. Stopping the service without disabling Puppet means the service will always be started automatically during a Puppet run. The files that control the audit configuration will also revert to their original state if changed manually on a client node. In the event auditd fails, the system will continue to operate. Several security guides have suggested that the system should shut down if auditd fails for any reason. To prevent operational issues, SIMP will not shut down, but will provide an alert via syslog when this happens. [AU-5 (1)]

SIMP also comes with an optional module for the Elasticsearch/Logstash/Grafana (ELG) stack. These three open source tools can be combined to parse, index, and visualize logs. There are also SIMP provided dashboards for the Kibana web interface. Implementations can build their own dashboards to meet local security or functional needs for log reduction and management. [AU-6]

See Elasticsearch, Logstash, and Grafana for more information.

6.2.31. Protection of Audit Information¶

The primary means of protecting the audit logs is through the use of file permissions. Audit records are stored in the /var/log directory and can only be accessed by root. Audit logs are rotated off daily if the implementation has not developed a way of offloading the logs to another location where they can be backed up. Lastly, if the rsyslog::stock::log_server module is implemented, logs are transmitted to the log server over a TLS protected link.

6.2.32. Time Synchronization¶

Each SIMP client (including the Puppet Master) has ntpd enabled by default. Part of the installation directs the clients to a time server. If no servers are available, the SIMP clients can use the Puppet Master as the central time source. Audit logs receive their time stamp from the local server’s system clock; therefore, the SIMP client must be connected to a central time source for timestamps in audit logs to be accurate.

6.3. Operational Security¶

This chapter contains SIMP security concepts that are related to the operational security controls in NIST 800-53.

6.3.1. Configuration Management¶

This section describes the management of various configurations within SIMP.

6.3.1.1. Baseline Configurations¶

SIMP baselines include configuration settings and Puppet modules. Currently, baselines are maintained for both Red Hat/CentOS 6.x, and Red Hat/CentOS 7.x. Each configuration item that is managed by a Puppet module has an RPM installed on the Puppet Master in the form of pupmod-name-x.x.x-x. This process allows for one main SIMP baseline to be maintained and modules to be upgraded easily. An overall SIMP RPM is also installed on the Puppet Master, which denotes the version number of SIMP that is installed. [CM-2, CM-2 (2), CM-2 (3), CM-6]

SIMP installs a minimal set of RPM packages, which can be found in the kickstart files on the ISO. RPMs, services, and IPTables rules all use a whitelist stance for allowing access or installation. [CM-2 (5)]

Additional RPMs must be installed by each implementation.
Services must be declared explicitly or they will be disabled by Puppet
IPTables rules must allow a service explicitly.

6.3.1.2. Managing Configuration Changes¶

Configuration change approvals are managed by each implementation; SIMP only provides the mechanisms to apply changes on clients. A combination of Puppet, rsync, and YUM is used to apply those changes across any number of target Puppet clients. All changes made are audited with auditd or are logged to via syslog. [CM-3a., CM-3 (3)]

Linux systems are made up of hundreds of configuration files that can contain numerous of settings. SIMP does not make an attempt to manage all of the settings in every file. Instead, critical operating system files or files that need to be controlled centrally are managed. Implementations can manage additional files if they are deemed necessary. [CM-6]

6.3.1.3. Security Verification and Flaw Remediation¶

SIMP cannot detect flaws automatically; each implementation is responsible for tracking flaws. However, SIMP provides a way for flaws to be fixed across all clients. One or all of the following can help automate flaw remediation [CM-6, SI-2, SI-2 (1), SI-2 (4)]:

Puppet:
- Apply a configuration change to files that are managed by Puppet.
rsync:
- Use this mechanism to deliver a file to a client. This can be used with or without Puppet to synchronize files.
YUM:
- Update packages nightly with YUM. Placing an updated package in YUM and running a YUM update manually, or allowing time for the cron job to run, will ensure packages on all clients are updated. Otherwise, a cron job will perform a daily update of packages with YUM.
MCollective:
- Allow users to execute specific commands across large numbers of nodes in an auditable, distributed, and scalable, fashion.

The extent of security verification that is performed currently is based on changes to files that Puppet or the Advanced Intrusion Detection Environment (AIDE) provides. There are also Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) profiles available from the SCAP-Security-Guide project that check security configuration settings. [SI-6]

6.3.1.4. Malicious Code Protection¶

For most environments, SIMP will use ClamAV to protect against malicious code. Rsync is used to push out new definitions, which should be updated by the local administrator regularly. SIMP also comes with a mcafee::uvscan module that manages an installation of uvscan, if it is preferred. The module can configure .dat file updates to occur over rsync.

Both the ClamAV and McAfee modules provide a method to run a scan via cron on a customer scheduled basis. [SI-3]

SIMP also comes with the chkrootkit tool to check for rootkits. The tool runs as a cron job and places its output into syslog. [SI-3]

6.3.1.5. Software and Information Integrity¶

Unauthorized changes to a local client can be detected by Puppet or AIDE (for any file managed by Puppet). In the event that a managed file is changed locally, Puppet will revert the file back to its original state. It is important to note that this is a function of Puppet and is intended to be more of a configuration management feature rather than a security feature. If a Puppet client has been compromised, the Puppet Master may not have the ability to retake control over that client. However, the Puppet Master can configure all other nodes to deny traffic from the compromised node if they are configured by the administrator to do so. There are additional configuration files that are checked by AIDE, which is triggered by a cron job. AIDE logs any detected file changes in syslog. Each implementation may add additional files that are managed by Puppet or watched by AIDE. The AIDE baseline database is updated periodically to handle the installation and updating of system RPMs and reduce false positives. [SI-7, SI-7 (1), SI-7 (2), SI-7 (3)]

6.3.2. Remote Maintenance¶

Remote maintenance can be performed on SIMP using SSH. Local maintenance can be performed at the console or via serial port (if available). SSH sessions are tracked and logged using the security features built into SIMP. Console access requires someone to have access to the physical (or virtual) console along with the root password. Auditing of those actions also occurs in accordance with the configured audit policy. It is up to the implementer to decide how to distribute authentication information for remote maintenance. [MA-4, MA-4 (1), MA-6]

6.3.3. Incident Response¶

While Puppet is not intended to be a security product primarily, its features help provide security functionality such as dynamic reconfigurations and wide-scale consistent mitigation application. If an implementation chooses, they can leverage Puppet’s ability to reconfigure systems as part of incident response.

SIMP also delivers an MCollective infrastructure which can be used to rapidly query for system state or apply hotfixes in a scalable manner. [IR-1]

6.3.4. Contingency Planning¶

SIMP does not provide any direct support for contingency planning. Some of the mechanisms provided by SIMP might be used to support an implementation’s contingency plan.

6.3.5. System Backup¶

SIMP comes with a module called backuppc. This module provides a base configuration of the BackupPC software and allows Puppet servers and clients to perform backups. [CP-10 (6)]

6.4. Information System Management¶

This chapter contains SIMP security concepts that are related to the management security controls in NIST 800-53.

6.4.1. Risk Assessment¶

This section describes the process of identifying risks within a system.

6.4.2. SIMP Self Risk Assessment¶

Risk can be found in any system. The SIMP team is constantly evaluating the system and the settings to minimize inherit risk. Most risks can be mitigated by processes and procedures at the implementation level. The following table describes the known areas in SIMP. [RA-1]

Risk	Possible Mitigations
Disabling Puppet: This can cause the clients to be out of sync with the Puppet Master.	SIMP attempts to force a break on any locks and restart Puppet on all clients after a time of 4*runinterval (30 minutes by default). Implementations should ensure that further steps have not been taken to disable Puppet and should monitor their logs. Administrators can use the puppetlast command on the Puppet Master to detect servers that have not checked in within a reasonable time period.
Out of Date Patches: SIMP can be built with the RPMs from CentOS or Red Hat. Those RPMs should be assumed out of date at the time a system is initially installed (if using the SIMP DVD).	Implementations should obtain the latest RPMs and apply them in a reasonable manner. All SIMP systems will, by default, attempt to update all packages using YUM nightly. Therefore, having an updated repository will ensure that the systems are updated on a regular basis.
Poor Account Management: SIMP security access control is based on users being created and managed over time. Giving shell access to unnecessary users allows them the opportunity to escalate privileges.	Use the default LDIF files and local user modules to ensure that account settings remain restrictive. Ensure the system has policies and procedures in place to manage accounts. Finally, ensure that users are in appropriate groups with limited privileges.

Table: SIMP Risk

6.4.3. Vulnerability Scanning¶

The SIMP development and security team performs regular vulnerability scanning of the product using commercial and open source tools. Results and mitigations for findings from those tools can be provided upon request. [CA-2, RA-5]

6.4.4. Security Assessment and Authorization¶

Assessment and authorization varies by implementation. Implementations are encouraged to use documentation artifacts provided by the SIMP team to assist with assessment and authorization. [CA-2]

Note

Should users find issues with internal assessments, the SIMP team highly encourages them to submit a bug report using our Bug Tracker

7. SIMP Security Control Mapping¶

This is the security control mapping for SIMP. The document has two main sections. The first section contains the security components, which in our case are SIMP modules. Each component is documented and mapped to the security control sources. The second contains security control sources which are references or reference documents that contain security guidance.

Contents:

7.1. SIMP Components¶

This section contains the security documentation for SIMP modules (represented as components).

7.1.1. SIMPLib¶

Module Name: pupmod-simp-simplib

This module collects custom functions, facts, and types relevant to SIMP that are common enough to warrant distributing as their own module.

7.1.1.1. Access Enforcement¶

SIMP uses a combination of discretionary and mandatory access control configurations to protect the operating system and the applications installed. Both forms of access control are built upon a model where a subject’s (user or process) access to an object is controlled by the underlying operating system.

SIMPLib puts some specific access control configurations in place. The /tmp and /var/tmp directories have nodev, noexec, and nosuid set to prevent users from misusing the systems global read/write directories.

References: AC-3

7.1.1.2. Audit Events¶

SIMP logs successful and unsuccessful logins. Logins from unknown users are also logged. These settings are found in the /etc/login.defs file and are activated by default.

References: AU-2

7.1.1.3. Authenticator Management¶

The operating system protects locally stored passwords by hashing them. SIMP maximizes that protection by using the SHA512 algorithm.

Passwords expire every 180 days, must be at least 1 day old to be changed, and users are warned 14 days before the password will expire.

References: IA-5c., IA-5f., IA-5h.

7.1.1.4. Baseline Configuration¶

SIMP uses crond to schedule a number of jobs that help keep systems in a consistent and known baseline. The SIMPLib module ensures that the cron daemon is installed and running on all systems.

References: CM-2 (1)

7.1.1.5. Boundary Protection¶

SIMPLib uses the kernel’s sysctl rp_filter (reverse path) setting to drop spoofed IPv4 packets.

References: SC-7

7.1.1.6. Concurrent Session Controls¶

A limit of 10 concurrent sessions are allowed per user. This value is controlled by the operating system’s Pluggable Authentication Modules(PAM) module pam_limits.so setting.

References: AC-10

7.1.1.7. Cryptographic Protection¶

SIMP enables Federal Information Processing Standard(FIPS) mode. FIPS Publication 140-2, is a computer security standard, developed by a U.S. Government and industry working group to validate the quality of cryptographic modules. FIPS publications (including 140-2) can be found at the following URL: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html. Enabling FIPS mode installs an integrity checking package and modifies ciphers available for applications to use.

References: SC-13

7.1.1.8. Denial of Service Protection¶

SIMP takes several measures to reduce the chances of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. The primary measures in place are to limit traffic with IPTables and set several kernel parameters. The kernel parameters set include limiting ICMP redirects, logging martian packets, ignoring ICMP broadcast traffic, ignoring bogus ICMP errors, and enabling protection against SYN cookies.

References: SC-5

7.1.1.9. Disable Inactive Accounts¶

Local accounts are disabled 35 days after their password expires. This is enforced using the ‘inactive’ value in the /etc/default/useradd file.

References: AC-2 (3)

7.1.1.10. Discretionary Access Control¶

SIMP uses the implementation of Discretionary Access Control (DAC) that is native to Linux. Specific file permissions have been assigned based on published security guidance for Red Hat, CentOS, and UNIX.

To ensure default permissions are as restrictive as possible, the user’s umask is set to 0077 while the daemon umask is set to 0027.

References: AC-3 (4)

7.1.1.11. Error Handling¶

Core dumps are disabled in SIMP. Core dump files may contain sensitive information and therefore are not written to disk.

References: SI-11, CP-12

7.1.1.12. Flaw Remediation¶

The Yellowdog Updater, Modified(YUM) client is configured to point to all SIMP repositories. Each night, a cron job runs yum update to install updated packages on each SIMP client. Therefore any packages in a repository are delivered within a 24 hour time period.

References: SI-2

7.1.1.13. Identification and Authentication¶

Root logins are restricted to a limited set of virtual terminals (tty1-tty6), serial interfaces (ttyS0-ttyS1), and the console.

References: IA-2

7.1.1.14. Least Functionality¶

Whenever possible, SIMP prevents kernel modules that could cause harm or are unnecessary from loading. The operating system’s modprobe blacklist feature is used to stop the following kernel modules from loading:

bluetooth
cramfs
dccp
dccp_ipv4
dccp_ipv6
freevxfs
hfs
hfsplus
ieee1394
jffs2
net-pf-31
rds
sctp
squashfs
tipc
udf
usb-storage

Certain applications or application features are also explicitly disabled. The``hosts.equiv`` (part of the r-series of commands) is disabled. Prelinking, which changes binaries to increase startup time, is also disabled.

References: CM-7

7.1.1.15. Least Privilege¶

SIMP utilizes the cron daemon’s access control by implementing the cron.allow feature. Only users in the cron.allow file are allowed to schedule cron jobs. Only the root user is in that file. The cron.deny file is forced to be absent, therefore all other users are denied the ability to schedule jobs.

The AT and incron services have the same access control configuration setup. Only the root user can schedule jobs and all other users are denied.

References: AC-6

7.1.1.16. Malicious Code Protection¶

SIMP installs the chkrootkit tool. Chkrootkit scans systems for the presence of rootkits. A cron job runs chkrootrootkit once per day.

References: SI-3, SI-3a.

7.1.1.18. Privileged Accounts¶

SIMP systems require a password when the system enters single user mode. In the event system maintenance needs to be performed at the system console, users must have the root password to be authenticated. Grub passwords are also set to prevent unauthorized modifications to boot parameters.

References: AC-6 (5)

7.1.1.19. Secure Name / Address Resolution Service¶

To protect against DNS spoofing, the /etc/host file is configured to log the potentially spoofed name lookups.

References: SC-20

7.1.1.20. Session Lock¶

Sessions do not “lock”. Instead, when there is a shell open and idle for 15 minutes, the session will timeout. This applies only when the shell is not running a command/process. Once the session is terminated, the user must reestablish the shell via console or SSH.

References: AC-11a., AC-11b.

7.1.1.21. Session Termination¶

Sessions are terminated after three failed logins. Users must start a new session to make additional attempts to authenticate. Sessions will also timeout after 60 seconds if not attempt is made to authenticate. Lastly, when prompted to change a password, a user has 3 attempts to successfully change it before the session is terminated.

References: AC-12

7.1.1.22. System Use Notification¶

A default SIMP warning banner is presented to the user prior to login. The content of that banner is:

---------------------------------- ATTENTION -----------------------------------
                    THIS IS A RESTRICTED COMPUTER SYSTEM

This computer system, and all related equipment, networks, and network devices
are provided for authorised use only.  All systems controlled by this
organisation will be monitored for all lawful purposes.  Monitoring includes
the totality of the operating system and connected networks.  No events on this
system are excluded from record and there are no exclusions from this policy.

Use of this system constitutes consent to full monitoring of your activities
for use by the authorised monitoring organisation.  Unauthorised use of this
system, including uninvited connections, may subject you to criminal
prosecution.

The data collected from this system may be used for any purpose by the
collecting organisation.  If you do not agree to this monitoring, discontinue
use of the system IMMEDIATELY.

References: AC-8a., AC-8a.2., AC-8a.3., AC-8c.1.

7.1.2. SIMP¶

Module Name: pupmod-simp-simp

This puppet module provides a set of default classes that will be useful to most users and which form the foundation of the core SIMP installation.

7.1.2.1. Account Management¶

SIMP makes several account management decisions that are part of the overall account management strategy. One of those cases is the use of passwordless sudo for any user in the administrators or auditors groups. This is on by default due to the expected use of SSH keys and lack of local passwords.

References: AC-2, AC-6 (1)

7.1.2.2. Audit Storage Capacity¶

When a SIMP client serves as syslog server, logrotate is used to help manage storage capacity. The following log rotate rules are applied:

Logs are rotated weekly
A maximum of 12 rotated logs are stored

References: AU-4

7.1.2.3. Authorize Access to Security Functions¶

One of the main mechanisms to control access to security functions is the use of sudo. SIMP installs the following sudo rules

Account	Sudo Commands	Run As Account	Password Required
administrators	/usr/bin/sudosh	root	no
administrators	/usr/sbin/puppetd	root	no
administrators	/usr/sbin/puppeca	root	no
administrators	/bin/rm -rf /var/lib/puppet/ssl	root	no
auditors	/bin/cat, /bin/ls, /usr/bin/lsattr, /sbin/aureport, /sbin/ausearch, /sbin/lspci, /sbin/lsusb, /sbin/lsmod, /usr/sbin/lsof, /bin/netstat, /sbin/ifconfig -a, /sbin/route, /sbin/route -[venC], /usr/bin/getent, /usr/bin/tail	root	no

References: AC-6 (1)

7.1.2.4. Authorized Software¶

SIMP builds and configures centralized YUM repositories which are hosted on the SIMP server. These repositories host all of the packages that are needed to install a SIMP server and client. Additionally, all of the packages available on a CentOS/RedHat ISO are also placed in a repository.

All of the repositories installed by the SIMP module require packages to the signed with a known GPG key.

References: CM-7 (5)

7.1.2.5. Centralized Management of Planned Audit Record Content¶

SIMP centrally controls what audit events are recorded on the clients. The SIMP module controls which of the those events are sent to local syslog daemon so that they may be forwarded to a central syslog server. The following list contains the conditions to be met for the SIMP logs to be sent to syslog.

$programname == ‘sudosh’
$programname ==’yum’
$syslogfacility-text == ‘cron’
$syslogfacility-text == ‘authpriv’
$syslogfacility-text == ‘local5’
$syslogfacility-text == ‘local6
$syslogfacility-text == ‘local7’
$syslogpriority-text == ‘emerg’
$syslogfacility-text == ‘kern’ and $msg startswith ‘IPT:’

SIMP also has a stock ryslog module that exists within the SIMP module. The stock rsylsog server configures the rsylog daemon to accept logs from SIMP clients and places them in /var/log/hosts/. The following files are recreated in that directory:

sudosh.log
httpd.log
dhcpd.log
puppet-agent-err.log
puppet-agent.log
puppet-master.log
audit.log
slapd.log
iptables.log
secure.log
messages.log
maillog.log
cron.log
spooler.log
boot.log

References: AU-3 (2), AU-13 (2), AU-6 (4)

7.1.2.6. Configuration Management Policy and Procedures¶

All software developed and delivered under SIMP has a version associated with it. The aggregation of those components come together to make up a SIMP version. The current installed version of SIMP is written to a local file /etc/simp/simp/version.

References: CM-1

7.1.2.7. Identification and Authentication¶

SIMP uses the SSSD client to authenticate with the SIMP LDAP server. The SSSD client is configured to:

Use LDAP
Use autofs
Use sudo
Use SSH
Enforce a minimum user ID of 500

References: IA-2

7.1.2.8. Predictable Failure Prevention¶

SIMP uses TCP to transmit syslog messages. TCP has built in transmission retries and reliability of packet delivery.

References: SI-13

7.1.2.9. Role Based Access Control¶

SIMP creates a group called administrators. The administrators group is for privileged users and is configured to have root level access to the system.

References: AC-2 (7)

7.1.3. AIDE¶

Module Name: pupmod-simp-aide

This module installs AIDE and creates a baseline set of rules and files that should be monitored.

7.1.3.1. Automated Notifications of Integrity Violations¶

When an integrity event is detected by AIDE, the event is written both to a local AIDE log and to syslog. When combined with a central logging capability, all AIDE events can be stored and searched from a central location.

References SC-7 (2)

7.1.3.2. Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity¶

AIDE is installed and configured. SIMP configures a default set of files to be monitored. When a change is made to one of those files, AIDE will log that event.

The default list of files include:

/boot   NORMAL
/bin    NORMAL
/sbin   NORMAL
/lib    NORMAL
/opt    NORMAL
/usr    NORMAL
/root   NORMAL
!/usr/src
!/usr/tmp
/etc    PERMS
!/etc/mtab
!/etc/.*~
/etc/exports  NORMAL
/etc/fstab    NORMAL
/etc/passwd   NORMAL
/etc/group    NORMAL
/etc/gshadow  NORMAL
/etc/shadow   NORMAL
/etc/security/opasswd   NORMAL
/etc/hosts.allow   NORMAL
/etc/hosts.deny    NORMAL
/etc/sudoers NORMAL
/etc/skel NORMAL
/etc/logrotate.d NORMAL
/etc/resolv.conf DATAONLY
/etc/nscd.conf NORMAL
/etc/securetty NORMAL
/etc/profile NORMAL
/etc/bashrc NORMAL
/etc/bash_completion.d/ NORMAL
/etc/login.defs NORMAL
/etc/zprofile NORMAL
/etc/zshrc NORMAL
/etc/zlogin NORMAL
/etc/zlogout NORMAL
/etc/profile.d/ NORMAL
/etc/X11/ NORMAL
/etc/yum.conf NORMAL
/etc/yumex.conf NORMAL
/etc/yumex.profiles.conf NORMAL
/etc/yum/ NORMAL
/etc/yum.repos.d/ NORMAL
/var/log   LOG
!/var/log/sa
!/var/log/aide/aide.log
!/var/log/aide/aide.report
/etc/audit/ LSPP
/etc/libaudit.conf LSPP
/usr/sbin/stunnel LSPP
/var/spool/at LSPP
/etc/at.allow LSPP
/etc/at.deny LSPP
/etc/cron.allow LSPP
/etc/cron.deny LSPP
/etc/cron.d/ LSPP
/etc/cron.daily/ LSPP
/etc/cron.hourly/ LSPP
/etc/cron.monthly/ LSPP
/etc/cron.weekly/ LSPP
/etc/crontab LSPP
/var/spool/cron/root LSPP
/etc/login.defs LSPP
/etc/securetty LSPP
/var/log/faillog LSPP
/var/log/lastlog LSPP
/etc/hosts LSPP
/etc/sysconfig LSPP
/etc/inittab LSPP
/etc/grub LSPP
/etc/rc.d LSPP
/etc/ld.so.conf LSPP
/etc/localtime LSPP
/etc/sysctl.conf LSPP
/etc/modprobe.d/00_simp_blacklist.conf LSPP
/etc/pam.d LSPP
/etc/security LSPP
/etc/aliases LSPP
/etc/postfix LSPP
/etc/ssh/sshd_config LSPP
/etc/ssh/ssh_config LSPP
/etc/stunnel LSPP
/etc/vsftpd.ftpusers LSPP
/etc/vsftpd LSPP
/etc/issue LSPP
/etc/issue.net LSPP
/etc/cups LSPP
!/var/log/and-httpd

References: SC-7

7.1.3.3. Transfer to Alternate Storage¶

The AIDE logs are configured to be sent to syslog. In a default SIMP install, this does not send them to an external host until one is defined.

References: AU-4 (1)

7.1.4. Apache¶

Module Name: pupmod-simp-apache

This Puppet module provides the capability to configure Apache and component sites.

7.1.4.1. Audit Storage and Capacity¶

The Apache logs are written to the /var/log partition. This puts them on the same logical volume as the audit logs. That volume is mounted on a separate partition so that log space does not interfere with operations.

References: AU-4

7.1.4.2. Automated Central Management / Application / Verification¶

SIMP uses rsync (over stunnel) to keep files in /var/www synchronized between all web servers. Any files that need to be the same on all web servers are then managed from the puppet master.

References: CM-7 (1)

7.1.4.3. Content of Audit Records¶

The SIMP Apache configuration uses the following string to populate the Apache logs: %h %l %u %t "%r" %>s %b "%{Referer}i" "%{User-Agent}i"

That will capture the remote hostname, the request log ID, the remote username, the time of the request, the first line of the request, the request status, the size of the response, the referrer, and the user agent used for the request.

There is an additional log file written for SSL logs. The following string is used for that log: %t %h %{SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_CN}x %{SSL_PROTOCOL}x %{SSL_CIPHER}x \"%r\" %b %s

That will capture the time stamp, hostname, the distinguished name of the client certification, SSL protocol used, first line of the request, size of the response, and the request status.

References: AU-3

7.1.4.4. Information Flow Enforcement¶

The Apache module explicitly opens up ports 80 and 443 for the root web servers by using IPTables rules. The connecting source IPs are limited to the value of $client_nets, which for most installs is the local network.

References: AC-4

7.1.4.5. Least Privilege¶

The Apache service runs under the apache user and apache group. This is allows directory permissions to limit the service’s access to files/directories not owned by the apache user/group. The apache user does not have a valid login shell.

References: AC-6

7.1.4.6. Mandatory Access Control¶

When SELinux is enabled in SIMP, Apache is configured to run within a context. Booleans specific to apache are also set.

References: AC-3, AC-3 (4)

7.1.4.7. Transfer to Alternate Storage¶

The Apache logs are configured to be sent to syslog. In a default SIMP install, this does not send them to an external host until one is defined.

References: AU-4 (1)

7.1.4.8. Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity¶

The SIMP server/puppet master has an SSL enabled Apache web server running on port 443. The protocols are limited to TLSv1, TLSv1.1, and TLSv1.2. If the web client does not support those protocols, the connection will be rejected. The certificates are in the /etc/httpd/conf/pki directory.

References: SC-8

7.1.5. Auditd¶

Module Name: pupmod-simp-auditd

This Puppet module provides the capability to configure auditd and rules affecting your system.

7.1.5.1. Audit Events¶

SIMP audit rules were built by using industry best practices gathered over the years. The heaviest reliance has been on the SCAP-Security Guide (SSG). SIMP aims for a balance between performance and operational needs so the settings are rarely an exact match from these guides.

The following audit rules are applied to SIMP systems:

## For audit 1.6.5 and higher
##

# Ignore errors
# This may sound counterintuitive, but we'd rather skip bad rules and load the
# rest than miss half the file.  Warnings are still logged in the daemon
# restart output.
-i

## Remove any existing rules
-D

## Continue loading rules on failure.
# Particularly with the automatically generated nature of these rules in
# Puppet, it is possible that one or more may fail to load. We want to continue
# in that case so that we audit as much as possible.
-c

## Increase buffer size to handle the increased number of messages.
## Feel free to increase this if the machine panic's
# Default: 8192
-b 32768

## Set failure mode to panic
# Default: 2
-f 1

## Rate limit messages
# Default: 0
# If you set this to non-zero, you almost definitely want to set -f to 1 above.
-r 0

## Get rid of all anonymous and daemon junk.  It clogs up the logs and doesn't
# do anyone # any good.
-a exit,never -F auid=-1

# Ignore system services. In most guides this is tagged onto every rule but
# that just makes for more processing time.
-a exit,never -F auid!=0 -F auid<500

## unsuccessful file operations
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S creat -S mkdir -S mknod -S link -S symlink -S
mkdirat -S mknodat -S linkat -S symlinkat -S openat -S open -S close -S rename
-S truncate -S ftruncate -S rmdir -S unlink -S unlinkat -F exit=-EPERM -k access
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S creat -S mkdir -S mknod -S link -S symlink -S
mkdirat -S mknodat -S linkat -S symlinkat -S openat -S open -S close -S rename
-S truncate -S ftruncate -S rmdir -S unlink -S unlinkat -F exit=-EPERM -k access

-a always,exit -F perm=a -F exit=-EPERM -k access

# Permissions auditing
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown -S fchmod -S fchmodat -S fchown -S fchownat
-S lchown -S setxattr -S lsetxattr -S fsetxattr -S removexattr -S lremovexattr
-S fremovexattr -k perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chown -S fchmod -S fchmodat -S fchown -S fchownat
-S lchown -S setxattr -S lsetxattr -S fsetxattr -S removexattr -S lremovexattr
-S fremovexattr -k perm_mod

# Audit useful items that someone does when su'ing to root.
# Had to add an entry at the top for getting rid of anonymous records.  They
# are only moderately useful and contain *way* too much noise since this covers
# things like cron as well.

-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F auid!=0 -F uid=0 -S capset -S mknod -S pivot_root
-S quotactl -S setsid -S settimeofday -S setuid -S swapoff -S swapon -k
su-root-activity
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F auid!=0 -F uid=0 -S capset -S mknod -S pivot_root
-S quotactl -S setsid -S settimeofday -S setuid -S swapoff -S swapon -k
su-root-activity

# Audit the execution of suid and sgid binaries.
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -F euid=0 -F uid!=0 -S execve -k suid-root-exec
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -F euid=0 -F uid!=0 -S execve -k suid-root-exec

## Audit the loading and unloading of kernel modules.
-w /sbin/insmod -p x -k modules
-w /sbin/rmmod -p x -k modules
-w /sbin/modprobe -p x -k modules
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module -S delete_module -k modules
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S init_module -S delete_module -k modules

## Things that could affect time
-a exit,always -F arch=b32 -S adjtimex -S stime -S clock_settime -S settimeofday
-k audit_time_rules
-a exit,always -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex -S clock_settime -S settimeofday -k
audit_time_rules

-w /etc/localtime -p wa -k audit_time_rules

## Things that could affect system locale
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S sethostname -S setdomainname -k
audit_network_modifications
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S sethostname -S setdomainname -k
audit_network_modifications
-w /etc/issue -p wa -k audit_network_modifications
-w /etc/issue.net -p wa -k audit_network_modifications
-w /etc/hosts -p wa -k audit_network_modifications
-w /etc/sysconfig/network -p wa -k audit_network_modifications

# Mount options.
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S mount -S umount -S umount2 -k mount
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S mount -S umount2 -k mount

# audit umask changes.
# This is uselessly noisy.
# -a exit,always -S umask -k umask

-w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_account_changes
-w /etc/group- -p wa -k audit_account_changes
-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_account_changes
-w /etc/passwd- -p wa -k audit_account_changes
-w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_account_changes
-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_account_changes
-w /etc/shadow- -p wa -k audit_account_changes
-w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_account_changes

-w /etc/selinux/ -p wa -k MAC-policy

-w /var/log/faillog -p wa -k logins
-w /var/log/lastlog -p wa -k logins

-w /var/run/utmp -p wa -k session
-w /var/run/btmp -p wa -k session
-w /var/run/wtmp -p wa -k session

-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k CFG_sys

# Generally good things to audit.
-w /boot/grub/grub.conf -p wa -k CFG_grub
-w /etc/aliases -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/anacrontab -p wa -k CFG_cron
-w /etc/at.deny -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/bashrc -p wa -k CFG_shell
-w /etc/cron.d -p wa -k CFG_cron
-w /etc/cron.daily -p wa -k CFG_cron
-w /etc/cron.deny -p wa -k CFG_cron
-w /etc/cron.hourly -p wa -k CFG_cron
-w /etc/cron.monthly -p wa -k CFG_cron
-w /etc/cron.weekly -p wa -k CFG_cron
-w /etc/crontab -p wa -k CFG_cron
-w /etc/csh.cshrc -p wa -k CFG_shell
-w /etc/csh.login -p wa -k CFG_shell
-w /etc/default -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/exports -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/fstab -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/host.conf -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/hosts.allow -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/hosts.deny -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/initlog.conf -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/inittab -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/issue -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/issue.net -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/krb5.conf -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/ld.so.conf -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/ld.so.conf.d -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/login.defs -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/modprobe.conf.d -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/modprobe.d/00_simp_blacklist.conf -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/nsswitch.conf -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/pam.d -p wa -k CFG_pam
-w /etc/pam_smb.conf -p wa -k CFG_pam
-w /etc/profile -p wa -k CFG_shell
-w /etc/rc.d/init.d -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/rc.local -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/rc.sysinit -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/resolv.conf -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/securetty -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/security -p wa -k CFG_security
-w /etc/services -p wa -k CFG_services
-w /etc/shells -p wa -k CFG_shell
-w /etc/snmp/snmpd.conf -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/ssh/sshd_config -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/sysconfig -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/sysctl.conf -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/xinetd.conf -p wa -k CFG_xinetd
-w /etc/xinetd.d -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /etc/yum.conf -p wa -k yum-config
-w /etc/yum.repos.d -p wa -k yum-config
-w /lib/firmware/microcode.dat -p wa -k CFG_sys
-w /var/spool/at -p wa -k CFG_sys
-a exit,always -F arch=b32 -S ptrace -k paranoid
-a exit,always -F arch=b64 -S ptrace -k paranoid
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S personality -k paranoid
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S personality -k paranoid
-w /etc/aide.conf -p wa -k CFG_aide
-w /etc/aide.conf.d/default.aide -p wa -k CFG_aide
-w /etc/rc.d/init.d/auditd -p wa -k auditd
-w /var/log/audit.log -p wa -k audit-logs
-w /etc/pam_ldap.conf -p a -k CFG_etc_ldap
-w /etc/pki/private -p wa -k PKI
-w /etc/pki/public -p wa -k PKI
-w /etc/pki/cacerts -p wa -k PKI
-w /etc/pki/private/blade01.tasty.bacon.pem -p wa -k PKI
-w /etc/pki/public/blade01.tasty.bacon.pub -p wa -k PKI
-a always,exit -F dir=/etc/puppet -F uid!=puppet -p wa -k Puppet_Config
-a always,exit -F dir=/var/log/puppet -F uid!=puppet -p wa -k Puppet_Log
-a always,exit -F dir=/var/run/puppet -F uid!=puppet -p wa -k Puppet_Run
-a always,exit -F dir=$vardir/ssl -F uid!=puppet -p wa -k Puppet_SSL
-w /var/log/audit.log.1 -p rwa -k audit-logs
-w /var/log/audit.log.2 -p rwa -k audit-logs
-w /var/log/audit.log.3 -p rwa -k audit-logs
-w /var/log/audit.log.4 -p rwa -k audit-logs
-w /var/log/audit.log.5 -p rwa -k audit-logs
-w /etc/init/ -p wa -k CFG_upstart

References: AU-2

7.1.5.2. Audit Generation¶

SIMP enables auditd on all systems. Auditd is the userspace component to the Linux Auditing System. It’s responsible for writing audit records to the disk. Viewing the logs is done with the ausearch or aureport utilities. Configuring the audit rules is done with the auditctl utility. During startup, the rules in /etc/audit/audit.rules are read by auditctl.

The audit daemon is configured to initiate auditing at boot time.

References: AU-12, AU-12a., AU-12c.

7.1.5.3. Audit Reviews and Updates¶

SIMP developers are constantly reviewing the audit rules for accuracy, relevance, and performance. Rules are added and in some cases removed as security requirements change or as we find ways to improve the performance of auditd.

References: AU-2 (3)

7.1.5.4. Audit Storage Capacity¶

To help manage the amount of local storage occupied by audit logs, the following rules are applied:

A maximum of 5 log files are retained. The oldest is removed when the logs are rotated.
Files can reach a maximum of 24 Mb before being rotated.

References: AU-4

7.1.5.5. Content of Audit Records¶

The Linux audit daemon contains event type, date/time, host, and outcome of events by default. Each event type has a varying level of detail depending on the audited action. The auditd documentation should be referred to for the event types.

References: AU-3

7.1.5.6. Response to Audit Processing Failures¶

The auditing dispatcher is system that allows external applications to access and make use of the auditd daemon in real time. When the internal queue of the audit dispatcher is full, a message is sent to syslog.

References: AU-5

7.1.5.7. Response To Audit Processing Failures - Audit Storage Capacity¶

Auditd has been configured to handle audit failures or potential failures due to storage capacity. Those settings include:

Send a warning to syslog when there is less than 75Mb of space on the audit partition (space_left).
Suspend the audit daemon when there is less than 50Mb of space left on the audit partition (admin_space_left).

References: AU-5 (1)

7.1.5.8. Transfer to Alternate Storage¶

The audit logs are configured to be sent to syslog. In a default SIMP install, this does not send them to an external host until one is defined.

References: AU-4 (1)

7.1.6. ClamAV¶

Module Name: pupmod-simp-clamav

This module installs and configures ClamAV. ClamAV is a command line malicious code detection tool.

7.1.6.1. Malicious Code Protection¶

SIMP installs and configures ClamAV. ClamAV is a command line malicious code detection tool.

ClamAV is scheduled to run once per day and scans /tmp, /var/tmp, and /dev/shm.

References: SI-3, SI-3a.

7.1.6.2. Transfer to Alternate Storage¶

The ClamAV logs are configured to be sent to syslog. In a default SIMP install, this does not send them to an external host until one is defined.

References: AU-4 (1)

7.1.7. Compliance¶

Module Name: pupmod-simp-compliance_markup

This module adds a function to enable compliance annotations in Puppet code.

7.1.7.1. Automated Central Management / Application / Verification¶

SIMP has a custom function that is embedded within the module code to validate each variable. Those variables are then verified against SIMP default configuration settings using hiera. Each time puppet runs on a client, the hiera variables are validated against SIMP defaults.

References: CM-7 (1)

7.1.8. IPTables¶

Module Name: pupmod-simp-iptables

The iptables module manages all IPTables and IP6Tables rules in an atomic fashion. All rules are applied only once per puppet agent run during the application of the last executed iptables resource.

7.1.8.1. Boundary Protection¶

The SIMP IPTables module adds an IPtables rule that will prevent external IP addresses from being able to send spoofed packets to your system. This applies to IPv6 traffic. IPv4 spoofing is prevented using the rp_filter sysctl setting.

References: SC-7

7.1.8.2. Enable / Disable Security Policy Filters¶

Only the root user or a user who has escalated to root can modify the IPtables filters.

References: AC-4 (10)

7.1.8.3. Information Flow Enforcement¶

IPTables is installed and running on all SIMP clients. IPtables controls the flow of inbound traffic by limiting IP addresses, protocols, and port numbers.

The default IPTables rules:

Allow all outbound traffic
Allow ping
Allow traffic from established connections
Drop broadcast traffic
Drop multicast traffic
Drop all other traffic

References: AC-4, CM-7b.

7.1.9. Named/Bind¶

Module Name: pupmod-simp-named

This Puppet module provides the capability to configure either a chrooted named process or a caching nameserver.

7.1.9.1. Automated Central Management / Application / Verification¶

Named configuration files are synchronized between the puppet master and the named servers using rsync.

References: CM-7 (1)

7.1.9.2. Information Flow Enforcement¶

The named module explicitly opens TCP and UDP ports 53 for the DNS by using IPTables rules. The connecting source IPs are limited to the value of $client_nets which for most installs is the local network.

References: AC-4

7.1.9.3. Least Functionality¶

The SIMP named service is configured to run within a chroot jail. This ensures that the service cannot see or access files outside of named directory. Should the named service become remotely compromised, the attack cannot be escalated to other parts of the file system.

References: CM-7

7.1.9.4. Least Privilege¶

The named service runs under the named user and named group. This is allows directory permissions to limit the service’s access to files/directories not owned by the apache user/group. The named user does not have a valid login shell.

References: AC-6

7.1.10. OpenLDAP¶

Module Name: pupmod-simp-openldap

This Puppet module provides the capability to configure OpenLDAP servers and clients.

7.1.10.1. Access Enforcement¶

User password history (shadowLastChange) is written to the LDAP server. For this to happen, the user is given write access to their own shadowLastChange entry in LDAP.

References: AC-3

7.1.10.2. Audit Storage Capacity¶

Logrotate is used to help manage log storage capacity. The following log rotate rules are applied to OpenLDAP:

Logs are rotated daily
A maximum of 7 rotated logs are stored

References: AU-4

7.1.10.3. Authenticator Management¶

Authenticator strength is enforced using slapo-ppolicy overlay for LDAP. The ppolicy overlay is then configured to use PAM cracklib to enforce complexity.

For the default password complexity rules see the What is the Password Complexity for SIMP? FAQ.

The integration point between the remote LDAP server and PAM is the pam_ldap pam module. SIMP configures pam_ldap to point to the SIMP LDAP server and communicates using TLS.

References: IA-5 (1)(a), IA-5 (1)(e)

7.1.10.4. Content of Audit Records¶

All LDAP transactions to the LDAP database are audited and written to /var/log/slapd.audit/ in LDIF format.

References: AU-3

7.1.10.5. Device Identification and Authentication¶

There is an account and password setup to authenticate devices needing to synchronize with the LDAD server. The username for that account is LDAPSync and the account and associated password are stored in LDAP.

There is also an account for a device to authenticate prior to being allowed to do anything else with the LDAP server. The username for that account is hostAuth and the account is stored in LDAP.

References: IA-3

7.1.10.6. Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users)¶

The pam_ldap module ensures that the username is mapped to the uid portion of the DN in LDAP.

The pam_ldap module is configured to tell the clients to ignore the following user names, forcing them to be authenticated locally:

root
bin
daemon
adm
lp
mail
operator
nobody
dbus
ntp
saslauth
postfix
sshd
puppet
stunnel
nscd
haldaemon
clamav
rpcuser
rpc
clam
nfsnobody
rpm
nslcd
avahi
gdm
rtkit
pulse
hsqldb
radvd
apache
tomcat

There as an ldap account created for LDAP administration. The username for that account is LDAPAdmin.

References: IA-2

7.1.10.7. Information Flow Enforcement¶

Since TCPWrappers has a default deny policy in place, a specific entry is added to allow all hosts to connect to the slapd service.

The OpenLDAP module explicitly opens up ports 389 (LDAP) and 636 (LDAPS) using IPTables rules. The connecting source IPs are limited to the value of $client_nets which for most installs is the local network.

References: AC-4

7.1.10.8. Least Privilege¶

The OpenLDAP service runs under the ldap user and ldap group. This is allows directory permissions to limit the service’s access to files/directories not owned by the ldap user/group. The ldap user does not have a valid login shell.

The default LDAP server policy denies all users access to everything (default deny). Access to LDAP entries are explicitly added.

References: AC-6

7.1.10.9. Transfer to Alternate Storage¶

The LDAP logs are configured to be sent to syslog. In a default SIMP install, this does not send them to an external host until one is defined.

References: AU-4 (1)

7.1.10.10. Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity¶

The pam_ldap OpenLDAP module is configured to use TLS to communicate with the LDAP server. It currently only supports TLSv1, TLSv2, and SSLv3. Supporting SSLv3 is a limitation of OpenLDAP.

References: SC-8

7.1.11. PAM¶

Module Name: pupmod-simp-pam

This Puppet module provides the capability to configure various PAM settings on the system.

Included are capabilities to manage:

system-auth
Group-based access to the system
access.conf

The system-auth settings are a bit draconian, but simple enough to work within.

7.1.11.1. Authenticator Management¶

Authenticator strength is enforced using pam_cracklib.so. The SIMP settings ensure that passwords:

Have at least four characters that are different from the previous password
Do not repeat a character more than two times in a row
Do not have the username (forward or reversed) in the password
Have at lease one character from three of the four classes: upper, lower, number, special character
Have at least 14 characters
Are not the same as any of the previous 24 passwords

Passwords are hashed using the SHA512 algorithm. Each password is hashed using 1000 rounds.

References: IA-5 (1)(a), IA-5 (1)(e)

7.1.11.2. Discretionary Access Control¶

When creating a home directory for the first time, PAM creates that directory using the umask of 0077.

References: AC-2

7.1.11.3. Group Authentication¶

SIMP does not use group accounts for authenticators. Instead, users are added to a group. In the case of the administrators group, a user first authenticates to their account, and then escalates to root using sudo.

References: IA-2 (5)

7.1.11.4. Least Privilege¶

SIMP uses the access conf file to identify which accounts can login to a system. After all other identification and authentication checks have passed, the pam access.conf file is checked to ensure the user is allowed to login. SIMP allows root and the adminstrators group to login to all systems and the simp user to login to the puppet master. All other users must be explicitly added to the access.conf file using the SIMP pam module.

References: AC-6

7.1.11.5. Privileged Accounts¶

Linux historically uses the wheel group to as an administrators group. SIMP makes use of the sudoers file with more granular group permissions. The PAM module enforces that only the root user is in the wheel group.

References: AC-6 (5)

7.1.11.6. Unsuccessful Login Attempts¶

A user is allowed three failed logins per session. After the third unsuccessful login attempt, the user is disconnected and must initiate a new session in order to make additional attempts.

After 5 failed login attempts in a time 15 minute span, the account is locked for a period of 15 minutes.

The root user account will be locked for one hour after 5 failed login attempts.

References: AC-7, AC-7(b), IA-11

7.1.12. Pupmod¶

Module Name: pupmod-simp-pupmod

This Puppet module provides the capability to configure both puppet servers and puppet clients.

The ability to switch puppetd from a system service to a cron job is also supported.

7.1.12.1. Access Enforcement¶

The puppet master uses a whitelist to determine which puppet clients can connect to the puppet master. The certificate of the connecting client must match the fully qualified domain name of the system. If it doesn’t, then the connection is denied.

References: AC-3

7.1.12.2. Audit Events¶

The following puppet files are added to the audit rules so that modifications to them are audited by auditd.

-a always,exit -F dir=${confdir} -F uid!=puppet -p wa -k Puppet_Config
-a always,exit -F dir=${logdir} -F uid!=puppet -p wa -k Puppet_Log
-a always,exit -F dir=${rundir} -F uid!=puppet -p wa -k Puppet_Run
-a always,exit -F dir=${ssldir} -F uid!=puppet -p wa -k Puppet_SSL

References: AU-2

7.1.12.3. Audit Storage and Capacity¶

The Puppet logs are written to the /var/log partition. This puts them on the same logical volume as the audit logs. That volume is mounted on a separate partition so that log space does not interfere with operations.

The puppet master logs reports from client puppet runs in /var/lib/puppet/reports. The SIMP pupmod puppet module purges reports older than 7 days.

References: AU-4

7.1.12.4. Automated Change Implementation¶

The most prominent tool in the SIMP architecture is Puppet. Puppet is a client/server tool where managed nodes run the Puppet agent application. One or more servers run the Puppet master application in the form of Puppet Server.

The Puppet agent sends facts to the Puppet master and request a catalog. The master compiles and returns that node’s catalog, using several sources of information it has access to.

Once it receives a catalog, Puppet agent applies it by checking each resource the catalog describes. If it finds any resources that are not in their desired state, it makes any changes necessary to correct them. After applying the catalog, the agent submits a report to the Puppet master.

Puppet clients have a cron job configured to run the puppet agent every 30 minutes.

References: CM-3 (3)

7.1.12.5. Content of Audit Records¶

The puppet master’s log level is set to WARN. Any changes that are made during a run of the puppet agent, are logged to the client’s log file.

References: AU-3

7.1.12.6. Information Flow Enforcement¶

The pupmod module explicitly opens up ports 8140 and 8141 using IPTables rules. Port 8140 is the puppet master port and 8141 is the certificate authority port. The connecting source IPs are limited to the value of $client_nets, which for most installs is the local network.

References: AC-4

7.1.12.7. Public Key Infrastructure¶

Puppet has it’s own public key infrastructure (PKI) that is used exclusively for the puppet application. The PKI is used to provide access control and protect communications between the puppet master and the clients.

Additional information on Puppet and PKI can be found at https://docs.puppet.com/background/ssl/certificates_pki.html.

SIMP installs a cron job that will download a copy of the certificate revocation list(CRL) two times per day. If there is a client certificate that needs to be revoked, they can be added to the CRL and will no longer be able to connect to the puppet master.

References: SC-17

7.1.12.8. Transfer to Alternate Storage¶

The puppet logs are configured to be sent to syslog facility local6. In a default SIMP install, this does not send them to an external host until one is defined.

References: AU-4 (1)

7.1.12.9. Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity¶

The SIMP server/puppet master uses TLS for communications between the puppet master and clients. The protocols for that communications are limited to TLSv1, TLSv1.1, and TLSv1.2.

References: SC-8

7.1.13. Rsync¶

Module Name: pupmod-simp-rsync

This Puppet module provides the capability to configure an rsync server. The intent is for this server to be run encrypted via a stunnel channel.

Client rsync rules have not been integrated into this module at this time.

7.1.13.1. Access Enforcement¶

SIMP rsync is limited to read only so that files can not be remotely modified.

References: AC-3

7.1.13.2. Information Flow Enforcement¶

The rsync server port (over stunnel) is open to the IP addresses defined by the value of $client_nets, which for most installs is the local network.

References: AC-4

7.1.13.3. Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity¶

Rsync is not encrypted. To mitigate this, SIMP only allows rsync to listen on the local host. The server to client communications is then protected using the SIMP stunnel module.

References: SC-8

7.1.14. SSH¶

Module Name: pupmod-simp-ssh

This Puppet module manages the configuration of the system-wide SSH server and client.

7.1.14.1. Authenticator Management¶

The SSH daemon disallows the use of empty passwords. Additionally, the SSH daemon uses PAM to support authenticator security.

References: IA-5c.

7.1.14.2. Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management¶

The SSH server is configured to use the system’s existing system certificates. Those certificates are stored in /etc/pki and are used to generated the SSH server certificates stored in /etc/ssh.

References: SC-12

7.1.14.3. Cryptographic Protection¶

In the default FIPS mode, the SSH daemon limits the key exchange algorithms to:

ecdh-sha2-nistp521
ecdh-sha2-nistp384
ecdh-sha2-nistp256
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256

In the default FIPS mode, the SSH daemon limits the message authentication code (MAC) algorithms to:

hmac-sha2-256
hmac-sha1’

In the default FIPS mode, the SSH client limits the key exchange algorithms to:

In the default FIPS mode, the SSH client limits the MAC algorithms to:

hmac-sha2-256
hmac-sha1’

References: SC-13

7.1.14.4. Information Flow Enforcement¶

The SSH module explicitly opens up port 22 for the SSH server by using IPTables rules.

Since TCPWrappers has a default deny policy in place, a specific entry is added to allow all hosts to connect to the SSH service.

References: AC-4

7.1.14.5. Least Privilege¶

The SSH service runs under the ssh user and ssh group. This is allows directory permissions to limit the service’s access to files/directories not owned by the ssh user/group. The ssh user does not have a valid login shell.

X11 forwarding over SSH is explicitly disallowed. This limits the exposure of the SSH server to networks outside of the control of SIMP.

References: AC-6

7.1.14.6. Privileged Accounts¶

The SSH daemon disables root login. The root user is only allowed to login locally.

References: AC-6 (5), AC-6 (2)

7.1.14.7. System Use Notification¶

The SSH daemon is configured to use the /etc/issue.net file to present a banner prior to login.

References: AC-8a.

7.1.14.8. Transfer to Alternate Storage¶

The SSH logs are configured to be sent to the syslog facility AUTHPRIV. In a default SIMP install, this does not send them to an external host until one is defined.

References: AU-4 (1)

7.1.15. Stunnel¶

Module Name: pupmod-simp-stunnel

This Puppet module provides the capability to configure stunnel channels on your system.

7.1.15.1. Access Enforcement¶

Stunnel verifies the client certificate as a form of access control. It only checks that the client certificate is valid.

References: AC-3

7.1.15.2. Least Functionality¶

The SIMP stunnel service is configured to run within a chroot jail. This ensures that the service cannot see or access files outside of stunnel directory. Should the stunnel service become remotely compromised, the attack cannot be escalated to other parts of the file system.

References: CM-7

7.1.15.3. Least Privilege¶

The stunnel service runs under the stunnel user and stunnel group. This allows directory permissions to limit the service’s access to files/directories not owned by the stunnel user/group. The stunnel user does not have a valid login shell.

References: AC-6

7.1.15.4. Transfer to Alternate Storage¶

The stunnel logs are configured to be sent to syslog. In a default SIMP install, this does not send them to an external host until one is defined.

References: AU-4 (1)

7.1.15.5. Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity¶

The stunnel module is a framework used by other modules to encrypt communications for applications that might not natively support it.

The cipher negotiation is determined by the OpenSSL ciphers. In a default SIMP system, this will be TLSv1.1 or higher.

The certificates used for stunnel are in the /etc/pki directory.

References: SC-8

7.1.16. Sudo¶

Module Name: pupmod-simp-sudo

This Puppet module manages the sudoers infrastructure.

7.1.16.1. Authorize Access to Security Functions¶

The SIMP Suoders module make use of the operating system’s sudo capability to grant access to privileged functions. Specific rules are written to grant each user/group access to privileged command(s).

References: AC-6 (1)

7.1.17. Sudosh¶

Module Name: pupmod-simp-sudosh

This Puppet module provides the capability to use Sudosh with logging to rsyslog.

7.1.17.1. Session Audit¶

The sudosh tool is installed on each SIMP node. Sudosh is shell that logs the user’s keystrokes. The keystrokes are written to a log file /var/log/sudosh/log. Another utility, sudosh-replay is used to replay the keystrokes of a session.

References: AU-14

7.1.18. TCP Wrappers¶

Module Name: pupmod-simp-tcpwrappers

This Puppet module allows you to manage /etc/hosts.allow, /etc/hosts.deny is set to ALL:ALL by default.

7.1.18.1. Information Flow Enforcement¶

TCP Wrappers is enabled on SIMP systems. TCP Wrappers is a host-based networking ACL system, used to filter access to IP addresses. It allows host or subnetwork IP addresses, names and/or ident query replies, to be used as tokens on which to filter for access control purposes.

TCP Wrappers uses the /etc/hosts.allow and the /etc/hosts.deny files to configure the access control.

References: AC-4

7.1.18.2. Least Privilege¶

SIMP configures tcpwrappers to deny all, meaning that a service will be denied access to the TCP stack unless it is explicitly allowed. Each SIMP module that needs access to the TCP stack has an entry added to the host.allow file using this tcpwrappers module.

References: AC-6

7.2. Security Control Sources¶

7.2.1. NIST 800-53 Rev4¶

7.2.1.1. AC-1¶

Control Family: ACCESS CONTROL

7.2.1.1.1. AC-1¶

AC-1 : ACCESS CONTROL POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the AC family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.”

Related Controls:PM-9

7.2.1.1.1.1. AC-1a.¶

Description: “Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:”

7.2.1.1.1.2. AC-1a.1.¶

Description: “An access control policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and”

7.2.1.1.1.3. AC-1a.2.¶

Description: “Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the access control policy and associated access controls; and”

7.2.1.1.1.4. AC-1b.¶

Description: “Reviews and updates the current:”

7.2.1.1.1.5. AC-1b.1.¶

Description: “Access control policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and”

7.2.1.1.1.6. AC-1b.2.¶

Description: “Access control procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].” .. _header_AC-2:

7.2.1.2. AC-2¶

Control Family: ACCESS CONTROL

7.2.1.2.1. AC-2¶

AC-2 : ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Information system account types include, for example, individual, shared, group, system, guest/anonymous, emergency, developer/manufacturer/vendor, temporary, and service. Some of the account management requirements listed above can be implemented by organizational information systems. The identification of authorized users of the information system and the specification of access privileges reflects the requirements in other security controls in the security plan. Users requiring administrative privileges on information system accounts receive additional scrutiny by appropriate organizational personnel (e.g., system owner, mission/business owner, or chief information security officer) responsible for approving such accounts and privileged access. Organizations may choose to define access privileges or other attributes by account, by type of account, or a combination of both. Other attributes required for authorizing access include, for example, restrictions on time-of-day, day-of-week, and point-of-origin. In defining other account attributes, organizations consider system-related requirements (e.g., scheduled maintenance, system upgrades) and mission/business requirements, (e.g., time zone differences, customer requirements, remote access to support travel requirements). Failure to consider these factors could affect information system availability. Temporary and emergency accounts are accounts intended for short-term use. Organizations establish temporary accounts as a part of normal account activation procedures when there is a need for short-term accounts without the demand for immediacy in account activation. Organizations establish emergency accounts in response to crisis situations and with the need for rapid account activation. Therefore, emergency account activation may bypass normal account authorization processes. Emergency and temporary accounts are not to be confused with infrequently used accounts (e.g., local logon accounts used for special tasks defined by organizations or when network resources are unavailable). Such accounts remain available and are not subject to automatic disabling or removal dates. Conditions for disabling or deactivating accounts include, for example: (i) when shared/group, emergency, or temporary accounts are no longer required; or (ii) when individuals are transferred or terminated. Some types of information system accounts may require specialized training.”

Related Controls:AC-3,AC-4,AC-5,AC-6,AC-10,AC-17,AC-19,AC-20,AU-9,IA-2,IA-4,IA-5,IA-8,CM-5,CM-6,CM-11,MA-3,MA-4,MA-5,PL-4,SC-13

7.2.1.2.1.1. AC-2a.¶

Description: “Identifies and selects the following types of information system accounts to support organizational missions/business functions: [Assignment: organization-defined information system account types];”

7.2.1.2.1.2. AC-2b.¶

Description: “Assigns account managers for information system accounts;”

7.2.1.2.1.3. AC-2c.¶

Description: “Establishes conditions for group and role membership;”

7.2.1.2.1.4. AC-2d.¶

Description: “Specifies authorized users of the information system, group and role membership, and access authorizations (i.e., privileges) and other attributes (as required) for each account;”

7.2.1.2.1.5. AC-2e.¶

Description: “Requires approvals by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] for requests to create information system accounts;”

7.2.1.2.1.6. AC-2f.¶

Description: “Creates, enables, modifies, disables, and removes information system accounts in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined procedures or conditions];”

7.2.1.2.1.7. AC-2g.¶

Description: “Monitors the use of information system accounts;”

7.2.1.2.1.8. AC-2h.¶

Description: “Notifies account managers:”

7.2.1.2.1.9. AC-2h.1.¶

Description: “When accounts are no longer required;”

7.2.1.2.1.10. AC-2h.2.¶

Description: “When users are terminated or transferred; and”

7.2.1.2.1.11. AC-2h.3.¶

Description: “When individual information system usage or need-to-know changes;”

7.2.1.2.1.12. AC-2i.¶

Description: “Authorizes access to the information system based on:”

7.2.1.2.1.13. AC-2i.1.¶

Description: “A valid access authorization;”

7.2.1.2.1.14. AC-2i.2.¶

Description: “Intended system usage; and”

7.2.1.2.1.15. AC-2i.3.¶

Description: “Monitors information system accounts for [Assignment: organization-defined atypical usage]; and”

7.2.1.2.13.2. AC-2 (12)(b)¶

Description: “Reports atypical usage of information system accounts to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].”

7.2.1.2.14. AC-2 (13)¶

AC-2 (13) : DISABLE ACCOUNTS FOR HIGH-RISK INDIVIDUALS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization disables accounts of users posing a significant risk within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of discovery of the risk.” Supplemental Guidance: “Users posing a significant risk to organizations include individuals for whom reliable evidence or intelligence indicates either the intention to use authorized access to information systems to cause harm or through whom adversaries will cause harm. Harm includes potential adverse impacts to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation. Close coordination between authorizing officials, information system administrators, and human resource managers is essential in order for timely execution of this control enhancement.”

Related Controls:PS-4 .. _header_AC-3:

7.2.1.3. AC-3¶

Control Family: ACCESS CONTROL

7.2.1.3.1. AC-3¶

AC-3 : ACCESS ENFORCEMENT

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The information system enforces approved authorizations for logical access to information and system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies.” Supplemental Guidance: “Access control policies (e.g., identity-based policies, role-based policies, control matrices, cryptography) control access between active entities or subjects (i.e., users or processes acting on behalf of users) and passive entities or objects (e.g., devices, files, records, domains) in information systems. In addition to enforcing authorized access at the information system level and recognizing that information systems can host many applications and services in support of organizational missions and business operations, access enforcement mechanisms can also be employed at the application and service level to provide increased information security.”

Related Controls:AC-2,AC-4,AC-5,AC-6,AC-16,AC-17,AC-18,AC-19,AC-20,AC-21,AC-22,AU-9,CM-5,CM-6,CM-11,MA-3,MA-4,MA-5,PE-3

7.2.1.3.2. AC-3 (1)¶

AC-3 (1) : RESTRICTED ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-6].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.3.3. AC-3 (2)¶

AC-3 (2) : DUAL AUTHORIZATION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system enforces dual authorization for [Assignment: organization-defined privileged commands and/or other organization-defined actions].” Supplemental Guidance: “Dual authorization mechanisms require the approval of two authorized individuals in order to execute. Organizations do not require dual authorization mechanisms when immediate responses are necessary to ensure public and environmental safety. Dual authorization may also be known as two-person control.”

Related Controls:CP-9,MP-6

7.2.1.3.4. AC-3 (3)¶

AC-3 (3) : MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system enforces [Assignment: organization-defined mandatory access control policy] over all subjects and objects where the policy:” Supplemental Guidance: “Mandatory access control as defined in this control enhancement is synonymous with nondiscretionary access control, and is not constrained only to certain historical uses (e.g., implementations using the Bell-LaPadula Model). The above class of mandatory access control policies constrains what actions subjects can take with information obtained from data objects for which they have already been granted access, thus preventing the subjects from passing the information to unauthorized subjects and objects. This class of mandatory access control policies also constrains what actions subjects can take with respect to the propagation of access control privileges; that is, a subject with a privilege cannot pass that privilege to other subjects. The policy is uniformly enforced over all subjects and objects to which the information system has control. Otherwise, the access control policy can be circumvented. This enforcement typically is provided via an implementation that meets the reference monitor concept (see AC-25). The policy is bounded by the information system boundary (i.e., once the information is passed outside of the control of the system, additional means may be required to ensure that the constraints on the information remain in effect). The trusted subjects described above are granted privileges consistent with the concept of least privilege (see AC-6). Trusted subjects are only given the minimum privileges relative to the above policy necessary for satisfying organizational mission/business needs. The control is most applicable when there is some policy mandate (e.g., law, Executive Order, directive, or regulation) that establishes a policy regarding access to sensitive/classified information and some users of the information system are not authorized access to all sensitive/classified information resident in the information system. This control can operate in conjunction with AC-3 (4). A subject that is constrained in its operation by policies governed by this control is still able to operate under the less rigorous constraints of AC-3 (4), but policies governed by this control take precedence over the less rigorous constraints of AC-3 (4). For example, while a mandatory access control policy imposes a constraint preventing a subject from passing information to another subject operating at a different sensitivity label, AC-3 (4) permits the subject to pass the information to any subject with the same sensitivity label as the subject.”

Related Controls:AC-25,SC-11

7.2.1.3.4.1. AC-3 (3)(a)¶

Description: “Is uniformly enforced across all subjects and objects within the boundary of the information system;”

7.2.1.3.4.2. AC-3 (3)(b)¶

Description: “Specifies that a subject that has been granted access to information is constrained from doing any of the following;”

7.2.1.3.4.3. AC-3 (3)(b)(1)¶

Description: “Passing the information to unauthorized subjects or objects;”

7.2.1.3.4.4. AC-3 (3)(b)(2)¶

Description: “Granting its privileges to other subjects;”

7.2.1.3.4.5. AC-3 (3)(b)(3)¶

Description: “Changing one or more security attributes on subjects, objects, the information system, or information system components;”

7.2.1.3.4.6. AC-3 (3)(b)(4)¶

Description: “Choosing the security attributes and attribute values to be associated with newly created or modified objects; or”

7.2.1.3.4.7. AC-3 (3)(b)(5)¶

Description: “Changing the rules governing access control; and”

7.2.1.3.4.8. AC-3 (3)(c)¶

Description: “Specifies that [Assignment: organization-defined subjects] may explicitly be granted [Assignment: organization-defined privileges (i.e., they are trusted subjects)] such that they are not limited by some or all of the above constraints.”

7.2.1.3.5. AC-3 (4)¶

AC-3 (4) : DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system enforces [Assignment: organization-defined discretionary access control policy] over defined subjects and objects where the policy specifies that a subject that has been granted access to information can do one or more of the following:” Supplemental Guidance: “When discretionary access control policies are implemented, subjects are not constrained with regard to what actions they can take with information for which they have already been granted access. Thus, subjects that have been granted access to information are not prevented from passing (i.e., the subjects have the discretion to pass) the information to other subjects or objects. This control enhancement can operate in conjunction with AC-3 (3). A subject that is constrained in its operation by policies governed by AC-3 (3) is still able to operate under the less rigorous constraints of this control enhancement. Thus, while AC-3 (3) imposes constraints preventing a subject from passing information to another subject operating at a different sensitivity level, AC-3 (4) permits the subject to pass the information to any subject at the same sensitivity level. The policy is bounded by the information system boundary. Once the information is passed outside of the control of the information system, additional means may be required to ensure that the constraints remain in effect. While the older, more traditional definitions of discretionary access control require identity-based access control, that limitation is not required for this use of discretionary access control.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.3.5.1. AC-3 (4)(a)¶

Description: “Pass the information to any other subjects or objects;”

7.2.1.3.5.2. AC-3 (4)(b)¶

Description: “Grant its privileges to other subjects;”

7.2.1.3.5.3. AC-3 (4)(c)¶

Description: “The receiving [Assignment: organization-defined information system or system component] provides [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards]; and”

7.2.1.3.10.2. AC-3 (9)(b)¶

Description: “[Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] are used to validate the appropriateness of the information designated for release.”

7.2.1.3.11. AC-3 (10)¶

AC-3 (10) : AUDITED OVERRIDE OF ACCESS CONTROL MECHANISMS

Priority:

Control Family: ACCESS CONTROL

7.2.1.5.1. AC-5¶

AC-5 : SEPARATION OF DUTIES

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Separation of duties addresses the potential for abuse of authorized privileges and helps to reduce the risk of malevolent activity without collusion. Separation of duties includes, for example: (i) dividing mission functions and information system support functions among different individuals and/or roles; (ii) conducting information system support functions with different individuals (e.g., system management, programming, configuration management, quality assurance and testing, and network security); and (iii) ensuring security personnel administering access control functions do not also administer audit functions.”

Related Controls:AC-3,AC-6,PE-3,PE-4,PS-2

7.2.1.5.1.1. AC-5a.¶

Description: “Separates [Assignment: organization-defined duties of individuals];”

7.2.1.5.1.2. AC-5b.¶

AC-6 (7) : REVIEW OF USER PRIVILEGES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “The need for certain assigned user privileges may change over time reflecting changes in organizational missions/business function, environments of operation, technologies, or threat. Periodic review of assigned user privileges is necessary to determine if the rationale for assigning such privileges remains valid. If the need cannot be revalidated, organizations take appropriate corrective actions.”

Related Controls:CA-7

7.2.1.6.8.1. AC-6 (7)(a)¶

AC-8 : SYSTEM USE NOTIFICATION

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The information system:” Supplemental Guidance: “System use notifications can be implemented using messages or warning banners displayed before individuals log in to information systems. System use notifications are used only for access via logon interfaces with human users and are not required when such human interfaces do not exist. Organizations consider system use notification messages/banners displayed in multiple languages based on specific organizational needs and the demographics of information system users. Organizations also consult with the Office of the General Counsel for legal review and approval of warning banner content.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.8.1.1. AC-8a.¶

Description: “Displays to users [Assignment: organization-defined system use notification message or banner] before granting access to the system that provides privacy and security notices consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance and states that:”

7.2.1.8.1.2. AC-8a.1.¶

Description: “Users are accessing a U.S. Government information system;”

7.2.1.8.1.3. AC-8a.2.¶

Description: “Information system usage may be monitored, recorded, and subject to audit;”

7.2.1.8.1.4. AC-8a.3.¶

Description: “Unauthorized use of the information system is prohibited and subject to criminal and civil penalties; and”

7.2.1.8.1.5. AC-8a.4.¶

Description: “Use of the information system indicates consent to monitoring and recording;”

7.2.1.8.1.6. AC-8b.¶

Description: “Retains the notification message or banner on the screen until users acknowledge the usage conditions and take explicit actions to log on to or further access the information system; and”

7.2.1.8.1.7. AC-8c.¶

Description: “For publicly accessible systems:”

7.2.1.8.1.8. AC-8c.1.¶

Description: “Displays system use information [Assignment: organization-defined conditions], before granting further access;”

7.2.1.8.1.9. AC-8c.2.¶

Control Family: ACCESS CONTROL

7.2.1.10.1. AC-10¶

AC-10 : CONCURRENT SESSION CONTROL

Priority: P3

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The information system limits the number of concurrent sessions for each [Assignment: organization-defined account and/or account type] to [Assignment: organization-defined number].” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations may define the maximum number of concurrent sessions for information system accounts globally, by account type (e.g., privileged user, non-privileged user, domain, specific application), by account, or a combination. For example, organizations may limit the number of concurrent sessions for system administrators or individuals working in particularly sensitive domains or mission-critical applications. This control addresses concurrent sessions for information system accounts and does not address concurrent sessions by single users via multiple system accounts.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.11. AC-11¶

Control Family: ACCESS CONTROL

7.2.1.11.1. AC-11¶

AC-11 : SESSION LOCK

Priority: P3

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The information system:” Supplemental Guidance: “Session locks are temporary actions taken when users stop work and move away from the immediate vicinity of information systems but do not want to log out because of the temporary nature of their absences. Session locks are implemented where session activities can be determined. This is typically at the operating system level, but can also be at the application level. Session locks are not an acceptable substitute for logging out of information systems, for example, if organizations require users to log out at the end of workdays.”

Related Controls:AC-7

7.2.1.11.1.1. AC-11a.¶

Description: “Prevents further access to the system by initiating a session lock after [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of inactivity or upon receiving a request from a user; and”

7.2.1.11.1.2. AC-11b.¶

Description: “Retains the session lock until the user reestablishes access using established identification and authentication procedures.”

7.2.1.11.2. AC-11 (1)¶

AC-11 (1) : PATTERN-HIDING DISPLAYS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The information system conceals, via the session lock, information previously visible on the display with a publicly viewable image.” Supplemental Guidance: “Publicly viewable images can include static or dynamic images, for example, patterns used with screen savers, photographic images, solid colors, clock, battery life indicator, or a blank screen, with the additional caveat that none of the images convey sensitive information.”

Related Controls: .. _header_AC-12:

7.2.1.12. AC-12¶

Control Family: ACCESS CONTROL

7.2.1.12.1. AC-12¶

AC-12 : SESSION TERMINATION

Priority: P2

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The information system automatically terminates a user session after [Assignment: organization-defined conditions or trigger events requiring session disconnect].” Supplemental Guidance: “This control addresses the termination of user-initiated logical sessions in contrast to SC-10 which addresses the termination of network connections that are associated with communications sessions (i.e., network disconnect). A logical session (for local, network, and remote access) is initiated whenever a user (or process acting on behalf of a user) accesses an organizational information system. Such user sessions can be terminated (and thus terminate user access) without terminating network sessions. Session termination terminates all processes associated with a user�s logical session except those processes that are specifically created by the user (i.e., session owner) to continue after the session is terminated. Conditions or trigger events requiring automatic session termination can include, for example, organization-defined periods of user inactivity, targeted responses to certain types of incidents, time-of-day restrictions on information system use.”

Related Controls:SC-10,SC-23

7.2.1.12.2. AC-12 (1)¶

AC-12 (1) : USER-INITIATED LOGOUTS / MESSAGE DISPLAYS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system:” Supplemental Guidance: “Information resources to which users gain access via authentication include, for example, local workstations, databases, and password-protected websites/web-based services. Logout messages for web page access, for example, can be displayed after authenticated sessions have been terminated. However, for some types of interactive sessions including, for example, file transfer protocol (FTP) sessions, information systems typically send logout messages as final messages prior to terminating sessions.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.12.2.1. AC-12 (1)(a)¶

Description: “Provides a logout capability for user-initiated communications sessions whenever authentication is used to gain access to [Assignment: organization-defined information resources]; and”

7.2.1.12.2.2. AC-12 (1)(b)¶

Description: “Displays an explicit logout message to users indicating the reliable termination of authenticated communications sessions.” .. _header_AC-13:

7.2.1.13. AC-13¶

Control Family: ACCESS CONTROL

7.2.1.13.1. AC-13¶

AC-13 : SUPERVISION AND REVIEW - ACCESS CONTROL

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-2 and AU-6].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.14. AC-14¶

Control Family: ACCESS CONTROL

7.2.1.14.1. AC-14¶

AC-14 : PERMITTED ACTIONS WITHOUT IDENTIFICATION OR AUTHENTICATION

Priority: P3

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control addresses situations in which organizations determine that no identification or authentication is required in organizational information systems. Organizations may allow a limited number of user actions without identification or authentication including, for example, when individuals access public websites or other publicly accessible federal information systems, when individuals use mobile phones to receive calls, or when facsimiles are received. Organizations also identify actions that normally require identification or authentication but may under certain circumstances (e.g., emergencies), allow identification or authentication mechanisms to be bypassed. Such bypasses may occur, for example, via a software-readable physical switch that commands bypass of the logon functionality and is protected from accidental or unmonitored use. This control does not apply to situations where identification and authentication have already occurred and are not repeated, but rather to situations where identification and authentication have not yet occurred. Organizations may decide that there are no user actions that can be performed on organizational information systems without identification and authentication and thus, the values for assignment statements can be none.”

Related Controls:CP-2,IA-2

7.2.1.14.1.1. AC-14a.¶

Description: “Identifies [Assignment: organization-defined user actions] that can be performed on the information system without identification or authentication consistent with organizational missions/business functions; and”

7.2.1.14.1.2. AC-14b.¶

Description: “Documents and provides supporting rationale in the security plan for the information system, user actions not requiring identification or authentication.”

7.2.1.14.2. AC-14 (1)¶

AC-14 (1) : NECESSARY USES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-14].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls: .. _header_AC-15:

7.2.1.15. AC-15¶

Control Family: ACCESS CONTROL

7.2.1.15.1. AC-15¶

AC-15 : AUTOMATED MARKING

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-3].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.16. AC-16¶

Control Family: ACCESS CONTROL

7.2.1.16.1. AC-16¶

AC-16 : SECURITY ATTRIBUTES

Priority: P0

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Information is represented internally within information systems using abstractions known as data structures. Internal data structures can represent different types of entities, both active and passive. Active entities, also known as subjects, are typically associated with individuals, devices, or processes acting on behalf of individuals. Passive entities, also known as objects, are typically associated with data structures such as records, buffers, tables, files, inter-process pipes, and communications ports. Security attributes, a form of metadata, are abstractions representing the basic properties or characteristics of active and passive entities with respect to safeguarding information. These attributes may be associated with active entities (i.e., subjects) that have the potential to send or receive information, to cause information to flow among objects, or to change the information system state. These attributes may also be associated with passive entities (i.e., objects) that contain or receive information. The association of security attributes to subjects and objects is referred to as binding and is typically inclusive of setting the attribute value and the attribute type. Security attributes when bound to data/information, enables the enforcement of information security policies for access control and information flow control, either through organizational processes or information system functions or mechanisms. The content or assigned values of security attributes can directly affect the ability of individuals to access organizational information. Organizations can define the types of attributes needed for selected information systems to support missions/business functions. There is potentially a wide range of values that can be assigned to any given security attribute. Release markings could include, for example, US only, NATO, or NOFORN (not releasable to foreign nationals). By specifying permitted attribute ranges and values, organizations can ensure that the security attribute values are meaningful and relevant. The term security labeling refers to the association of security attributes with subjects and objects represented by internal data structures within organizational information systems, to enable information system-based enforcement of information security policies. Security labels include, for example, access authorizations, data life cycle protection (i.e., encryption and data expiration), nationality, affiliation as contractor, and classification of information in accordance with legal and compliance requirements. The term security marking refers to the association of security attributes with objects in a human-readable form, to enable organizational process-based enforcement of information security policies. The AC-16 base control represents the requirement for user-based attribute association (marking). The enhancements to AC-16 represent additional requirements including information system-based attribute association (labeling). Types of attributes include, for example, classification level for objects and clearance (access authorization) level for subjects. An example of a value for both of these attribute types is Top Secret.”

Related Controls:AC-3,AC-4,AC-6,AC-21,AU-2,AU-10,SC-16,MP-3

7.2.1.16.1.1. AC-16a.¶

Description: “Provides the means to associate [Assignment: organization-defined types of security attributes] having [Assignment: organization-defined security attribute values] with information in storage, in process, and/or in transmission;”

7.2.1.16.1.2. AC-16b.¶

AC-16 (10) : ATTRIBUTE CONFIGURATION BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system provides authorized individuals the capability to define or change the type and value of security attributes available for association with subjects and objects.” Supplemental Guidance: “The content or assigned values of security attributes can directly affect the ability of individuals to access organizational information. Therefore, it is important for information systems to be able to limit the ability to create or modify security attributes to authorized individuals only.”

Related Controls: .. _header_AC-17:

7.2.1.17. AC-17¶

Control Family: ACCESS CONTROL

7.2.1.17.1. AC-17¶

AC-17 : REMOTE ACCESS

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Remote access is access to organizational information systems by users (or processes acting on behalf of users) communicating through external networks (e.g., the Internet). Remote access methods include, for example, dial-up, broadband, and wireless. Organizations often employ encrypted virtual private networks (VPNs) to enhance confidentiality and integrity over remote connections. The use of encrypted VPNs does not make the access non-remote; however, the use of VPNs, when adequately provisioned with appropriate security controls (e.g., employing appropriate encryption techniques for confidentiality and integrity protection) may provide sufficient assurance to the organization that it can effectively treat such connections as internal networks. Still, VPN connections traverse external networks, and the encrypted VPN does not enhance the availability of remote connections. Also, VPNs with encrypted tunnels can affect the organizational capability to adequately monitor network communications traffic for malicious code. Remote access controls apply to information systems other than public web servers or systems designed for public access. This control addresses authorization prior to allowing remote access without specifying the formats for such authorization. While organizations may use interconnection security agreements to authorize remote access connections, such agreements are not required by this control. Enforcing access restrictions for remote connections is addressed in AC-3.”

Related Controls:AC-2,AC-3,AC-18,AC-19,AC-20,CA-3,CA-7,CM-8,IA-2,IA-3,IA-8,MA-4,PE-17,PL-4,SC-10,SI-4

7.2.1.17.1.1. AC-17a.¶

Description: “Establishes and documents usage restrictions, configuration/connection requirements, and implementation guidance for each type of remote access allowed; and”

7.2.1.17.1.2. AC-17b.¶

Description: “Authorizes remote access to the information system prior to allowing such connections.”

7.2.1.17.2. AC-17 (1)¶

AC-17 (1) : AUTOMATED MONITORING / CONTROL

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The information system monitors and controls remote access methods.” Supplemental Guidance: “Automated monitoring and control of remote access sessions allows organizations to detect cyber attacks and also ensure ongoing compliance with remote access policies by auditing connection activities of remote users on a variety of information system components (e.g., servers, workstations, notebook computers, smart phones, and tablets).”

Related Controls:AU-2,AU-12

7.2.1.17.3. AC-17 (2)¶

AC-17 (2) : PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY / INTEGRITY USING ENCRYPTION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality and integrity of remote access sessions.” Supplemental Guidance: “The encryption strength of mechanism is selected based on the security categorization of the information.”

Related Controls:SC-8,SC-12,SC-13

7.2.1.17.4. AC-17 (3)¶

AC-17 (3) : MANAGED ACCESS CONTROL POINTS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The information system routes all remote accesses through [Assignment: organization-defined number] managed network access control points.” Supplemental Guidance: “Limiting the number of access control points for remote accesses reduces the attack surface for organizations. Organizations consider the Trusted Internet Connections (TIC) initiative requirements for external network connections.”

Related Controls:SC-7

7.2.1.17.5. AC-17 (4)¶

AC-17 (4) : PRIVILEGED COMMANDS / ACCESS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:AC-6

7.2.1.17.5.1. AC-17 (4)(a)¶

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization selects radio antennas and calibrates transmission power levels to reduce the probability that usable signals can be received outside of organization-controlled boundaries.” Supplemental Guidance: “Actions that may be taken by organizations to limit unauthorized use of wireless communications outside of organization-controlled boundaries include, for example: (i) reducing the power of wireless transmissions so that the transmissions are less likely to emit a signal that can be used by adversaries outside of the physical perimeters of organizations; (ii) employing measures such as TEMPEST to control wireless emanations; and (iii) using directional/beam forming antennas that reduce the likelihood that unintended receivers will be able to intercept signals. Prior to taking such actions, organizations can conduct periodic wireless surveys to understand the radio frequency profile of organizational information systems as well as other systems that may be operating in the area.”

Related Controls:PE-19 .. _header_AC-19:

7.2.1.19. AC-19¶

Control Family: ACCESS CONTROL

7.2.1.19.1. AC-19¶

AC-19 : ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “A mobile device is a computing device that: (i) has a small form factor such that it can easily be carried by a single individual; (ii) is designed to operate without a physical connection (e.g., wirelessly transmit or receive information); (iii) possesses local, non-removable or removable data storage; and (iv) includes a self-contained power source. Mobile devices may also include voice communication capabilities, on-board sensors that allow the device to capture information, and/or built-in features for synchronizing local data with remote locations. Examples include smart phones, E-readers, and tablets. Mobile devices are typically associated with a single individual and the device is usually in close proximity to the individual; however, the degree of proximity can vary depending upon on the form factor and size of the device. The processing, storage, and transmission capability of the mobile device may be comparable to or merely a subset of desktop systems, depending upon the nature and intended purpose of the device. Due to the large variety of mobile devices with different technical characteristics and capabilities, organizational restrictions may vary for the different classes/types of such devices. Usage restrictions and specific implementation guidance for mobile devices include, for example, configuration management, device identification and authentication, implementation of mandatory protective software (e.g., malicious code detection, firewall), scanning devices for malicious code, updating virus protection software, scanning for critical software updates and patches, conducting primary operating system (and possibly other resident software) integrity checks, and disabling unnecessary hardware (e.g., wireless, infrared). Organizations are cautioned that the need to provide adequate security for mobile devices goes beyond the requirements in this control. Many safeguards and countermeasures for mobile devices are reflected in other security controls in the catalog allocated in the initial control baselines as starting points for the development of security plans and overlays using the tailoring process. There may also be some degree of overlap in the requirements articulated by the security controls within the different families of controls. AC-20 addresses mobile devices that are not organization-controlled.”

Related Controls:AC-3,AC-7,AC-18,AC-20,CA-9,CM-2,IA-2,IA-3,MP-2,MP-4,MP-5,PL-4,SC-7,SC-43,SI-3,SI-4

7.2.1.19.1.1. AC-19a.¶

Description: “Establishes usage restrictions, configuration requirements, connection requirements, and implementation guidance for organization-controlled mobile devices; and”

7.2.1.19.1.2. AC-19b.¶

Description: “Authorizes the connection of mobile devices to organizational information systems.”

7.2.1.19.2. AC-19 (1)¶

AC-19 (1) : USE OF WRITABLE / PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-7].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.19.3. AC-19 (2)¶

AC-19 (2) : USE OF PERSONALLY OWNED PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-7].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.19.4. AC-19 (3)¶

AC-19 (3) : USE OF PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES WITH NO IDENTIFIABLE OWNER

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-7].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.19.5. AC-19 (4)¶

AC-19 (4) : RESTRICTIONS FOR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:CA-6,IR-4

7.2.1.19.5.1. AC-19 (4)(a)¶

Description: “Prohibits the use of unclassified mobile devices in facilities containing information systems processing, storing, or transmitting classified information unless specifically permitted by the authorizing official; and”

7.2.1.19.5.2. AC-19 (4)(b)¶

Description: “Enforces the following restrictions on individuals permitted by the authorizing official to use unclassified mobile devices in facilities containing information systems processing, storing, or transmitting classified information:”

7.2.1.19.5.3. AC-19 (4)(b)(1)¶

Description: “Connection of unclassified mobile devices to classified information systems is prohibited;”

7.2.1.19.5.4. AC-19 (4)(b)(2)¶

Description: “Connection of unclassified mobile devices to unclassified information systems requires approval from the authorizing official;”

7.2.1.19.5.5. AC-19 (4)(b)(3)¶

Description: “Use of internal or external modems or wireless interfaces within the unclassified mobile devices is prohibited; and”

7.2.1.19.5.6. AC-19 (4)(b)(4)¶

Description: “Unclassified mobile devices and the information stored on those devices are subject to random reviews and inspections by [Assignment: organization-defined security officials], and if classified information is found, the incident handling policy is followed.”

7.2.1.19.5.7. AC-19 (4)(c)¶

Description: “Restricts the connection of classified mobile devices to classified information systems in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined security policies].”

7.2.1.19.6. AC-19 (5)¶

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization [Selection: restricts; prohibits] the use of organization-controlled portable storage devices by authorized individuals on external information systems.” Supplemental Guidance: “Limits on the use of organization-controlled portable storage devices in external information systems include, for example, complete prohibition of the use of such devices or restrictions on how the devices may be used and under what conditions the devices may be used.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.20.4. AC-20 (3)¶

AC-20 (3) : NON-ORGANIZATIONALLY OWNED SYSTEMS / COMPONENTS / DEVICES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization [Selection: restricts; prohibits] the use of non-organizationally owned information systems, system components, or devices to process, store, or transmit organizational information.” Supplemental Guidance: “Non-organizationally owned devices include devices owned by other organizations (e.g., federal/state agencies, contractors) and personally owned devices. There are risks to using non-organizationally owned devices. In some cases, the risk is sufficiently high as to prohibit such use. In other cases, it may be such that the use of non-organizationally owned devices is allowed but restricted in some way. Restrictions include, for example: (i) requiring the implementation of organization-approved security controls prior to authorizing such connections; (ii) limiting access to certain types of information, services, or applications; (iii) using virtualization techniques to limit processing and storage activities to servers or other system components provisioned by the organization; and (iv) agreeing to terms and conditions for usage. For personally owned devices, organizations consult with the Office of the General Counsel regarding legal issues associated with using such devices in operational environments, including, for example, requirements for conducting forensic analyses during investigations after an incident.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.20.5. AC-20 (4)¶

AC-20 (4) : NETWORK ACCESSIBLE STORAGE DEVICES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization prohibits the use of [Assignment: organization-defined network accessible storage devices] in external information systems.” Supplemental Guidance: “Network accessible storage devices in external information systems include, for example, online storage devices in public, hybrid, or community cloud-based systems.”

Related Controls: .. _header_AC-21:

7.2.1.21. AC-21¶

Control Family: ACCESS CONTROL

7.2.1.21.1. AC-21¶

AC-21 : INFORMATION SHARING

Priority: P2

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control applies to information that may be restricted in some manner (e.g., privileged medical information, contract-sensitive information, proprietary information, personally identifiable information, classified information related to special access programs or compartments) based on some formal or administrative determination. Depending on the particular information-sharing circumstances, sharing partners may be defined at the individual, group, or organizational level. Information may be defined by content, type, security category, or special access program/compartment.”

Related Controls:AC-3

7.2.1.21.1.1. AC-21a.¶

Description: “Facilitates information sharing by enabling authorized users to determine whether access authorizations assigned to the sharing partner match the access restrictions on the information for [Assignment: organization-defined information sharing circumstances where user discretion is required]; and”

7.2.1.21.1.2. AC-21b.¶

Description: “Employs [Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms or manual processes] to assist users in making information sharing/collaboration decisions.”

7.2.1.21.2. AC-21 (1)¶

AC-21 (1) : AUTOMATED DECISION SUPPORT

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system enforces information-sharing decisions by authorized users based on access authorizations of sharing partners and access restrictions on information to be shared.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.21.3. AC-21 (2)¶

AC-21 (2) : INFORMATION SEARCH AND RETRIEVAL

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system implements information search and retrieval services that enforce [Assignment: organization-defined information sharing restrictions].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls: .. _header_AC-22:

7.2.1.22. AC-22¶

Control Family: ACCESS CONTROL

7.2.1.22.1. AC-22¶

AC-22 : PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE CONTENT

Priority: P3

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “In accordance with federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and/or guidance, the general public is not authorized access to nonpublic information (e.g., information protected under the Privacy Act and proprietary information). This control addresses information systems that are controlled by the organization and accessible to the general public, typically without identification or authentication. The posting of information on non-organization information systems is covered by organizational policy.”

Related Controls:AC-3,AC-4,AT-2,AT-3,AU-13

7.2.1.22.1.1. AC-22a.¶

Description: “Designates individuals authorized to post information onto a publicly accessible information system;”

7.2.1.22.1.2. AC-22b.¶

Description: “Trains authorized individuals to ensure that publicly accessible information does not contain nonpublic information;”

7.2.1.22.1.3. AC-22c.¶

Description: “Reviews the proposed content of information prior to posting onto the publicly accessible information system to ensure that nonpublic information is not included; and”

7.2.1.22.1.4. AC-22d.¶

Description: “Reviews the content on the publicly accessible information system for nonpublic information [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and removes such information, if discovered.” .. _header_AC-23:

7.2.1.23. AC-23¶

Control Family: ACCESS CONTROL

7.2.1.23.1. AC-23¶

AC-23 : DATA MINING PROTECTION

Priority: P0

Control Family: ACCESS CONTROL

7.2.1.25.1. AC-25¶

AC-25 : REFERENCE MONITOR

Priority: P0

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system implements a reference monitor for [Assignment: organization-defined access control policies] that is tamperproof, always invoked, and small enough to be subject to analysis and testing, the completeness of which can be assured.” Supplemental Guidance: “Information is represented internally within information systems using abstractions known as data structures. Internal data structures can represent different types of entities, both active and passive. Active entities, also known as subjects, are typically associated with individuals, devices, or processes acting on behalf of individuals. Passive entities, also known as objects, are typically associated with data structures such as records, buffers, tables, files, inter-process pipes, and communications ports. Reference monitors typically enforce mandatory access control policies�a type of access control that restricts access to objects based on the identity of subjects or groups to which the subjects belong. The access controls are mandatory because subjects with certain privileges (i.e., access permissions) are restricted from passing those privileges on to any other subjects, either directly or indirectly�that is, the information system strictly enforces the access control policy based on the rule set established by the policy. The tamperproof property of the reference monitor prevents adversaries from compromising the functioning of the mechanism. The always invoked property prevents adversaries from bypassing the mechanism and hence violating the security policy. The smallness property helps to ensure the completeness in the analysis and testing of the mechanism to detect weaknesses or deficiencies (i.e., latent flaws) that would prevent the enforcement of the security policy.”

Related Controls:AC-3,AC-16,SC-3,SC-39

7.2.1.26. AT-1¶

Control Family: AWARENESS AND TRAINING

7.2.1.26.1. AT-1¶

AT-1 : SECURITY AWARENESS AND TRAINING POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the AT family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.”

Related Controls:PM-9

7.2.1.26.1.1. AT-1a.¶

Description: “Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:”

7.2.1.26.1.2. AT-1a.1.¶

Description: “A security awareness and training policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and”

7.2.1.26.1.3. AT-1a.2.¶

Description: “Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the security awareness and training policy and associated security awareness and training controls; and”

7.2.1.26.1.4. AT-1b.¶

Description: “Reviews and updates the current:”

7.2.1.26.1.5. AT-1b.1.¶

Description: “Security awareness and training policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and”

7.2.1.26.1.6. AT-1b.2.¶

Description: “Security awareness and training procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].” .. _header_AT-2:

7.2.1.27. AT-2¶

Control Family: AWARENESS AND TRAINING

7.2.1.27.1. AT-2¶

AT-2 : SECURITY AWARENESS TRAINING

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization provides basic security awareness training to information system users (including managers, senior executives, and contractors):” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations determine the appropriate content of security awareness training and security awareness techniques based on the specific organizational requirements and the information systems to which personnel have authorized access. The content includes a basic understanding of the need for information security and user actions to maintain security and to respond to suspected security incidents. The content also addresses awareness of the need for operations security. Security awareness techniques can include, for example, displaying posters, offering supplies inscribed with security reminders, generating email advisories/notices from senior organizational officials, displaying logon screen messages, and conducting information security awareness events.”

Related Controls:AT-3,AT-4,PL-4

7.2.1.27.1.1. AT-2a.¶

Description: “As part of initial training for new users;”

7.2.1.27.1.2. AT-2b.¶

Description: “When required by information system changes; and”

7.2.1.27.1.3. AT-2c.¶

Description: “[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter.”

7.2.1.27.2. AT-2 (1)¶

AT-2 (1) : PRACTICAL EXERCISES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization includes practical exercises in security awareness training that simulate actual cyber attacks.” Supplemental Guidance: “Practical exercises may include, for example, no-notice social engineering attempts to collect information, gain unauthorized access, or simulate the adverse impact of opening malicious email attachments or invoking, via spear phishing attacks, malicious web links.”

Related Controls:CA-2,CA-7,CP-4,IR-3

7.2.1.27.3. AT-2 (2)¶

AT-2 (2) : INSIDER THREAT

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization includes security awareness training on recognizing and reporting potential indicators of insider threat.” Supplemental Guidance: “Potential indicators and possible precursors of insider threat can include behaviors such as inordinate, long-term job dissatisfaction, attempts to gain access to information not required for job performance, unexplained access to financial resources, bullying or sexual harassment of fellow employees, workplace violence, and other serious violations of organizational policies, procedures, directives, rules, or practices. Security awareness training includes how to communicate employee and management concerns regarding potential indicators of insider threat through appropriate organizational channels in accordance with established organizational policies and procedures.”

Related Controls:PL-4,PM-12,PS-3,PS-6 .. _header_AT-3:

7.2.1.28. AT-3¶

Control Family: AWARENESS AND TRAINING

7.2.1.28.1. AT-3¶

AT-3 : ROLE-BASED SECURITY TRAINING

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization provides role-based security training to personnel with assigned security roles and responsibilities:” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations determine the appropriate content of security training based on the assigned roles and responsibilities of individuals and the specific security requirements of organizations and the information systems to which personnel have authorized access. In addition, organizations provide enterprise architects, information system developers, software developers, acquisition/procurement officials, information system managers, system/network administrators, personnel conducting configuration management and auditing activities, personnel performing independent verification and validation activities, security control assessors, and other personnel having access to system-level software, adequate security-related technical training specifically tailored for their assigned duties. Comprehensive role-based training addresses management, operational, and technical roles and responsibilities covering physical, personnel, and technical safeguards and countermeasures. Such training can include for example, policies, procedures, tools, and artifacts for the organizational security roles defined. Organizations also provide the training necessary for individuals to carry out their responsibilities related to operations and supply chain security within the context of organizational information security programs. Role-based security training also applies to contractors providing services to federal agencies.”

Related Controls:AT-2,AT-4,PL-4,PS-7,SA-3,SA-12,SA-16

7.2.1.28.1.1. AT-3a.¶

Description: “Before authorizing access to the information system or performing assigned duties;”

7.2.1.28.1.2. AT-3b.¶

Description: “When required by information system changes; and”

7.2.1.28.1.3. AT-3c.¶

Description: “[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter.”

7.2.1.28.2. AT-3 (1)¶

AT-3 (1) : ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization provides [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] with initial and [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] training in the employment and operation of environmental controls.” Supplemental Guidance: “Environmental controls include, for example, fire suppression and detection devices/systems, sprinkler systems, handheld fire extinguishers, fixed fire hoses, smoke detectors, temperature/humidity, HVAC, and power within the facility. Organizations identify personnel with specific roles and responsibilities associated with environmental controls requiring specialized training.”

Related Controls:PE-1,PE-13,PE-14,PE-15

7.2.1.28.3. AT-3 (2)¶

AT-3 (2) : PHYSICAL SECURITY CONTROLS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization provides [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] with initial and [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] training in the employment and operation of physical security controls.” Supplemental Guidance: “Physical security controls include, for example, physical access control devices, physical intrusion alarms, monitoring/surveillance equipment, and security guards (deployment and operating procedures). Organizations identify personnel with specific roles and responsibilities associated with physical security controls requiring specialized training.”

Related Controls:PE-2,PE-3,PE-4,PE-5

7.2.1.28.4. AT-3 (3)¶

AT-3 (3) : PRACTICAL EXERCISES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization includes practical exercises in security training that reinforce training objectives.” Supplemental Guidance: “Practical exercises may include, for example, security training for software developers that includes simulated cyber attacks exploiting common software vulnerabilities (e.g., buffer overflows), or spear/whale phishing attacks targeted at senior leaders/executives. These types of practical exercises help developers better understand the effects of such vulnerabilities and appreciate the need for security coding standards and processes.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.28.5. AT-3 (4)¶

AT-3 (4) : SUSPICIOUS COMMUNICATIONS AND ANOMALOUS SYSTEM BEHAVIOR

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization provides training to its personnel on [Assignment: organization-defined indicators of malicious code] to recognize suspicious communications and anomalous behavior in organizational information systems.” Supplemental Guidance: “A well-trained workforce provides another organizational safeguard that can be employed as part of a defense-in-depth strategy to protect organizations against malicious code coming in to organizations via email or the web applications. Personnel are trained to look for indications of potentially suspicious email (e.g., receiving an unexpected email, receiving an email containing strange or poor grammar, or receiving an email from an unfamiliar sender but who appears to be from a known sponsor or contractor). Personnel are also trained on how to respond to such suspicious email or web communications (e.g., not opening attachments, not clicking on embedded web links, and checking the source of email addresses). For this process to work effectively, all organizational personnel are trained and made aware of what constitutes suspicious communications. Training personnel on how to recognize anomalous behaviors in organizational information systems can potentially provide early warning for the presence of malicious code. Recognition of such anomalous behavior by organizational personnel can supplement automated malicious code detection and protection tools and systems employed by organizations.”

Related Controls: .. _header_AT-4:

7.2.1.29. AT-4¶

Control Family: AWARENESS AND TRAINING

7.2.1.29.1. AT-4¶

AT-4 : SECURITY TRAINING RECORDS

Priority: P3

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Documentation for specialized training may be maintained by individual supervisors at the option of the organization.”

Related Controls:AT-2,AT-3,PM-14

7.2.1.29.1.1. AT-4a.¶

Description: “Documents and monitors individual information system security training activities including basic security awareness training and specific information system security training; and”

7.2.1.29.1.2. AT-4b.¶

Description: “Retains individual training records for [Assignment: organization-defined time period].” .. _header_AT-5:

7.2.1.30. AT-5¶

Control Family: AWARENESS AND TRAINING

7.2.1.30.1. AT-5¶

AT-5 : CONTACTS WITH SECURITY GROUPS AND ASSOCIATIONS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PM-15].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.31. AU-1¶

Control Family: AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

7.2.1.31.1. AU-1¶

AU-1 : AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the AU family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.”

Related Controls:PM-9

7.2.1.31.1.1. AU-1a.¶

Description: “Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:”

7.2.1.31.1.2. AU-1a.1.¶

Description: “An audit and accountability policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and”

7.2.1.31.1.3. AU-1a.2.¶

Description: “Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the audit and accountability policy and associated audit and accountability controls; and”

7.2.1.31.1.4. AU-1b.¶

Description: “Reviews and updates the current:”

7.2.1.31.1.5. AU-1b.1.¶

Description: “Audit and accountability policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and”

7.2.1.31.1.6. AU-1b.2.¶

Description: “Audit and accountability procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].” .. _header_AU-2:

7.2.1.32. AU-2¶

Control Family: AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

7.2.1.32.1. AU-2¶

AU-2 : AUDIT EVENTS

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “An event is any observable occurrence in an organizational information system. Organizations identify audit events as those events which are significant and relevant to the security of information systems and the environments in which those systems operate in order to meet specific and ongoing audit needs. Audit events can include, for example, password changes, failed logons, or failed accesses related to information systems, administrative privilege usage, PIV credential usage, or third-party credential usage. In determining the set of auditable events, organizations consider the auditing appropriate for each of the security controls to be implemented. To balance auditing requirements with other information system needs, this control also requires identifying that subset of auditable events that are audited at a given point in time. For example, organizations may determine that information systems must have the capability to log every file access both successful and unsuccessful, but not activate that capability except for specific circumstances due to the potential burden on system performance. Auditing requirements, including the need for auditable events, may be referenced in other security controls and control enhancements. Organizations also include auditable events that are required by applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards. Audit records can be generated at various levels of abstraction, including at the packet level as information traverses the network. Selecting the appropriate level of abstraction is a critical aspect of an audit capability and can facilitate the identification of root causes to problems. Organizations consider in the definition of auditable events, the auditing necessary to cover related events such as the steps in distributed, transaction-based processes (e.g., processes that are distributed across multiple organizations) and actions that occur in service-oriented architectures.”

Related Controls:AC-6,AC-17,AU-3,AU-12,MA-4,MP-2,MP-4,SI-4

7.2.1.32.1.1. AU-2a.¶

Description: “Determines that the information system is capable of auditing the following events: [Assignment: organization-defined auditable events];”

7.2.1.32.1.2. AU-2b.¶

Description: “Coordinates the security audit function with other organizational entities requiring audit-related information to enhance mutual support and to help guide the selection of auditable events;”

7.2.1.32.1.3. AU-2c.¶

Description: “Provides a rationale for why the auditable events are deemed to be adequate to support after-the-fact investigations of security incidents; and”

7.2.1.32.1.4. AU-2d.¶

Description: “Determines that the following events are to be audited within the information system: [Assignment: organization-defined audited events (the subset of the auditable events defined in AU-2 a.) along with the frequency of (or situation requiring) auditing for each identified event].”

7.2.1.32.2. AU-2 (1)¶

AU-2 (1) : COMPILATION OF AUDIT RECORDS FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AU-12].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.32.3. AU-2 (2)¶

AU-2 (2) : SELECTION OF AUDIT EVENTS BY COMPONENT

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AU-12].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.32.4. AU-2 (3)¶

AU-2 (3) : REVIEWS AND UPDATES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization reviews and updates the audited events [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].” Supplemental Guidance: “Over time, the events that organizations believe should be audited may change. Reviewing and updating the set of audited events periodically is necessary to ensure that the current set is still necessary and sufficient.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.32.5. AU-2 (4)¶

AU-2 (4) : PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into AC-6 (9)].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls: .. _header_AU-3:

7.2.1.33. AU-3¶

Control Family: AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

7.2.1.33.1. AU-3¶

AU-3 : CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The information system generates audit records containing information that establishes what type of event occurred, when the event occurred, where the event occurred, the source of the event, the outcome of the event, and the identity of any individuals or subjects associated with the event.” Supplemental Guidance: “Audit record content that may be necessary to satisfy the requirement of this control, includes, for example, time stamps, source and destination addresses, user/process identifiers, event descriptions, success/fail indications, filenames involved, and access control or flow control rules invoked. Event outcomes can include indicators of event success or failure and event-specific results (e.g., the security state of the information system after the event occurred).”

Related Controls:AU-2,AU-8,AU-12,SI-11

7.2.1.33.2. AU-3 (1)¶

AU-3 (1) : ADDITIONAL AUDIT INFORMATION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The information system generates audit records containing the following additional information: [Assignment: organization-defined additional, more detailed information].” Supplemental Guidance: “Detailed information that organizations may consider in audit records includes, for example, full text recording of privileged commands or the individual identities of group account users. Organizations consider limiting the additional audit information to only that information explicitly needed for specific audit requirements. This facilitates the use of audit trails and audit logs by not including information that could potentially be misleading or could make it more difficult to locate information of interest.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.33.3. AU-3 (2)¶

AU-3 (2) : CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OF PLANNED AUDIT RECORD CONTENT

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The information system provides centralized management and configuration of the content to be captured in audit records generated by [Assignment: organization-defined information system components].” Supplemental Guidance: “This control enhancement requires that the content to be captured in audit records be configured from a central location (necessitating automation). Organizations coordinate the selection of required audit content to support the centralized management and configuration capability provided by the information system.”

Related Controls:AU-6,AU-7 .. _header_AU-4:

7.2.1.34. AU-4¶

Control Family: AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

7.2.1.34.1. AU-4¶

AU-4 : AUDIT STORAGE CAPACITY

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization allocates audit record storage capacity in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined audit record storage requirements].” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations consider the types of auditing to be performed and the audit processing requirements when allocating audit storage capacity. Allocating sufficient audit storage capacity reduces the likelihood of such capacity being exceeded and resulting in the potential loss or reduction of auditing capability.”

Related Controls:AU-2,AU-5,AU-6,AU-7,AU-11,SI-4

7.2.1.34.2. AU-4 (1)¶

AU-4 (1) : TRANSFER TO ALTERNATE STORAGE

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system off-loads audit records [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] onto a different system or media than the system being audited.” Supplemental Guidance: “Off-loading is a process designed to preserve the confidentiality and integrity of audit records by moving the records from the primary information system to a secondary or alternate system. It is a common process in information systems with limited audit storage capacity; the audit storage is used only in a transitory fashion until the system can communicate with the secondary or alternate system designated for storing the audit records, at which point the information is transferred.”

Related Controls: .. _header_AU-5:

7.2.1.35. AU-5¶

Control Family: AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

7.2.1.35.1. AU-5¶

AU-5 : RESPONSE TO AUDIT PROCESSING FAILURES

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The information system:” Supplemental Guidance: “Audit processing failures include, for example, software/hardware errors, failures in the audit capturing mechanisms, and audit storage capacity being reached or exceeded. Organizations may choose to define additional actions for different audit processing failures (e.g., by type, by location, by severity, or a combination of such factors). This control applies to each audit data storage repository (i.e., distinct information system component where audit records are stored), the total audit storage capacity of organizations (i.e., all audit data storage repositories combined), or both.”

Related Controls:AU-4,SI-12

7.2.1.35.1.1. AU-5a.¶

Description: “Alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] in the event of an audit processing failure; and”

7.2.1.35.1.2. AU-5b.¶

Description: “Takes the following additional actions: [Assignment: organization-defined actions to be taken (e.g., shut down information system, overwrite oldest audit records, stop generating audit records)].”

7.2.1.35.2. AU-5 (1)¶

AU-5 (1) : AUDIT STORAGE CAPACITY

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system maintains reviewer/releaser identity and credentials within the established chain of custody for all information reviewed or released.” Supplemental Guidance: “Chain of custody is a process that tracks the movement of evidence through its collection, safeguarding, and analysis life cycle by documenting each person who handled the evidence, the date and time it was collected or transferred, and the purpose for the transfer. If the reviewer is a human or if the review function is automated but separate from the release/transfer function, the information system associates the identity of the reviewer of the information to be released with the information and the information label. In the case of human reviews, this control enhancement provides organizational officials the means to identify who reviewed and released the information. In the case of automated reviews, this control enhancement ensures that only approved review functions are employed.”

Related Controls:AC-4,AC-16

7.2.1.40.5. AU-10 (4)¶

AU-10 (4) : VALIDATE BINDING OF INFORMATION REVIEWER IDENTITY

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control enhancement prevents the modification of information between review and transfer/release. The validation of bindings can be achieved, for example, by the use of cryptographic checksums. Organizations determine validations are in response to user requests or generated automatically.”

Related Controls:AC-4,AC-16

7.2.1.40.5.1. AU-10 (4)(a)¶

Description: “Validates the binding of the information reviewer identity to the information at the transfer or release points prior to release/transfer between [Assignment: organization-defined security domains]; and”

7.2.1.40.5.2. AU-10 (4)(b)¶

Description: “Performs [Assignment: organization-defined actions] in the event of a validation error.”

7.2.1.40.6. AU-10 (5)¶

AU-10 (5) : DIGITAL SIGNATURES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-7].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls: .. _header_AU-11:

7.2.1.41. AU-11¶

Control Family: AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

7.2.1.41.1. AU-11¶

AU-11 : AUDIT RECORD RETENTION

Priority: P3

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization retains audit records for [Assignment: organization-defined time period consistent with records retention policy] to provide support for after-the-fact investigations of security incidents and to meet regulatory and organizational information retention requirements.” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations retain audit records until it is determined that they are no longer needed for administrative, legal, audit, or other operational purposes. This includes, for example, retention and availability of audit records relative to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, subpoenas, and law enforcement actions. Organizations develop standard categories of audit records relative to such types of actions and standard response processes for each type of action. The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) General Records Schedules provide federal policy on record retention.”

Related Controls:AU-4,AU-5,AU-9,MP-6

7.2.1.41.2. AU-11 (1)¶

AU-11 (1) : LONG-TERM RETRIEVAL CAPABILITY

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined measures] to ensure that long-term audit records generated by the information system can be retrieved.” Supplemental Guidance: “Measures employed by organizations to help facilitate the retrieval of audit records include, for example, converting records to newer formats, retaining equipment capable of reading the records, and retaining necessary documentation to help organizational personnel understand how to interpret the records.”

Related Controls: .. _header_AU-12:

7.2.1.42. AU-12¶

Control Family: AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

7.2.1.42.1. AU-12¶

AU-12 : AUDIT GENERATION

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The information system:” Supplemental Guidance: “Audit records can be generated from many different information system components. The list of audited events is the set of events for which audits are to be generated. These events are typically a subset of all events for which the information system is capable of generating audit records.”

Related Controls:AC-3,AU-2,AU-3,AU-6,AU-7

7.2.1.42.1.1. AU-12a.¶

Description: “Provides audit record generation capability for the auditable events defined in AU-2 a. at [Assignment: organization-defined information system components];”

7.2.1.42.1.2. AU-12b.¶

Description: “Allows [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to select which auditable events are to be audited by specific components of the information system; and”

7.2.1.42.1.3. AU-12c.¶

Description: “Generates audit records for the events defined in AU-2 d. with the content defined in AU-3.”

7.2.1.42.2. AU-12 (1)¶

AU-12 (1) : SYSTEM-WIDE / TIME-CORRELATED AUDIT TRAIL

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The information system compiles audit records from [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] into a system-wide (logical or physical) audit trail that is time-correlated to within [Assignment: organization-defined level of tolerance for the relationship between time stamps of individual records in the audit trail].” Supplemental Guidance: “Audit trails are time-correlated if the time stamps in the individual audit records can be reliably related to the time stamps in other audit records to achieve a time ordering of the records within organizational tolerances.”

Related Controls:AU-8,AU-12

7.2.1.42.3. AU-12 (2)¶

AU-12 (2) : STANDARDIZED FORMATS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system produces a system-wide (logical or physical) audit trail composed of audit records in a standardized format.” Supplemental Guidance: “Audit information that is normalized to common standards promotes interoperability and exchange of such information between dissimilar devices and information systems. This facilitates production of event information that can be more readily analyzed and correlated. Standard formats for audit records include, for example, system log records and audit records compliant with Common Event Expressions (CEE). If logging mechanisms within information systems do not conform to standardized formats, systems may convert individual audit records into standardized formats when compiling system-wide audit trails.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.42.4. AU-12 (3)¶

AU-12 (3) : CHANGES BY AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The information system provides the capability for [Assignment: organization-defined individuals or roles] to change the auditing to be performed on [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] based on [Assignment: organization-defined selectable event criteria] within [Assignment: organization-defined time thresholds].” Supplemental Guidance: “This control enhancement enables organizations to extend or limit auditing as necessary to meet organizational requirements. Auditing that is limited to conserve information system resources may be extended to address certain threat situations. In addition, auditing may be limited to a specific set of events to facilitate audit reduction, analysis, and reporting. Organizations can establish time thresholds in which audit actions are changed, for example, near real-time, within minutes, or within hours.”

Related Controls:AU-7 .. _header_AU-13:

7.2.1.43. AU-13¶

Control Family: AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

7.2.1.43.1. AU-13¶

AU-13 : MONITORING FOR INFORMATION DISCLOSURE

Priority: P0

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization monitors [Assignment: organization-defined open source information and/or information sites] [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] for evidence of unauthorized disclosure of organizational information.” Supplemental Guidance: “Open source information includes, for example, social networking sites.”

Related Controls:PE-3,SC-7

7.2.1.43.2. AU-13 (1)¶

AU-13 (1) : USE OF AUTOMATED TOOLS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization employs automated mechanisms to determine if organizational information has been disclosed in an unauthorized manner.” Supplemental Guidance: “Automated mechanisms can include, for example, automated scripts to monitor new posts on selected websites, and commercial services providing notifications and alerts to organizations.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.43.3. AU-13 (2)¶

AU-13 (2) : REVIEW OF MONITORED SITES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization reviews the open source information sites being monitored [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls: .. _header_AU-14:

7.2.1.44. AU-14¶

Control Family: AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

7.2.1.44.1. AU-14¶

AU-14 : SESSION AUDIT

Priority: P0

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system provides the capability for authorized users to select a user session to capture/record or view/hear.” Supplemental Guidance: “Session audits include, for example, monitoring keystrokes, tracking websites visited, and recording information and/or file transfers. Session auditing activities are developed, integrated, and used in consultation with legal counsel in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, or standards.”

Related Controls:AC-3,AU-4,AU-5,AU-9,AU-11

7.2.1.44.2. AU-14 (1)¶

AU-14 (1) : SYSTEM START-UP

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system initiates session audits at system start-up.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.44.3. AU-14 (2)¶

AU-14 (2) : CAPTURE/RECORD AND LOG CONTENT

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system provides the capability for authorized users to capture/record and log content related to a user session.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.44.4. AU-14 (3)¶

AU-14 (3) : REMOTE VIEWING / LISTENING

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system provides the capability for authorized users to remotely view/hear all content related to an established user session in real time.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls: .. _header_AU-15:

7.2.1.45. AU-15¶

Control Family: AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

7.2.1.45.1. AU-15¶

AU-15 : ALTERNATE AUDIT CAPABILITY

Priority: P0

Control Family: SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION

7.2.1.47.1. CA-1¶

CA-1 : SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the CA family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.”

Related Controls:PM-9

7.2.1.47.1.1. CA-1a.¶

Description: “Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:”

7.2.1.47.1.2. CA-1a.1.¶

Description: “A security assessment and authorization policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and”

7.2.1.47.1.3. CA-1a.2.¶

Description: “Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the security assessment and authorization policy and associated security assessment and authorization controls; and”

7.2.1.47.1.4. CA-1b.¶

Description: “Reviews and updates the current:”

7.2.1.47.1.5. CA-1b.1.¶

Description: “Security assessment and authorization policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and”

7.2.1.47.1.6. CA-1b.2.¶

Description: “Security assessment and authorization procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].” .. _header_CA-2:

7.2.1.48. CA-2¶

Control Family: SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION

7.2.1.48.1. CA-2¶

CA-2 : SECURITY ASSESSMENTS

Priority: P2

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations assess security controls in organizational information systems and the environments in which those systems operate as part of: (i) initial and ongoing security authorizations; (ii) FISMA annual assessments; (iii) continuous monitoring; and (iv) system development life cycle activities. Security assessments: (i) ensure that information security is built into organizational information systems; (ii) identify weaknesses and deficiencies early in the development process; (iii) provide essential information needed to make risk-based decisions as part of security authorization processes; and (iv) ensure compliance to vulnerability mitigation procedures. Assessments are conducted on the implemented security controls from Appendix F (main catalog) and Appendix G (Program Management controls) as documented in System Security Plans and Information Security Program Plans. Organizations can use other types of assessment activities such as vulnerability scanning and system monitoring to maintain the security posture of information systems during the entire life cycle. Security assessment reports document assessment results in sufficient detail as deemed necessary by organizations, to determine the accuracy and completeness of the reports and whether the security controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting security requirements. The FISMA requirement for assessing security controls at least annually does not require additional assessment activities to those activities already in place in organizational security authorization processes. Security assessment results are provided to the individuals or roles appropriate for the types of assessments being conducted. For example, assessments conducted in support of security authorization decisions are provided to authorizing officials or authorizing official designated representatives. To satisfy annual assessment requirements, organizations can use assessment results from the following sources: (i) initial or ongoing information system authorizations; (ii) continuous monitoring; or (iii) system development life cycle activities. Organizations ensure that security assessment results are current, relevant to the determination of security control effectiveness, and obtained with the appropriate level of assessor independence. Existing security control assessment results can be reused to the extent that the results are still valid and can also be supplemented with additional assessments as needed. Subsequent to initial authorizations and in accordance with OMB policy, organizations assess security controls during continuous monitoring. Organizations establish the frequency for ongoing security control assessments in accordance with organizational continuous monitoring strategies. Information Assurance Vulnerability Alerts provide useful examples of vulnerability mitigation procedures. External audits (e.g., audits by external entities such as regulatory agencies) are outside the scope of this control.”

Related Controls:CA-5,CA-6,CA-7,PM-9,RA-5,SA-11,SA-12,SI-4

7.2.1.48.1.1. CA-2a.¶

Description: “Develops a security assessment plan that describes the scope of the assessment including:”

7.2.1.48.1.2. CA-2a.1.¶

Description: “Security controls and control enhancements under assessment;”

7.2.1.48.1.3. CA-2a.2.¶

Description: “Assessment procedures to be used to determine security control effectiveness; and”

7.2.1.48.1.4. CA-2a.3.¶

Description: “Assessment environment, assessment team, and assessment roles and responsibilities;”

7.2.1.48.1.5. CA-2b.¶

Description: “Assesses the security controls in the information system and its environment of operation [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine the extent to which the controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting established security requirements;”

7.2.1.48.1.6. CA-2c.¶

Description: “Produces a security assessment report that documents the results of the assessment; and”

7.2.1.48.1.7. CA-2d.¶

Description: “Provides the results of the security control assessment to [Assignment: organization-defined individuals or roles].”

7.2.1.48.2. CA-2 (1)¶

CA-2 (1) : INDEPENDENT ASSESSORS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization employs assessors or assessment teams with [Assignment: organization-defined level of independence] to conduct security control assessments.” Supplemental Guidance: “Independent assessors or assessment teams are individuals or groups who conduct impartial assessments of organizational information systems. Impartiality implies that assessors are free from any perceived or actual conflicts of interest with regard to the development, operation, or management of the organizational information systems under assessment or to the determination of security control effectiveness. To achieve impartiality, assessors should not: (i) create a mutual or conflicting interest with the organizations where the assessments are being conducted; (ii) assess their own work; (iii) act as management or employees of the organizations they are serving; or (iv) place themselves in positions of advocacy for the organizations acquiring their services. Independent assessments can be obtained from elements within organizations or can be contracted to public or private sector entities outside of organizations. Authorizing officials determine the required level of independence based on the security categories of information systems and/or the ultimate risk to organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals. Authorizing officials also determine if the level of assessor independence provides sufficient assurance that the results are sound and can be used to make credible, risk-based decisions. This includes determining whether contracted security assessment services have sufficient independence, for example, when information system owners are not directly involved in contracting processes or cannot unduly influence the impartiality of assessors conducting assessments. In special situations, for example, when organizations that own the information systems are small or organizational structures require that assessments are conducted by individuals that are in the developmental, operational, or management chain of system owners, independence in assessment processes can be achieved by ensuring that assessment results are carefully reviewed and analyzed by independent teams of experts to validate the completeness, accuracy, integrity, and reliability of the results. Organizations recognize that assessments performed for purposes other than direct support to authorization decisions are, when performed by assessors with sufficient independence, more likely to be useable for such decisions, thereby reducing the need to repeat assessments.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.48.3. CA-2 (2)¶

CA-2 (2) : SPECIALIZED ASSESSMENTS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization includes as part of security control assessments, [Assignment: organization-defined frequency], [Selection: announced; unannounced], [Selection (one or more): in-depth monitoring; vulnerability scanning; malicious user testing; insider threat assessment; performance/load testing; [Assignment: organization-defined other forms of security assessment]].” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations can employ information system monitoring, insider threat assessments, malicious user testing, and other forms of testing (e.g., verification and validation) to improve readiness by exercising organizational capabilities and indicating current performance levels as a means of focusing actions to improve security. Organizations conduct assessment activities in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards. Authorizing officials approve the assessment methods in coordination with the organizational risk executive function. Organizations can incorporate vulnerabilities uncovered during assessments into vulnerability remediation processes.”

Related Controls:PE-3,SI-2

7.2.1.48.4. CA-2 (3)¶

CA-2 (3) : EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization accepts the results of an assessment of [Assignment: organization-defined information system] performed by [Assignment: organization-defined external organization] when the assessment meets [Assignment: organization-defined requirements].” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations may often rely on assessments of specific information systems by other (external) organizations. Utilizing such existing assessments (i.e., reusing existing assessment evidence) can significantly decrease the time and resources required for organizational assessments by limiting the amount of independent assessment activities that organizations need to perform. The factors that organizations may consider in determining whether to accept assessment results from external organizations can vary. Determinations for accepting assessment results can be based on, for example, past assessment experiences one organization has had with another organization, the reputation that organizations have with regard to assessments, the level of detail of supporting assessment documentation provided, or mandates imposed upon organizations by federal legislation, policies, or directives.”

Related Controls: .. _header_CA-3:

7.2.1.49. CA-3¶

Control Family: SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION

7.2.1.49.1. CA-3¶

CA-3 : SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control applies to dedicated connections between information systems (i.e., system interconnections) and does not apply to transitory, user-controlled connections such as email and website browsing. Organizations carefully consider the risks that may be introduced when information systems are connected to other systems with different security requirements and security controls, both within organizations and external to organizations. Authorizing officials determine the risk associated with information system connections and the appropriate controls employed. If interconnecting systems have the same authorizing official, organizations do not need to develop Interconnection Security Agreements. Instead, organizations can describe the interface characteristics between those interconnecting systems in their respective security plans. If interconnecting systems have different authorizing officials within the same organization, organizations can either develop Interconnection Security Agreements or describe the interface characteristics between systems in the security plans for the respective systems. Organizations may also incorporate Interconnection Security Agreement information into formal contracts, especially for interconnections established between federal agencies and nonfederal (i.e., private sector) organizations. Risk considerations also include information systems sharing the same networks. For certain technologies (e.g., space, unmanned aerial vehicles, and medical devices), there may be specialized connections in place during preoperational testing. Such connections may require Interconnection Security Agreements and be subject to additional security controls.”

Related Controls:AC-3,AC-4,AC-20,AU-2,AU-12,AU-16,CA-7,IA-3,SA-9,SC-7,SI-4

7.2.1.49.1.1. CA-3a.¶

Control Family: SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION

7.2.1.50.1. CA-4¶

CA-4 : SECURITY CERTIFICATION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CA-2].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.51. CA-5¶

Control Family: SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION

7.2.1.51.1. CA-5¶

CA-5 : PLAN OF ACTION AND MILESTONES

Priority: P3

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Plans of action and milestones are key documents in security authorization packages and are subject to federal reporting requirements established by OMB.”

Related Controls:CA-2,CA-7,CM-4,PM-4

7.2.1.51.1.1. CA-5a.¶

Description: “Develops a plan of action and milestones for the information system to document the organization�s planned remedial actions to correct weaknesses or deficiencies noted during the assessment of the security controls and to reduce or eliminate known vulnerabilities in the system; and”

7.2.1.51.1.2. CA-5b.¶

Description: “Updates existing plan of action and milestones [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] based on the findings from security controls assessments, security impact analyses, and continuous monitoring activities.”

7.2.1.51.2. CA-5 (1)¶

CA-5 (1) : AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR ACCURACY / CURRENCY

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization employs automated mechanisms to help ensure that the plan of action and milestones for the information system is accurate, up to date, and readily available.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls: .. _header_CA-6:

7.2.1.52. CA-6¶

Control Family: SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION

7.2.1.52.1. CA-6¶

CA-6 : SECURITY AUTHORIZATION

Priority: P2

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Security authorizations are official management decisions, conveyed through authorization decision documents, by senior organizational officials or executives (i.e., authorizing officials) to authorize operation of information systems and to explicitly accept the risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation based on the implementation of agreed-upon security controls. Authorizing officials provide budgetary oversight for organizational information systems or assume responsibility for the mission/business operations supported by those systems. The security authorization process is an inherently federal responsibility and therefore, authorizing officials must be federal employees. Through the security authorization process, authorizing officials assume responsibility and are accountable for security risks associated with the operation and use of organizational information systems. Accordingly, authorizing officials are in positions with levels of authority commensurate with understanding and accepting such information security-related risks. OMB policy requires that organizations conduct ongoing authorizations of information systems by implementing continuous monitoring programs. Continuous monitoring programs can satisfy three-year reauthorization requirements, so separate reauthorization processes are not necessary. Through the employment of comprehensive continuous monitoring processes, critical information contained in authorization packages (i.e., security plans, security assessment reports, and plans of action and milestones) is updated on an ongoing basis, providing authorizing officials and information system owners with an up-to-date status of the security state of organizational information systems and environments of operation. To reduce the administrative cost of security reauthorization, authorizing officials use the results of continuous monitoring processes to the maximum extent possible as the basis for rendering reauthorization decisions.”

Related Controls:CA-2,CA-7,PM-9,PM-10

7.2.1.52.1.1. CA-6a.¶

Description: “Assigns a senior-level executive or manager as the authorizing official for the information system;”

7.2.1.52.1.2. CA-6b.¶

Description: “Ensures that the authorizing official authorizes the information system for processing before commencing operations; and”

7.2.1.52.1.3. CA-6c.¶

Description: “Updates the security authorization [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].” .. _header_CA-7:

7.2.1.53. CA-7¶

Control Family: SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION

7.2.1.53.1. CA-7¶

CA-7 : CONTINUOUS MONITORING

Priority: P2

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization develops a continuous monitoring strategy and implements a continuous monitoring program that includes:” Supplemental Guidance: “Continuous monitoring programs facilitate ongoing awareness of threats, vulnerabilities, and information security to support organizational risk management decisions. The terms continuous and ongoing imply that organizations assess/analyze security controls and information security-related risks at a frequency sufficient to support organizational risk-based decisions. The results of continuous monitoring programs generate appropriate risk response actions by organizations. Continuous monitoring programs also allow organizations to maintain the security authorizations of information systems and common controls over time in highly dynamic environments of operation with changing mission/business needs, threats, vulnerabilities, and technologies. Having access to security-related information on a continuing basis through reports/dashboards gives organizational officials the capability to make more effective and timely risk management decisions, including ongoing security authorization decisions. Automation supports more frequent updates to security authorization packages, hardware/software/firmware inventories, and other system information. Effectiveness is further enhanced when continuous monitoring outputs are formatted to provide information that is specific, measurable, actionable, relevant, and timely. Continuous monitoring activities are scaled in accordance with the security categories of information systems.”

Related Controls:CA-2,CA-5,CA-6,CM-3,CM-4,PM-6,PM-9,RA-5,SA-11,SA-12,SI-2,SI-4

7.2.1.53.1.1. CA-7a.¶

Description: “Establishment of [Assignment: organization-defined metrics] to be monitored;”

7.2.1.53.1.2. CA-7b.¶

Description: “Establishment of [Assignment: organization-defined frequencies] for monitoring and [Assignment: organization-defined frequencies] for assessments supporting such monitoring;”

7.2.1.53.1.3. CA-7c.¶

Description: “Ongoing security control assessments in accordance with the organizational continuous monitoring strategy;”

7.2.1.53.1.4. CA-7d.¶

Description: “Ongoing security status monitoring of organization-defined metrics in accordance with the organizational continuous monitoring strategy;”

7.2.1.53.1.5. CA-7e.¶

Description: “Correlation and analysis of security-related information generated by assessments and monitoring;”

7.2.1.53.1.6. CA-7f.¶

Description: “Response actions to address results of the analysis of security-related information; and”

7.2.1.53.1.7. CA-7g.¶

Description: “Reporting the security status of organization and the information system to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].”

7.2.1.53.2. CA-7 (1)¶

CA-7 (1) : INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization employs assessors or assessment teams with [Assignment: organization-defined level of independence] to monitor the security controls in the information system on an ongoing basis.” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations can maximize the value of assessments of security controls during the continuous monitoring process by requiring that such assessments be conducted by assessors or assessment teams with appropriate levels of independence based on continuous monitoring strategies. Assessor independence provides a degree of impartiality to the monitoring process. To achieve such impartiality, assessors should not: (i) create a mutual or conflicting interest with the organizations where the assessments are being conducted; (ii) assess their own work; (iii) act as management or employees of the organizations they are serving; or (iv) place themselves in advocacy positions for the organizations acquiring their services.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.53.3. CA-7 (2)¶

CA-7 (2) : TYPES OF ASSESSMENTS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CA-2].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.53.4. CA-7 (3)¶

CA-7 (3) : TREND ANALYSES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization employs trend analyses to determine if security control implementations, the frequency of continuous monitoring activities, and/or the types of activities used in the continuous monitoring process need to be modified based on empirical data.” Supplemental Guidance: “Trend analyses can include, for example, examining recent threat information regarding the types of threat events that have occurred within the organization or across the federal government, success rates of certain types of cyber attacks, emerging vulnerabilities in information technologies, evolving social engineering techniques, results from multiple security control assessments, the effectiveness of configuration settings, and findings from Inspectors General or auditors.”

Related Controls: .. _header_CA-8:

7.2.1.54. CA-8¶

Related Controls:CM-6 .. _header_CM-1:

7.2.1.56. CM-1¶

Control Family: CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT

7.2.1.56.1. CM-1¶

CM-1 : CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the CM family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.”

Related Controls:PM-9

7.2.1.56.1.1. CM-1a.¶

Description: “Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:”

7.2.1.56.1.2. CM-1a.1.¶

Description: “A configuration management policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and”

7.2.1.56.1.3. CM-1a.2.¶

Description: “Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the configuration management policy and associated configuration management controls; and”

7.2.1.56.1.4. CM-1b.¶

Description: “Reviews and updates the current:”

7.2.1.56.1.5. CM-1b.1.¶

Description: “Configuration management policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and”

7.2.1.56.1.6. CM-1b.2.¶

Description: “Configuration management procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].” .. _header_CM-2:

7.2.1.57. CM-2¶

Related Controls:CM-4,SC-3,SC-7

7.2.1.57.8. CM-2 (7)¶

CM-2 (7) : CONFIGURE SYSTEMS, COMPONENTS, OR DEVICES FOR HIGH-RISK AREAS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “When it is known that information systems, system components, or devices (e.g., notebook computers, mobile devices) will be located in high-risk areas, additional security controls may be implemented to counter the greater threat in such areas coupled with the lack of physical security relative to organizational-controlled areas. For example, organizational policies and procedures for notebook computers used by individuals departing on and returning from travel include, for example, determining which locations are of concern, defining required configurations for the devices, ensuring that the devices are configured as intended before travel is initiated, and applying specific safeguards to the device after travel is completed. Specially configured notebook computers include, for example, computers with sanitized hard drives, limited applications, and additional hardening (e.g., more stringent configuration settings). Specified safeguards applied to mobile devices upon return from travel include, for example, examining the device for signs of physical tampering and purging/reimaging the hard disk drive. Protecting information residing on mobile devices is covered in the media protection family.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.57.8.1. CM-2 (7)(a)¶

Description: “Issues [Assignment: organization-defined information systems, system components, or devices] with [Assignment: organization-defined configurations] to individuals traveling to locations that the organization deems to be of significant risk; and”

7.2.1.57.8.2. CM-2 (7)(b)¶

Description: “Applies [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to the devices when the individuals return.” .. _header_CM-3:

7.2.1.58. CM-3¶

Control Family: CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT

7.2.1.58.1. CM-3¶

CM-3 : CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Configuration change controls for organizational information systems involve the systematic proposal, justification, implementation, testing, review, and disposition of changes to the systems, including system upgrades and modifications. Configuration change control includes changes to baseline configurations for components and configuration items of information systems, changes to configuration settings for information technology products (e.g., operating systems, applications, firewalls, routers, and mobile devices), unscheduled/unauthorized changes, and changes to remediate vulnerabilities. Typical processes for managing configuration changes to information systems include, for example, Configuration Control Boards that approve proposed changes to systems. For new development information systems or systems undergoing major upgrades, organizations consider including representatives from development organizations on the Configuration Control Boards. Auditing of changes includes activities before and after changes are made to organizational information systems and the auditing activities required to implement such changes.”

Related Controls:CA-7,CM-2,CM-4,CM-5,CM-6,CM-9,SA-10,SI-2,SI-12

7.2.1.58.1.1. CM-3a.¶

Description: “Determines the types of changes to the information system that are configuration-controlled;”

7.2.1.58.1.2. CM-3b.¶

Description: “Reviews proposed configuration-controlled changes to the information system and approves or disapproves such changes with explicit consideration for security impact analyses;”

7.2.1.58.1.3. CM-3c.¶

Description: “Documents configuration change decisions associated with the information system;”

7.2.1.58.1.4. CM-3d.¶

Description: “Implements approved configuration-controlled changes to the information system;”

7.2.1.58.1.5. CM-3e.¶

Description: “Retains records of configuration-controlled changes to the information system for [Assignment: organization-defined time period];”

7.2.1.58.1.6. CM-3f.¶

Description: “Audits and reviews activities associated with configuration-controlled changes to the information system; and”

7.2.1.58.1.7. CM-3g.¶

Description: “Coordinates and provides oversight for configuration change control activities through [Assignment: organization-defined configuration change control element (e.g., committee, board)] that convenes [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; [Assignment: organization-defined configuration change conditions]].”

7.2.1.58.2. CM-3 (1)¶

CM-3 (1) : AUTOMATED DOCUMENT / NOTIFICATION / PROHIBITION OF CHANGES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization employs automated mechanisms to:” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.58.2.1. CM-3 (1)(a)¶

Description: “Document proposed changes to the information system;”

7.2.1.58.2.2. CM-3 (1)(b)¶

Description: “Notify [Assignment: organized-defined approval authorities] of proposed changes to the information system and request change approval;”

7.2.1.58.2.3. CM-3 (1)(c)¶

Description: “Highlight proposed changes to the information system that have not been approved or disapproved by [Assignment: organization-defined time period];”

7.2.1.58.2.4. CM-3 (1)(d)¶

Control Family: CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT

7.2.1.59.1. CM-4¶

CM-4 : SECURITY IMPACT ANALYSIS

Priority: P2

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization analyzes changes to the information system to determine potential security impacts prior to change implementation.” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizational personnel with information security responsibilities (e.g., Information System Administrators, Information System Security Officers, Information System Security Managers, and Information System Security Engineers) conduct security impact analyses. Individuals conducting security impact analyses possess the necessary skills/technical expertise to analyze the changes to information systems and the associated security ramifications. Security impact analysis may include, for example, reviewing security plans to understand security control requirements and reviewing system design documentation to understand control implementation and how specific changes might affect the controls. Security impact analyses may also include assessments of risk to better understand the impact of the changes and to determine if additional security controls are required. Security impact analyses are scaled in accordance with the security categories of the information systems.”

Related Controls:CA-2,CA-7,CM-3,CM-9,SA-4,SA-5,SA-10,SI-2

7.2.1.59.2. CM-4 (1)¶

CM-4 (1) : SEPARATE TEST ENVIRONMENTS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization analyzes changes to the information system in a separate test environment before implementation in an operational environment, looking for security impacts due to flaws, weaknesses, incompatibility, or intentional malice.” Supplemental Guidance: “Separate test environment in this context means an environment that is physically or logically isolated and distinct from the operational environment. The separation is sufficient to ensure that activities in the test environment do not impact activities in the operational environment, and information in the operational environment is not inadvertently transmitted to the test environment. Separate environments can be achieved by physical or logical means. If physically separate test environments are not used, organizations determine the strength of mechanism required when implementing logical separation (e.g., separation achieved through virtual machines).”

Related Controls:SA-11,SC-3,SC-7

7.2.1.59.3. CM-4 (2)¶

CM-4 (2) : VERIFICATION OF SECURITY FUNCTIONS

Priority:

CM-5 (5) : LIMIT PRODUCTION / OPERATIONAL PRIVILEGES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “In many organizations, information systems support multiple core missions/business functions. Limiting privileges to change information system components with respect to operational systems is necessary because changes to a particular information system component may have far-reaching effects on mission/business processes supported by the system where the component resides. The complex, many-to-many relationships between systems and mission/business processes are in some cases, unknown to developers.”

Related Controls:AC-2

7.2.1.60.6.1. CM-5 (5)(a)¶

Description: “Limits privileges to change information system components and system-related information within a production or operational environment; and”

7.2.1.60.6.2. CM-5 (5)(b)¶

Description: “Reviews and reevaluates privileges [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].”

7.2.1.60.7. CM-5 (6)¶

CM-5 (6) : LIMIT LIBRARY PRIVILEGES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization limits privileges to change software resident within software libraries.” Supplemental Guidance: “Software libraries include privileged programs.”

Related Controls:AC-2

7.2.1.60.8. CM-5 (7)¶

CM-5 (7) : AUTOMATIC IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY SAFEGUARDS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-7].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls: .. _header_CM-6:

7.2.1.61. CM-6¶

Control Family: CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT

7.2.1.61.1. CM-6¶

CM-6 : CONFIGURATION SETTINGS

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Configuration settings are the set of parameters that can be changed in hardware, software, or firmware components of the information system that affect the security posture and/or functionality of the system. Information technology products for which security-related configuration settings can be defined include, for example, mainframe computers, servers (e.g., database, electronic mail, authentication, web, proxy, file, domain name), workstations, input/output devices (e.g., scanners, copiers, and printers), network components (e.g., firewalls, routers, gateways, voice and data switches, wireless access points, network appliances, sensors), operating systems, middleware, and applications. Security-related parameters are those parameters impacting the security state of information systems including the parameters required to satisfy other security control requirements. Security-related parameters include, for example: (i) registry settings; (ii) account, file, directory permission settings; and (iii) settings for functions, ports, protocols, services, and remote connections. Organizations establish organization-wide configuration settings and subsequently derive specific settings for information systems. The established settings become part of the systems configuration baseline. Common secure configurations (also referred to as security configuration checklists, lockdown and hardening guides, security reference guides, security technical implementation guides) provide recognized, standardized, and established benchmarks that stipulate secure configuration settings for specific information technology platforms/products and instructions for configuring those information system components to meet operational requirements. Common secure configurations can be developed by a variety of organizations including, for example, information technology product developers, manufacturers, vendors, consortia, academia, industry, federal agencies, and other organizations in the public and private sectors. Common secure configurations include the United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB) which affects the implementation of CM-6 and other controls such as AC-19 and CM-7. The Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) and the defined standards within the protocol (e.g., Common Configuration Enumeration) provide an effective method to uniquely identify, track, and control configuration settings. OMB establishes federal policy on configuration requirements for federal information systems.”

Related Controls:AC-19,CM-2,CM-3,CM-7,SI-4

7.2.1.61.1.1. CM-6a.¶

Description: “Establishes and documents configuration settings for information technology products employed within the information system using [Assignment: organization-defined security configuration checklists] that reflect the most restrictive mode consistent with operational requirements;”

7.2.1.61.1.2. CM-6b.¶

Description: “Implements the configuration settings;”

7.2.1.61.1.3. CM-6c.¶

Description: “Identifies, documents, and approves any deviations from established configuration settings for [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] based on [Assignment: organization-defined operational requirements]; and”

7.2.1.61.1.4. CM-6d.¶

Description: “Monitors and controls changes to the configuration settings in accordance with organizational policies and procedures.”

7.2.1.61.2. CM-6 (1)¶

CM-6 (1) : AUTOMATED CENTRAL MANAGEMENT / APPLICATION / VERIFICATION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization employs automated mechanisms to centrally manage, apply, and verify configuration settings for [Assignment: organization-defined information system components].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:CA-7,CM-4

7.2.1.61.3. CM-6 (2)¶

CM-6 (2) : RESPOND TO UNAUTHORIZED CHANGES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to respond to unauthorized changes to [Assignment: organization-defined configuration settings].” Supplemental Guidance: “Responses to unauthorized changes to configuration settings can include, for example, alerting designated organizational personnel, restoring established configuration settings, or in extreme cases, halting affected information system processing.”

Related Controls:IR-4,SI-7

7.2.1.61.4. CM-6 (3)¶

CM-6 (3) : UNAUTHORIZED CHANGE DETECTION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-7].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.61.5. CM-6 (4)¶

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The information system prevents program execution in accordance with [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined policies regarding software program usage and restrictions]; rules authorizing the terms and conditions of software program usage].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:CM-8,PM-5

7.2.1.62.4. CM-7 (3)¶

CM-7 (3) : REGISTRATION COMPLIANCE

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization ensures compliance with [Assignment: organization-defined registration requirements for functions, ports, protocols, and services].” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations use the registration process to manage, track, and provide oversight for information systems and implemented functions, ports, protocols, and services.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.62.5. CM-7 (4)¶

CM-7 (4) : UNAUTHORIZED SOFTWARE / BLACKLISTING

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “The process used to identify software programs that are not authorized to execute on organizational information systems is commonly referred to as blacklisting. Organizations can implement CM-7 (5) instead of this control enhancement if whitelisting (the stronger of the two policies) is the preferred approach for restricting software program execution.”

Related Controls:CM-6,CM-8,PM-5

7.2.1.62.5.1. CM-7 (4)(a)¶

Description: “Identifies [Assignment: organization-defined software programs not authorized to execute on the information system];”

7.2.1.62.5.2. CM-7 (4)(b)¶

Description: “Employs an allow-all, deny-by-exception policy to prohibit the execution of unauthorized software programs on the information system; and”

7.2.1.62.5.3. CM-7 (4)(c)¶

Description: “Reviews and updates the list of unauthorized software programs [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].”

7.2.1.62.6. CM-7 (5)¶

CM-7 (5) : AUTHORIZED SOFTWARE / WHITELISTING

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “The process used to identify software programs that are authorized to execute on organizational information systems is commonly referred to as whitelisting. In addition to whitelisting, organizations consider verifying the integrity of white-listed software programs using, for example, cryptographic checksums, digital signatures, or hash functions. Verification of white-listed software can occur either prior to execution or at system startup.”

Related Controls:CM-2,CM-6,CM-8,PM-5,SA-10,SC-34,SI-7

7.2.1.62.6.1. CM-7 (5)(a)¶

Description: “Identifies [Assignment: organization-defined software programs authorized to execute on the information system];”

7.2.1.62.6.2. CM-7 (5)(b)¶

Description: “Employs a deny-all, permit-by-exception policy to allow the execution of authorized software programs on the information system; and”

7.2.1.62.6.3. CM-7 (5)(c)¶

Description: “Reviews and updates the list of authorized software programs [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].” .. _header_CM-8:

7.2.1.63. CM-8¶

Control Family: CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT

7.2.1.63.1. CM-8¶

CM-8 : INFORMATION SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations may choose to implement centralized information system component inventories that include components from all organizational information systems. In such situations, organizations ensure that the resulting inventories include system-specific information required for proper component accountability (e.g., information system association, information system owner). Information deemed necessary for effective accountability of information system components includes, for example, hardware inventory specifications, software license information, software version numbers, component owners, and for networked components or devices, machine names and network addresses. Inventory specifications include, for example, manufacturer, device type, model, serial number, and physical location.”

Related Controls:CM-2,CM-6,PM-5

7.2.1.63.1.1. CM-8a.¶

Description: “Develops and documents an inventory of information system components that:”

7.2.1.63.1.2. CM-8a.1.¶

Description: “Accurately reflects the current information system;”

7.2.1.63.1.3. CM-8a.2.¶

Description: “Includes all components within the authorization boundary of the information system;”

7.2.1.63.1.4. CM-8a.3.¶

Description: “Is at the level of granularity deemed necessary for tracking and reporting; and”

7.2.1.63.1.5. CM-8a.4.¶

Description: “Includes [Assignment: organization-defined information deemed necessary to achieve effective information system component accountability]; and”

7.2.1.63.1.6. CM-8b.¶

Description: “Reviews and updates the information system component inventory [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].”

7.2.1.63.2. CM-8 (1)¶

CM-8 (1) : UPDATES DURING INSTALLATIONS / REMOVALS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization updates the inventory of information system components as an integral part of component installations, removals, and information system updates.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.63.3. CM-8 (2)¶

CM-8 (2) : AUTOMATED MAINTENANCE

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization employs automated mechanisms to help maintain an up-to-date, complete, accurate, and readily available inventory of information system components.” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations maintain information system inventories to the extent feasible. Virtual machines, for example, can be difficult to monitor because such machines are not visible to the network when not in use. In such cases, organizations maintain as up-to-date, complete, and accurate an inventory as is deemed reasonable. This control enhancement can be satisfied by the implementation of CM-2 (2) for organizations that choose to combine information system component inventory and baseline configuration activities.”

Related Controls:SI-7

7.2.1.63.4. CM-8 (3)¶

CM-8 (3) : AUTOMATED UNAUTHORIZED COMPONENT DETECTION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control enhancement is applied in addition to the monitoring for unauthorized remote connections and mobile devices. Monitoring for unauthorized system components may be accomplished on an ongoing basis or by the periodic scanning of systems for that purpose. Automated mechanisms can be implemented within information systems or in other separate devices. Isolation can be achieved, for example, by placing unauthorized information system components in separate domains or subnets or otherwise quarantining such components. This type of component isolation is commonly referred to as sandboxing.”

CM-8 (9) : ASSIGNMENT OF COMPONENTS TO SYSTEMS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations determine the criteria for or types of information system components (e.g., microprocessors, motherboards, software, programmable logic controllers, and network devices) that are subject to this control enhancement.”

Related Controls:SA-4

7.2.1.63.10.1. CM-8 (9)(a)¶

Description: “Assigns [Assignment: organization-defined acquired information system components] to an information system; and”

7.2.1.63.10.2. CM-8 (9)(b)¶

Description: “Receives an acknowledgement from the information system owner of this assignment.” .. _header_CM-9:

7.2.1.64. CM-9¶

Control Family: CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT

7.2.1.64.1. CM-9¶

CM-9 : CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PLAN

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization develops, documents, and implements a configuration management plan for the information system that:” Supplemental Guidance: “Configuration management plans satisfy the requirements in configuration management policies while being tailored to individual information systems. Such plans define detailed processes and procedures for how configuration management is used to support system development life cycle activities at the information system level. Configuration management plans are typically developed during the development/acquisition phase of the system development life cycle. The plans describe how to move changes through change management processes, how to update configuration settings and baselines, how to maintain information system component inventories, how to control development, test, and operational environments, and how to develop, release, and update key documents. Organizations can employ templates to help ensure consistent and timely development and implementation of configuration management plans. Such templates can represent a master configuration management plan for the organization at large with subsets of the plan implemented on a system by system basis. Configuration management approval processes include designation of key management stakeholders responsible for reviewing and approving proposed changes to information systems, and personnel that conduct security impact analyses prior to the implementation of changes to the systems. Configuration items are the information system items (hardware, software, firmware, and documentation) to be configuration-managed. As information systems continue through the system development life cycle, new configuration items may be identified and some existing configuration items may no longer need to be under configuration control.”

Related Controls:CM-2,CM-3,CM-4,CM-5,CM-8,SA-10

7.2.1.64.1.1. CM-9a.¶

Description: “Addresses roles, responsibilities, and configuration management processes and procedures;”

7.2.1.64.1.2. CM-9b.¶

Description: “Establishes a process for identifying configuration items throughout the system development life cycle and for managing the configuration of the configuration items;”

7.2.1.64.1.3. CM-9c.¶

Description: “Defines the configuration items for the information system and places the configuration items under configuration management; and”

7.2.1.64.1.4. CM-9d.¶

Description: “Protects the configuration management plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.”

7.2.1.64.2. CM-9 (1)¶

CM-9 (1) : ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization assigns responsibility for developing the configuration management process to organizational personnel that are not directly involved in information system development.” Supplemental Guidance: “In the absence of dedicated configuration management teams assigned within organizations, system developers may be tasked to develop configuration management processes using personnel who are not directly involved in system development or integration. This separation of duties ensures that organizations establish and maintain a sufficient degree of independence between the information system development and integration processes and configuration management processes to facilitate quality control and more effective oversight.”

Related Controls: .. _header_CM-10:

7.2.1.65. CM-10¶

Control Family: CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT

7.2.1.65.1. CM-10¶

CM-10 : SOFTWARE USAGE RESTRICTIONS

Priority: P2

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Software license tracking can be accomplished by manual methods (e.g., simple spreadsheets) or automated methods (e.g., specialized tracking applications) depending on organizational needs.”

Related Controls:AC-17,CM-8,SC-7

7.2.1.65.1.1. CM-10a.¶

Description: “Uses software and associated documentation in accordance with contract agreements and copyright laws;”

7.2.1.65.1.2. CM-10b.¶

Description: “Tracks the use of software and associated documentation protected by quantity licenses to control copying and distribution; and”

7.2.1.65.1.3. CM-10c.¶

Description: “Controls and documents the use of peer-to-peer file sharing technology to ensure that this capability is not used for the unauthorized distribution, display, performance, or reproduction of copyrighted work.”

7.2.1.65.2. CM-10 (1)¶

CM-10 (1) : OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization establishes the following restrictions on the use of open source software: [Assignment: organization-defined restrictions].” Supplemental Guidance: “Open source software refers to software that is available in source code form. Certain software rights normally reserved for copyright holders are routinely provided under software license agreements that permit individuals to study, change, and improve the software. From a security perspective, the major advantage of open source software is that it provides organizations with the ability to examine the source code. However, there are also various licensing issues associated with open source software including, for example, the constraints on derivative use of such software.”

Related Controls: .. _header_CM-11:

7.2.1.66. CM-11¶

Control Family: CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT

7.2.1.66.1. CM-11¶

CM-11 : USER-INSTALLED SOFTWARE

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “If provided the necessary privileges, users have the ability to install software in organizational information systems. To maintain control over the types of software installed, organizations identify permitted and prohibited actions regarding software installation. Permitted software installations may include, for example, updates and security patches to existing software and downloading applications from organization-approved �app stores.� Prohibited software installations may include, for example, software with unknown or suspect pedigrees or software that organizations consider potentially malicious. The policies organizations select governing user-installed software may be organization-developed or provided by some external entity. Policy enforcement methods include procedural methods (e.g., periodic examination of user accounts), automated methods (e.g., configuration settings implemented on organizational information systems), or both.”

Related Controls:AC-3,CM-2,CM-3,CM-5,CM-6,CM-7,PL-4

7.2.1.66.1.1. CM-11a.¶

Description: “Establishes [Assignment: organization-defined policies] governing the installation of software by users;”

7.2.1.66.1.2. CM-11b.¶

Description: “Enforces software installation policies through [Assignment: organization-defined methods]; and”

7.2.1.66.1.3. CM-11c.¶

Description: “Monitors policy compliance at [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].”

7.2.1.66.2. CM-11 (1)¶

CM-11 (1) : ALERTS FOR UNAUTHORIZED INSTALLATIONS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] when the unauthorized installation of software is detected.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:CA-7,SI-4

7.2.1.66.3. CM-11 (2)¶

CM-11 (2) : PROHIBIT INSTALLATION WITHOUT PRIVILEGED STATUS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system prohibits user installation of software without explicit privileged status.” Supplemental Guidance: “Privileged status can be obtained, for example, by serving in the role of system administrator.”

Related Controls:AC-6 .. _header_CP-1:

7.2.1.67. CP-1¶

Control Family: CONTINGENCY PLANNING

7.2.1.67.1. CP-1¶

CP-1 : CONTINGENCY PLANNING POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the CP family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.”

Related Controls:PM-9

7.2.1.67.1.1. CP-1a.¶

Description: “Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:”

7.2.1.67.1.2. CP-1a.1.¶

Description: “A contingency planning policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and”

7.2.1.67.1.3. CP-1a.2.¶

Description: “Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the contingency planning policy and associated contingency planning controls; and”

7.2.1.67.1.4. CP-1b.¶

Description: “Reviews and updates the current:”

7.2.1.67.1.5. CP-1b.1.¶

Description: “Contingency planning policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and”

7.2.1.67.1.6. CP-1b.2.¶

Description: “Contingency planning procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].” .. _header_CP-2:

7.2.1.68. CP-2¶

Control Family: CONTINGENCY PLANNING

7.2.1.68.1. CP-2¶

CP-2 : CONTINGENCY PLAN

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Contingency planning for information systems is part of an overall organizational program for achieving continuity of operations for mission/business functions. Contingency planning addresses both information system restoration and implementation of alternative mission/business processes when systems are compromised. The effectiveness of contingency planning is maximized by considering such planning throughout the phases of the system development life cycle. Performing contingency planning on hardware, software, and firmware development can be an effective means of achieving information system resiliency. Contingency plans reflect the degree of restoration required for organizational information systems since not all systems may need to fully recover to achieve the level of continuity of operations desired. Information system recovery objectives reflect applicable laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, standards, regulations, and guidelines. In addition to information system availability, contingency plans also address other security-related events resulting in a reduction in mission and/or business effectiveness, such as malicious attacks compromising the confidentiality or integrity of information systems. Actions addressed in contingency plans include, for example, orderly/graceful degradation, information system shutdown, fallback to a manual mode, alternate information flows, and operating in modes reserved for when systems are under attack. By closely coordinating contingency planning with incident handling activities, organizations can ensure that the necessary contingency planning activities are in place and activated in the event of a security incident.”

Related Controls:AC-14,CP-6,CP-7,CP-8,CP-9,CP-10,IR-4,IR-8,MP-2,MP-4,MP-5,PM-8,PM-11

7.2.1.68.1.1. CP-2a.¶

Description: “Develops a contingency plan for the information system that:”

7.2.1.68.1.2. CP-2a.1.¶

Description: “Identifies essential missions and business functions and associated contingency requirements;”

7.2.1.68.1.3. CP-2a.2.¶

Description: “Provides recovery objectives, restoration priorities, and metrics;”

7.2.1.68.1.4. CP-2a.3.¶

Description: “Addresses contingency roles, responsibilities, assigned individuals with contact information;”

7.2.1.68.1.5. CP-2a.4.¶

Description: “Addresses maintaining essential missions and business functions despite an information system disruption, compromise, or failure;”

7.2.1.68.1.6. CP-2a.5.¶

Description: “Addresses eventual, full information system restoration without deterioration of the security safeguards originally planned and implemented; and”

7.2.1.68.1.7. CP-2a.6.¶

Description: “Is reviewed and approved by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles];”

7.2.1.68.1.8. CP-2b.¶

Description: “Distributes copies of the contingency plan to [Assignment: organization-defined key contingency personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements];”

7.2.1.68.1.9. CP-2c.¶

Description: “Coordinates contingency planning activities with incident handling activities;”

7.2.1.68.1.10. CP-2d.¶

Description: “Reviews the contingency plan for the information system [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];”

7.2.1.68.1.11. CP-2e.¶

CP-2 (8) : IDENTIFY CRITICAL ASSETS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization identifies critical information system assets supporting essential missions and business functions.” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations may choose to carry out the contingency planning activities in this control enhancement as part of organizational business continuity planning including, for example, as part of business impact analyses. Organizations identify critical information system assets so that additional safeguards and countermeasures can be employed (above and beyond those safeguards and countermeasures routinely implemented) to help ensure that organizational missions/business functions can continue to be conducted during contingency operations. In addition, the identification of critical information assets facilitates the prioritization of organizational resources. Critical information system assets include technical and operational aspects. Technical aspects include, for example, information technology services, information system components, information technology products, and mechanisms. Operational aspects include, for example, procedures (manually executed operations) and personnel (individuals operating technical safeguards and/or executing manual procedures). Organizational program protection plans can provide assistance in identifying critical assets.”

Related Controls:SA-14,SA-15 .. _header_CP-3:

7.2.1.69. CP-3¶

Control Family: CONTINGENCY PLANNING

7.2.1.69.1. CP-3¶

CP-3 : CONTINGENCY TRAINING

Priority: P2

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization provides contingency training to information system users consistent with assigned roles and responsibilities:” Supplemental Guidance: “Contingency training provided by organizations is linked to the assigned roles and responsibilities of organizational personnel to ensure that the appropriate content and level of detail is included in such training. For example, regular users may only need to know when and where to report for duty during contingency operations and if normal duties are affected; system administrators may require additional training on how to set up information systems at alternate processing and storage sites; and managers/senior leaders may receive more specific training on how to conduct mission-essential functions in designated off-site locations and how to establish communications with other governmental entities for purposes of coordination on contingency-related activities. Training for contingency roles/responsibilities reflects the specific continuity requirements in the contingency plan.”

Related Controls:AT-2,AT-3,CP-2,IR-2

7.2.1.69.1.1. CP-3a.¶

Description: “Within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of assuming a contingency role or responsibility;”

7.2.1.69.1.2. CP-3b.¶

Description: “When required by information system changes; and”

7.2.1.69.1.3. CP-3c.¶

Description: “[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter.”

7.2.1.69.2. CP-3 (1)¶

CP-3 (1) : SIMULATED EVENTS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization incorporates simulated events into contingency training to facilitate effective response by personnel in crisis situations.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.69.3. CP-3 (2)¶

CP-3 (2) : AUTOMATED TRAINING ENVIRONMENTS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization employs automated mechanisms to provide a more thorough and realistic contingency training environment.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls: .. _header_CP-4:

7.2.1.70. CP-4¶

Control Family: CONTINGENCY PLANNING

7.2.1.70.1. CP-4¶

CP-4 : CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING

Priority: P2

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Methods for testing contingency plans to determine the effectiveness of the plans and to identify potential weaknesses in the plans include, for example, walk-through and tabletop exercises, checklists, simulations (parallel, full interrupt), and comprehensive exercises. Organizations conduct testing based on the continuity requirements in contingency plans and include a determination of the effects on organizational operations, assets, and individuals arising due to contingency operations. Organizations have flexibility and discretion in the breadth, depth, and timelines of corrective actions.”

Related Controls:CP-2,CP-3,IR-3

7.2.1.70.1.1. CP-4a.¶

Description: “Tests the contingency plan for the information system [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] using [Assignment: organization-defined tests] to determine the effectiveness of the plan and the organizational readiness to execute the plan;”

7.2.1.70.1.2. CP-4b.¶

Description: “Reviews the contingency plan test results; and”

7.2.1.70.1.3. CP-4c.¶

Description: “Initiates corrective actions, if needed.”

7.2.1.70.2. CP-4 (1)¶

CP-4 (1) : COORDINATE WITH RELATED PLANS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization coordinates contingency plan testing with organizational elements responsible for related plans.” Supplemental Guidance: “Plans related to contingency plans for organizational information systems include, for example, Business Continuity Plans, Disaster Recovery Plans, Continuity of Operations Plans, Crisis Communications Plans, Critical Infrastructure Plans, Cyber Incident Response Plans, and Occupant Emergency Plans. This control enhancement does not require organizations to create organizational elements to handle related plans or to align such elements with specific plans. It does require, however, that if such organizational elements are responsible for related plans, organizations should coordinate with those elements.”

Related Controls:IR-8,PM-8

7.2.1.70.3. CP-4 (2)¶

CP-4 (2) : ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization tests the contingency plan at the alternate processing site:” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:CP-7

7.2.1.70.3.1. CP-4 (2)(a)¶

Description: “To familiarize contingency personnel with the facility and available resources; and”

7.2.1.70.3.2. CP-4 (2)(b)¶

Description: “To evaluate the capabilities of the alternate processing site to support contingency operations.”

7.2.1.70.4. CP-4 (3)¶

CP-4 (3) : AUTOMATED TESTING

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization employs automated mechanisms to more thoroughly and effectively test the contingency plan.” Supplemental Guidance: “Automated mechanisms provide more thorough and effective testing of contingency plans, for example: (i) by providing more complete coverage of contingency issues; (ii) by selecting more realistic test scenarios and environments; and (iii) by effectively stressing the information system and supported missions.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.70.5. CP-4 (4)¶

CP-4 (4) : FULL RECOVERY / RECONSTITUTION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization includes a full recovery and reconstitution of the information system to a known state as part of contingency plan testing.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:CP-10,SC-24 .. _header_CP-5:

7.2.1.71. CP-5¶

Control Family: CONTINGENCY PLANNING

7.2.1.71.1. CP-5¶

CP-5 : CONTINGENCY PLAN UPDATE

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CP-2].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.72. CP-6¶

Control Family: CONTINGENCY PLANNING

7.2.1.72.1. CP-6¶

CP-6 : ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Alternate storage sites are sites that are geographically distinct from primary storage sites. An alternate storage site maintains duplicate copies of information and data in the event that the primary storage site is not available. Items covered by alternate storage site agreements include, for example, environmental conditions at alternate sites, access rules, physical and environmental protection requirements, and coordination of delivery/retrieval of backup media. Alternate storage sites reflect the requirements in contingency plans so that organizations can maintain essential missions/business functions despite disruption, compromise, or failure in organizational information systems.”

Related Controls:CP-2,CP-7,CP-9,CP-10,MP-4

7.2.1.72.1.1. CP-6a.¶

Description: “Establishes an alternate storage site including necessary agreements to permit the storage and retrieval of information system backup information; and”

7.2.1.72.1.2. CP-6b.¶

Description: “Ensures that the alternate storage site provides information security safeguards equivalent to that of the primary site.”

7.2.1.72.2. CP-6 (1)¶

CP-6 (1) : SEPARATION FROM PRIMARY SITE

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization identifies an alternate storage site that is separated from the primary storage site to reduce susceptibility to the same threats.” Supplemental Guidance: “Threats that affect alternate storage sites are typically defined in organizational assessments of risk and include, for example, natural disasters, structural failures, hostile cyber attacks, and errors of omission/commission. Organizations determine what is considered a sufficient degree of separation between primary and alternate storage sites based on the types of threats that are of concern. For one particular type of threat (i.e., hostile cyber attack), the degree of separation between sites is less relevant.”

Related Controls:RA-3

7.2.1.72.3. CP-6 (2)¶

CP-6 (2) : RECOVERY TIME / POINT OBJECTIVES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization configures the alternate storage site to facilitate recovery operations in accordance with recovery time and recovery point objectives.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.72.4. CP-6 (3)¶

CP-6 (3) : ACCESSIBILITY

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization identifies potential accessibility problems to the alternate storage site in the event of an area-wide disruption or disaster and outlines explicit mitigation actions.” Supplemental Guidance: “Area-wide disruptions refer to those types of disruptions that are broad in geographic scope (e.g., hurricane, regional power outage) with such determinations made by organizations based on organizational assessments of risk. Explicit mitigation actions include, for example: (i) duplicating backup information at other alternate storage sites if access problems occur at originally designated alternate sites; or (ii) planning for physical access to retrieve backup information if electronic accessibility to the alternate site is disrupted.”

Related Controls:RA-3 .. _header_CP-7:

7.2.1.73. CP-7¶

Control Family: CONTINGENCY PLANNING

7.2.1.73.1. CP-7¶

CP-7 : ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Alternate processing sites are sites that are geographically distinct from primary processing sites. An alternate processing site provides processing capability in the event that the primary processing site is not available. Items covered by alternate processing site agreements include, for example, environmental conditions at alternate sites, access rules, physical and environmental protection requirements, and coordination for the transfer/assignment of personnel. Requirements are specifically allocated to alternate processing sites that reflect the requirements in contingency plans to maintain essential missions/business functions despite disruption, compromise, or failure in organizational information systems.”

Related Controls:CP-2,CP-6,CP-8,CP-9,CP-10,MA-6

7.2.1.73.1.1. CP-7a.¶

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization obtains alternate telecommunications services from providers that are separated from primary service providers to reduce susceptibility to the same threats.” Supplemental Guidance: “Threats that affect telecommunications services are typically defined in organizational assessments of risk and include, for example, natural disasters, structural failures, hostile cyber/physical attacks, and errors of omission/commission. Organizations seek to reduce common susceptibilities by, for example, minimizing shared infrastructure among telecommunications service providers and achieving sufficient geographic separation between services. Organizations may consider using a single service provider in situations where the service provider can provide alternate telecommunications services meeting the separation needs addressed in the risk assessment.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.74.5. CP-8 (4)¶

CP-8 (4) : PROVIDER CONTINGENCY PLAN

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Reviews of provider contingency plans consider the proprietary nature of such plans. In some situations, a summary of provider contingency plans may be sufficient evidence for organizations to satisfy the review requirement. Telecommunications service providers may also participate in ongoing disaster recovery exercises in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security, state, and local governments. Organizations may use these types of activities to satisfy evidentiary requirements related to service provider contingency plan reviews, testing, and training.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.74.5.1. CP-8 (4)(a)¶

Description: “Requires primary and alternate telecommunications service providers to have contingency plans;”

7.2.1.74.5.2. CP-8 (4)(b)¶

Description: “Reviews provider contingency plans to ensure that the plans meet organizational contingency requirements; and”

7.2.1.74.5.3. CP-8 (4)(c)¶

Description: “Obtains evidence of contingency testing/training by providers [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].”

7.2.1.74.6. CP-8 (5)¶

CP-8 (5) : ALTERNATE TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICE TESTING

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization tests alternate telecommunication services [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls: .. _header_CP-9:

7.2.1.75. CP-9¶

Control Family: CONTINGENCY PLANNING

7.2.1.75.1. CP-9¶

CP-9 : INFORMATION SYSTEM BACKUP

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “System-level information includes, for example, system-state information, operating system and application software, and licenses. User-level information includes any information other than system-level information. Mechanisms employed by organizations to protect the integrity of information system backups include, for example, digital signatures and cryptographic hashes. Protection of system backup information while in transit is beyond the scope of this control. Information system backups reflect the requirements in contingency plans as well as other organizational requirements for backing up information.”

Related Controls:CP-2,CP-6,MP-4,MP-5,SC-13

7.2.1.75.1.1. CP-9a.¶

Description: “Conducts backups of user-level information contained in the information system [Assignment: organization-defined frequency consistent with recovery time and recovery point objectives];”

7.2.1.75.1.2. CP-9b.¶

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system provides the capability to employ [Assignment: organization-defined alternative communications protocols] in support of maintaining continuity of operations.” Supplemental Guidance: “Contingency plans and the associated training and testing for those plans, incorporate an alternate communications protocol capability as part of increasing the resilience of organizational information systems. Alternate communications protocols include, for example, switching from Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) Version 4 to TCP/IP Version 6. Switching communications protocols may affect software applications and therefore, the potential side effects of introducing alternate communications protocols are analyzed prior to implementation.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.78. CP-12¶

Control Family: CONTINGENCY PLANNING

7.2.1.78.1. CP-12¶

CP-12 : SAFE MODE

Priority: P0

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system, when [Assignment: organization-defined conditions] are detected, enters a safe mode of operation with [Assignment: organization-defined restrictions of safe mode of operation].” Supplemental Guidance: “For information systems supporting critical missions/business functions including, for example, military operations and weapons systems, civilian space operations, nuclear power plant operations, and air traffic control operations (especially real-time operational environments), organizations may choose to identify certain conditions under which those systems revert to a predefined safe mode of operation. The safe mode of operation, which can be activated automatically or manually, restricts the types of activities or operations information systems could execute when those conditions are encountered. Restriction includes, for example, allowing only certain functions that could be carried out under limited power or with reduced communications bandwidth.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.79. CP-13¶

Control Family: CONTINGENCY PLANNING

7.2.1.79.1. CP-13¶

CP-13 : ALTERNATIVE SECURITY MECHANISMS

Priority: P0

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined alternative or supplemental security mechanisms] for satisfying [Assignment: organization-defined security functions] when the primary means of implementing the security function is unavailable or compromised.” Supplemental Guidance: “This control supports information system resiliency and contingency planning/continuity of operations. To ensure mission/business continuity, organizations can implement alternative or supplemental security mechanisms. These mechanisms may be less effective than the primary mechanisms (e.g., not as easy to use, not as scalable, or not as secure). However, having the capability to readily employ these alternative/supplemental mechanisms enhances overall mission/business continuity that might otherwise be adversely impacted if organizational operations had to be curtailed until the primary means of implementing the functions was restored. Given the cost and level of effort required to provide such alternative capabilities, this control would typically be applied only to critical security capabilities provided by information systems, system components, or information system services. For example, an organization may issue to senior executives and system administrators one-time pads in case multifactor tokens, the organization�s standard means for secure remote authentication, is compromised.”

Related Controls:CP-2

7.2.1.80. IA-1¶

Control Family: IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

7.2.1.80.1. IA-1¶

IA-1 : IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the IA family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.”

Related Controls:PM-9

7.2.1.80.1.1. IA-1a.¶

Description: “Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:”

7.2.1.80.1.2. IA-1a.1.¶

Description: “An identification and authentication policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and”

7.2.1.80.1.3. IA-1a.2.¶

Description: “Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the identification and authentication policy and associated identification and authentication controls; and”

7.2.1.80.1.4. IA-1b.¶

Description: “Reviews and updates the current:”

7.2.1.80.1.5. IA-1b.1.¶

IA-2 (13) : OUT-OF-BAND AUTHENTICATION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined out-of-band authentication] under [Assignment: organization-defined conditions].” Supplemental Guidance: “Out-of-band authentication (OOBA) refers to the use of two separate communication paths to identify and authenticate users or devices to an information system. The first path (i.e., the in-band path), is used to identify and authenticate users or devices, and generally is the path through which information flows. The second path (i.e., the out-of-band path) is used to independently verify the authentication and/or requested action. For example, a user authenticates via a notebook computer to a remote server to which the user desires access, and requests some action of the server via that communication path. Subsequently, the server contacts the user via the user�s cell phone to verify that the requested action originated from the user. The user may either confirm the intended action to an individual on the telephone or provide an authentication code via the telephone. This type of authentication can be employed by organizations to mitigate actual or suspected man-in the-middle attacks. The conditions for activation can include, for example, suspicious activities, new threat indicators or elevated threat levels, or the impact level or classification level of information in requested transactions.”

Related Controls:IA-10,IA-11,SC-37 .. _header_IA-3:

7.2.1.82. IA-3¶

Control Family: IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

7.2.1.82.1. IA-3¶

IA-3 : DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The information system uniquely identifies and authenticates [Assignment: organization-defined specific and/or types of devices] before establishing a [Selection (one or more): local; remote; network] connection.” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizational devices requiring unique device-to-device identification and authentication may be defined by type, by device, or by a combination of type/device. Information systems typically use either shared known information (e.g., Media Access Control [MAC] or Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol [TCP/IP] addresses) for device identification or organizational authentication solutions (e.g., IEEE 802.1x and Extensible Authentication Protocol [EAP], Radius server with EAP-Transport Layer Security [TLS] authentication, Kerberos) to identify/authenticate devices on local and/or wide area networks. Organizations determine the required strength of authentication mechanisms by the security categories of information systems. Because of the challenges of applying this control on large scale, organizations are encouraged to only apply the control to those limited number (and type) of devices that truly need to support this capability.”

Related Controls:AC-17,AC-18,AC-19,CA-3,IA-4,IA-5

7.2.1.82.2. IA-3 (1)¶

IA-3 (1) : CRYPTOGRAPHIC BIDIRECTIONAL AUTHENTICATION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system authenticates [Assignment: organization-defined specific devices and/or types of devices] before establishing [Selection (one or more): local; remote; network] connection using bidirectional authentication that is cryptographically based.” Supplemental Guidance: “A local connection is any connection with a device communicating without the use of a network. A network connection is any connection with a device that communicates through a network (e.g., local area or wide area network, Internet). A remote connection is any connection with a device communicating through an external network (e.g., the Internet). Bidirectional authentication provides stronger safeguards to validate the identity of other devices for connections that are of greater risk (e.g., remote connections).”

Related Controls:SC-8,SC-12,SC-13

7.2.1.82.3. IA-3 (2)¶

IA-3 (2) : CRYPTOGRAPHIC BIDIRECTIONAL NETWORK AUTHENTICATION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into IA-3 (1)].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.82.4. IA-3 (3)¶

IA-3 (3) : DYNAMIC ADDRESS ALLOCATION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “DHCP-enabled clients obtaining leases for IP addresses from DHCP servers, is a typical example of dynamic address allocation for devices.”

Related Controls:AU-2,AU-3,AU-6,AU-12

7.2.1.82.4.1. IA-3 (3)(a)¶

Description: “Standardizes dynamic address allocation lease information and the lease duration assigned to devices in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined lease information and lease duration]; and”

7.2.1.82.4.2. IA-3 (3)(b)¶

Description: “Audits lease information when assigned to a device.”

7.2.1.82.5. IA-3 (4)¶

IA-3 (4) : DEVICE ATTESTATION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization ensures that device identification and authentication based on attestation is handled by [Assignment: organization-defined configuration management process].” Supplemental Guidance: “Device attestation refers to the identification and authentication of a device based on its configuration and known operating state. This might be determined via some cryptographic hash of the device. If device attestation is the means of identification and authentication, then it is important that patches and updates to the device are handled via a configuration management process such that the those patches/updates are done securely and at the same time do not disrupt the identification and authentication to other devices.”

Related Controls: .. _header_IA-4:

7.2.1.83. IA-4¶

Control Family: IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

7.2.1.83.1. IA-4¶

IA-4 : IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization manages information system identifiers by:” Supplemental Guidance: “Common device identifiers include, for example, media access control (MAC), Internet protocol (IP) addresses, or device-unique token identifiers. Management of individual identifiers is not applicable to shared information system accounts (e.g., guest and anonymous accounts). Typically, individual identifiers are the user names of the information system accounts assigned to those individuals. In such instances, the account management activities of AC-2 use account names provided by IA-4. This control also addresses individual identifiers not necessarily associated with information system accounts (e.g., identifiers used in physical security control databases accessed by badge reader systems for access to information systems). Preventing reuse of identifiers implies preventing the assignment of previously used individual, group, role, or device identifiers to different individuals, groups, roles, or devices.”

Related Controls:AC-2,IA-2,IA-3,IA-5,IA-8,SC-37

7.2.1.83.1.1. IA-4a.¶

Description: “Receiving authorization from [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to assign an individual, group, role, or device identifier;”

7.2.1.83.1.2. IA-4b.¶

Description: “Selecting an identifier that identifies an individual, group, role, or device;”

7.2.1.83.1.3. IA-4c.¶

Control Family: IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

7.2.1.84.1. IA-5¶

IA-5 : AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization manages information system authenticators by:” Supplemental Guidance: “Individual authenticators include, for example, passwords, tokens, biometrics, PKI certificates, and key cards. Initial authenticator content is the actual content (e.g., the initial password) as opposed to requirements about authenticator content (e.g., minimum password length). In many cases, developers ship information system components with factory default authentication credentials to allow for initial installation and configuration. Default authentication credentials are often well known, easily discoverable, and present a significant security risk. The requirement to protect individual authenticators may be implemented via control PL-4 or PS-6 for authenticators in the possession of individuals and by controls AC-3, AC-6, and SC-28 for authenticators stored within organizational information systems (e.g., passwords stored in hashed or encrypted formats, files containing encrypted or hashed passwords accessible with administrator privileges). Information systems support individual authenticator management by organization-defined settings and restrictions for various authenticator characteristics including, for example, minimum password length, password composition, validation time window for time synchronous one-time tokens, and number of allowed rejections during the verification stage of biometric authentication. Specific actions that can be taken to safeguard authenticators include, for example, maintaining possession of individual authenticators, not loaning or sharing individual authenticators with others, and reporting lost, stolen, or compromised authenticators immediately. Authenticator management includes issuing and revoking, when no longer needed, authenticators for temporary access such as that required for remote maintenance. Device authenticators include, for example, certificates and passwords.”

Related Controls:AC-2,AC-3,AC-6,CM-6,IA-2,IA-4,IA-8,PL-4,PS-5,PS-6,SC-12,SC-13,SC-17,SC-28

7.2.1.84.1.1. IA-5a.¶

Description: “Verifying, as part of the initial authenticator distribution, the identity of the individual, group, role, or device receiving the authenticator;”

7.2.1.84.1.2. IA-5b.¶

Description: “Establishing initial authenticator content for authenticators defined by the organization;”

7.2.1.84.1.3. IA-5c.¶

Description: “Ensuring that authenticators have sufficient strength of mechanism for their intended use;”

7.2.1.84.1.4. IA-5d.¶

Description: “Establishing and implementing administrative procedures for initial authenticator distribution, for lost/compromised or damaged authenticators, and for revoking authenticators;”

7.2.1.84.1.5. IA-5e.¶

Description: “Changing default content of authenticators prior to information system installation;”

7.2.1.84.1.6. IA-5f.¶

Description: “Establishing minimum and maximum lifetime restrictions and reuse conditions for authenticators;”

7.2.1.84.1.7. IA-5g.¶

Description: “Changing/refreshing authenticators [Assignment: organization-defined time period by authenticator type];”

7.2.1.84.1.8. IA-5h.¶

Description: “Protecting authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification;”

7.2.1.84.1.9. IA-5i.¶

Description: “Requiring individuals to take, and having devices implement, specific security safeguards to protect authenticators; and”

7.2.1.84.1.10. IA-5j.¶

Description: “Changing authenticators for group/role accounts when membership to those accounts changes.”

7.2.1.84.2. IA-5 (1)¶

IA-5 (1) : PASSWORD-BASED AUTHENTICATION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The information system, for password-based authentication:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control enhancement applies to single-factor authentication of individuals using passwords as individual or group authenticators, and in a similar manner, when passwords are part of multifactor authenticators. This control enhancement does not apply when passwords are used to unlock hardware authenticators (e.g., Personal Identity Verification cards). The implementation of such password mechanisms may not meet all of the requirements in the enhancement. Cryptographically-protected passwords include, for example, encrypted versions of passwords and one-way cryptographic hashes of passwords. The number of changed characters refers to the number of changes required with respect to the total number of positions in the current password. Password lifetime restrictions do not apply to temporary passwords. To mitigate certain brute force attacks against passwords, organizations may also consider salting passwords.”

Related Controls:IA-6

7.2.1.84.2.1. IA-5 (1)(a)¶

Description: “Enforces minimum password complexity of [Assignment: organization-defined requirements for case sensitivity, number of characters, mix of upper-case letters, lower-case letters, numbers, and special characters, including minimum requirements for each type];”

7.2.1.84.2.2. IA-5 (1)(b)¶

Description: “Enforces at least the following number of changed characters when new passwords are created: [Assignment: organization-defined number];”

7.2.1.84.2.3. IA-5 (1)(c)¶

Description: “Stores and transmits only cryptographically-protected passwords;”

7.2.1.84.2.4. IA-5 (1)(d)¶

Description: “Enforces password minimum and maximum lifetime restrictions of [Assignment: organization-defined numbers for lifetime minimum, lifetime maximum];”

7.2.1.84.2.5. IA-5 (1)(e)¶

Description: “Prohibits password reuse for [Assignment: organization-defined number] generations; and”

7.2.1.84.2.6. IA-5 (1)(f)¶

Description: “Allows the use of a temporary password for system logons with an immediate change to a permanent password.”

7.2.1.84.3. IA-5 (2)¶

IA-5 (2) : PKI-BASED AUTHENTICATION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The information system, for PKI-based authentication:” Supplemental Guidance: “Status information for certification paths includes, for example, certificate revocation lists or certificate status protocol responses. For PIV cards, validation of certifications involves the construction and verification of a certification path to the Common Policy Root trust anchor including certificate policy processing.”

Related Controls:IA-6

7.2.1.84.3.1. IA-5 (2)(a)¶

Description: “Validates certifications by constructing and verifying a certification path to an accepted trust anchor including checking certificate status information;”

7.2.1.84.3.2. IA-5 (2)(b)¶

Control Family: IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

7.2.1.85.1. IA-6¶

IA-6 : AUTHENTICATOR FEEDBACK

Priority: P2

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The information system obscures feedback of authentication information during the authentication process to protect the information from possible exploitation/use by unauthorized individuals.” Supplemental Guidance: “The feedback from information systems does not provide information that would allow unauthorized individuals to compromise authentication mechanisms. For some types of information systems or system components, for example, desktops/notebooks with relatively large monitors, the threat (often referred to as shoulder surfing) may be significant. For other types of systems or components, for example, mobile devices with 2-4 inch screens, this threat may be less significant, and may need to be balanced against the increased likelihood of typographic input errors due to the small keyboards. Therefore, the means for obscuring the authenticator feedback is selected accordingly. Obscuring the feedback of authentication information includes, for example, displaying asterisks when users type passwords into input devices, or displaying feedback for a very limited time before fully obscuring it.”

Related Controls:PE-18

7.2.1.86. IA-7¶

Control Family: IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

7.2.1.86.1. IA-7¶

IA-7 : CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE AUTHENTICATION

Priority: P1

IA-8 (5) : ACCEPTANCE OF PIV-I CREDENTIALS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system accepts and electronically verifies Personal Identity Verification-I (PIV-I) credentials.” Supplemental Guidance: “This control enhancement: (i) applies to logical and physical access control systems; and (ii) addresses Non-Federal Issuers (NFIs) of identity cards that desire to interoperate with United States Government Personal Identity Verification (PIV) information systems and that can be trusted by federal government-relying parties. The X.509 certificate policy for the Federal Bridge Certification Authority (FBCA) addresses PIV-I requirements. The PIV-I card is suitable for Assurance Level 4 as defined in OMB Memorandum 04-04 and NIST Special Publication 800-63, and multifactor authentication as defined in NIST Special Publication 800-116. PIV-I credentials are those credentials issued by a PIV-I provider whose PIV-I certificate policy maps to the Federal Bridge PIV-I Certificate Policy. A PIV-I provider is cross-certified (directly or through another PKI bridge) with the FBCA with policies that have been mapped and approved as meeting the requirements of the PIV-I policies defined in the FBCA certificate policy.”

Related Controls:AU-2 .. _header_IA-9:

7.2.1.88. IA-9¶

Control Family: IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

7.2.1.88.1. IA-9¶

IA-9 : SERVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

Priority: P0

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization identifies and authenticates [Assignment: organization-defined information system services] using [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards].” Supplemental Guidance: “This control supports service-oriented architectures and other distributed architectural approaches requiring the identification and authentication of information system services. In such architectures, external services often appear dynamically. Therefore, information systems should be able to determine in a dynamic manner, if external providers and associated services are authentic. Safeguards implemented by organizational information systems to validate provider and service authenticity include, for example, information or code signing, provenance graphs, and/or electronic signatures indicating or including the sources of services.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.88.2. IA-9 (1)¶

IA-9 (1) : INFORMATION EXCHANGE

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization ensures that service providers receive, validate, and transmit identification and authentication information.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.88.3. IA-9 (2)¶

IA-9 (2) : TRANSMISSION OF DECISIONS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization ensures that identification and authentication decisions are transmitted between [Assignment: organization-defined services] consistent with organizational policies.” Supplemental Guidance: “For distributed architectures (e.g., service-oriented architectures), the decisions regarding the validation of identification and authentication claims may be made by services separate from the services acting on those decisions. In such situations, it is necessary to provide the identification and authentication decisions (as opposed to the actual identifiers and authenticators) to the services that need to act on those decisions.”

Related Controls:SC-8 .. _header_IA-10:

7.2.1.89. IA-10¶

Control Family: IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

7.2.1.89.1. IA-10¶

IA-10 : ADAPTIVE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

Priority: P0

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization requires that individuals accessing the information system employ [Assignment: organization-defined supplemental authentication techniques or mechanisms] under specific [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances or situations].” Supplemental Guidance: “Adversaries may compromise individual authentication mechanisms and subsequently attempt to impersonate legitimate users. This situation can potentially occur with any authentication mechanisms employed by organizations. To address this threat, organizations may employ specific techniques/mechanisms and establish protocols to assess suspicious behavior (e.g., individuals accessing information that they do not typically access as part of their normal duties, roles, or responsibilities, accessing greater quantities of information than the individuals would routinely access, or attempting to access information from suspicious network addresses). In these situations when certain preestablished conditions or triggers occur, organizations can require selected individuals to provide additional authentication information. Another potential use for adaptive identification and authentication is to increase the strength of mechanism based on the number and/or types of records being accessed.”

Related Controls:AU-6,SI-4

7.2.1.90. IA-11¶

Control Family: IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

7.2.1.90.1. IA-11¶

IA-11 : RE-AUTHENTICATION

Priority: P0

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization requires users and devices to re-authenticate when [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances or situations requiring re-authentication].” Supplemental Guidance: “In addition to the re-authentication requirements associated with session locks, organizations may require re-authentication of individuals and/or devices in other situations including, for example: (i) when authenticators change; (ii), when roles change; (iii) when security categories of information systems change; (iv), when the execution of privileged functions occurs; (v) after a fixed period of time; or (vi) periodically.”

Related Controls:AC-11

7.2.1.91. IR-1¶

Control Family: INCIDENT RESPONSE

7.2.1.91.1. IR-1¶

IR-1 : INCIDENT RESPONSE POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the IR family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.”

Related Controls:PM-9

7.2.1.91.1.1. IR-1a.¶

Description: “Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:”

7.2.1.91.1.2. IR-1a.1.¶

Description: “An incident response policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and”

7.2.1.91.1.3. IR-1a.2.¶

Description: “Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the incident response policy and associated incident response controls; and”

7.2.1.91.1.4. IR-1b.¶

Description: “Reviews and updates the current:”

7.2.1.91.1.5. IR-1b.1.¶

Description: “Incident response policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and”

7.2.1.91.1.6. IR-1b.2.¶

Description: “Incident response procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].” .. _header_IR-2:

7.2.1.92. IR-2¶

Control Family: INCIDENT RESPONSE

7.2.1.92.1. IR-2¶

IR-2 : INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING

Priority: P2

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization provides incident response training to information system users consistent with assigned roles and responsibilities:” Supplemental Guidance: “Incident response training provided by organizations is linked to the assigned roles and responsibilities of organizational personnel to ensure the appropriate content and level of detail is included in such training. For example, regular users may only need to know who to call or how to recognize an incident on the information system; system administrators may require additional training on how to handle/remediate incidents; and incident responders may receive more specific training on forensics, reporting, system recovery, and restoration. Incident response training includes user training in the identification and reporting of suspicious activities, both from external and internal sources.”

Related Controls:AT-3,CP-3,IR-8

7.2.1.92.1.1. IR-2a.¶

Description: “Within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of assuming an incident response role or responsibility;”

7.2.1.92.1.2. IR-2b.¶

Description: “When required by information system changes; and”

7.2.1.92.1.3. IR-2c.¶

Description: “[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter.”

7.2.1.92.2. IR-2 (1)¶

IR-2 (1) : SIMULATED EVENTS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization incorporates simulated events into incident response training to facilitate effective response by personnel in crisis situations.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.92.3. IR-2 (2)¶

IR-2 (2) : AUTOMATED TRAINING ENVIRONMENTS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization employs automated mechanisms to provide a more thorough and realistic incident response training environment.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls: .. _header_IR-3:

7.2.1.93. IR-3¶

Control Family: INCIDENT RESPONSE

7.2.1.93.1. IR-3¶

IR-3 : INCIDENT RESPONSE TESTING

Priority: P2

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization tests the incident response capability for the information system [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] using [Assignment: organization-defined tests] to determine the incident response effectiveness and documents the results.” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations test incident response capabilities to determine the overall effectiveness of the capabilities and to identify potential weaknesses or deficiencies. Incident response testing includes, for example, the use of checklists, walk-through or tabletop exercises, simulations (parallel/full interrupt), and comprehensive exercises. Incident response testing can also include a determination of the effects on organizational operations (e.g., reduction in mission capabilities), organizational assets, and individuals due to incident response.”

Related Controls:CP-4,IR-8

7.2.1.93.2. IR-3 (1)¶

IR-3 (1) : AUTOMATED TESTING

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization employs automated mechanisms to more thoroughly and effectively test the incident response capability.” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations use automated mechanisms to more thoroughly and effectively test incident response capabilities, for example: (i) by providing more complete coverage of incident response issues; (ii) by selecting more realistic test scenarios and test environments; and (iii) by stressing the response capability.”

Related Controls:AT-2

7.2.1.93.3. IR-3 (2)¶

IR-3 (2) : COORDINATION WITH RELATED PLANS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization coordinates incident response testing with organizational elements responsible for related plans.” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizational plans related to incident response testing include, for example, Business Continuity Plans, Contingency Plans, Disaster Recovery Plans, Continuity of Operations Plans, Crisis Communications Plans, Critical Infrastructure Plans, and Occupant Emergency Plans.”

Related Controls: .. _header_IR-4:

7.2.1.94. IR-4¶

Control Family: INCIDENT RESPONSE

7.2.1.94.1. IR-4¶

IR-4 : INCIDENT HANDLING

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations recognize that incident response capability is dependent on the capabilities of organizational information systems and the mission/business processes being supported by those systems. Therefore, organizations consider incident response as part of the definition, design, and development of mission/business processes and information systems. Incident-related information can be obtained from a variety of sources including, for example, audit monitoring, network monitoring, physical access monitoring, user/administrator reports, and reported supply chain events. Effective incident handling capability includes coordination among many organizational entities including, for example, mission/business owners, information system owners, authorizing officials, human resources offices, physical and personnel security offices, legal departments, operations personnel, procurement offices, and the risk executive (function).”

Related Controls:AU-6,CM-6,CP-2,CP-4,IR-2,IR-3,IR-8,PE-6,SC-5,SC-7,SI-3,SI-4,SI-7

7.2.1.94.1.1. IR-4a.¶

IR-4 (10) : SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization coordinates incident handling activities involving supply chain events with other organizations involved in the supply chain.” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations involved in supply chain activities include, for example, system/product developers, integrators, manufacturers, packagers, assemblers, distributors, vendors, and resellers. Supply chain incidents include, for example, compromises/breaches involving information system components, information technology products, development processes or personnel, and distribution processes or warehousing facilities.”

Related Controls: .. _header_IR-5:

7.2.1.95. IR-5¶

Control Family: INCIDENT RESPONSE

7.2.1.95.1. IR-5¶

IR-5 : INCIDENT MONITORING

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization tracks and documents information system security incidents.” Supplemental Guidance: “Documenting information system security incidents includes, for example, maintaining records about each incident, the status of the incident, and other pertinent information necessary for forensics, evaluating incident details, trends, and handling. Incident information can be obtained from a variety of sources including, for example, incident reports, incident response teams, audit monitoring, network monitoring, physical access monitoring, and user/administrator reports.”

Related Controls:AU-6,IR-8,PE-6,SC-5,SC-7,SI-3,SI-4,SI-7

7.2.1.95.2. IR-5 (1)¶

IR-5 (1) : AUTOMATED TRACKING / DATA COLLECTION / ANALYSIS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization employs automated mechanisms to assist in the tracking of security incidents and in the collection and analysis of incident information.” Supplemental Guidance: “Automated mechanisms for tracking security incidents and collecting/analyzing incident information include, for example, the Einstein network monitoring device and monitoring online Computer Incident Response Centers (CIRCs) or other electronic databases of incidents.”

Related Controls:AU-7,IR-4 .. _header_IR-6:

7.2.1.96. IR-6¶

Control Family: INCIDENT RESPONSE

7.2.1.96.1. IR-6¶

IR-6 : INCIDENT REPORTING

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “The intent of this control is to address both specific incident reporting requirements within an organization and the formal incident reporting requirements for federal agencies and their subordinate organizations. Suspected security incidents include, for example, the receipt of suspicious email communications that can potentially contain malicious code. The types of security incidents reported, the content and timeliness of the reports, and the designated reporting authorities reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Current federal policy requires that all federal agencies (unless specifically exempted from such requirements) report security incidents to the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) within specified time frames designated in the US-CERT Concept of Operations for Federal Cyber Security Incident Handling.”

Related Controls:IR-4,IR-5,IR-8

7.2.1.96.1.1. IR-6a.¶

Description: “Requires personnel to report suspected security incidents to the organizational incident response capability within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and”

7.2.1.96.1.2. IR-6b.¶

Description: “Reports security incident information to [Assignment: organization-defined authorities].”

7.2.1.96.2. IR-6 (1)¶

IR-6 (1) : AUTOMATED REPORTING

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization employs automated mechanisms to assist in the reporting of security incidents.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:IR-7

7.2.1.96.3. IR-6 (2)¶

IR-6 (2) : VULNERABILITIES RELATED TO INCIDENTS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization reports information system vulnerabilities associated with reported security incidents to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.96.4. IR-6 (3)¶

IR-6 (3) : COORDINATION WITH SUPPLY CHAIN

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization provides security incident information to other organizations involved in the supply chain for information systems or information system components related to the incident.” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations involved in supply chain activities include, for example, system/product developers, integrators, manufacturers, packagers, assemblers, distributors, vendors, and resellers. Supply chain incidents include, for example, compromises/breaches involving information system components, information technology products, development processes or personnel, and distribution processes or warehousing facilities. Organizations determine the appropriate information to share considering the value gained from support by external organizations with the potential for harm due to sensitive information being released to outside organizations of perhaps questionable trustworthiness.”

Related Controls: .. _header_IR-7:

7.2.1.97. IR-7¶

Control Family: INCIDENT RESPONSE

7.2.1.97.1. IR-7¶

IR-7 : INCIDENT RESPONSE ASSISTANCE

Priority: P2

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization provides an incident response support resource, integral to the organizational incident response capability that offers advice and assistance to users of the information system for the handling and reporting of security incidents.” Supplemental Guidance: “Incident response support resources provided by organizations include, for example, help desks, assistance groups, and access to forensics services, when required.”

Related Controls:AT-2,IR-4,IR-6,IR-8,SA-9

7.2.1.97.2. IR-7 (1)¶

IR-7 (1) : AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION / SUPPORT

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization employs automated mechanisms to increase the availability of incident response-related information and support.” Supplemental Guidance: “Automated mechanisms can provide a push and/or pull capability for users to obtain incident response assistance. For example, individuals might have access to a website to query the assistance capability, or conversely, the assistance capability may have the ability to proactively send information to users (general distribution or targeted) as part of increasing understanding of current response capabilities and support.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.97.3. IR-7 (2)¶

IR-7 (2) : COORDINATION WITH EXTERNAL PROVIDERS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “External providers of information system protection capability include, for example, the Computer Network Defense program within the U.S. Department of Defense. External providers help to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within organizational information systems and networks.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.97.3.1. IR-7 (2)(a)¶

Description: “Establishes a direct, cooperative relationship between its incident response capability and external providers of information system protection capability; and”

7.2.1.97.3.2. IR-7 (2)(b)¶

Description: “Identifies organizational incident response team members to the external providers.” .. _header_IR-8:

7.2.1.98. IR-8¶

Control Family: INCIDENT RESPONSE

7.2.1.98.1. IR-8¶

IR-8 : INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “It is important that organizations develop and implement a coordinated approach to incident response. Organizational missions, business functions, strategies, goals, and objectives for incident response help to determine the structure of incident response capabilities. As part of a comprehensive incident response capability, organizations consider the coordination and sharing of information with external organizations, including, for example, external service providers and organizations involved in the supply chain for organizational information systems.”

Related Controls:MP-2,MP-4,MP-5

7.2.1.98.1.1. IR-8a.¶

Description: “Develops an incident response plan that:”

7.2.1.98.1.2. IR-8a.1.¶

Description: “Provides the organization with a roadmap for implementing its incident response capability;”

7.2.1.98.1.3. IR-8a.2.¶

Description: “Describes the structure and organization of the incident response capability;”

7.2.1.98.1.4. IR-8a.3.¶

Description: “Provides a high-level approach for how the incident response capability fits into the overall organization;”

7.2.1.98.1.5. IR-8a.4.¶

Description: “Meets the unique requirements of the organization, which relate to mission, size, structure, and functions;”

7.2.1.98.1.6. IR-8a.5.¶

Description: “Defines reportable incidents;”

7.2.1.98.1.7. IR-8a.6.¶

Description: “Provides metrics for measuring the incident response capability within the organization;”

7.2.1.98.1.8. IR-8a.7.¶

Description: “Defines the resources and management support needed to effectively maintain and mature an incident response capability; and”

7.2.1.98.1.9. IR-8a.8.¶

Description: “Is reviewed and approved by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles];”

7.2.1.98.1.10. IR-8b.¶

Description: “Distributes copies of the incident response plan to [Assignment: organization-defined incident response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements];”

7.2.1.98.1.11. IR-8c.¶

Description: “Reviews the incident response plan [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];”

7.2.1.98.1.12. IR-8d.¶

Description: “Updates the incident response plan to address system/organizational changes or problems encountered during plan implementation, execution, or testing;”

7.2.1.98.1.13. IR-8e.¶

Description: “Communicates incident response plan changes to [Assignment: organization-defined incident response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements]; and”

7.2.1.98.1.14. IR-8f.¶

Description: “Protects the incident response plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.” .. _header_IR-9:

7.2.1.99. IR-9¶

Control Family: INCIDENT RESPONSE

7.2.1.99.1. IR-9¶

IR-9 : INFORMATION SPILLAGE RESPONSE

Priority: P0

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization responds to information spills by:” Supplemental Guidance: “Information spillage refers to instances where either classified or sensitive information is inadvertently placed on information systems that are not authorized to process such information. Such information spills often occur when information that is initially thought to be of lower sensitivity is transmitted to an information system and then is subsequently determined to be of higher sensitivity. At that point, corrective action is required. The nature of the organizational response is generally based upon the degree of sensitivity of the spilled information (e.g., security category or classification level), the security capabilities of the information system, the specific nature of contaminated storage media, and the access authorizations (e.g., security clearances) of individuals with authorized access to the contaminated system. The methods used to communicate information about the spill after the fact do not involve methods directly associated with the actual spill to minimize the risk of further spreading the contamination before such contamination is isolated and eradicated.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.99.1.1. IR-9a.¶

Description: “Identifying the specific information involved in the information system contamination;”

7.2.1.99.1.2. IR-9b.¶

Description: “Alerting [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] of the information spill using a method of communication not associated with the spill;”

7.2.1.99.1.3. IR-9c.¶

Description: “Isolating the contaminated information system or system component;”

7.2.1.99.1.4. IR-9d.¶

Description: “Eradicating the information from the contaminated information system or component;”

7.2.1.99.1.5. IR-9e.¶

Description: “Identifying other information systems or system components that may have been subsequently contaminated; and”

7.2.1.99.1.6. IR-9f.¶

Description: “Performing other [Assignment: organization-defined actions].”

7.2.1.99.2. IR-9 (1)¶

IR-9 (1) : RESPONSIBLE PERSONNEL

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization assigns [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] with responsibility for responding to information spills.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.99.3. IR-9 (2)¶

IR-9 (2) : TRAINING

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization provides information spillage response training [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.99.4. IR-9 (3)¶

IR-9 (3) : POST-SPILL OPERATIONS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization implements [Assignment: organization-defined procedures] to ensure that organizational personnel impacted by information spills can continue to carry out assigned tasks while contaminated systems are undergoing corrective actions.” Supplemental Guidance: “Correction actions for information systems contaminated due to information spillages may be very time-consuming. During those periods, personnel may not have access to the contaminated systems, which may potentially affect their ability to conduct organizational business.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.99.5. IR-9 (4)¶

IR-9 (4) : EXPOSURE TO UNAUTHORIZED PERSONNEL

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] for personnel exposed to information not within assigned access authorizations.” Supplemental Guidance: “Security safeguards include, for example, making personnel exposed to spilled information aware of the federal laws, directives, policies, and/or regulations regarding the information and the restrictions imposed based on exposure to such information.”

Related Controls: .. _header_IR-10:

7.2.1.100. IR-10¶

Control Family: INCIDENT RESPONSE

7.2.1.100.1. IR-10¶

IR-10 : INTEGRATED INFORMATION SECURITY ANALYSIS TEAM

Priority: P0

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization establishes an integrated team of forensic/malicious code analysts, tool developers, and real-time operations personnel.” Supplemental Guidance: “Having an integrated team for incident response facilitates information sharing. Such capability allows organizational personnel, including developers, implementers, and operators, to leverage the team knowledge of the threat in order to implement defensive measures that will enable organizations to deter intrusions more effectively. Moreover, it promotes the rapid detection of intrusions, development of appropriate mitigations, and the deployment of effective defensive measures. For example, when an intrusion is detected, the integrated security analysis team can rapidly develop an appropriate response for operators to implement, correlate the new incident with information on past intrusions, and augment ongoing intelligence development. This enables the team to identify adversary TTPs that are linked to the operations tempo or to specific missions/business functions, and to define responsive actions in a way that does not disrupt the mission/business operations. Ideally, information security analysis teams are distributed within organizations to make the capability more resilient.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.101. MA-1¶

Control Family: MAINTENANCE

7.2.1.101.1. MA-1¶

MA-1 : SYSTEM MAINTENANCE POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the MA family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.”

Related Controls:PM-9

7.2.1.101.1.1. MA-1a.¶

Description: “Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:”

7.2.1.101.1.2. MA-1a.1.¶

Description: “A system maintenance policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and”

7.2.1.101.1.3. MA-1a.2.¶

Description: “Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system maintenance policy and associated system maintenance controls; and”

7.2.1.101.1.4. MA-1b.¶

Description: “Reviews and updates the current:”

7.2.1.101.1.5. MA-1b.1.¶

Description: “System maintenance policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and”

7.2.1.101.1.6. MA-1b.2.¶

Description: “System maintenance procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].” .. _header_MA-2:

7.2.1.102. MA-2¶

Control Family: MAINTENANCE

7.2.1.102.1. MA-2¶

MA-2 : CONTROLLED MAINTENANCE

Priority: P2

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control addresses the information security aspects of the information system maintenance program and applies to all types of maintenance to any system component (including applications) conducted by any local or nonlocal entity (e.g., in-contract, warranty, in-house, software maintenance agreement). System maintenance also includes those components not directly associated with information processing and/or data/information retention such as scanners, copiers, and printers. Information necessary for creating effective maintenance records includes, for example: (i) date and time of maintenance; (ii) name of individuals or group performing the maintenance; (iii) name of escort, if necessary; (iv) a description of the maintenance performed; and (v) information system components/equipment removed or replaced (including identification numbers, if applicable). The level of detail included in maintenance records can be informed by the security categories of organizational information systems. Organizations consider supply chain issues associated with replacement components for information systems.”

Related Controls:CM-3,CM-4,MA-4,MP-6,PE-16,SA-12,SI-2

7.2.1.102.1.1. MA-2a.¶

Description: “Schedules, performs, documents, and reviews records of maintenance and repairs on information system components in accordance with manufacturer or vendor specifications and/or organizational requirements;”

7.2.1.102.1.2. MA-2b.¶

Description: “Approves and monitors all maintenance activities, whether performed on site or remotely and whether the equipment is serviced on site or removed to another location;”

7.2.1.102.1.3. MA-2c.¶

Description: “Requires that [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] explicitly approve the removal of the information system or system components from organizational facilities for off-site maintenance or repairs;”

7.2.1.102.1.4. MA-2d.¶

Description: “Sanitizes equipment to remove all information from associated media prior to removal from organizational facilities for off-site maintenance or repairs;”

7.2.1.102.1.5. MA-2e.¶

Description: “Checks all potentially impacted security controls to verify that the controls are still functioning properly following maintenance or repair actions; and”

7.2.1.102.1.6. MA-2f.¶

Description: “Includes [Assignment: organization-defined maintenance-related information] in organizational maintenance records.”

7.2.1.102.2. MA-2 (1)¶

MA-2 (1) : RECORD CONTENT

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MA-2].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.102.3. MA-2 (2)¶

MA-2 (2) : AUTOMATED MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:CA-7,MA-3

7.2.1.102.3.1. MA-2 (2)(a)¶

Description: “Employs automated mechanisms to schedule, conduct, and document maintenance and repairs; and”

7.2.1.102.3.2. MA-2 (2)(b)¶

Description: “Produces up-to date, accurate, and complete records of all maintenance and repair actions requested, scheduled, in process, and completed.” .. _header_MA-3:

7.2.1.103. MA-3¶

Control Family: MAINTENANCE

7.2.1.103.1. MA-3¶

MA-3 : MAINTENANCE TOOLS

Priority: P3

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization approves, controls, and monitors information system maintenance tools.” Supplemental Guidance: “This control addresses security-related issues associated with maintenance tools used specifically for diagnostic and repair actions on organizational information systems. Maintenance tools can include hardware, software, and firmware items. Maintenance tools are potential vehicles for transporting malicious code, either intentionally or unintentionally, into a facility and subsequently into organizational information systems. Maintenance tools can include, for example, hardware/software diagnostic test equipment and hardware/software packet sniffers. This control does not cover hardware/software components that may support information system maintenance, yet are a part of the system, for example, the software implementing �ping,� �ls,� �ipconfig,� or the hardware and software implementing the monitoring port of an Ethernet switch.”

Related Controls:MA-2,MA-5,MP-6

7.2.1.103.2. MA-3 (1)¶

MA-3 (1) : INSPECT TOOLS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization inspects the maintenance tools carried into a facility by maintenance personnel for improper or unauthorized modifications.” Supplemental Guidance: “If, upon inspection of maintenance tools, organizations determine that the tools have been modified in an improper/unauthorized manner or contain malicious code, the incident is handled consistent with organizational policies and procedures for incident handling.”

Related Controls:SI-7

7.2.1.103.3. MA-3 (2)¶

MA-3 (2) : INSPECT MEDIA

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization checks media containing diagnostic and test programs for malicious code before the media are used in the information system.” Supplemental Guidance: “If, upon inspection of media containing maintenance diagnostic and test programs, organizations determine that the media contain malicious code, the incident is handled consistent with organizational incident handling policies and procedures.”

Related Controls:SI-3

7.2.1.103.4. MA-3 (3)¶

MA-3 (3) : PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED REMOVAL

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization prevents the unauthorized removal of maintenance equipment containing organizational information by:” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizational information includes all information specifically owned by organizations and information provided to organizations in which organizations serve as information stewards.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.103.4.1. MA-3 (3)(a)¶

Description: “Verifying that there is no organizational information contained on the equipment;”

7.2.1.103.4.2. MA-3 (3)(b)¶

Description: “Sanitizing or destroying the equipment;”

7.2.1.103.4.3. MA-3 (3)(c)¶

Description: “Retaining the equipment within the facility; or”

7.2.1.103.4.4. MA-3 (3)(d)¶

Description: “Obtaining an exemption from [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] explicitly authorizing removal of the equipment from the facility.”

7.2.1.103.5. MA-3 (4)¶

MA-3 (4) : RESTRICTED TOOL USE

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system restricts the use of maintenance tools to authorized personnel only.” Supplemental Guidance: “This control enhancement applies to information systems that are used to carry out maintenance functions.”

Related Controls:AC-2,AC-3,AC-5,AC-6 .. _header_MA-4:

7.2.1.104. MA-4¶

Control Family: MAINTENANCE

7.2.1.104.1. MA-4¶

MA-4 : NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE

Priority: P2

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities conducted by individuals communicating through a network, either an external network (e.g., the Internet) or an internal network. Local maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities carried out by individuals physically present at the information system or information system component and not communicating across a network connection. Authentication techniques used in the establishment of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions reflect the network access requirements in IA-2. Typically, strong authentication requires authenticators that are resistant to replay attacks and employ multifactor authentication. Strong authenticators include, for example, PKI where certificates are stored on a token protected by a password, passphrase, or biometric. Enforcing requirements in MA-4 is accomplished in part by other controls.”

Related Controls:AC-2,AC-3,AC-6,AC-17,AU-2,AU-3,IA-2,IA-4,IA-5,IA-8,MA-2,MA-5,MP-6,PL-2,SC-7,SC-10,SC-17

7.2.1.104.1.1. MA-4a.¶

Description: “Approves and monitors nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities;”

7.2.1.104.1.2. MA-4b.¶

Description: “Allows the use of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic tools only as consistent with organizational policy and documented in the security plan for the information system;”

7.2.1.104.1.3. MA-4c.¶

Description: “Employs strong authenticators in the establishment of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions;”

7.2.1.104.1.4. MA-4d.¶

Description: “Maintains records for nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities; and”

7.2.1.104.1.5. MA-4e.¶

Description: “Terminates session and network connections when nonlocal maintenance is completed.”

7.2.1.104.2. MA-4 (1)¶

MA-4 (1) : AUDITING AND REVIEW

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:AU-2,AU-6,AU-12

7.2.1.104.2.1. MA-4 (1)(a)¶

Description: “Audits nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions [Assignment: organization-defined audit events]; and”

7.2.1.104.2.2. MA-4 (1)(b)¶

Description: “Reviews the records of the maintenance and diagnostic sessions.”

7.2.1.104.3. MA-4 (2)¶

MA-4 (2) : DOCUMENT NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization documents in the security plan for the information system, the policies and procedures for the establishment and use of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic connections.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.104.4. MA-4 (3)¶

MA-4 (3) : COMPARABLE SECURITY / SANITIZATION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Comparable security capability on information systems, diagnostic tools, and equipment providing maintenance services implies that the implemented security controls on those systems, tools, and equipment are at least as comprehensive as the controls on the information system being serviced.”

Related Controls:MA-3,SA-12,SI-3,SI-7

7.2.1.104.4.1. MA-4 (3)(a)¶

Description: “Requires that nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic services be performed from an information system that implements a security capability comparable to the capability implemented on the system being serviced; or”

7.2.1.104.4.2. MA-4 (3)(b)¶

Description: “Removes the component to be serviced from the information system prior to nonlocal maintenance or diagnostic services, sanitizes the component (with regard to organizational information) before removal from organizational facilities, and after the service is performed, inspects and sanitizes the component (with regard to potentially malicious software) before reconnecting the component to the information system.”

7.2.1.104.5. MA-4 (4)¶

MA-4 (4) : AUTHENTICATION / SEPARATION OF MAINTENANCE SESSIONS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization protects nonlocal maintenance sessions by:” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:SC-13

7.2.1.104.5.1. MA-4 (4)(a)¶

Description: “Employing [Assignment: organization-defined authenticators that are replay resistant]; and”

7.2.1.104.5.2. MA-4 (4)(b)¶

Description: “Separating the maintenance sessions from other network sessions with the information system by either:”

7.2.1.104.5.3. MA-4 (4)(b)(1)¶

Description: “Physically separated communications paths; or”

7.2.1.104.5.4. MA-4 (4)(b)(2)¶

Description: “Logically separated communications paths based upon encryption.”

7.2.1.104.6. MA-4 (5)¶

MA-4 (5) : APPROVALS AND NOTIFICATIONS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Notification may be performed by maintenance personnel. Approval of nonlocal maintenance sessions is accomplished by organizational personnel with sufficient information security and information system knowledge to determine the appropriateness of the proposed maintenance.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.104.6.1. MA-4 (5)(a)¶

Description: “Requires the approval of each nonlocal maintenance session by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]; and”

7.2.1.104.6.2. MA-4 (5)(b)¶

Description: “Notifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] of the date and time of planned nonlocal maintenance.”

7.2.1.104.7. MA-4 (6)¶

MA-4 (6) : CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect the integrity and confidentiality of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic communications.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:SC-8,SC-13

7.2.1.104.8. MA-4 (7)¶

MA-4 (7) : REMOTE DISCONNECT VERIFICATION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system implements remote disconnect verification at the termination of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions.” Supplemental Guidance: “Remote disconnect verification ensures that remote connections from nonlocal maintenance sessions have been terminated and are no longer available for use.”

Related Controls:SC-13 .. _header_MA-5:

7.2.1.105. MA-5¶

Control Family: MAINTENANCE

7.2.1.105.1. MA-5¶

MA-5 : MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL

Priority: P2

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control applies to individuals performing hardware or software maintenance on organizational information systems, while PE-2 addresses physical access for individuals whose maintenance duties place them within the physical protection perimeter of the systems (e.g., custodial staff, physical plant maintenance personnel). Technical competence of supervising individuals relates to the maintenance performed on the information systems while having required access authorizations refers to maintenance on and near the systems. Individuals not previously identified as authorized maintenance personnel, such as information technology manufacturers, vendors, systems integrators, and consultants, may require privileged access to organizational information systems, for example, when required to conduct maintenance activities with little or no notice. Based on organizational assessments of risk, organizations may issue temporary credentials to these individuals. Temporary credentials may be for one-time use or for very limited time periods.”

Related Controls:AC-2,IA-8,MP-2,PE-2,PE-3,PE-4,RA-3

7.2.1.105.1.1. MA-5a.¶

Description: “Establishes a process for maintenance personnel authorization and maintains a list of authorized maintenance organizations or personnel;”

7.2.1.105.1.2. MA-5b.¶

Description: “Ensures that non-escorted personnel performing maintenance on the information system have required access authorizations; and”

7.2.1.105.1.3. MA-5c.¶

Description: “Designates organizational personnel with required access authorizations and technical competence to supervise the maintenance activities of personnel who do not possess the required access authorizations.”

7.2.1.105.2. MA-5 (1)¶

MA-5 (1) : INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT APPROPRIATE ACCESS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control enhancement denies individuals who lack appropriate security clearances (i.e., individuals who do not possess security clearances or possess security clearances at a lower level than required) or who are not U.S. citizens, visual and electronic access to any classified information, Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), or any other sensitive information contained on organizational information systems. Procedures for the use of maintenance personnel can be documented in security plans for the information systems.”

Related Controls:MP-6,PL-2

7.2.1.105.2.1. MA-5 (1)(a)¶

Description: “Implements procedures for the use of maintenance personnel that lack appropriate security clearances or are not U.S. citizens, that include the following requirements:”

7.2.1.105.2.2. MA-5 (1)(a)(1)¶

Description: “Maintenance personnel who do not have needed access authorizations, clearances, or formal access approvals are escorted and supervised during the performance of maintenance and diagnostic activities on the information system by approved organizational personnel who are fully cleared, have appropriate access authorizations, and are technically qualified;”

7.2.1.105.2.3. MA-5 (1)(a)(2)¶

Description: “Prior to initiating maintenance or diagnostic activities by personnel who do not have needed access authorizations, clearances or formal access approvals, all volatile information storage components within the information system are sanitized and all nonvolatile storage media are removed or physically disconnected from the system and secured; and”

7.2.1.105.2.4. MA-5 (1)(b)¶

Description: “Develops and implements alternate security safeguards in the event an information system component cannot be sanitized, removed, or disconnected from the system.”

7.2.1.105.3. MA-5 (2)¶

MA-5 (2) : SECURITY CLEARANCES FOR CLASSIFIED SYSTEMS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization ensures that personnel performing maintenance and diagnostic activities on an information system processing, storing, or transmitting classified information possess security clearances and formal access approvals for at least the highest classification level and for all compartments of information on the system.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:PS-3

7.2.1.105.4. MA-5 (3)¶

MA-5 (3) : CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASSIFIED SYSTEMS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization ensures that personnel performing maintenance and diagnostic activities on an information system processing, storing, or transmitting classified information are U.S. citizens.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:PS-3

7.2.1.105.5. MA-5 (4)¶

MA-5 (4) : FOREIGN NATIONALS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization ensures that:” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:PS-3

7.2.1.105.5.1. MA-5 (4)(a)¶

Description: “Cleared foreign nationals (i.e., foreign nationals with appropriate security clearances), are used to conduct maintenance and diagnostic activities on classified information systems only when the systems are jointly owned and operated by the United States and foreign allied governments, or owned and operated solely by foreign allied governments; and”

7.2.1.105.5.2. MA-5 (4)(b)¶

Description: “Approvals, consents, and detailed operational conditions regarding the use of foreign nationals to conduct maintenance and diagnostic activities on classified information systems are fully documented within Memoranda of Agreements.”

7.2.1.105.6. MA-5 (5)¶

MA-5 (5) : NONSYSTEM-RELATED MAINTENANCE

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization ensures that non-escorted personnel performing maintenance activities not directly associated with the information system but in the physical proximity of the system, have required access authorizations.” Supplemental Guidance: “Personnel performing maintenance activities in other capacities not directly related to the information system include, for example, physical plant personnel and janitorial personnel.”

Related Controls: .. _header_MA-6:

7.2.1.106. MA-6¶

Control Family: MAINTENANCE

7.2.1.106.1. MA-6¶

MA-6 : TIMELY MAINTENANCE

Priority: P2

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization obtains maintenance support and/or spare parts for [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of failure.” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations specify the information system components that result in increased risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation when the functionality provided by those components is not operational. Organizational actions to obtain maintenance support typically include having appropriate contracts in place.”

Related Controls:CM-8,CP-2,CP-7,SA-14,SA-15

7.2.1.106.2. MA-6 (1)¶

MA-6 (1) : PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization performs preventive maintenance on [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] at [Assignment: organization-defined time intervals].” Supplemental Guidance: “Preventive maintenance includes proactive care and servicing of organizational information systems components for the purpose of maintaining equipment and facilities in satisfactory operating condition. Such maintenance provides for the systematic inspection, tests, measurements, adjustments, parts replacement, detection, and correction of incipient failures either before they occur or before they develop into major defects. The primary goal of preventive maintenance is to avoid/mitigate the consequences of equipment failures. Preventive maintenance is designed to preserve and restore equipment reliability by replacing worn components before they actually fail. Methods of determining what preventive (or other) failure management policies to apply include, for example, original equipment manufacturer (OEM) recommendations, statistical failure records, requirements of codes, legislation, or regulations within a jurisdiction, expert opinion, maintenance that has already been conducted on similar equipment, or measured values and performance indications.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.106.3. MA-6 (2)¶

MA-6 (2) : PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization performs predictive maintenance on [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] at [Assignment: organization-defined time intervals].” Supplemental Guidance: “Predictive maintenance, or condition-based maintenance, attempts to evaluate the condition of equipment by performing periodic or continuous (online) equipment condition monitoring. The goal of predictive maintenance is to perform maintenance at a scheduled point in time when the maintenance activity is most cost-effective and before the equipment loses performance within a threshold. The predictive component of predictive maintenance stems from the goal of predicting the future trend of the equipment’s condition. This approach uses principles of statistical process control to determine at what point in the future maintenance activities will be appropriate. Most predictive maintenance inspections are performed while equipment is in service, thereby minimizing disruption of normal system operations. Predictive maintenance can result in substantial cost savings and higher system reliability. Predictive maintenance tends to include measurement of the item. To evaluate equipment condition, predictive maintenance utilizes nondestructive testing technologies such as infrared, acoustic (partial discharge and airborne ultrasonic), corona detection, vibration analysis, sound level measurements, oil analysis, and other specific online tests.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.106.4. MA-6 (3)¶

MA-6 (3) : AUTOMATED SUPPORT FOR PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization employs automated mechanisms to transfer predictive maintenance data to a computerized maintenance management system.” Supplemental Guidance: “A computerized maintenance management system maintains a computer database of information about the maintenance operations of organizations and automates processing equipment condition data in order to trigger maintenance planning, execution, and reporting.”

Related Controls: .. _header_MP-1:

7.2.1.107. MP-1¶

Control Family: MEDIA PROTECTION

7.2.1.107.1. MP-1¶

MP-1 : MEDIA PROTECTION POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the MP family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.”

Related Controls:PM-9

7.2.1.107.1.1. MP-1a.¶

Description: “Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:”

7.2.1.107.1.2. MP-1a.1.¶

Description: “A media protection policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and”

7.2.1.107.1.3. MP-1a.2.¶

Description: “Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the media protection policy and associated media protection controls; and”

7.2.1.107.1.4. MP-1b.¶

Description: “Reviews and updates the current:”

7.2.1.107.1.5. MP-1b.1.¶

Description: “Media protection policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and”

7.2.1.107.1.6. MP-1b.2.¶

Description: “Media protection procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].” .. _header_MP-2:

7.2.1.108. MP-2¶

Control Family: MEDIA PROTECTION

7.2.1.108.1. MP-2¶

MP-2 : MEDIA ACCESS

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization restricts access to [Assignment: organization-defined types of digital and/or non-digital media] to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].” Supplemental Guidance: “Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk drives, flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, for example, paper and microfilm. Restricting non-digital media access includes, for example, denying access to patient medical records in a community hospital unless the individuals seeking access to such records are authorized healthcare providers. Restricting access to digital media includes, for example, limiting access to design specifications stored on compact disks in the media library to the project leader and the individuals on the development team.”

Related Controls:AC-3,IA-2,MP-4,PE-2,PE-3,PL-2

7.2.1.108.2. MP-2 (1)¶

MP-2 (1) : AUTOMATED RESTRICTED ACCESS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into MP-4 (2)].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.108.3. MP-2 (2)¶

MP-2 (2) : CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-28 (1)].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls: .. _header_MP-3:

7.2.1.109. MP-3¶

Control Family: MEDIA PROTECTION

7.2.1.109.1. MP-3¶

MP-3 : MEDIA MARKING

Priority: P2

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “The term security marking refers to the application/use of human-readable security attributes. The term security labeling refers to the application/use of security attributes with regard to internal data structures within information systems (see AC-16). Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk drives, flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, for example, paper and microfilm. Security marking is generally not required for media containing information determined by organizations to be in the public domain or to be publicly releasable. However, some organizations may require markings for public information indicating that the information is publicly releasable. Marking of information system media reflects applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance.”

Related Controls:AC-16,PL-2,RA-3

7.2.1.109.1.1. MP-3a.¶

Description: “Marks information system media indicating the distribution limitations, handling caveats, and applicable security markings (if any) of the information; and”

7.2.1.109.1.2. MP-3b.¶

Description: “Exempts [Assignment: organization-defined types of information system media] from marking as long as the media remain within [Assignment: organization-defined controlled areas].” .. _header_MP-4:

7.2.1.110. MP-4¶

Control Family: MEDIA PROTECTION

7.2.1.110.1. MP-4¶

MP-4 : MEDIA STORAGE

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk drives, flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, for example, paper and microfilm. Physically controlling information system media includes, for example, conducting inventories, ensuring procedures are in place to allow individuals to check out and return media to the media library, and maintaining accountability for all stored media. Secure storage includes, for example, a locked drawer, desk, or cabinet, or a controlled media library. The type of media storage is commensurate with the security category and/or classification of the information residing on the media. Controlled areas are areas for which organizations provide sufficient physical and procedural safeguards to meet the requirements established for protecting information and/or information systems. For media containing information determined by organizations to be in the public domain, to be publicly releasable, or to have limited or no adverse impact on organizations or individuals if accessed by other than authorized personnel, fewer safeguards may be needed. In these situations, physical access controls provide adequate protection.”

Related Controls:CP-6,CP-9,MP-2,MP-7,PE-3

7.2.1.110.1.1. MP-4a.¶

Description: “Physically controls and securely stores [Assignment: organization-defined types of digital and/or non-digital media] within [Assignment: organization-defined controlled areas]; and”

7.2.1.110.1.2. MP-4b.¶

Description: “Protects information system media until the media are destroyed or sanitized using approved equipment, techniques, and procedures.”

7.2.1.110.2. MP-4 (1)¶

MP-4 (1) : CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-28 (1)].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.110.3. MP-4 (2)¶

MP-4 (2) : AUTOMATED RESTRICTED ACCESS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization employs automated mechanisms to restrict access to media storage areas and to audit access attempts and access granted.” Supplemental Guidance: “Automated mechanisms can include, for example, keypads on the external entries to media storage areas.”

Related Controls:AU-2,AU-9,AU-6,AU-12 .. _header_MP-5:

7.2.1.111. MP-5¶

Control Family: MEDIA PROTECTION

7.2.1.111.1. MP-5¶

MP-5 : MEDIA TRANSPORT

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk drives, flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, for example, paper and microfilm. This control also applies to mobile devices with information storage capability (e.g., smart phones, tablets, E-readers), that are transported outside of controlled areas. Controlled areas are areas or spaces for which organizations provide sufficient physical and/or procedural safeguards to meet the requirements established for protecting information and/or information systems. Physical and technical safeguards for media are commensurate with the security category or classification of the information residing on the media. Safeguards to protect media during transport include, for example, locked containers and cryptography. Cryptographic mechanisms can provide confidentiality and integrity protections depending upon the mechanisms used. Activities associated with transport include the actual transport as well as those activities such as releasing media for transport and ensuring that media enters the appropriate transport processes. For the actual transport, authorized transport and courier personnel may include individuals from outside the organization (e.g., U.S. Postal Service or a commercial transport or delivery service). Maintaining accountability of media during transport includes, for example, restricting transport activities to authorized personnel, and tracking and/or obtaining explicit records of transport activities as the media moves through the transportation system to prevent and detect loss, destruction, or tampering. Organizations establish documentation requirements for activities associated with the transport of information system media in accordance with organizational assessments of risk to include the flexibility to define different record-keeping methods for the different types of media transport as part of an overall system of transport-related records.”

Related Controls:AC-19,CP-9,MP-3,MP-4,RA-3,SC-8,SC-13,SC-28

7.2.1.111.1.1. MP-5a.¶

Description: “Protects and controls [Assignment: organization-defined types of information system media] during transport outside of controlled areas using [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards];”

7.2.1.111.1.2. MP-5b.¶

Description: “Maintains accountability for information system media during transport outside of controlled areas;”

7.2.1.111.1.3. MP-5c.¶

Description: “Documents activities associated with the transport of information system media; and”

7.2.1.111.1.4. MP-5d.¶

Description: “Restricts the activities associated with the transport of information system media to authorized personnel.”

7.2.1.111.2. MP-5 (1)¶

MP-5 (1) : PROTECTION OUTSIDE OF CONTROLLED AREAS

Priority:

MP-7 : MEDIA USE

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization [Selection: restricts; prohibits] the use of [Assignment: organization-defined types of information system media] on [Assignment: organization-defined information systems or system components] using [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards].” Supplemental Guidance: “Information system media includes both digital and non-digital media. Digital media includes, for example, diskettes, magnetic tapes, external/removable hard disk drives, flash drives, compact disks, and digital video disks. Non-digital media includes, for example, paper and microfilm. This control also applies to mobile devices with information storage capability (e.g., smart phones, tablets, E-readers). In contrast to MP-2, which restricts user access to media, this control restricts the use of certain types of media on information systems, for example, restricting/prohibiting the use of flash drives or external hard disk drives. Organizations can employ technical and nontechnical safeguards (e.g., policies, procedures, rules of behavior) to restrict the use of information system media. Organizations may restrict the use of portable storage devices, for example, by using physical cages on workstations to prohibit access to certain external ports, or disabling/removing the ability to insert, read or write to such devices. Organizations may also limit the use of portable storage devices to only approved devices including, for example, devices provided by the organization, devices provided by other approved organizations, and devices that are not personally owned. Finally, organizations may restrict the use of portable storage devices based on the type of device, for example, prohibiting the use of writeable, portable storage devices, and implementing this restriction by disabling or removing the capability to write to such devices.”

Related Controls:AC-19,PL-4

7.2.1.113.2. MP-7 (1)¶

MP-7 (1) : PROHIBIT USE WITHOUT OWNER

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization prohibits the use of portable storage devices in organizational information systems when such devices have no identifiable owner.” Supplemental Guidance: “Requiring identifiable owners (e.g., individuals, organizations, or projects) for portable storage devices reduces the risk of using such technologies by allowing organizations to assign responsibility and accountability for addressing known vulnerabilities in the devices (e.g., malicious code insertion).”

Related Controls:PL-4

7.2.1.113.3. MP-7 (2)¶

MP-7 (2) : PROHIBIT USE OF SANITIZATION-RESISTANT MEDIA

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization prohibits the use of sanitization-resistant media in organizational information systems.” Supplemental Guidance: “Sanitization-resistance applies to the capability to purge information from media. Certain types of media do not support sanitize commands, or if supported, the interfaces are not supported in a standardized way across these devices. Sanitization-resistant media include, for example, compact flash, embedded flash on boards and devices, solid state drives, and USB removable media.”

Related Controls:MP-6 .. _header_MP-8:

7.2.1.114. MP-8¶

Control Family: MEDIA PROTECTION

7.2.1.114.1. MP-8¶

MP-8 : MEDIA DOWNGRADING

Priority: P0

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control applies to all information system media, digital and non-digital, subject to release outside of the organization, whether or not the media is considered removable. The downgrading process, when applied to system media, removes information from the media, typically by security category or classification level, such that the information cannot be retrieved or reconstructed. Downgrading of media includes redacting information to enable wider release and distribution. Downgrading of media also ensures that empty space on the media (e.g., slack space within files) is devoid of information.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.114.1.1. MP-8a.¶

Description: “Establishes [Assignment: organization-defined information system media downgrading process] that includes employing downgrading mechanisms with [Assignment: organization-defined strength and integrity];”

7.2.1.114.1.2. MP-8b.¶

Description: “Ensures that the information system media downgrading process is commensurate with the security category and/or classification level of the information to be removed and the access authorizations of the potential recipients of the downgraded information;”

7.2.1.114.1.3. MP-8c.¶

Description: “Identifies [Assignment: organization-defined information system media requiring downgrading]; and”

7.2.1.114.1.4. MP-8d.¶

Description: “Downgrades the identified information system media using the established process.”

7.2.1.114.2. MP-8 (1)¶

MP-8 (1) : DOCUMENTATION OF PROCESS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization documents information system media downgrading actions.” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations can document the media downgrading process by providing information such as the downgrading technique employed, the identification number of the downgraded media, and the identity of the individual that authorized and/or performed the downgrading action.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.114.3. MP-8 (2)¶

MP-8 (2) : EQUIPMENT TESTING

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined tests] of downgrading equipment and procedures to verify correct performance [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.114.4. MP-8 (3)¶

MP-8 (3) : CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization downgrades information system media containing [Assignment: organization-defined Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)] prior to public release in accordance with applicable federal and organizational standards and policies.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.114.5. MP-8 (4)¶

MP-8 (4) : CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization downgrades information system media containing classified information prior to release to individuals without required access authorizations in accordance with NSA standards and policies.” Supplemental Guidance: “Downgrading of classified information uses approved sanitization tools, techniques, and procedures to transfer information confirmed to be unclassified from classified information systems to unclassified media.”

Related Controls: .. _header_PE-1:

7.2.1.115. PE-1¶

Control Family: PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

7.2.1.115.1. PE-1¶

PE-1 : PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the PE family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.”

Related Controls:PM-9

7.2.1.115.1.1. PE-1a.¶

Description: “Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:”

7.2.1.115.1.2. PE-1a.1.¶

Description: “A physical and environmental protection policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and”

7.2.1.115.1.3. PE-1a.2.¶

Description: “Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the physical and environmental protection policy and associated physical and environmental protection controls; and”

7.2.1.115.1.4. PE-1b.¶

Description: “Reviews and updates the current:”

7.2.1.115.1.5. PE-1b.1.¶

Description: “Physical and environmental protection policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and”

7.2.1.115.1.6. PE-1b.2.¶

Description: “Physical and environmental protection procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].” .. _header_PE-2:

7.2.1.116. PE-2¶

Control Family: PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

7.2.1.116.1. PE-2¶

PE-2 : PHYSICAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control applies to organizational employees and visitors. Individuals (e.g., employees, contractors, and others) with permanent physical access authorization credentials are not considered visitors. Authorization credentials include, for example, badges, identification cards, and smart cards. Organizations determine the strength of authorization credentials needed (including level of forge-proof badges, smart cards, or identification cards) consistent with federal standards, policies, and procedures. This control only applies to areas within facilities that have not been designated as publicly accessible.”

Related Controls:PE-3,PE-4,PS-3

7.2.1.116.1.1. PE-2a.¶

Description: “Develops, approves, and maintains a list of individuals with authorized access to the facility where the information system resides;”

7.2.1.116.1.2. PE-2b.¶

Description: “Issues authorization credentials for facility access;”

7.2.1.116.1.3. PE-2c.¶

Description: “Reviews the access list detailing authorized facility access by individuals [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and”

7.2.1.116.1.4. PE-2d.¶

Description: “Removes individuals from the facility access list when access is no longer required.”

7.2.1.116.2. PE-2 (1)¶

PE-2 (1) : ACCESS BY POSITION / ROLE

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization authorizes physical access to the facility where the information system resides based on position or role.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:AC-2,AC-3,AC-6

7.2.1.116.3. PE-2 (2)¶

PE-2 (2) : TWO FORMS OF IDENTIFICATION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization requires two forms of identification from [Assignment: organization-defined list of acceptable forms of identification] for visitor access to the facility where the information system resides.” Supplemental Guidance: “Acceptable forms of government photo identification include, for example, passports, Personal Identity Verification (PIV) cards, and drivers� licenses. In the case of gaining access to facilities using automated mechanisms, organizations may use PIV cards, key cards, PINs, and biometrics.”

Related Controls:IA-2,IA-4,IA-5

7.2.1.116.4. PE-2 (3)¶

PE-2 (3) : RESTRICT UNESCORTED ACCESS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization restricts unescorted access to the facility where the information system resides to personnel with [Selection (one or more): security clearances for all information contained within the system; formal access authorizations for all information contained within the system; need for access to all information contained within the system; [Assignment: organization-defined credentials]].” Supplemental Guidance: “Due to the highly sensitive nature of classified information stored within certain facilities, it is important that individuals lacking sufficient security clearances, access approvals, or need to know, be escorted by individuals with appropriate credentials to ensure that such information is not exposed or otherwise compromised.”

Related Controls:PS-2,PS-6 .. _header_PE-3:

7.2.1.117. PE-3¶

Control Family: PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

7.2.1.117.1. PE-3¶

PE-3 : PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control applies to organizational employees and visitors. Individuals (e.g., employees, contractors, and others) with permanent physical access authorization credentials are not considered visitors. Organizations determine the types of facility guards needed including, for example, professional physical security staff or other personnel such as administrative staff or information system users. Physical access devices include, for example, keys, locks, combinations, and card readers. Safeguards for publicly accessible areas within organizational facilities include, for example, cameras, monitoring by guards, and isolating selected information systems and/or system components in secured areas. Physical access control systems comply with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. The Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management Program provides implementation guidance for identity, credential, and access management capabilities for physical access control systems. Organizations have flexibility in the types of audit logs employed. Audit logs can be procedural (e.g., a written log of individuals accessing the facility and when such access occurred), automated (e.g., capturing ID provided by a PIV card), or some combination thereof. Physical access points can include facility access points, interior access points to information systems and/or components requiring supplemental access controls, or both. Components of organizational information systems (e.g., workstations, terminals) may be located in areas designated as publicly accessible with organizations safeguarding access to such devices.”

Related Controls:AU-2,AU-6,MP-2,MP-4,PE-2,PE-4,PE-5,PS-3,RA-3

7.2.1.117.1.1. PE-3a.¶

Description: “Enforces physical access authorizations at [Assignment: organization-defined entry/exit points to the facility where the information system resides] by;”

7.2.1.117.1.2. PE-3a.1.¶

Description: “Verifying individual access authorizations before granting access to the facility; and”

7.2.1.117.1.3. PE-3a.2.¶

Description: “Controlling ingress/egress to the facility using [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined physical access control systems/devices]; guards];”

7.2.1.117.1.4. PE-3b.¶

Description: “Maintains physical access audit logs for [Assignment: organization-defined entry/exit points];”

7.2.1.117.1.5. PE-3c.¶

Description: “Provides [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to control access to areas within the facility officially designated as publicly accessible;”

7.2.1.117.1.6. PE-3d.¶

Description: “Escorts visitors and monitors visitor activity [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances requiring visitor escorts and monitoring];”

7.2.1.117.1.7. PE-3e.¶

PE-3 (6) : FACILITY PENETRATION TESTING

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization employs a penetration testing process that includes [Assignment: organization-defined frequency], unannounced attempts to bypass or circumvent security controls associated with physical access points to the facility.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:CA-2,CA-7 .. _header_PE-4:

7.2.1.118. PE-4¶

Control Family: PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

7.2.1.118.1. PE-4¶

PE-4 : ACCESS CONTROL FOR TRANSMISSION MEDIUM

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization controls physical access to [Assignment: organization-defined information system distribution and transmission lines] within organizational facilities using [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards].” Supplemental Guidance: “Physical security safeguards applied to information system distribution and transmission lines help to prevent accidental damage, disruption, and physical tampering. In addition, physical safeguards may be necessary to help prevent eavesdropping or in transit modification of unencrypted transmissions. Security safeguards to control physical access to system distribution and transmission lines include, for example: (i) locked wiring closets; (ii) disconnected or locked spare jacks; and/or (iii) protection of cabling by conduit or cable trays.”

Related Controls:MP-2,MP-4,PE-2,PE-3,PE-5,SC-7,SC-8

7.2.1.119. PE-5¶

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization marks [Assignment: organization-defined information system output devices] indicating the appropriate security marking of the information permitted to be output from the device.” Supplemental Guidance: “Outputs devices include, for example, printers, monitors, facsimile machines, scanners, copiers, and audio devices. This control enhancement is generally applicable to information system output devices other than mobiles devices.”

Related Controls: .. _header_PE-6:

7.2.1.120. PE-6¶

Control Family: PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

7.2.1.120.1. PE-6¶

PE-6 : MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizational incident response capabilities include investigations of and responses to detected physical security incidents. Security incidents include, for example, apparent security violations or suspicious physical access activities. Suspicious physical access activities include, for example: (i) accesses outside of normal work hours; (ii) repeated accesses to areas not normally accessed; (iii) accesses for unusual lengths of time; and (iv) out-of-sequence accesses.”

Related Controls:CA-7,IR-4,IR-8

7.2.1.120.1.1. PE-6a.¶

Description: “Monitors physical access to the facility where the information system resides to detect and respond to physical security incidents;”

7.2.1.120.1.2. PE-6b.¶

Description: “Reviews physical access logs [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and upon occurrence of [Assignment: organization-defined events or potential indications of events]; and”

7.2.1.120.1.3. PE-6c.¶

Description: “Coordinates results of reviews and investigations with the organizational incident response capability.”

7.2.1.120.2. PE-6 (1)¶

PE-6 (1) : INTRUSION ALARMS / SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization monitors physical intrusion alarms and surveillance equipment.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.120.3. PE-6 (2)¶

PE-6 (2) : AUTOMATED INTRUSION RECOGNITION / RESPONSES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization employs automated mechanisms to recognize [Assignment: organization-defined classes/types of intrusions] and initiate [Assignment: organization-defined response actions].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:SI-4

7.2.1.120.4. PE-6 (3)¶

PE-6 (3) : VIDEO SURVEILLANCE

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization employs video surveillance of [Assignment: organization-defined operational areas] and retains video recordings for [Assignment: organization-defined time period].” Supplemental Guidance: “This control enhancement focuses on recording surveillance video for purposes of subsequent review, if circumstances so warrant (e.g., a break-in detected by other means). It does not require monitoring surveillance video although organizations may choose to do so. Note that there may be legal considerations when performing and retaining video surveillance, especially if such surveillance is in a public location.”

Description: “Maintains visitor access records to the facility where the information system resides for [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and”

7.2.1.122.1.2. PE-8b.¶

Description: “Reviews visitor access records [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].”

7.2.1.122.2. PE-8 (1)¶

PE-8 (1) : AUTOMATED RECORDS MAINTENANCE / REVIEW

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization employs automated mechanisms to facilitate the maintenance and review of visitor access records.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.122.3. PE-8 (2)¶

PE-8 (2) : PHYSICAL ACCESS RECORDS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PE-2].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls: .. _header_PE-9:

7.2.1.123. PE-9¶

Control Family: PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

7.2.1.123.1. PE-9¶

PE-9 : POWER EQUIPMENT AND CABLING

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization protects power equipment and power cabling for the information system from damage and destruction.” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations determine the types of protection necessary for power equipment and cabling employed at different locations both internal and external to organizational facilities and environments of operation. This includes, for example, generators and power cabling outside of buildings, internal cabling and uninterruptable power sources within an office or data center, and power sources for self-contained entities such as vehicles and satellites.”

Related Controls:PE-4

7.2.1.123.2. PE-9 (1)¶

PE-9 (1) : REDUNDANT CABLING

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization employs redundant power cabling paths that are physically separated by [Assignment: organization-defined distance].” Supplemental Guidance: “Physically separate, redundant power cables help to ensure that power continues to flow in the event one of the cables is cut or otherwise damaged.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.123.3. PE-9 (2)¶

PE-9 (2) : AUTOMATIC VOLTAGE CONTROLS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization employs automatic voltage controls for [Assignment: organization-defined critical information system components].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls: .. _header_PE-10:

7.2.1.124. PE-10¶

Control Family: PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

7.2.1.124.1. PE-10¶

PE-10 : EMERGENCY SHUTOFF

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control applies primarily to facilities containing concentrations of information system resources including, for example, data centers, server rooms, and mainframe computer rooms.”

Related Controls:PE-15

7.2.1.124.1.1. PE-10a.¶

Description: “Provides the capability of shutting off power to the information system or individual system components in emergency situations;”

7.2.1.124.1.2. PE-10b.¶

Description: “Places emergency shutoff switches or devices in [Assignment: organization-defined location by information system or system component] to facilitate safe and easy access for personnel; and”

7.2.1.124.1.3. PE-10c.¶

Description: “Protects emergency power shutoff capability from unauthorized activation.”

7.2.1.124.2. PE-10 (1)¶

PE-10 (1) : ACCIDENTAL / UNAUTHORIZED ACTIVATION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PE-10].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls: .. _header_PE-11:

7.2.1.125. PE-11¶

Control Family: PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

7.2.1.125.1. PE-11¶

PE-11 : EMERGENCY POWER

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization provides a short-term uninterruptible power supply to facilitate [Selection (one or more): an orderly shutdown of the information system; transition of the information system to long-term alternate power] in the event of a primary power source loss.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:AT-3,CP-2,CP-7

7.2.1.125.2. PE-11 (1)¶

PE-11 (1) : LONG-TERM ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY - MINIMAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization provides a long-term alternate power supply for the information system that is capable of maintaining minimally required operational capability in the event of an extended loss of the primary power source.” Supplemental Guidance: “This control enhancement can be satisfied, for example, by the use of a secondary commercial power supply or other external power supply. Long-term alternate power supplies for the information system can be either manually or automatically activated.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.125.3. PE-11 (2)¶

PE-11 (2) : LONG-TERM ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY - SELF-CONTAINED

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization provides a long-term alternate power supply for the information system that is:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control enhancement can be satisfied, for example, by the use of one or more generators with sufficient capacity to meet the needs of the organization. Long-term alternate power supplies for organizational information systems are either manually or automatically activated.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.125.3.1. PE-11 (2)(a)¶

Description: “Self-contained;”

7.2.1.125.3.2. PE-11 (2)(b)¶

Description: “Not reliant on external power generation; and”

7.2.1.125.3.3. PE-11 (2)(c)¶

Description: “Capable of maintaining [Selection: minimally required operational capability; full operational capability] in the event of an extended loss of the primary power source.” .. _header_PE-12:

7.2.1.126. PE-12¶

Control Family: PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

7.2.1.126.1. PE-12¶

PE-12 : EMERGENCY LIGHTING

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization employs and maintains automatic emergency lighting for the information system that activates in the event of a power outage or disruption and that covers emergency exits and evacuation routes within the facility.” Supplemental Guidance: “This control applies primarily to facilities containing concentrations of information system resources including, for example, data centers, server rooms, and mainframe computer rooms.”

Related Controls:CP-2,CP-7

7.2.1.126.2. PE-12 (1)¶

PE-12 (1) : ESSENTIAL MISSIONS / BUSINESS FUNCTIONS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization provides emergency lighting for all areas within the facility supporting essential missions and business functions.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls: .. _header_PE-13:

7.2.1.127. PE-13¶

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization protects the information system from damage resulting from water leakage by providing master shutoff or isolation valves that are accessible, working properly, and known to key personnel.” Supplemental Guidance: “This control applies primarily to facilities containing concentrations of information system resources including, for example, data centers, server rooms, and mainframe computer rooms. Isolation valves can be employed in addition to or in lieu of master shutoff valves to shut off water supplies in specific areas of concern, without affecting entire organizations.”

Related Controls:AT-3

7.2.1.129.2. PE-15 (1)¶

PE-15 (1) : AUTOMATION SUPPORT

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization employs automated mechanisms to detect the presence of water in the vicinity of the information system and alerts [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].” Supplemental Guidance: “Automated mechanisms can include, for example, water detection sensors, alarms, and notification systems.”

Related Controls: .. _header_PE-16:

7.2.1.130. PE-16¶

Related Controls:CM-8

7.2.1.134.1.1. PE-20a.¶

Description: “Employs [Assignment: organization-defined asset location technologies] to track and monitor the location and movement of [Assignment: organization-defined assets] within [Assignment: organization-defined controlled areas]; and”

7.2.1.134.1.2. PE-20b.¶

Description: “Ensures that asset location technologies are employed in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance.” .. _header_PL-1:

7.2.1.135. PL-1¶

Control Family: PLANNING

7.2.1.135.1. PL-1¶

PL-1 : SECURITY PLANNING POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the PL family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.”

Related Controls:PM-9

7.2.1.135.1.1. PL-1a.¶

Description: “Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:”

7.2.1.135.1.2. PL-1a.1.¶

Description: “A security planning policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and”

7.2.1.135.1.3. PL-1a.2.¶

Description: “Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the security planning policy and associated security planning controls; and”

7.2.1.135.1.4. PL-1b.¶

Description: “Reviews and updates the current:”

7.2.1.135.1.5. PL-1b.1.¶

Description: “Security planning policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and”

7.2.1.135.1.6. PL-1b.2.¶

Description: “Security planning procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].” .. _header_PL-2:

7.2.1.136. PL-2¶

Control Family: PLANNING

7.2.1.136.1. PL-2¶

PL-2 : SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Security plans relate security requirements to a set of security controls and control enhancements. Security plans also describe, at a high level, how the security controls and control enhancements meet those security requirements, but do not provide detailed, technical descriptions of the specific design or implementation of the controls/enhancements. Security plans contain sufficient information (including the specification of parameter values for assignment and selection statements either explicitly or by reference) to enable a design and implementation that is unambiguously compliant with the intent of the plans and subsequent determinations of risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation if the plan is implemented as intended. Organizations can also apply tailoring guidance to the security control baselines in Appendix D and CNSS Instruction 1253 to develop overlays for community-wide use or to address specialized requirements, technologies, or missions/environments of operation (e.g., DoD-tactical, Federal Public Key Infrastructure, or Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management, space operations). Appendix I provides guidance on developing overlays. Security plans need not be single documents; the plans can be a collection of various documents including documents that already exist. Effective security plans make extensive use of references to policies, procedures, and additional documents (e.g., design and implementation specifications) where more detailed information can be obtained. This reduces the documentation requirements associated with security programs and maintains security-related information in other established management/operational areas related to enterprise architecture, system development life cycle, systems engineering, and acquisition. For example, security plans do not contain detailed contingency plan or incident response plan information but instead provide explicitly or by reference, sufficient information to define what needs to be accomplished by those plans.”

Related Controls:AC-2,AC-6,AC-14,AC-17,AC-20,CA-2,CA-3,CA-7,CM-9,CP-2,IR-8,MA-4,MA-5,MP-2,MP-4,MP-5,PL-7,PM-1,PM-7,PM-8,PM-9,PM-11,SA-5,SA-17

7.2.1.136.1.1. PL-2a.¶

Description: “Develops a security plan for the information system that:”

7.2.1.136.1.2. PL-2a.1.¶

Description: “Is consistent with the organization�s enterprise architecture;”

7.2.1.136.1.3. PL-2a.2.¶

Description: “Explicitly defines the authorization boundary for the system;”

7.2.1.136.1.4. PL-2a.3.¶

Description: “Describes the operational context of the information system in terms of missions and business processes;”

7.2.1.136.1.5. PL-2a.4.¶

Description: “Provides the security categorization of the information system including supporting rationale;”

7.2.1.136.1.6. PL-2a.5.¶

Description: “Describes the operational environment for the information system and relationships with or connections to other information systems;”

7.2.1.136.1.7. PL-2a.6.¶

Description: “Provides an overview of the security requirements for the system;”

7.2.1.136.1.8. PL-2a.7.¶

Description: “Identifies any relevant overlays, if applicable;”

7.2.1.136.1.9. PL-2a.8.¶

Description: “Describes the security controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements including a rationale for the tailoring decisions; and”

7.2.1.136.1.10. PL-2a.9.¶

Description: “Is reviewed and approved by the authorizing official or designated representative prior to plan implementation;”

7.2.1.136.1.11. PL-2b.¶

Description: “Distributes copies of the security plan and communicates subsequent changes to the plan to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles];”

7.2.1.136.1.12. PL-2c.¶

Description: “Reviews the security plan for the information system [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];”

7.2.1.136.1.13. PL-2d.¶

Description: “Updates the plan to address changes to the information system/environment of operation or problems identified during plan implementation or security control assessments; and”

7.2.1.136.1.14. PL-2e.¶

Description: “Protects the security plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.”

7.2.1.136.2. PL-2 (1)¶

PL-2 (1) : CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PL-7].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.136.3. PL-2 (2)¶

PL-2 (2) : FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PL-8].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.136.4. PL-2 (3)¶

PL-2 (3) : PLAN / COORDINATE WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONAL ENTITIES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization plans and coordinates security-related activities affecting the information system with [Assignment: organization-defined individuals or groups] before conducting such activities in order to reduce the impact on other organizational entities.” Supplemental Guidance: “Security-related activities include, for example, security assessments, audits, hardware and software maintenance, patch management, and contingency plan testing. Advance planning and coordination includes emergency and nonemergency (i.e., planned or nonurgent unplanned) situations. The process defined by organizations to plan and coordinate security-related activities can be included in security plans for information systems or other documents, as appropriate.”

Related Controls:CP-4,IR-4 .. _header_PL-3:

7.2.1.137. PL-3¶

Control Family: PLANNING

7.2.1.137.1. PL-3¶

PL-3 : SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN UPDATE

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PL-2].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.138. PL-4¶

Control Family: PLANNING

7.2.1.138.1. PL-4¶

PL-4 : RULES OF BEHAVIOR

Priority: P2

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control enhancement applies to organizational users. Organizations consider rules of behavior based on individual user roles and responsibilities, differentiating, for example, between rules that apply to privileged users and rules that apply to general users. Establishing rules of behavior for some types of non-organizational users including, for example, individuals who simply receive data/information from federal information systems, is often not feasible given the large number of such users and the limited nature of their interactions with the systems. Rules of behavior for both organizational and non-organizational users can also be established in AC-8, System Use Notification. PL-4 b. (the signed acknowledgment portion of this control) may be satisfied by the security awareness training and role-based security training programs conducted by organizations if such training includes rules of behavior. Organizations can use electronic signatures for acknowledging rules of behavior.”

Related Controls:AC-2,AC-6,AC-8,AC-9,AC-17,AC-18,AC-19,AC-20,AT-2,AT-3,CM-11,IA-2,IA-4,IA-5,MP-7,PS-6,PS-8,SA-5

7.2.1.138.1.1. PL-4a.¶

Description: “Establishes and makes readily available to individuals requiring access to the information system, the rules that describe their responsibilities and expected behavior with regard to information and information system usage;”

7.2.1.138.1.2. PL-4b.¶

Description: “Receives a signed acknowledgment from such individuals, indicating that they have read, understand, and agree to abide by the rules of behavior, before authorizing access to information and the information system;”

7.2.1.138.1.3. PL-4c.¶

Description: “Reviews and updates the rules of behavior [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and”

7.2.1.138.1.4. PL-4d.¶

Description: “Requires individuals who have signed a previous version of the rules of behavior to read and re-sign when the rules of behavior are revised/updated.”

7.2.1.138.2. PL-4 (1)¶

PL-7 : SECURITY CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Priority: P0

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “The security CONOPS may be included in the security plan for the information system or in other system development life cycle-related documents, as appropriate. Changes to the CONOPS are reflected in ongoing updates to the security plan, the information security architecture, and other appropriate organizational documents (e.g., security specifications for procurements/acquisitions, system development life cycle documents, and systems/security engineering documents).”

Related Controls:PL-2

7.2.1.141.1.1. PL-7a.¶

Description: “Develops a security Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the information system containing at a minimum, how the organization intends to operate the system from the perspective of information security; and”

7.2.1.141.1.2. PL-7b.¶

Description: “Reviews and updates the CONOPS [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].” .. _header_PL-8:

7.2.1.142. PL-8¶

Control Family: PLANNING

7.2.1.142.1. PL-8¶

PL-8 : INFORMATION SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control addresses actions taken by organizations in the design and development of information systems. The information security architecture at the individual information system level is consistent with and complements the more global, organization-wide information security architecture described in PM-7 that is integral to and developed as part of the enterprise architecture. The information security architecture includes an architectural description, the placement/allocation of security functionality (including security controls), security-related information for external interfaces, information being exchanged across the interfaces, and the protection mechanisms associated with each interface. In addition, the security architecture can include other important security-related information, for example, user roles and access privileges assigned to each role, unique security requirements, the types of information processed, stored, and transmitted by the information system, restoration priorities of information and information system services, and any other specific protection needs. In today�s modern architecture, it is becoming less common for organizations to control all information resources. There are going to be key dependencies on external information services and service providers. Describing such dependencies in the information security architecture is important to developing a comprehensive mission/business protection strategy. Establishing, developing, documenting, and maintaining under configuration control, a baseline configuration for organizational information systems is critical to implementing and maintaining an effective information security architecture. The development of the information security architecture is coordinated with the Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP)/Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) to ensure that security controls needed to support privacy requirements are identified and effectively implemented. PL-8 is primarily directed at organizations (i.e., internally focused) to help ensure that organizations develop an information security architecture for the information system, and that the security architecture is integrated with or tightly coupled to the enterprise architecture through the organization-wide information security architecture. In contrast, SA-17 is primarily directed at external information technology product/system developers and integrators (although SA-17 could be used internally within organizations for in-house system development). SA-17, which is complementary to PL-8, is selected when organizations outsource the development of information systems or information system components to external entities, and there is a need to demonstrate/show consistency with the organization�s enterprise architecture and information security architecture.”

Related Controls:CM-2,CM-6,PL-2,PM-7,SA-5,SA-17,Appendix J

7.2.1.142.1.1. PL-8a.¶

Description: “Develops an information security architecture for the information system that:”

7.2.1.142.1.2. PL-8a.1.¶

Description: “Describes the overall philosophy, requirements, and approach to be taken with regard to protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of organizational information;”

7.2.1.142.1.3. PL-8a.2.¶

Description: “Describes how the information security architecture is integrated into and supports the enterprise architecture; and”

7.2.1.142.1.4. PL-8a.3.¶

Description: “Describes any information security assumptions about, and dependencies on, external services;”

7.2.1.142.1.5. PL-8b.¶

Description: “Reviews and updates the information security architecture [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to reflect updates in the enterprise architecture; and”

7.2.1.142.1.6. PL-8c.¶

Description: “Ensures that planned information security architecture changes are reflected in the security plan, the security Concept of Operations (CONOPS), and organizational procurements/acquisitions.”

7.2.1.142.2. PL-8 (1)¶

PL-8 (1) : DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization designs its security architecture using a defense-in-depth approach that:” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations strategically allocate security safeguards (procedural, technical, or both) in the security architecture so that adversaries have to overcome multiple safeguards to achieve their objective. Requiring adversaries to defeat multiple mechanisms makes it more difficult to successfully attack critical information resources (i.e., increases adversary work factor) and also increases the likelihood of detection. The coordination of allocated safeguards is essential to ensure that an attack that involves one safeguard does not create adverse unintended consequences (e.g., lockout, cascading alarms) by interfering with another safeguard. Placement of security safeguards is a key activity. Greater asset criticality or information value merits additional layering. Thus, an organization may choose to place anti-virus software at organizational boundary layers, email/web servers, notebook computers, and workstations to maximize the number of related safeguards adversaries must penetrate before compromising the information and information systems.”

Related Controls:SC-29,SC-36

7.2.1.142.2.1. PL-8 (1)(a)¶

Description: “Allocates [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to [Assignment: organization-defined locations and architectural layers]; and”

7.2.1.142.2.2. PL-8 (1)(b)¶

Description: “Ensures that the allocated security safeguards operate in a coordinated and mutually reinforcing manner.”

7.2.1.142.3. PL-8 (2)¶

PL-8 (2) : SUPPLIER DIVERSITY

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization requires that [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] allocated to [Assignment: organization-defined locations and architectural layers] are obtained from different suppliers.” Supplemental Guidance: “Different information technology products have different strengths and weaknesses. Providing a broad spectrum of products complements the individual offerings. For example, vendors offering malicious code protection typically update their products at different times, often developing solutions for known viruses, Trojans, or worms according to their priorities and development schedules. By having different products at different locations (e.g., server, boundary, desktop) there is an increased likelihood that at least one will detect the malicious code.”

Related Controls:SA-12 .. _header_PL-9:

7.2.1.143. PL-9¶

Control Family: PLANNING

7.2.1.143.1. PL-9¶

PL-9 : CENTRAL MANAGEMENT

Priority: P0

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization centrally manages [Assignment: organization-defined security controls and related processes].” Supplemental Guidance: “Central management refers to the organization-wide management and implementation of selected security controls and related processes. Central management includes planning, implementing, assessing, authorizing, and monitoring the organization-defined, centrally managed security controls and processes. As central management of security controls is generally associated with common controls, such management promotes and facilitates standardization of security control implementations and management and judicious use of organizational resources. Centrally-managed security controls and processes may also meet independence requirements for assessments in support of initial and ongoing authorizations to operate as part of organizational continuous monitoring. As part of the security control selection process, organizations determine which controls may be suitable for central management based on organizational resources and capabilities. Organizations consider that it may not always be possible to centrally manage every aspect of a security control. In such cases, the security control is treated as a hybrid control with the control managed and implemented either centrally or at the information system level. Controls and control enhancements that are candidates for full or partial central management include, but are not limited to: AC-2 (1) (2) (3) (4); AC-17 (1) (2) (3) (9); AC-18 (1) (3) (4) (5); AC-19 (4); AC-22; AC-23; AT-2 (1) (2); AT-3 (1) (2) (3); AT-4; AU-6 (1) (3) (5) (6) (9); AU-7 (1) (2); AU-11, AU-13, AU-16, CA-2 (1) (2) (3); CA-3 (1) (2) (3); CA-7 (1); CA-9; CM-2 (1) (2); CM-3 (1) (4); CM-4; CM-6 (1); CM-7 (4) (5); CM-8 (all); CM-9 (1); CM-10; CM-11; CP-7 (all); CP-8 (all); SC-43; SI-2; SI-3; SI-7; and SI-8.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.144. PS-1¶

Control Family: PERSONNEL SECURITY

7.2.1.144.1. PS-1¶

PS-1 : PERSONNEL SECURITY POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the PS family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.”

Related Controls:PM-9

7.2.1.144.1.1. PS-1a.¶

Description: “Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:”

7.2.1.144.1.2. PS-1a.1.¶

Description: “A personnel security policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and”

7.2.1.144.1.3. PS-1a.2.¶

Description: “Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the personnel security policy and associated personnel security controls; and”

7.2.1.144.1.4. PS-1b.¶

Description: “Reviews and updates the current:”

7.2.1.144.1.5. PS-1b.1.¶

Description: “Personnel security policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and”

7.2.1.144.1.6. PS-1b.2.¶

Description: “Personnel security procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].” .. _header_PS-2:

7.2.1.145. PS-2¶

Control Family: PERSONNEL SECURITY

7.2.1.145.1. PS-2¶

PS-2 : POSITION RISK DESIGNATION

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Position risk designations reflect Office of Personnel Management policy and guidance. Risk designations can guide and inform the types of authorizations individuals receive when accessing organizational information and information systems. Position screening criteria include explicit information security role appointment requirements (e.g., training, security clearances).”

Related Controls:AT-3,PL-2,PS-3

7.2.1.145.1.1. PS-2a.¶

Description: “Assigns a risk designation to all organizational positions;”

7.2.1.145.1.2. PS-2b.¶

Description: “Establishes screening criteria for individuals filling those positions; and”

7.2.1.145.1.3. PS-2c.¶

Description: “Reviews and updates position risk designations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].” .. _header_PS-3:

7.2.1.146. PS-3¶

Control Family: PERSONNEL SECURITY

7.2.1.146.1. PS-3¶

PS-3 : PERSONNEL SCREENING

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Personnel screening and rescreening activities reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, guidance, and specific criteria established for the risk designations of assigned positions. Organizations may define different rescreening conditions and frequencies for personnel accessing information systems based on types of information processed, stored, or transmitted by the systems.”

Related Controls:AC-2,IA-4,PE-2,PS-2

7.2.1.146.1.1. PS-3a.¶

Description: “Screens individuals prior to authorizing access to the information system; and”

7.2.1.146.1.2. PS-3b.¶

Description: “Rescreens individuals according to [Assignment: organization-defined conditions requiring rescreening and, where rescreening is so indicated, the frequency of such rescreening].”

7.2.1.146.2. PS-3 (1)¶

PS-3 (1) : CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization ensures that individuals accessing an information system processing, storing, or transmitting classified information are cleared and indoctrinated to the highest classification level of the information to which they have access on the system.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:AC-3,AC-4

7.2.1.146.3. PS-3 (2)¶

PS-3 (2) : FORMAL INDOCTRINATION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization ensures that individuals accessing an information system processing, storing, or transmitting types of classified information which require formal indoctrination, are formally indoctrinated for all of the relevant types of information to which they have access on the system.” Supplemental Guidance: “Types of classified information requiring formal indoctrination include, for example, Special Access Program (SAP), Restricted Data (RD), and Sensitive Compartment Information (SCI).”

Related Controls:AC-3,AC-4

7.2.1.146.4. PS-3 (3)¶

PS-3 (3) : INFORMATION WITH SPECIAL PROTECTION MEASURES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization ensures that individuals accessing an information system processing, storing, or transmitting information requiring special protection:” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizational information requiring special protection includes, for example, Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) and Sources and Methods Information (SAMI). Personnel security criteria include, for example, position sensitivity background screening requirements.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.146.4.1. PS-3 (3)(a)¶

Description: “Have valid access authorizations that are demonstrated by assigned official government duties; and”

7.2.1.146.4.2. PS-3 (3)(b)¶

Description: “Satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined additional personnel screening criteria].” .. _header_PS-4:

7.2.1.147. PS-4¶

Control Family: PERSONNEL SECURITY

7.2.1.147.1. PS-4¶

PS-4 : PERSONNEL TERMINATION

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization, upon termination of individual employment:” Supplemental Guidance: “Information system-related property includes, for example, hardware authentication tokens, system administration technical manuals, keys, identification cards, and building passes. Exit interviews ensure that terminated individuals understand the security constraints imposed by being former employees and that proper accountability is achieved for information system-related property. Security topics of interest at exit interviews can include, for example, reminding terminated individuals of nondisclosure agreements and potential limitations on future employment. Exit interviews may not be possible for some terminated individuals, for example, in cases related to job abandonment, illnesses, and nonavailability of supervisors. Exit interviews are important for individuals with security clearances. Timely execution of termination actions is essential for individuals terminated for cause. In certain situations, organizations consider disabling the information system accounts of individuals that are being terminated prior to the individuals being notified.”

Related Controls:AC-2,IA-4,PE-2,PS-5,PS-6

7.2.1.147.1.1. PS-4a.¶

Description: “Disables information system access within [Assignment: organization-defined time period];”

7.2.1.147.1.2. PS-4b.¶

Description: “Terminates/revokes any authenticators/credentials associated with the individual;”

7.2.1.147.1.3. PS-4c.¶

Description: “Conducts exit interviews that include a discussion of [Assignment: organization-defined information security topics];”

7.2.1.147.1.4. PS-4d.¶

Description: “Retrieves all security-related organizational information system-related property;”

7.2.1.147.1.5. PS-4e.¶

Description: “Retains access to organizational information and information systems formerly controlled by terminated individual; and”

7.2.1.147.1.6. PS-4f.¶

Description: “Notifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] within [Assignment: organization-defined time period].”

7.2.1.147.2. PS-4 (1)¶

PS-4 (1) : POST-EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations consult with the Office of the General Counsel regarding matters of post-employment requirements on terminated individuals.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.147.2.1. PS-4 (1)(a)¶

Description: “Notifies terminated individuals of applicable, legally binding post-employment requirements for the protection of organizational information; and”

7.2.1.147.2.2. PS-4 (1)(b)¶

Description: “Requires terminated individuals to sign an acknowledgment of post-employment requirements as part of the organizational termination process.”

7.2.1.147.3. PS-4 (2)¶

PS-4 (2) : AUTOMATED NOTIFICATION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization employs automated mechanisms to notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] upon termination of an individual.” Supplemental Guidance: “In organizations with a large number of employees, not all personnel who need to know about termination actions receive the appropriate notifications�or, if such notifications are received, they may not occur in a timely manner. Automated mechanisms can be used to send automatic alerts or notifications to specific organizational personnel or roles (e.g., management personnel, supervisors, personnel security officers, information security officers, systems administrators, or information technology administrators) when individuals are terminated. Such automatic alerts or notifications can be conveyed in a variety of ways, including, for example, telephonically, via electronic mail, via text message, or via websites.”

Related Controls: .. _header_PS-5:

7.2.1.148. PS-5¶

Control Family: PERSONNEL SECURITY

7.2.1.148.1. PS-5¶

PS-5 : PERSONNEL TRANSFER

Priority: P2

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control applies when reassignments or transfers of individuals are permanent or of such extended durations as to make the actions warranted. Organizations define actions appropriate for the types of reassignments or transfers, whether permanent or extended. Actions that may be required for personnel transfers or reassignments to other positions within organizations include, for example: (i) returning old and issuing new keys, identification cards, and building passes; (ii) closing information system accounts and establishing new accounts; (iii) changing information system access authorizations (i.e., privileges); and (iv) providing for access to official records to which individuals had access at previous work locations and in previous information system accounts.”

Related Controls:AC-2,IA-4,PE-2,PS-4

7.2.1.148.1.1. PS-5a.¶

Description: “Reviews and confirms ongoing operational need for current logical and physical access authorizations to information systems/facilities when individuals are reassigned or transferred to other positions within the organization;”

7.2.1.148.1.2. PS-5b.¶

Description: “Initiates [Assignment: organization-defined transfer or reassignment actions] within [Assignment: organization-defined time period following the formal transfer action];”

7.2.1.148.1.3. PS-5c.¶

Description: “Modifies access authorization as needed to correspond with any changes in operational need due to reassignment or transfer; and”

7.2.1.148.1.4. PS-5d.¶

Description: “Notifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] within [Assignment: organization-defined time period].” .. _header_PS-6:

7.2.1.149. PS-6¶

Control Family: PERSONNEL SECURITY

7.2.1.149.1. PS-6¶

PS-6 : ACCESS AGREEMENTS

Priority: P3

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Access agreements include, for example, nondisclosure agreements, acceptable use agreements, rules of behavior, and conflict-of-interest agreements. Signed access agreements include an acknowledgement that individuals have read, understand, and agree to abide by the constraints associated with organizational information systems to which access is authorized. Organizations can use electronic signatures to acknowledge access agreements unless specifically prohibited by organizational policy.”

Related Controls:PL-4,PS-2,PS-3,PS-4,PS-8

7.2.1.149.1.1. PS-6a.¶

Description: “Develops and documents access agreements for organizational information systems;”

7.2.1.149.1.2. PS-6b.¶

Description: “Reviews and updates the access agreements [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and”

7.2.1.149.1.3. PS-6c.¶

Description: “Ensures that individuals requiring access to organizational information and information systems:”

7.2.1.149.1.4. PS-6c.1.¶

Description: “Sign appropriate access agreements prior to being granted access; and”

7.2.1.149.1.5. PS-6c.2.¶

Description: “Re-sign access agreements to maintain access to organizational information systems when access agreements have been updated or [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].”

7.2.1.149.2. PS-6 (1)¶

PS-6 (1) : INFORMATION REQUIRING SPECIAL PROTECTION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into PS-3].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.149.3. PS-6 (2)¶

PS-6 (2) : CLASSIFIED INFORMATION REQUIRING SPECIAL PROTECTION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization ensures that access to classified information requiring special protection is granted only to individuals who:” Supplemental Guidance: “Classified information requiring special protection includes, for example, collateral information, Special Access Program (SAP) information, and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). Personnel security criteria reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.149.3.1. PS-6 (2)(a)¶

Description: “Have a valid access authorization that is demonstrated by assigned official government duties;”

7.2.1.149.3.2. PS-6 (2)(b)¶

Description: “Satisfy associated personnel security criteria; and”

7.2.1.149.3.3. PS-6 (2)(c)¶

Description: “Have read, understood, and signed a nondisclosure agreement.”

7.2.1.149.4. PS-6 (3)¶

PS-6 (3) : POST-EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations consult with the Office of the General Counsel regarding matters of post-employment requirements on terminated individuals.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.149.4.1. PS-6 (3)(a)¶

Description: “Notifies individuals of applicable, legally binding post-employment requirements for protection of organizational information; and”

7.2.1.149.4.2. PS-6 (3)(b)¶

Description: “Requires individuals to sign an acknowledgment of these requirements, if applicable, as part of granting initial access to covered information.” .. _header_PS-7:

7.2.1.150. PS-7¶

Control Family: PERSONNEL SECURITY

7.2.1.150.1. PS-7¶

PS-7 : THIRD-PARTY PERSONNEL SECURITY

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Third-party providers include, for example, service bureaus, contractors, and other organizations providing information system development, information technology services, outsourced applications, and network and security management. Organizations explicitly include personnel security requirements in acquisition-related documents. Third-party providers may have personnel working at organizational facilities with credentials, badges, or information system privileges issued by organizations. Notifications of third-party personnel changes ensure appropriate termination of privileges and credentials. Organizations define the transfers and terminations deemed reportable by security-related characteristics that include, for example, functions, roles, and nature of credentials/privileges associated with individuals transferred or terminated.”

Related Controls:PS-2,PS-3,PS-4,PS-5,PS-6,SA-9,SA-21

7.2.1.150.1.1. PS-7a.¶

Description: “Establishes personnel security requirements including security roles and responsibilities for third-party providers;”

7.2.1.150.1.2. PS-7b.¶

Description: “Requires third-party providers to comply with personnel security policies and procedures established by the organization;”

7.2.1.150.1.3. PS-7c.¶

Description: “Documents personnel security requirements;”

7.2.1.150.1.4. PS-7d.¶

Description: “Requires third-party providers to notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] of any personnel transfers or terminations of third-party personnel who possess organizational credentials and/or badges, or who have information system privileges within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and”

7.2.1.150.1.5. PS-7e.¶

Description: “Monitors provider compliance.” .. _header_PS-8:

7.2.1.151. PS-8¶

Control Family: PERSONNEL SECURITY

7.2.1.151.1. PS-8¶

PS-8 : PERSONNEL SANCTIONS

Priority: P3

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizational sanctions processes reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Sanctions processes are described in access agreements and can be included as part of general personnel policies and procedures for organizations. Organizations consult with the Office of the General Counsel regarding matters of employee sanctions.”

Related Controls:PL-4,PS-6

7.2.1.151.1.1. PS-8a.¶

Description: “Employs a formal sanctions process for individuals failing to comply with established information security policies and procedures; and”

7.2.1.151.1.2. PS-8b.¶

Description: “Notifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] when a formal employee sanctions process is initiated, identifying the individual sanctioned and the reason for the sanction.” .. _header_RA-1:

7.2.1.152. RA-1¶

Control Family: RISK ASSESSMENT

7.2.1.152.1. RA-1¶

RA-1 : RISK ASSESSMENT POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the RA family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.”

Related Controls:PM-9

7.2.1.152.1.1. RA-1a.¶

Description: “Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:”

7.2.1.152.1.2. RA-1a.1.¶

Description: “A risk assessment policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and”

7.2.1.152.1.3. RA-1a.2.¶

Description: “Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the risk assessment policy and associated risk assessment controls; and”

7.2.1.152.1.4. RA-1b.¶

Description: “Reviews and updates the current:”

7.2.1.152.1.5. RA-1b.1.¶

Description: “Risk assessment policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and”

7.2.1.152.1.6. RA-1b.2.¶

Description: “Risk assessment procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].” .. _header_RA-2:

7.2.1.153. RA-2¶

Control Family: RISK ASSESSMENT

7.2.1.153.1. RA-2¶

RA-2 : SECURITY CATEGORIZATION

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Clearly defined authorization boundaries are a prerequisite for effective security categorization decisions. Security categories describe the potential adverse impacts to organizational operations, organizational assets, and individuals if organizational information and information systems are comprised through a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Organizations conduct the security categorization process as an organization-wide activity with the involvement of chief information officers, senior information security officers, information system owners, mission/business owners, and information owners/stewards. Organizations also consider the potential adverse impacts to other organizations and, in accordance with the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and Homeland Security Presidential Directives, potential national-level adverse impacts. Security categorization processes carried out by organizations facilitate the development of inventories of information assets, and along with CM-8, mappings to specific information system components where information is processed, stored, or transmitted.”

Related Controls:CM-8,MP-4,RA-3,SC-7

7.2.1.153.1.1. RA-2a.¶

Description: “Categorizes information and the information system in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance;”

7.2.1.153.1.2. RA-2b.¶

Description: “Documents the security categorization results (including supporting rationale) in the security plan for the information system; and”

7.2.1.153.1.3. RA-2c.¶

Description: “Ensures that the authorizing official or authorizing official designated representative reviews and approves the security categorization decision.” .. _header_RA-3:

7.2.1.154. RA-3¶

Control Family: RISK ASSESSMENT

7.2.1.154.1. RA-3¶

RA-3 : RISK ASSESSMENT

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Clearly defined authorization boundaries are a prerequisite for effective risk assessments. Risk assessments take into account threats, vulnerabilities, likelihood, and impact to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation based on the operation and use of information systems. Risk assessments also take into account risk from external parties (e.g., service providers, contractors operating information systems on behalf of the organization, individuals accessing organizational information systems, outsourcing entities). In accordance with OMB policy and related E-authentication initiatives, authentication of public users accessing federal information systems may also be required to protect nonpublic or privacy-related information. As such, organizational assessments of risk also address public access to federal information systems. Risk assessments (either formal or informal) can be conducted at all three tiers in the risk management hierarchy (i.e., organization level, mission/business process level, or information system level) and at any phase in the system development life cycle. Risk assessments can also be conducted at various steps in the Risk Management Framework, including categorization, security control selection, security control implementation, security control assessment, information system authorization, and security control monitoring. RA-3 is noteworthy in that the control must be partially implemented prior to the implementation of other controls in order to complete the first two steps in the Risk Management Framework. Risk assessments can play an important role in security control selection processes, particularly during the application of tailoring guidance, which includes security control supplementation.”

Related Controls:RA-2,PM-9

7.2.1.154.1.1. RA-3a.¶

Description: “Conducts an assessment of risk, including the likelihood and magnitude of harm, from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of the information system and the information it processes, stores, or transmits;”

7.2.1.154.1.2. RA-3b.¶

Description: “Documents risk assessment results in [Selection: security plan; risk assessment report; [Assignment: organization-defined document]];”

7.2.1.154.1.3. RA-3c.¶

Description: “Reviews risk assessment results [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];”

7.2.1.154.1.4. RA-3d.¶

Description: “Disseminates risk assessment results to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]; and”

7.2.1.154.1.5. RA-3e.¶

Description: “Updates the risk assessment [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] or whenever there are significant changes to the information system or environment of operation (including the identification of new threats and vulnerabilities), or other conditions that may impact the security state of the system.” .. _header_RA-4:

7.2.1.155. RA-4¶

Control Family: RISK ASSESSMENT

7.2.1.155.1. RA-4¶

RA-4 : RISK ASSESSMENT UPDATE

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into RA-3].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.156. RA-5¶

Control Family: RISK ASSESSMENT

7.2.1.156.1. RA-5¶

RA-5 : VULNERABILITY SCANNING

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Security categorization of information systems guides the frequency and comprehensiveness of vulnerability scans. Organizations determine the required vulnerability scanning for all information system components, ensuring that potential sources of vulnerabilities such as networked printers, scanners, and copiers are not overlooked. Vulnerability analyses for custom software applications may require additional approaches such as static analysis, dynamic analysis, binary analysis, or a hybrid of the three approaches. Organizations can employ these analysis approaches in a variety of tools (e.g., web-based application scanners, static analysis tools, binary analyzers) and in source code reviews. Vulnerability scanning includes, for example: (i) scanning for patch levels; (ii) scanning for functions, ports, protocols, and services that should not be accessible to users or devices; and (iii) scanning for improperly configured or incorrectly operating information flow control mechanisms. Organizations consider using tools that express vulnerabilities in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) naming convention and that use the Open Vulnerability Assessment Language (OVAL) to determine/test for the presence of vulnerabilities. Suggested sources for vulnerability information include the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) listing and the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). In addition, security control assessments such as red team exercises provide other sources of potential vulnerabilities for which to scan. Organizations also consider using tools that express vulnerability impact by the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).”

Related Controls:CA-2,CA-7,CM-4,CM-6,RA-2,RA-3,SA-11,SI-2

7.2.1.156.1.1. RA-5a.¶

Description: “Scans for vulnerabilities in the information system and hosted applications [Assignment: organization-defined frequency and/or randomly in accordance with organization-defined process] and when new vulnerabilities potentially affecting the system/applications are identified and reported;”

7.2.1.156.1.2. RA-5b.¶

Description: “Employs vulnerability scanning tools and techniques that facilitate interoperability among tools and automate parts of the vulnerability management process by using standards for:”

7.2.1.156.1.3. RA-5b.1.¶

Description: “Enumerating platforms, software flaws, and improper configurations;”

7.2.1.156.1.4. RA-5b.2.¶

Description: “Formatting checklists and test procedures; and”

7.2.1.156.1.5. RA-5b.3.¶

Description: “Measuring vulnerability impact;”

7.2.1.156.1.6. RA-5c.¶

RA-5 (10) : CORRELATE SCANNING INFORMATION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization correlates the output from vulnerability scanning tools to determine the presence of multi-vulnerability/multi-hop attack vectors.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls: .. _header_RA-6:

7.2.1.157. RA-6¶

Control Family: RISK ASSESSMENT

7.2.1.157.1. RA-6¶

RA-6 : TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES SURVEY

Priority: P0

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization employs a technical surveillance countermeasures survey at [Assignment: organization-defined locations] [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; [Assignment: organization-defined events or indicators occur]].” Supplemental Guidance: “Technical surveillance countermeasures surveys are performed by qualified personnel to detect the presence of technical surveillance devices/hazards and to identify technical security weaknesses that could aid in the conduct of technical penetrations of surveyed facilities. Such surveys provide evaluations of the technical security postures of organizations and facilities and typically include thorough visual, electronic, and physical examinations in and about surveyed facilities. The surveys also provide useful input into risk assessments and organizational exposure to potential adversaries.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.158. SA-1¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION

7.2.1.158.1. SA-1¶

SA-1 : SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the SA family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.”

Related Controls:PM-9

7.2.1.158.1.1. SA-1a.¶

Description: “Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:”

7.2.1.158.1.2. SA-1a.1.¶

Description: “A system and services acquisition policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and”

7.2.1.158.1.3. SA-1a.2.¶

Description: “Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and services acquisition policy and associated system and services acquisition controls; and”

7.2.1.158.1.4. SA-1b.¶

Description: “Reviews and updates the current:”

7.2.1.158.1.5. SA-1b.1.¶

Description: “System and services acquisition policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and”

7.2.1.158.1.6. SA-1b.2.¶

Description: “System and services acquisition procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].” .. _header_SA-2:

7.2.1.159. SA-2¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION

7.2.1.159.1. SA-2¶

SA-2 : ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Resource allocation for information security includes funding for the initial information system or information system service acquisition and funding for the sustainment of the system/service.”

Related Controls:PM-3,PM-11

7.2.1.159.1.1. SA-2a.¶

Description: “Determines information security requirements for the information system or information system service in mission/business process planning;”

7.2.1.159.1.2. SA-2b.¶

Description: “Determines, documents, and allocates the resources required to protect the information system or information system service as part of its capital planning and investment control process; and”

7.2.1.159.1.3. SA-2c.¶

Description: “Establishes a discrete line item for information security in organizational programming and budgeting documentation.” .. _header_SA-3:

7.2.1.160. SA-3¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION

7.2.1.160.1. SA-3¶

SA-3 : SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “A well-defined system development life cycle provides the foundation for the successful development, implementation, and operation of organizational information systems. To apply the required security controls within the system development life cycle requires a basic understanding of information security, threats, vulnerabilities, adverse impacts, and risk to critical missions/business functions. The security engineering principles in SA-8 cannot be properly applied if individuals that design, code, and test information systems and system components (including information technology products) do not understand security. Therefore, organizations include qualified personnel, for example, chief information security officers, security architects, security engineers, and information system security officers in system development life cycle activities to ensure that security requirements are incorporated into organizational information systems. It is equally important that developers include individuals on the development team that possess the requisite security expertise and skills to ensure that needed security capabilities are effectively integrated into the information system. Security awareness and training programs can help ensure that individuals having key security roles and responsibilities have the appropriate experience, skills, and expertise to conduct assigned system development life cycle activities. The effective integration of security requirements into enterprise architecture also helps to ensure that important security considerations are addressed early in the system development life cycle and that those considerations are directly related to the organizational mission/business processes. This process also facilitates the integration of the information security architecture into the enterprise architecture, consistent with organizational risk management and information security strategies.”

Related Controls:AT-3,PM-7,SA-8

7.2.1.160.1.1. SA-3a.¶

Description: “Manages the information system using [Assignment: organization-defined system development life cycle] that incorporates information security considerations;”

7.2.1.160.1.2. SA-3b.¶

Description: “Defines and documents information security roles and responsibilities throughout the system development life cycle;”

7.2.1.160.1.3. SA-3c.¶

Description: “Identifies individuals having information security roles and responsibilities; and”

7.2.1.160.1.4. SA-3d.¶

Description: “Integrates the organizational information security risk management process into system development life cycle activities.” .. _header_SA-4:

7.2.1.161. SA-4¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION

7.2.1.161.1. SA-4¶

SA-4 : ACQUISITION PROCESS

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization includes the following requirements, descriptions, and criteria, explicitly or by reference, in the acquisition contract for the information system, system component, or information system service in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, guidelines, and organizational mission/business needs:” Supplemental Guidance: “Information system components are discrete, identifiable information technology assets (e.g., hardware, software, or firmware) that represent the building blocks of an information system. Information system components include commercial information technology products. Security functional requirements include security capabilities, security functions, and security mechanisms. Security strength requirements associated with such capabilities, functions, and mechanisms include degree of correctness, completeness, resistance to direct attack, and resistance to tampering or bypass. Security assurance requirements include: (i) development processes, procedures, practices, and methodologies; and (ii) evidence from development and assessment activities providing grounds for confidence that the required security functionality has been implemented and the required security strength has been achieved. Security documentation requirements address all phases of the system development life cycle. Security functionality, assurance, and documentation requirements are expressed in terms of security controls and control enhancements that have been selected through the tailoring process. The security control tailoring process includes, for example, the specification of parameter values through the use of assignment and selection statements and the specification of platform dependencies and implementation information. Security documentation provides user and administrator guidance regarding the implementation and operation of security controls. The level of detail required in security documentation is based on the security category or classification level of the information system and the degree to which organizations depend on the stated security capability, functions, or mechanisms to meet overall risk response expectations (as defined in the organizational risk management strategy). Security requirements can also include organizationally mandated configuration settings specifying allowed functions, ports, protocols, and services. Acceptance criteria for information systems, information system components, and information system services are defined in the same manner as such criteria for any organizational acquisition or procurement. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Section 7.103 contains information security requirements from FISMA.”

Related Controls:CM-6,PL-2,PS-7,SA-3,SA-5,SA-8,SA-11,SA-12

7.2.1.161.1.1. SA-4a.¶

Description: “Security functional requirements;”

7.2.1.161.1.2. SA-4b.¶

Description: “Security strength requirements;”

7.2.1.161.1.3. SA-4c.¶

Description: “Security assurance requirements;”

7.2.1.161.1.4. SA-4d.¶

Description: “Security-related documentation requirements;”

7.2.1.161.1.5. SA-4e.¶

Description: “Requirements for protecting security-related documentation;”

7.2.1.161.1.6. SA-4f.¶

Description: “Description of the information system development environment and environment in which the system is intended to operate; and”

7.2.1.161.1.7. SA-4g.¶

Description: “Acceptance criteria.”

7.2.1.161.2. SA-4 (1)¶

SA-4 (1) : FUNCTIONAL PROPERTIES OF SECURITY CONTROLS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to provide a description of the functional properties of the security controls to be employed.” Supplemental Guidance: “Functional properties of security controls describe the functionality (i.e., security capability, functions, or mechanisms) visible at the interfaces of the controls and specifically exclude functionality and data structures internal to the operation of the controls.”

Related Controls:SA-5

7.2.1.161.3. SA-4 (2)¶

SA-4 (2) : DESIGN / IMPLEMENTATION INFORMATION FOR SECURITY CONTROLS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to provide design and implementation information for the security controls to be employed that includes: [Selection (one or more): security-relevant external system interfaces; high-level design; low-level design; source code or hardware schematics; [Assignment: organization-defined design/implementation information]] at [Assignment: organization-defined level of detail].” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations may require different levels of detail in design and implementation documentation for security controls employed in organizational information systems, system components, or information system services based on mission/business requirements, requirements for trustworthiness/resiliency, and requirements for analysis and testing. Information systems can be partitioned into multiple subsystems. Each subsystem within the system can contain one or more modules. The high-level design for the system is expressed in terms of multiple subsystems and the interfaces between subsystems providing security-relevant functionality. The low-level design for the system is expressed in terms of modules with particular emphasis on software and firmware (but not excluding hardware) and the interfaces between modules providing security-relevant functionality. Source code and hardware schematics are typically referred to as the implementation representation of the information system.”

Related Controls:SA-5

7.2.1.161.4. SA-4 (3)¶

SA-4 (3) : DEVELOPMENT METHODS / TECHNIQUES / PRACTICES

Priority:

SA-4 (8) : CONTINUOUS MONITORING PLAN

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to produce a plan for the continuous monitoring of security control effectiveness that contains [Assignment: organization-defined level of detail].” Supplemental Guidance: “The objective of continuous monitoring plans is to determine if the complete set of planned, required, and deployed security controls within the information system, system component, or information system service continue to be effective over time based on the inevitable changes that occur. Developer continuous monitoring plans include a sufficient level of detail such that the information can be incorporated into the continuous monitoring strategies and programs implemented by organizations.”

Related Controls:CA-7

7.2.1.161.10. SA-4 (9)¶

SA-4 (9) : FUNCTIONS / PORTS / PROTOCOLS / SERVICES IN USE

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to identify early in the system development life cycle, the functions, ports, protocols, and services intended for organizational use.” Supplemental Guidance: “The identification of functions, ports, protocols, and services early in the system development life cycle (e.g., during the initial requirements definition and design phases) allows organizations to influence the design of the information system, information system component, or information system service. This early involvement in the life cycle helps organizations to avoid or minimize the use of functions, ports, protocols, or services that pose unnecessarily high risks and understand the trade-offs involved in blocking specific ports, protocols, or services (or when requiring information system service providers to do so). Early identification of functions, ports, protocols, and services avoids costly retrofitting of security controls after the information system, system component, or information system service has been implemented. SA-9 describes requirements for external information system services with organizations identifying which functions, ports, protocols, and services are provided from external sources.”

Related Controls:CM-7,SA-9

7.2.1.161.11. SA-4 (10)¶

SA-4 (10) : USE OF APPROVED PIV PRODUCTS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization employs only information technology products on the FIPS 201-approved products list for Personal Identity Verification (PIV) capability implemented within organizational information systems.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:IA-2,IA-8 .. _header_SA-5:

7.2.1.162. SA-5¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION

7.2.1.162.1. SA-5¶

SA-5 : INFORMATION SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION

Priority: P2

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control helps organizational personnel understand the implementation and operation of security controls associated with information systems, system components, and information system services. Organizations consider establishing specific measures to determine the quality/completeness of the content provided. The inability to obtain needed documentation may occur, for example, due to the age of the information system/component or lack of support from developers and contractors. In those situations, organizations may need to recreate selected documentation if such documentation is essential to the effective implementation or operation of security controls. The level of protection provided for selected information system, component, or service documentation is commensurate with the security category or classification of the system. For example, documentation associated with a key DoD weapons system or command and control system would typically require a higher level of protection than a routine administrative system. Documentation that addresses information system vulnerabilities may also require an increased level of protection. Secure operation of the information system, includes, for example, initially starting the system and resuming secure system operation after any lapse in system operation.”

Related Controls:CM-6,CM-8,PL-2,PL-4,PS-2,SA-3,SA-4

7.2.1.162.1.1. SA-5a.¶

Description: “Obtains administrator documentation for the information system, system component, or information system service that describes:”

7.2.1.162.1.2. SA-5a.1.¶

Description: “Secure configuration, installation, and operation of the system, component, or service;”

7.2.1.162.1.3. SA-5a.2.¶

Description: “Effective use and maintenance of security functions/mechanisms; and”

7.2.1.162.1.4. SA-5a.3.¶

Description: “Known vulnerabilities regarding configuration and use of administrative (i.e., privileged) functions;”

7.2.1.162.1.5. SA-5b.¶

Description: “Obtains user documentation for the information system, system component, or information system service that describes:”

7.2.1.162.1.6. SA-5b.1.¶

Description: “User-accessible security functions/mechanisms and how to effectively use those security functions/mechanisms;”

7.2.1.162.1.7. SA-5b.2.¶

Description: “Methods for user interaction, which enables individuals to use the system, component, or service in a more secure manner; and”

7.2.1.162.1.8. SA-5b.3.¶

Description: “User responsibilities in maintaining the security of the system, component, or service;”

7.2.1.162.1.9. SA-5c.¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION

7.2.1.163.1. SA-6¶

SA-6 : SOFTWARE USAGE RESTRICTIONS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-10 and SI-7].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.164. SA-7¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION

7.2.1.164.1. SA-7¶

SA-7 : USER-INSTALLED SOFTWARE

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into CM-11 and SI-7].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.165. SA-8¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION

7.2.1.165.1. SA-8¶

SA-8 : SECURITY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization applies information system security engineering principles in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the information system.” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations apply security engineering principles primarily to new development information systems or systems undergoing major upgrades. For legacy systems, organizations apply security engineering principles to system upgrades and modifications to the extent feasible, given the current state of hardware, software, and firmware within those systems. Security engineering principles include, for example: (i) developing layered protections; (ii) establishing sound security policy, architecture, and controls as the foundation for design; (iii) incorporating security requirements into the system development life cycle; (iv) delineating physical and logical security boundaries; (v) ensuring that system developers are trained on how to build secure software; (vi) tailoring security controls to meet organizational and operational needs; (vii) performing threat modeling to identify use cases, threat agents, attack vectors, and attack patterns as well as compensating controls and design patterns needed to mitigate risk; and (viii) reducing risk to acceptable levels, thus enabling informed risk management decisions.”

Related Controls:PM-7,SA-3,SA-4,SA-17,SC-2,SC-3

7.2.1.166. SA-9¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION

7.2.1.166.1. SA-9¶

SA-9 : EXTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEM SERVICES

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “External information system services are services that are implemented outside of the authorization boundaries of organizational information systems. This includes services that are used by, but not a part of, organizational information systems. FISMA and OMB policy require that organizations using external service providers that are processing, storing, or transmitting federal information or operating information systems on behalf of the federal government ensure that such providers meet the same security requirements that federal agencies are required to meet. Organizations establish relationships with external service providers in a variety of ways including, for example, through joint ventures, business partnerships, contracts, interagency agreements, lines of business arrangements, licensing agreements, and supply chain exchanges. The responsibility for managing risks from the use of external information system services remains with authorizing officials. For services external to organizations, a chain of trust requires that organizations establish and retain a level of confidence that each participating provider in the potentially complex consumer-provider relationship provides adequate protection for the services rendered. The extent and nature of this chain of trust varies based on the relationships between organizations and the external providers. Organizations document the basis for trust relationships so the relationships can be monitored over time. External information system services documentation includes government, service providers, end user security roles and responsibilities, and service-level agreements. Service-level agreements define expectations of performance for security controls, describe measurable outcomes, and identify remedies and response requirements for identified instances of noncompliance.”

Related Controls:CA-3,IR-7,PS-7

7.2.1.166.1.1. SA-9a.¶

Description: “Requires that providers of external information system services comply with organizational information security requirements and employ [Assignment: organization-defined security controls] in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance;”

7.2.1.166.1.2. SA-9b.¶

Description: “Defines and documents government oversight and user roles and responsibilities with regard to external information system services; and”

7.2.1.166.1.3. SA-9c.¶

Description: “Employs [Assignment: organization-defined processes, methods, and techniques] to monitor security control compliance by external service providers on an ongoing basis.”

7.2.1.166.2. SA-9 (1)¶

SA-9 (1) : RISK ASSESSMENTS / ORGANIZATIONAL APPROVALS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Dedicated information security services include, for example, incident monitoring, analysis and response, operation of information security-related devices such as firewalls, or key management services.”

Related Controls:CA-6,RA-3

7.2.1.166.2.1. SA-9 (1)(a)¶

Description: “Conducts an organizational assessment of risk prior to the acquisition or outsourcing of dedicated information security services; and”

7.2.1.166.2.2. SA-9 (1)(b)¶

Description: “Ensures that the acquisition or outsourcing of dedicated information security services is approved by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].”

7.2.1.166.3. SA-9 (2)¶

SA-9 (2) : IDENTIFICATION OF FUNCTIONS / PORTS / PROTOCOLS / SERVICES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization requires providers of [Assignment: organization-defined external information system services] to identify the functions, ports, protocols, and other services required for the use of such services.” Supplemental Guidance: “Information from external service providers regarding the specific functions, ports, protocols, and services used in the provision of such services can be particularly useful when the need arises to understand the trade-offs involved in restricting certain functions/services or blocking certain ports/protocols.”

Related Controls:CM-7

7.2.1.166.4. SA-9 (3)¶

SA-9 (3) : ESTABLISH / MAINTAIN TRUST RELATIONSHIP WITH PROVIDERS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization establishes, documents, and maintains trust relationships with external service providers based on [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements, properties, factors, or conditions defining acceptable trust relationships].” Supplemental Guidance: “The degree of confidence that the risk from using external services is at an acceptable level depends on the trust that organizations place in the external providers, individually or in combination. Trust relationships can help organization to gain increased levels of confidence that participating service providers are providing adequate protection for the services rendered. Such relationships can be complicated due to the number of potential entities participating in the consumer-provider interactions, subordinate relationships and levels of trust, and the types of interactions between the parties. In some cases, the degree of trust is based on the amount of direct control organizations are able to exert on external service providers with regard to employment of security controls necessary for the protection of the service/information and the evidence brought forth as to the effectiveness of those controls. The level of control is typically established by the terms and conditions of the contracts or service-level agreements and can range from extensive control (e.g., negotiating contracts or agreements that specify security requirements for the providers) to very limited control (e.g., using contracts or service-level agreements to obtain commodity services such as commercial telecommunications services). In other cases, levels of trust are based on factors that convince organizations that required security controls have been employed and that determinations of control effectiveness exist. For example, separately authorized external information system services provided to organizations through well-established business relationships may provide degrees of trust in such services within the tolerable risk range of the organizations using the services. External service providers may also outsource selected services to other external entities, making the trust relationship more difficult and complicated to manage. Depending on the nature of the services, organizations may find it very difficult to place significant trust in external providers. This is not due to any inherent untrustworthiness on the part of providers, but to the intrinsic level of risk in the services.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.166.5. SA-9 (4)¶

SA-9 (4) : CONSISTENT INTERESTS OF CONSUMERS AND PROVIDERS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization employs [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to ensure that the interests of [Assignment: organization-defined external service providers] are consistent with and reflect organizational interests.” Supplemental Guidance: “As organizations increasingly use external service providers, the possibility exists that the interests of the service providers may diverge from organizational interests. In such situations, simply having the correct technical, procedural, or operational safeguards in place may not be sufficient if the service providers that implement and control those safeguards are not operating in a manner consistent with the interests of the consuming organizations. Possible actions that organizations might take to address such concerns include, for example, requiring background checks for selected service provider personnel, examining ownership records, employing only trustworthy service providers (i.e., providers with which organizations have had positive experiences), and conducting periodic/unscheduled visits to service provider facilities.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.166.6. SA-9 (5)¶

SA-9 (5) : PROCESSING, STORAGE, AND SERVICE LOCATION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization restricts the location of [Selection (one or more): information processing; information/data; information system services] to [Assignment: organization-defined locations] based on [Assignment: organization-defined requirements or conditions].” Supplemental Guidance: “The location of information processing, information/data storage, or information system services that are critical to organizations can have a direct impact on the ability of those organizations to successfully execute their missions/business functions. This situation exists when external providers control the location of processing, storage or services. The criteria external providers use for the selection of processing, storage, or service locations may be different from organizational criteria. For example, organizations may want to ensure that data/information storage locations are restricted to certain locations to facilitate incident response activities (e.g., forensic analyses, after-the-fact investigations) in case of information security breaches/compromises. Such incident response activities may be adversely affected by the governing laws or protocols in the locations where processing and storage occur and/or the locations from which information system services emanate.”

Related Controls: .. _header_SA-10:

7.2.1.167. SA-10¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION

7.2.1.167.1. SA-10¶

SA-10 : DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control also applies to organizations conducting internal information systems development and integration. Organizations consider the quality and completeness of the configuration management activities conducted by developers as evidence of applying effective security safeguards. Safeguards include, for example, protecting from unauthorized modification or destruction, the master copies of all material used to generate security-relevant portions of the system hardware, software, and firmware. Maintaining the integrity of changes to the information system, information system component, or information system service requires configuration control throughout the system development life cycle to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes. Configuration items that are placed under configuration management (if existence/use is required by other security controls) include: the formal model; the functional, high-level, and low-level design specifications; other design data; implementation documentation; source code and hardware schematics; the running version of the object code; tools for comparing new versions of security-relevant hardware descriptions and software/firmware source code with previous versions; and test fixtures and documentation. Depending on the mission/business needs of organizations and the nature of the contractual relationships in place, developers may provide configuration management support during the operations and maintenance phases of the life cycle.”

Related Controls:CM-3,CM-4,CM-9,SA-12,SI-2

7.2.1.167.1.1. SA-10a.¶

Description: “Perform configuration management during system, component, or service [Selection (one or more): design; development; implementation; operation];”

7.2.1.167.1.2. SA-10b.¶

Description: “Document, manage, and control the integrity of changes to [Assignment: organization-defined configuration items under configuration management];”

7.2.1.167.1.3. SA-10c.¶

SA-10 (6) : TRUSTED DISTRIBUTION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to execute procedures for ensuring that security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware updates distributed to the organization are exactly as specified by the master copies.” Supplemental Guidance: “The trusted distribution of security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware updates helps to ensure that such updates are faithful representations of the master copies maintained by the developer and have not been tampered with during distribution.”

Related Controls: .. _header_SA-11:

7.2.1.168. SA-11¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION

7.2.1.168.1. SA-11¶

SA-11 : DEVELOPER SECURITY TESTING AND EVALUATION

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to:” Supplemental Guidance: “Developmental security testing/evaluation occurs at all post-design phases of the system development life cycle. Such testing/evaluation confirms that the required security controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, enforcing the desired security policy, and meeting established security requirements. Security properties of information systems may be affected by the interconnection of system components or changes to those components. These interconnections or changes (e.g., upgrading or replacing applications and operating systems) may adversely affect previously implemented security controls. This control provides additional types of security testing/evaluation that developers can conduct to reduce or eliminate potential flaws. Testing custom software applications may require approaches such as static analysis, dynamic analysis, binary analysis, or a hybrid of the three approaches. Developers can employ these analysis approaches in a variety of tools (e.g., web-based application scanners, static analysis tools, binary analyzers) and in source code reviews. Security assessment plans provide the specific activities that developers plan to carry out including the types of analyses, testing, evaluation, and reviews of software and firmware components, the degree of rigor to be applied, and the types of artifacts produced during those processes. The depth of security testing/evaluation refers to the rigor and level of detail associated with the assessment process (e.g., black box, gray box, or white box testing). The coverage of security testing/evaluation refers to the scope (i.e., number and type) of the artifacts included in the assessment process. Contracts specify the acceptance criteria for security assessment plans, flaw remediation processes, and the evidence that the plans/processes have been diligently applied. Methods for reviewing and protecting assessment plans, evidence, and documentation are commensurate with the security category or classification level of the information system. Contracts may specify documentation protection requirements.”

Related Controls:CA-2,CM-4,SA-3,SA-4,SA-5,SI-2

7.2.1.168.1.1. SA-11a.¶

Description: “Create and implement a security assessment plan;”

7.2.1.168.1.2. SA-11b.¶

Description: “Perform [Selection (one or more): unit; integration; system; regression] testing/evaluation at [Assignment: organization-defined depth and coverage];”

7.2.1.168.1.3. SA-11c.¶

Description: “Produce evidence of the execution of the security assessment plan and the results of the security testing/evaluation;”

7.2.1.168.1.4. SA-11d.¶

Description: “Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process; and”

7.2.1.168.1.5. SA-11e.¶

Description: “Correct flaws identified during security testing/evaluation.”

7.2.1.168.2. SA-11 (1)¶

SA-11 (1) : STATIC CODE ANALYSIS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to employ static code analysis tools to identify common flaws and document the results of the analysis.” Supplemental Guidance: “Static code analysis provides a technology and methodology for security reviews. Such analysis can be used to identify security vulnerabilities and enforce security coding practices. Static code analysis is most effective when used early in the development process, when each code change can be automatically scanned for potential weaknesses. Static analysis can provide clear remediation guidance along with defects to enable developers to fix such defects. Evidence of correct implementation of static analysis can include, for example, aggregate defect density for critical defect types, evidence that defects were inspected by developers or security professionals, and evidence that defects were fixed. An excessively high density of ignored findings (commonly referred to as ignored or false positives) indicates a potential problem with the analysis process or tool. In such cases, organizations weigh the validity of the evidence against evidence from other sources.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.168.3. SA-11 (2)¶

SA-11 (2) : THREAT AND VULNERABILITY ANALYSES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to perform threat and vulnerability analyses and subsequent testing/evaluation of the as-built system, component, or service.” Supplemental Guidance: “Applications may deviate significantly from the functional and design specifications created during the requirements and design phases of the system development life cycle. Therefore, threat and vulnerability analyses of information systems, system components, and information system services prior to delivery are critical to the effective operation of those systems, components, and services. Threat and vulnerability analyses at this phase of the life cycle help to ensure that design or implementation changes have been accounted for, and that any new vulnerabilities created as a result of those changes have been reviewed and mitigated.”

Related Controls:PM-15,RA-5

7.2.1.168.4. SA-11 (3)¶

SA-11 (3) : INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF ASSESSMENT PLANS / EVIDENCE

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Independent agents have the necessary qualifications (i.e., expertise, skills, training, and experience) to verify the correct implementation of developer security assessment plans.”

SA-12 (15) : PROCESSES TO ADDRESS WEAKNESSES OR DEFICIENCIES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization establishes a process to address weaknesses or deficiencies in supply chain elements identified during independent or organizational assessments of such elements.” Supplemental Guidance: “Evidence generated during independent or organizational assessments of supply chain elements (e.g., penetration testing, audits, verification/validation activities) is documented and used in follow-on processes implemented by organizations to respond to the risks related to the identified weaknesses and deficiencies. Supply chain elements include, for example, supplier development processes and supplier distribution systems.”

Related Controls: .. _header_SA-13:

7.2.1.170. SA-13¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION

7.2.1.170.1. SA-13¶

SA-13 : TRUSTWORTHINESS

Priority: P0

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control helps organizations to make explicit trustworthiness decisions when designing, developing, and implementing information systems that are needed to conduct critical organizational missions/business functions. Trustworthiness is a characteristic/property of an information system that expresses the degree to which the system can be expected to preserve the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information it processes, stores, or transmits. Trustworthy information systems are systems that are capable of being trusted to operate within defined levels of risk despite the environmental disruptions, human errors, and purposeful attacks that are expected to occur in the specified environments of operation. Trustworthy systems are important to mission/business success. Two factors affecting the trustworthiness of information systems include: (i) security functionality (i.e., the security features, functions, and/or mechanisms employed within the system and its environment of operation); and (ii) security assurance (i.e., the grounds for confidence that the security functionality is effective in its application). Developers, implementers, operators, and maintainers of organizational information systems can increase the level of assurance (and trustworthiness), for example, by employing well-defined security policy models, structured and rigorous hardware, software, and firmware development techniques, sound system/security engineering principles, and secure configuration settings (defined by a set of assurance-related security controls in Appendix E). Assurance is also based on the assessment of evidence produced during the system development life cycle. Critical missions/business functions are supported by high-impact systems and the associated assurance requirements for such systems. The additional assurance controls in Table E-4 in Appendix E (designated as optional) can be used to develop and implement high-assurance solutions for specific information systems and system components using the concept of overlays described in Appendix I. Organizations select assurance overlays that have been developed, validated, and approved for community adoption (e.g., cross-organization, governmentwide), limiting the development of such overlays on an organization-by-organization basis. Organizations can conduct criticality analyses as described in SA-14, to determine the information systems, system components, or information system services that require high-assurance solutions. Trustworthiness requirements and assurance overlays can be described in the security plans for organizational information systems.”

Related Controls:RA-2,SA-4,SA-8,SA-14,SC-3

7.2.1.170.1.1. SA-13a.¶

Description: “Describes the trustworthiness required in the [Assignment: organization-defined information system, information system component, or information system service] supporting its critical missions/business functions; and”

7.2.1.170.1.2. SA-13b.¶

Description: “Implements [Assignment: organization-defined assurance overlay] to achieve such trustworthiness.” .. _header_SA-14:

7.2.1.171. SA-14¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION

7.2.1.171.1. SA-14¶

SA-14 : CRITICALITY ANALYSIS

Priority: P0

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization identifies critical information system components and functions by performing a criticality analysis for [Assignment: organization-defined information systems, information system components, or information system services] at [Assignment: organization-defined decision points in the system development life cycle].” Supplemental Guidance: “Criticality analysis is a key tenet of supply chain risk management and informs the prioritization of supply chain protection activities such as attack surface reduction, use of all-source intelligence, and tailored acquisition strategies. Information system engineers can conduct an end-to-end functional decomposition of an information system to identify mission-critical functions and components. The functional decomposition includes the identification of core organizational missions supported by the system, decomposition into the specific functions to perform those missions, and traceability to the hardware, software, and firmware components that implement those functions, including when the functions are shared by many components within and beyond the information system boundary. Information system components that allow for unmediated access to critical components or functions are considered critical due to the inherent vulnerabilities such components create. Criticality is assessed in terms of the impact of the function or component failure on the ability of the component to complete the organizational missions supported by the information system. A criticality analysis is performed whenever an architecture or design is being developed or modified, including upgrades.”

Related Controls:CP-2,PL-2,PL-8,PM-1,SA-8,SA-12,SA-13,SA-15,SA-20

7.2.1.171.2. SA-14 (1)¶

SA-14 (1) : CRITICAL COMPONENTS WITH NO VIABLE ALTERNATIVE SOURCING

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SA-20].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls: .. _header_SA-15:

7.2.1.172. SA-15¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION

7.2.1.172.1. SA-15¶

SA-15 : DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS

Priority: P2

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Development tools include, for example, programming languages and computer-aided design (CAD) systems. Reviews of development processes can include, for example, the use of maturity models to determine the potential effectiveness of such processes. Maintaining the integrity of changes to tools and processes enables accurate supply chain risk assessment and mitigation, and requires robust configuration control throughout the life cycle (including design, development, transport, delivery, integration, and maintenance) to track authorized changes and prevent unauthorized changes.”

Related Controls:SA-3,SA-8

7.2.1.172.1.1. SA-15a.¶

Description: “Requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to follow a documented development process that:”

7.2.1.172.1.2. SA-15a.1.¶

Description: “Explicitly addresses security requirements;”

7.2.1.172.1.3. SA-15a.2.¶

Description: “Identifies the standards and tools used in the development process;”

7.2.1.172.1.4. SA-15a.3.¶

Description: “Documents the specific tool options and tool configurations used in the development process; and”

7.2.1.172.1.5. SA-15a.4.¶

Description: “Documents, manages, and ensures the integrity of changes to the process and/or tools used in development; and”

7.2.1.172.1.6. SA-15b.¶

Description: “Reviews the development process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine if the process, standards, tools, and tool options/configurations selected and employed can satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined security requirements].”

7.2.1.172.2. SA-15 (1)¶

SA-15 (1) : QUALITY METRICS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to:” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations use quality metrics to establish minimum acceptable levels of information system quality. Metrics may include quality gates which are collections of completion criteria or sufficiency standards representing the satisfactory execution of particular phases of the system development project. A quality gate, for example, may require the elimination of all compiler warnings or an explicit determination that the warnings have no impact on the effectiveness of required security capabilities. During the execution phases of development projects, quality gates provide clear, unambiguous indications of progress. Other metrics apply to the entire development project. These metrics can include defining the severity thresholds of vulnerabilities, for example, requiring no known vulnerabilities in the delivered information system with a Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) severity of Medium or High.”

Description: “Perform an automated vulnerability analysis using [Assignment: organization-defined tools];”

7.2.1.172.8.2. SA-15 (7)(b)¶

Description: “Determine the exploitation potential for discovered vulnerabilities;”

7.2.1.172.8.3. SA-15 (7)(c)¶

Description: “Determine potential risk mitigations for delivered vulnerabilities; and”

7.2.1.172.8.4. SA-15 (7)(d)¶

Description: “Deliver the outputs of the tools and results of the analysis to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].”

7.2.1.172.9. SA-15 (8)¶

SA-15 (8) : REUSE OF THREAT / VULNERABILITY INFORMATION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to use threat modeling and vulnerability analyses from similar systems, components, or services to inform the current development process.” Supplemental Guidance: “Analysis of vulnerabilities found in similar software applications can inform potential design or implementation issues for information systems under development. Similar information systems or system components may exist within developer organizations. Authoritative vulnerability information is available from a variety of public and private sector sources including, for example, the National Vulnerability Database.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.172.10. SA-15 (9)¶

SA-15 (9) : USE OF LIVE DATA

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization approves, documents, and controls the use of live data in development and test environments for the information system, system component, or information system service.” Supplemental Guidance: “The use of live data in preproduction environments can result in significant risk to organizations. Organizations can minimize such risk by using test or dummy data during the development and testing of information systems, information system components, and information system services.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.172.11. SA-15 (10)¶

SA-15 (10) : INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to provide an incident response plan.” Supplemental Guidance: “The incident response plan for developers of information systems, system components, and information system services is incorporated into organizational incident response plans to provide the type of incident response information not readily available to organizations. Such information may be extremely helpful, for example, when organizations respond to vulnerabilities in commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) information technology products.”

Related Controls:IR-8

7.2.1.172.12. SA-15 (11)¶

SA-15 (11) : ARCHIVE INFORMATION SYSTEM / COMPONENT

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization requires the developer of the information system or system component to archive the system or component to be released or delivered together with the corresponding evidence supporting the final security review.” Supplemental Guidance: “Archiving relevant documentation from the development process can provide a readily available baseline of information that can be helpful during information system/component upgrades or modifications.”

Related Controls: .. _header_SA-16:

7.2.1.173. SA-16¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION

7.2.1.173.1. SA-16¶

SA-16 : DEVELOPER-PROVIDED TRAINING

Priority: P2

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to provide [Assignment: organization-defined training] on the correct use and operation of the implemented security functions, controls, and/or mechanisms.” Supplemental Guidance: “This control applies to external and internal (in-house) developers. Training of personnel is an essential element to ensure the effectiveness of security controls implemented within organizational information systems. Training options include, for example, classroom-style training, web-based/computer-based training, and hands-on training. Organizations can also request sufficient training materials from developers to conduct in-house training or offer self-training to organizational personnel. Organizations determine the type of training necessary and may require different types of training for different security functions, controls, or mechanisms.”

Related Controls:AT-2,AT-3,SA-5

7.2.1.174. SA-17¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION

7.2.1.174.1. SA-17¶

SA-17 : DEVELOPER SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to produce a design specification and security architecture that:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control is primarily directed at external developers, although it could also be used for internal (in-house) development. In contrast, PL-8 is primarily directed at internal developers to help ensure that organizations develop an information security architecture and such security architecture is integrated or tightly coupled to the enterprise architecture. This distinction is important if/when organizations outsource the development of information systems, information system components, or information system services to external entities, and there is a requirement to demonstrate consistency with the organization�s enterprise architecture and information security architecture.”

Related Controls:PL-8,PM-7,SA-3,SA-8

7.2.1.174.1.1. SA-17a.¶

Description: “Is consistent with and supportive of the organization�s security architecture which is established within and is an integrated part of the organization�s enterprise architecture;”

7.2.1.174.1.2. SA-17b.¶

Description: “Accurately and completely describes the required security functionality, and the allocation of security controls among physical and logical components; and”

7.2.1.174.1.3. SA-17c.¶

Description: “Expresses how individual security functions, mechanisms, and services work together to provide required security capabilities and a unified approach to protection.”

7.2.1.174.2. SA-17 (1)¶

SA-17 (1) : FORMAL POLICY MODEL

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to:” Supplemental Guidance: “Formal models describe specific behaviors or security policies using formal languages, thus enabling the correctness of those behaviors/policies to be formally proven. Not all components of information systems can be modeled, and generally, formal specifications are scoped to specific behaviors or policies of interest (e.g., nondiscretionary access control policies). Organizations choose the particular formal modeling language and approach based on the nature of the behaviors/policies to be described and the available tools. Formal modeling tools include, for example, Gypsy and Zed.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.174.2.1. SA-17 (1)(a)¶

Description: “Produce, as an integral part of the development process, a formal policy model describing the [Assignment: organization-defined elements of organizational security policy] to be enforced; and”

7.2.1.174.2.2. SA-17 (1)(b)¶

Description: “Prove that the formal policy model is internally consistent and sufficient to enforce the defined elements of the organizational security policy when implemented.”

7.2.1.174.3. SA-17 (2)¶

SA-17 (2) : SECURITY-RELEVANT COMPONENTS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to:” Supplemental Guidance: “Security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware represent the portion of the information system, component, or service that must be trusted to perform correctly in order to maintain required security properties.”

Related Controls:SA-5

7.2.1.174.3.1. SA-17 (2)(a)¶

Description: “Define security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware; and”

7.2.1.174.3.2. SA-17 (2)(b)¶

Description: “Provide a rationale that the definition for security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware is complete.”

7.2.1.174.4. SA-17 (3)¶

SA-17 (3) : FORMAL CORRESPONDENCE

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to:” Supplemental Guidance: “Correspondence is an important part of the assurance gained through modeling. It demonstrates that the implementation is an accurate transformation of the model, and that any additional code or implementation details present have no impact on the behaviors or policies being modeled. Formal methods can be used to show that the high-level security properties are satisfied by the formal information system description, and that the formal system description is correctly implemented by a description of some lower level, for example a hardware description. Consistency between the formal top-level specification and the formal policy models is generally not amenable to being fully proven. Therefore, a combination of formal/informal methods may be needed to show such consistency. Consistency between the formal top-level specification and the implementation may require the use of an informal demonstration due to limitations in the applicability of formal methods to prove that the specification accurately reflects the implementation. Hardware, software, and firmware mechanisms strictly internal to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware include, for example, mapping registers and direct memory input/output.”

Related Controls:SA-5

7.2.1.174.4.1. SA-17 (3)(a)¶

Description: “Produce, as an integral part of the development process, a formal top-level specification that specifies the interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware in terms of exceptions, error messages, and effects;”

7.2.1.174.4.2. SA-17 (3)(b)¶

Description: “Show via proof to the extent feasible with additional informal demonstration as necessary, that the formal top-level specification is consistent with the formal policy model;”

7.2.1.174.4.3. SA-17 (3)(c)¶

Description: “Show via informal demonstration, that the formal top-level specification completely covers the interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware;”

7.2.1.174.4.4. SA-17 (3)(d)¶

Description: “Show that the formal top-level specification is an accurate description of the implemented security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware; and”

7.2.1.174.4.5. SA-17 (3)(e)¶

Description: “Describe the security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware mechanisms not addressed in the formal top-level specification but strictly internal to the security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware.”

7.2.1.174.5. SA-17 (4)¶

SA-17 (4) : INFORMAL CORRESPONDENCE

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to:” Supplemental Guidance: “Correspondence is an important part of the assurance gained through modeling. It demonstrates that the implementation is an accurate transformation of the model, and that any additional code or implementation details present has no impact on the behaviors or policies being modeled. Consistency between the descriptive top-level specification (i.e., high-level/low-level design) and the formal policy model is generally not amenable to being fully proven. Therefore, a combination of formal/informal methods may be needed to show such consistency. Hardware, software, and firmware mechanisms strictly internal to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware include, for example, mapping registers and direct memory input/output.”

Related Controls:SA-5

7.2.1.174.5.1. SA-17 (4)(a)¶

Description: “Produce, as an integral part of the development process, an informal descriptive top-level specification that specifies the interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware in terms of exceptions, error messages, and effects;”

7.2.1.174.5.2. SA-17 (4)(b)¶

Description: “Show via [Selection: informal demonstration, convincing argument with formal methods as feasible] that the descriptive top-level specification is consistent with the formal policy model;”

7.2.1.174.5.3. SA-17 (4)(c)¶

Description: “Show via informal demonstration, that the descriptive top-level specification completely covers the interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware;”

7.2.1.174.5.4. SA-17 (4)(d)¶

Description: “Show that the descriptive top-level specification is an accurate description of the interfaces to security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware; and”

7.2.1.174.5.5. SA-17 (4)(e)¶

Description: “Describe the security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware mechanisms not addressed in the descriptive top-level specification but strictly internal to the security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware.”

7.2.1.174.6. SA-17 (5)¶

SA-17 (5) : CONCEPTUALLY SIMPLE DESIGN

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to:” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:SC-3

7.2.1.174.6.1. SA-17 (5)(a)¶

Description: “Design and structure the security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware to use a complete, conceptually simple protection mechanism with precisely defined semantics; and”

7.2.1.174.6.2. SA-17 (5)(b)¶

Description: “Internally structure the security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware with specific regard for this mechanism.”

7.2.1.174.7. SA-17 (6)¶

SA-17 (6) : STRUCTURE FOR TESTING

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to structure security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware to facilitate testing.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:SA-11

7.2.1.174.8. SA-17 (7)¶

SA-17 (7) : STRUCTURE FOR LEAST PRIVILEGE

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to structure security-relevant hardware, software, and firmware to facilitate controlling access with least privilege.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:AC-5,AC-6 .. _header_SA-18:

7.2.1.175. SA-18¶

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization re-implements or custom develops [Assignment: organization-defined critical information system components].” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations determine that certain information system components likely cannot be trusted due to specific threats to and vulnerabilities in those components, and for which there are no viable security controls to adequately mitigate the resulting risk. Re-implementation or custom development of such components helps to satisfy requirements for higher assurance. This is accomplished by initiating changes to system components (including hardware, software, and firmware) such that the standard attacks by adversaries are less likely to succeed. In situations where no alternative sourcing is available and organizations choose not to re-implement or custom develop critical information system components, additional safeguards can be employed (e.g., enhanced auditing, restrictions on source code and system utility access, and protection from deletion of system and application files.”

Related Controls:CP-2,SA-8,SA-14

7.2.1.178. SA-21¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION

7.2.1.178.1. SA-21¶

SA-21 : DEVELOPER SCREENING

Priority: P0

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization requires that the developer of [Assignment: organization-defined information system, system component, or information system service]:” Supplemental Guidance: “Because the information system, system component, or information system service may be employed in critical activities essential to the national and/or economic security interests of the United States, organizations have a strong interest in ensuring that the developer is trustworthy. The degree of trust required of the developer may need to be consistent with that of the individuals accessing the information system/component/service once deployed. Examples of authorization and personnel screening criteria include clearance, satisfactory background checks, citizenship, and nationality. Trustworthiness of developers may also include a review and analysis of company ownership and any relationships the company has with entities potentially affecting the quality/reliability of the systems, components, or services being developed.”

Related Controls:PS-3,PS-7

7.2.1.178.1.1. SA-21a.¶

Description: “Have appropriate access authorizations as determined by assigned [Assignment: organization-defined official government duties]; and”

7.2.1.178.1.2. SA-21b.¶

Description: “Satisfy [Assignment: organization-defined additional personnel screening criteria].”

7.2.1.178.2. SA-21 (1)¶

SA-21 (1) : VALIDATION OF SCREENING

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service take [Assignment: organization-defined actions] to ensure that the required access authorizations and screening criteria are satisfied.” Supplemental Guidance: “Satisfying required access authorizations and personnel screening criteria includes, for example, providing a listing of all the individuals authorized to perform development activities on the selected information system, system component, or information system service so that organizations can validate that the developer has satisfied the necessary authorization and screening requirements.”

Related Controls: .. _header_SA-22:

7.2.1.179. SA-22¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION

7.2.1.179.1. SA-22¶

SA-22 : UNSUPPORTED SYSTEM COMPONENTS

Priority: P0

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Support for information system components includes, for example, software patches, firmware updates, replacement parts, and maintenance contracts. Unsupported components (e.g., when vendors are no longer providing critical software patches), provide a substantial opportunity for adversaries to exploit new weaknesses discovered in the currently installed components. Exceptions to replacing unsupported system components may include, for example, systems that provide critical mission/business capability where newer technologies are not available or where the systems are so isolated that installing replacement components is not an option.”

Related Controls:PL-2,SA-3

7.2.1.179.1.1. SA-22a.¶

Description: “Replaces information system components when support for the components is no longer available from the developer, vendor, or manufacturer; and”

7.2.1.179.1.2. SA-22b.¶

Description: “Provides justification and documents approval for the continued use of unsupported system components required to satisfy mission/business needs.”

7.2.1.179.2. SA-22 (1)¶

SA-22 (1) : ALTERNATIVE SOURCES FOR CONTINUED SUPPORT

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization provides [Selection (one or more): in-house support; [Assignment: organization-defined support from external providers]] for unsupported information system components.” Supplemental Guidance: “This control enhancement addresses the need to provide continued support for selected information system components that are no longer supported by the original developers, vendors, or manufacturers when such components remain essential to mission/business operations. Organizations can establish in-house support, for example, by developing customized patches for critical software components or secure the services of external providers who through contractual relationships, provide ongoing support for the designated unsupported components. Such contractual relationships can include, for example, Open Source Software value-added vendors.”

Related Controls: .. _header_SC-1:

7.2.1.180. SC-1¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION

7.2.1.180.1. SC-1¶

SC-1 : SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the SC family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.”

Related Controls:PM-9

7.2.1.180.1.1. SC-1a.¶

Description: “Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:”

7.2.1.180.1.2. SC-1a.1.¶

Description: “A system and communications protection policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and”

7.2.1.180.1.3. SC-1a.2.¶

Description: “Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and communications protection policy and associated system and communications protection controls; and”

7.2.1.180.1.4. SC-1b.¶

Description: “Reviews and updates the current:”

7.2.1.180.1.5. SC-1b.1.¶

Description: “System and communications protection policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and”

7.2.1.180.1.6. SC-1b.2.¶

Description: “System and communications protection procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].” .. _header_SC-2:

7.2.1.181. SC-2¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION

7.2.1.181.1. SC-2¶

SC-2 : APPLICATION PARTITIONING

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The information system separates user functionality (including user interface services) from information system management functionality.” Supplemental Guidance: “Information system management functionality includes, for example, functions necessary to administer databases, network components, workstations, or servers, and typically requires privileged user access. The separation of user functionality from information system management functionality is either physical or logical. Organizations implement separation of system management-related functionality from user functionality by using different computers, different central processing units, different instances of operating systems, different network addresses, virtualization techniques, or combinations of these or other methods, as appropriate. This type of separation includes, for example, web administrative interfaces that use separate authentication methods for users of any other information system resources. Separation of system and user functionality may include isolating administrative interfaces on different domains and with additional access controls.”

Related Controls:SA-4,SA-8,SC-3

7.2.1.181.2. SC-2 (1)¶

SC-2 (1) : INTERFACES FOR NON-PRIVILEGED USERS

Priority:

SC-3 (5) : LAYERED STRUCTURES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization implements security functions as a layered structure minimizing interactions between layers of the design and avoiding any dependence by lower layers on the functionality or correctness of higher layers.” Supplemental Guidance: “The implementation of layered structures with minimized interactions among security functions and non-looping layers (i.e., lower-layer functions do not depend on higher-layer functions) further enables the isolation of security functions and management of complexity.”

Related Controls: .. _header_SC-4:

7.2.1.183. SC-4¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION

7.2.1.183.1. SC-4¶

SC-4 : INFORMATION IN SHARED RESOURCES

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The information system prevents unauthorized and unintended information transfer via shared system resources.” Supplemental Guidance: “This control prevents information, including encrypted representations of information, produced by the actions of prior users/roles (or the actions of processes acting on behalf of prior users/roles) from being available to any current users/roles (or current processes) that obtain access to shared system resources (e.g., registers, main memory, hard disks) after those resources have been released back to information systems. The control of information in shared resources is also commonly referred to as object reuse and residual information protection. This control does not address: (i) information remanence which refers to residual representation of data that has been nominally erased or removed; (ii) covert channels (including storage and/or timing channels) where shared resources are manipulated to violate information flow restrictions; or (iii) components within information systems for which there are only single users/roles.”

Related Controls:AC-3,AC-4,MP-6

7.2.1.183.2. SC-4 (1)¶

SC-4 (1) : SECURITY LEVELS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-4].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.183.3. SC-4 (2)¶

SC-4 (2) : PERIODS PROCESSING

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system prevents unauthorized information transfer via shared resources in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined procedures] when system processing explicitly switches between different information classification levels or security categories.” Supplemental Guidance: “This control enhancement applies when there are explicit changes in information processing levels during information system operations, for example, during multilevel processing and periods processing with information at different classification levels or security categories. Organization-defined procedures may include, for example, approved sanitization processes for electronically stored information.”

Related Controls: .. _header_SC-5:

7.2.1.184. SC-5¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION

7.2.1.184.1. SC-5¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION

7.2.1.186.1. SC-7¶

SC-7 : BOUNDARY PROTECTION

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The information system:” Supplemental Guidance: “Managed interfaces include, for example, gateways, routers, firewalls, guards, network-based malicious code analysis and virtualization systems, or encrypted tunnels implemented within a security architecture (e.g., routers protecting firewalls or application gateways residing on protected subnetworks). Subnetworks that are physically or logically separated from internal networks are referred to as demilitarized zones or DMZs. Restricting or prohibiting interfaces within organizational information systems includes, for example, restricting external web traffic to designated web servers within managed interfaces and prohibiting external traffic that appears to be spoofing internal addresses. Organizations consider the shared nature of commercial telecommunications services in the implementation of security controls associated with the use of such services. Commercial telecommunications services are commonly based on network components and consolidated management systems shared by all attached commercial customers, and may also include third party-provided access lines and other service elements. Such transmission services may represent sources of increased risk despite contract security provisions.”

Related Controls:AC-4,AC-17,CA-3,CM-7,CP-8,IR-4,RA-3,SC-5,SC-13

7.2.1.186.1.1. SC-7a.¶

Description: “Monitors and controls communications at the external boundary of the system and at key internal boundaries within the system;”

7.2.1.186.1.2. SC-7b.¶

Description: “Implements subnetworks for publicly accessible system components that are [Selection: physically; logically] separated from internal organizational networks; and”

7.2.1.186.1.3. SC-7c.¶

Description: “Connects to external networks or information systems only through managed interfaces consisting of boundary protection devices arranged in accordance with an organizational security architecture.”

7.2.1.186.2. SC-7 (1)¶

SC-7 (1) : PHYSICALLY SEPARATED SUBNETWORKS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-7].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.186.3. SC-7 (2)¶

SC-7 (2) : PUBLIC ACCESS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-7].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.186.4. SC-7 (3)¶

SC-7 (3) : ACCESS POINTS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization limits the number of external network connections to the information system.” Supplemental Guidance: “Limiting the number of external network connections facilitates more comprehensive monitoring of inbound and outbound communications traffic. The Trusted Internet Connection (TIC) initiative is an example of limiting the number of external network connections.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.186.5. SC-7 (4)¶

SC-7 (4) : EXTERNAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:SC-8

7.2.1.186.5.1. SC-7 (4)(a)¶

Description: “Implements a managed interface for each external telecommunication service;”

7.2.1.186.5.2. SC-7 (4)(b)¶

Description: “Establishes a traffic flow policy for each managed interface;”

7.2.1.186.5.3. SC-7 (4)(c)¶

SC-7 (23) : DISABLE SENDER FEEDBACK ON PROTOCOL VALIDATION FAILURE

Priority:

Control Family: SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION

7.2.1.188.1. SC-9¶

SC-9 : TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-8].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.189. SC-10¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION

7.2.1.189.1. SC-10¶

SC-10 : NETWORK DISCONNECT

Priority: P2

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The information system terminates the network connection associated with a communications session at the end of the session or after [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of inactivity.” Supplemental Guidance: “This control applies to both internal and external networks. Terminating network connections associated with communications sessions include, for example, de-allocating associated TCP/IP address/port pairs at the operating system level, or de-allocating networking assignments at the application level if multiple application sessions are using a single, operating system-level network connection. Time periods of inactivity may be established by organizations and include, for example, time periods by type of network access or for specific network accesses.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.190. SC-11¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION

7.2.1.190.1. SC-11¶

SC-11 : TRUSTED PATH

Priority: P0

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system establishes a trusted communications path between the user and the following security functions of the system: [Assignment: organization-defined security functions to include at a minimum, information system authentication and re-authentication].” Supplemental Guidance: “Trusted paths are mechanisms by which users (through input devices) can communicate directly with security functions of information systems with the requisite assurance to support information security policies. The mechanisms can be activated only by users or the security functions of organizational information systems. User responses via trusted paths are protected from modifications by or disclosure to untrusted applications. Organizations employ trusted paths for high-assurance connections between security functions of information systems and users (e.g., during system logons). Enforcement of trusted communications paths is typically provided via an implementation that meets the reference monitor concept.”

Related Controls:AC-16,AC-25

7.2.1.190.2. SC-11 (1)¶

SC-11 (1) : LOGICAL ISOLATION

Priority:

SC-12 (5) : PKI CERTIFICATES / HARDWARE TOKENS

Priority:

Control Family: SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION

7.2.1.193.1. SC-14¶

SC-14 : PUBLIC ACCESS PROTECTIONS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Capability provided by AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, AC-6, SI-3, SI-4, SI-5, SI-7, SI-10].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.194. SC-15¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION

7.2.1.194.1. SC-15¶

SC-15 : COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The information system:” Supplemental Guidance: “Collaborative computing devices include, for example, networked white boards, cameras, and microphones. Explicit indication of use includes, for example, signals to users when collaborative computing devices are activated.”

Related Controls:AC-21

7.2.1.194.1.1. SC-15a.¶

Description: “Prohibits remote activation of collaborative computing devices with the following exceptions: [Assignment: organization-defined exceptions where remote activation is to be allowed]; and”

7.2.1.194.1.2. SC-15b.¶

Description: “Provides an explicit indication of use to users physically present at the devices.”

7.2.1.194.2. SC-15 (1)¶

SC-15 (1) : PHYSICAL DISCONNECT

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system provides physical disconnect of collaborative computing devices in a manner that supports ease of use.” Supplemental Guidance: “Failing to physically disconnect from collaborative computing devices can result in subsequent compromises of organizational information. Providing easy methods to physically disconnect from such devices after a collaborative computing session helps to ensure that participants actually carry out the disconnect activity without having to go through complex and tedious procedures.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.194.3. SC-15 (2)¶

SC-15 (2) : BLOCKING INBOUND / OUTBOUND COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SC-7].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.194.4. SC-15 (3)¶

SC-15 (3) : DISABLING / REMOVAL IN SECURE WORK AREAS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization disables or removes collaborative computing devices from [Assignment: organization-defined information systems or information system components] in [Assignment: organization-defined secure work areas].” Supplemental Guidance: “Failing to disable or remove collaborative computing devices from information systems or information system components can result in subsequent compromises of organizational information including, for example, eavesdropping on conversations.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.194.5. SC-15 (4)¶

SC-15 (4) : EXPLICITLY INDICATE CURRENT PARTICIPANTS

Priority:

Control Family: SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION

7.2.1.196.1. SC-17¶

SC-17 : PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE CERTIFICATES

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization issues public key certificates under an [Assignment: organization-defined certificate policy] or obtains public key certificates from an approved service provider.” Supplemental Guidance: “For all certificates, organizations manage information system trust stores to ensure only approved trust anchors are in the trust stores. This control addresses both certificates with visibility external to organizational information systems and certificates related to the internal operations of systems, for example, application-specific time services.”

Related Controls:SC-12

7.2.1.197. SC-18¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION

7.2.1.197.1. SC-18¶

SC-18 : MOBILE CODE

Priority: P2

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Decisions regarding the employment of mobile code within organizational information systems are based on the potential for the code to cause damage to the systems if used maliciously. Mobile code technologies include, for example, Java, JavaScript, ActiveX, Postscript, PDF, Shockwave movies, Flash animations, and VBScript. Usage restrictions and implementation guidance apply to both the selection and use of mobile code installed on servers and mobile code downloaded and executed on individual workstations and devices (e.g., smart phones). Mobile code policy and procedures address preventing the development, acquisition, or introduction of unacceptable mobile code within organizational information systems.”

Related Controls:AU-2,AU-12,CM-2,CM-6,SI-3

7.2.1.197.1.1. SC-18a.¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION

7.2.1.198.1. SC-19¶

SC-19 : VOICE OVER INTERNET PROTOCOL

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:CM-6,SC-7,SC-15

7.2.1.198.1.1. SC-19a.¶

Description: “Establishes usage restrictions and implementation guidance for Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) technologies based on the potential to cause damage to the information system if used maliciously; and”

7.2.1.198.1.2. SC-19b.¶

Description: “Authorizes, monitors, and controls the use of VoIP within the information system.” .. _header_SC-20:

7.2.1.199. SC-20¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION

7.2.1.199.1. SC-20¶

SC-20 : SECURE NAME / ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (AUTHORITATIVE SOURCE)

Priority: P1

SC-23 (5) : ALLOWED CERTIFICATE AUTHORITIES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system only allows the use of [Assignment: organization-defined certificate authorities] for verification of the establishment of protected sessions.” Supplemental Guidance: “Reliance on certificate authorities (CAs) for the establishment of secure sessions includes, for example, the use of Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and/or Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates. These certificates, after verification by the respective certificate authorities, facilitate the establishment of protected sessions between web clients and web servers.”

Related Controls:SC-13 .. _header_SC-24:

7.2.1.203. SC-24¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION

7.2.1.203.1. SC-24¶

SC-24 : FAIL IN KNOWN STATE

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The information system fails to a [Assignment: organization-defined known-state] for [Assignment: organization-defined types of failures] preserving [Assignment: organization-defined system state information] in failure.” Supplemental Guidance: “Failure in a known state addresses security concerns in accordance with the mission/business needs of organizations. Failure in a known secure state helps to prevent the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information in the event of failures of organizational information systems or system components. Failure in a known safe state helps to prevent systems from failing to a state that may cause injury to individuals or destruction to property. Preserving information system state information facilitates system restart and return to the operational mode of organizations with less disruption of mission/business processes.”

Related Controls:CP-2,CP-10,CP-12,SC-7,SC-22

7.2.1.204. SC-25¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION

7.2.1.204.1. SC-25¶

SC-25 : THIN NODES

Priority: P0

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system at [Assignment: organization-defined information system components]:” Supplemental Guidance: “The term operating environment is defined as the specific code that hosts applications, for example, operating systems, executives, or monitors including virtual machine monitors (i.e., hypervisors). It can also include certain applications running directly on hardware platforms. Hardware-enforced, read-only media include, for example, Compact Disk-Recordable (CD-R)/Digital Video Disk-Recordable (DVD-R) disk drives and one-time programmable read-only memory. The use of non-modifiable storage ensures the integrity of software from the point of creation of the read-only image. The use of reprogrammable read-only memory can be accepted as read-only media provided: (i) integrity can be adequately protected from the point of initial writing to the insertion of the memory into the information system; and (ii) there are reliable hardware protections against reprogramming the memory while installed in organizational information systems.”

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms that achieve [Assignment: organization-defined level of protection] against the effects of intentional electromagnetic interference.” Supplemental Guidance: “This control enhancement protects against intentional jamming that might deny or impair communications by ensuring that wireless spread spectrum waveforms used to provide anti-jam protection are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. The control enhancement may also coincidentally help to mitigate the effects of unintentional jamming due to interference from legitimate transmitters sharing the same spectrum. Mission requirements, projected threats, concept of operations, and applicable legislation, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines determine levels of wireless link availability and performance/cryptography needed.”

Related Controls:SC-12,SC-13

7.2.1.219.3. SC-40 (2)¶

SC-40 (2) : REDUCE DETECTION POTENTIAL

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to reduce the detection potential of wireless links to [Assignment: organization-defined level of reduction].” Supplemental Guidance: “This control enhancement is needed for covert communications and protecting wireless transmitters from being geo-located by their transmissions. The control enhancement ensures that spread spectrum waveforms used to achieve low probability of detection are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. Mission requirements, projected threats, concept of operations, and applicable legislation, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines determine the levels to which wireless links should be undetectable.”

Related Controls:SC-12,SC-13

7.2.1.219.4. SC-40 (3)¶

SC-40 (3) : IMITATIVE OR MANIPULATIVE COMMUNICATIONS DECEPTION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to identify and reject wireless transmissions that are deliberate attempts to achieve imitative or manipulative communications deception based on signal parameters.” Supplemental Guidance: “This control enhancement ensures that the signal parameters of wireless transmissions are not predictable by unauthorized individuals. Such unpredictability reduces the probability of imitative or manipulative communications deception based upon signal parameters alone.”

Description: “Prohibits the remote activation of environmental sensing capabilities with the following exceptions: [Assignment: organization-defined exceptions where remote activation of sensors is allowed]; and”

7.2.1.221.1.2. SC-42b.¶

Description: “Provides an explicit indication of sensor use to [Assignment: organization-defined class of users].”

7.2.1.221.2. SC-42 (1)¶

SC-42 (1) : REPORTING TO AUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS OR ROLES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization ensures that the information system is configured so that data or information collected by the [Assignment: organization-defined sensors] is only reported to authorized individuals or roles.” Supplemental Guidance: “In situations where sensors are activated by authorized individuals (e.g., end users), it is still possible that the data/information collected by the sensors will be sent to unauthorized entities.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.221.3. SC-42 (2)¶

SC-42 (2) : AUTHORIZED USE

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization employs the following measures: [Assignment: organization-defined measures], so that data or information collected by [Assignment: organization-defined sensors] is only used for authorized purposes.” Supplemental Guidance: “Information collected by sensors for a specific authorized purpose potentially could be misused for some unauthorized purpose. For example, GPS sensors that are used to support traffic navigation could be misused to track movements of individuals. Measures to mitigate such activities include, for example, additional training to ensure that authorized parties do not abuse their authority, or (in the case where sensor data/information is maintained by external parties) contractual restrictions on the use of the data/information.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.221.4. SC-42 (3)¶

SC-42 (3) : PROHIBIT USE OF DEVICES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization prohibits the use of devices possessing [Assignment: organization-defined environmental sensing capabilities] in [Assignment: organization-defined facilities, areas, or systems].” Supplemental Guidance: “For example, organizations may prohibit individuals from bringing cell phones or digital cameras into certain facilities or specific controlled areas within facilities where classified information is stored or sensitive conversations are taking place.”

Related Controls: .. _header_SC-43:

7.2.1.222. SC-43¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION

7.2.1.222.1. SC-43¶

SC-43 : USAGE RESTRICTIONS

Priority: P0

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Information system components include hardware, software, or firmware components (e.g., Voice Over Internet Protocol, mobile code, digital copiers, printers, scanners, optical devices, wireless technologies, mobile devices).”

Related Controls:CM-6,SC-7

7.2.1.222.1.1. SC-43a.¶

Description: “Establishes usage restrictions and implementation guidance for [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] based on the potential to cause damage to the information system if used maliciously; and”

7.2.1.222.1.2. SC-43b.¶

Description: “Authorizes, monitors, and controls the use of such components within the information system.” .. _header_SC-44:

7.2.1.223. SC-44¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION

7.2.1.223.1. SC-44¶

SC-44 : DETONATION CHAMBERS

Priority: P0

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization employs a detonation chamber capability within [Assignment: organization-defined information system, system component, or location].” Supplemental Guidance: “Detonation chambers, also known as dynamic execution environments, allow organizations to open email attachments, execute untrusted or suspicious applications, and execute Universal Resource Locator (URL) requests in the safety of an isolated environment or virtualized sandbox. These protected and isolated execution environments provide a means of determining whether the associated attachments/applications contain malicious code. While related to the concept of deception nets, the control is not intended to maintain a long-term environment in which adversaries can operate and their actions can be observed. Rather, it is intended to quickly identify malicious code and reduce the likelihood that the code is propagated to user environments of operation (or prevent such propagation completely).”

Related Controls:SC-7,SC-25,SC-26,SC-30

7.2.1.224. SI-1¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY

7.2.1.224.1. SI-1¶

SI-1 : SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY POLICY AND PROCEDURES

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control addresses the establishment of policy and procedures for the effective implementation of selected security controls and control enhancements in the SI family. Policy and procedures reflect applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidance. Security program policies and procedures at the organization level may make the need for system-specific policies and procedures unnecessary. The policy can be included as part of the general information security policy for organizations or conversely, can be represented by multiple policies reflecting the complex nature of certain organizations. The procedures can be established for the security program in general and for particular information systems, if needed. The organizational risk management strategy is a key factor in establishing policy and procedures.”

Related Controls:PM-9

7.2.1.224.1.1. SI-1a.¶

Description: “Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:”

7.2.1.224.1.2. SI-1a.1.¶

Description: “A system and information integrity policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and”

7.2.1.224.1.3. SI-1a.2.¶

Description: “Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and information integrity policy and associated system and information integrity controls; and”

7.2.1.224.1.4. SI-1b.¶

Description: “Reviews and updates the current:”

7.2.1.224.1.5. SI-1b.1.¶

Description: “System and information integrity policy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and”

7.2.1.224.1.6. SI-1b.2.¶

Description: “System and information integrity procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].” .. _header_SI-2:

7.2.1.225. SI-2¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY

7.2.1.225.1. SI-2¶

SI-2 : FLAW REMEDIATION

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations identify information systems affected by announced software flaws including potential vulnerabilities resulting from those flaws, and report this information to designated organizational personnel with information security responsibilities. Security-relevant software updates include, for example, patches, service packs, hot fixes, and anti-virus signatures. Organizations also address flaws discovered during security assessments, continuous monitoring, incident response activities, and system error handling. Organizations take advantage of available resources such as the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) or Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) databases in remediating flaws discovered in organizational information systems. By incorporating flaw remediation into ongoing configuration management processes, required/anticipated remediation actions can be tracked and verified. Flaw remediation actions that can be tracked and verified include, for example, determining whether organizations follow US-CERT guidance and Information Assurance Vulnerability Alerts. Organization-defined time periods for updating security-relevant software and firmware may vary based on a variety of factors including, for example, the security category of the information system or the criticality of the update (i.e., severity of the vulnerability related to the discovered flaw). Some types of flaw remediation may require more testing than other types. Organizations determine the degree and type of testing needed for the specific type of flaw remediation activity under consideration and also the types of changes that are to be configuration-managed. In some situations, organizations may determine that the testing of software and/or firmware updates is not necessary or practical, for example, when implementing simple anti-virus signature updates. Organizations may also consider in testing decisions, whether security-relevant software or firmware updates are obtained from authorized sources with appropriate digital signatures.”

Related Controls:CA-2,CA-7,CM-3,CM-5,CM-8,MA-2,IR-4,RA-5,SA-10,SA-11,SI-11

7.2.1.225.1.1. SI-2a.¶

Description: “Identifies, reports, and corrects information system flaws;”

7.2.1.225.1.2. SI-2b.¶

Description: “Tests software and firmware updates related to flaw remediation for effectiveness and potential side effects before installation;”

7.2.1.225.1.3. SI-2c.¶

Description: “Installs security-relevant software and firmware updates within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of the release of the updates; and”

7.2.1.225.1.4. SI-2d.¶

Description: “Incorporates flaw remediation into the organizational configuration management process.”

7.2.1.225.2. SI-2 (1)¶

SI-2 (1) : CENTRAL MANAGEMENT

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization centrally manages the flaw remediation process.” Supplemental Guidance: “Central management is the organization-wide management and implementation of flaw remediation processes. Central management includes planning, implementing, assessing, authorizing, and monitoring the organization-defined, centrally managed flaw remediation security controls.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.225.3. SI-2 (2)¶

SI-2 (2) : AUTOMATED FLAW REMEDIATION STATUS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization employs automated mechanisms [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine the state of information system components with regard to flaw remediation.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:CM-6,SI-4

7.2.1.225.4. SI-2 (3)¶

SI-2 (3) : TIME TO REMEDIATE FLAWS / BENCHMARKS FOR CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control enhancement requires organizations to determine the current time it takes on the average to correct information system flaws after such flaws have been identified, and subsequently establish organizational benchmarks (i.e., time frames) for taking corrective actions. Benchmarks can be established by type of flaw and/or severity of the potential vulnerability if the flaw can be exploited.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.225.4.1. SI-2 (3)(a)¶

Description: “Measures the time between flaw identification and flaw remediation; and”

7.2.1.225.4.2. SI-2 (3)(b)¶

Description: “Establishes [Assignment: organization-defined benchmarks] for taking corrective actions.”

7.2.1.225.5. SI-2 (4)¶

SI-2 (4) : AUTOMATED PATCH MANAGEMENT TOOLS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-2].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.225.6. SI-2 (5)¶

SI-2 (5) : AUTOMATIC SOFTWARE / FIRMWARE UPDATES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization installs [Assignment: organization-defined security-relevant software and firmware updates] automatically to [Assignment: organization-defined information system components].” Supplemental Guidance: “Due to information system integrity and availability concerns, organizations give careful consideration to the methodology used to carry out automatic updates. Organizations must balance the need to ensure that the updates are installed as soon as possible with the need to maintain configuration management and with any mission or operational impacts that automatic updates might impose.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.225.7. SI-2 (6)¶

SI-2 (6) : REMOVAL OF PREVIOUS VERSIONS OF SOFTWARE / FIRMWARE

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization removes [Assignment: organization-defined software and firmware components] after updated versions have been installed.” Supplemental Guidance: “Previous versions of software and/or firmware components that are not removed from the information system after updates have been installed may be exploited by adversaries. Some information technology products may remove older versions of software and/or firmware automatically from the information system.”

Related Controls: .. _header_SI-3:

7.2.1.226. SI-3¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY

7.2.1.226.1. SI-3¶

SI-3 : MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Information system entry and exit points include, for example, firewalls, electronic mail servers, web servers, proxy servers, remote-access servers, workstations, notebook computers, and mobile devices. Malicious code includes, for example, viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and spyware. Malicious code can also be encoded in various formats (e.g., UUENCODE, Unicode), contained within compressed or hidden files, or hidden in files using steganography. Malicious code can be transported by different means including, for example, web accesses, electronic mail, electronic mail attachments, and portable storage devices. Malicious code insertions occur through the exploitation of information system vulnerabilities. Malicious code protection mechanisms include, for example, anti-virus signature definitions and reputation-based technologies. A variety of technologies and methods exist to limit or eliminate the effects of malicious code. Pervasive configuration management and comprehensive software integrity controls may be effective in preventing execution of unauthorized code. In addition to commercial off-the-shelf software, malicious code may also be present in custom-built software. This could include, for example, logic bombs, back doors, and other types of cyber attacks that could affect organizational missions/business functions. Traditional malicious code protection mechanisms cannot always detect such code. In these situations, organizations rely instead on other safeguards including, for example, secure coding practices, configuration management and control, trusted procurement processes, and monitoring practices to help ensure that software does not perform functions other than the functions intended. Organizations may determine that in response to the detection of malicious code, different actions may be warranted. For example, organizations can define actions in response to malicious code detection during periodic scans, actions in response to detection of malicious downloads, and/or actions in response to detection of maliciousness when attempting to open or execute files.”

Related Controls:CM-3,MP-2,SA-4,SA-8,SA-12,SA-13,SC-7,SC-26,SC-44,SI-2,SI-4,SI-7

7.2.1.226.1.1. SI-3a.¶

Description: “Employs malicious code protection mechanisms at information system entry and exit points to detect and eradicate malicious code;”

7.2.1.226.1.2. SI-3b.¶

Description: “Updates malicious code protection mechanisms whenever new releases are available in accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures;”

7.2.1.226.1.3. SI-3c.¶

Description: “Configures malicious code protection mechanisms to:”

7.2.1.226.1.4. SI-3c.1.¶

SI-3 (6) : TESTING / VERIFICATION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:CA-2,CA-7,RA-5

7.2.1.226.7.1. SI-3 (6)(a)¶

Description: “Tests malicious code protection mechanisms [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] by introducing a known benign, non-spreading test case into the information system; and”

7.2.1.226.7.2. SI-3 (6)(b)¶

Description: “Verifies that both detection of the test case and associated incident reporting occur.”

7.2.1.226.8. SI-3 (7)¶

SI-3 (7) : NONSIGNATURE-BASED DETECTION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system implements nonsignature-based malicious code detection mechanisms.” Supplemental Guidance: “Nonsignature-based detection mechanisms include, for example, the use of heuristics to detect, analyze, and describe the characteristics or behavior of malicious code and to provide safeguards against malicious code for which signatures do not yet exist or for which existing signatures may not be effective. This includes polymorphic malicious code (i.e., code that changes signatures when it replicates). This control enhancement does not preclude the use of signature-based detection mechanisms.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.226.9. SI-3 (8)¶

SI-3 (8) : DETECT UNAUTHORIZED COMMANDS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system detects [Assignment: organization-defined unauthorized operating system commands] through the kernel application programming interface at [Assignment: organization-defined information system hardware components] and [Selection (one or more): issues a warning; audits the command execution; prevents the execution of the command].” Supplemental Guidance: “This control enhancement can also be applied to critical interfaces other than kernel-based interfaces, including for example, interfaces with virtual machines and privileged applications. Unauthorized operating system commands include, for example, commands for kernel functions from information system processes that are not trusted to initiate such commands, or commands for kernel functions that are suspicious even though commands of that type are reasonable for processes to initiate. Organizations can define the malicious commands to be detected by a combination of command types, command classes, or specific instances of commands. Organizations can define hardware components by specific component, component type, location in the network, or combination therein. Organizations may select different actions for different types/classes/specific instances of potentially malicious commands.”

Related Controls:AU-6

7.2.1.226.10. SI-3 (9)¶

SI-3 (9) : AUTHENTICATE REMOTE COMMANDS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to authenticate [Assignment: organization-defined remote commands].” Supplemental Guidance: “This control enhancement protects against unauthorized commands and replay of authorized commands. This capability is important for those remote information systems whose loss, malfunction, misdirection, or exploitation would have immediate and/or serious consequences (e.g., injury or death, property damage, loss of high-valued assets or sensitive information, or failure of important missions/business functions). Authentication safeguards for remote commands help to ensure that information systems accept and execute in the order intended, only authorized commands, and that unauthorized commands are rejected. Cryptographic mechanisms can be employed, for example, to authenticate remote commands.”

Related Controls:SC-12,SC-13,SC-23

7.2.1.226.11. SI-3 (10)¶

SI-3 (10) : MALICIOUS CODE ANALYSIS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “The application of selected malicious code analysis tools and techniques provides organizations with a more in-depth understanding of adversary tradecraft (i.e., tactics, techniques, and procedures) and the functionality and purpose of specific instances of malicious code. Understanding the characteristics of malicious code facilitates more effective organizational responses to current and future threats. Organizations can conduct malicious code analyses by using reverse engineering techniques or by monitoring the behavior of executing code.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.226.11.1. SI-3 (10)(a)¶

Description: “Employs [Assignment: organization-defined tools and techniques] to analyze the characteristics and behavior of malicious code; and”

7.2.1.226.11.2. SI-3 (10)(b)¶

Description: “Incorporates the results from malicious code analysis into organizational incident response and flaw remediation processes.” .. _header_SI-4:

7.2.1.227. SI-4¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY

7.2.1.227.1. SI-4¶

SI-4 : INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Information system monitoring includes external and internal monitoring. External monitoring includes the observation of events occurring at the information system boundary (i.e., part of perimeter defense and boundary protection). Internal monitoring includes the observation of events occurring within the information system. Organizations can monitor information systems, for example, by observing audit activities in real time or by observing other system aspects such as access patterns, characteristics of access, and other actions. The monitoring objectives may guide determination of the events. Information system monitoring capability is achieved through a variety of tools and techniques (e.g., intrusion detection systems, intrusion prevention systems, malicious code protection software, scanning tools, audit record monitoring software, network monitoring software). Strategic locations for monitoring devices include, for example, selected perimeter locations and near server farms supporting critical applications, with such devices typically being employed at the managed interfaces associated with controls SC-7 and AC-17. Einstein network monitoring devices from the Department of Homeland Security can also be included as monitoring devices. The granularity of monitoring information collected is based on organizational monitoring objectives and the capability of information systems to support such objectives. Specific types of transactions of interest include, for example, Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) traffic that bypasses HTTP proxies. Information system monitoring is an integral part of organizational continuous monitoring and incident response programs. Output from system monitoring serves as input to continuous monitoring and incident response programs. A network connection is any connection with a device that communicates through a network (e.g., local area network, Internet). A remote connection is any connection with a device communicating through an external network (e.g., the Internet). Local, network, and remote connections can be either wired or wireless.”

Related Controls:AC-3,AC-4,AC-8,AC-17,AU-2,AU-6,AU-7,AU-9,AU-12,CA-7,IR-4,PE-3,RA-5,SC-7,SC-26,SC-35,SI-3,SI-7

7.2.1.227.1.1. SI-4a.¶

Description: “Monitors the information system to detect:”

7.2.1.227.1.2. SI-4a.1.¶

Description: “Attacks and indicators of potential attacks in accordance with [Assignment: organization-defined monitoring objectives]; and”

7.2.1.227.1.3. SI-4a.2.¶

Description: “Unauthorized local, network, and remote connections;”

7.2.1.227.1.4. SI-4b.¶

Description: “Identifies unauthorized use of the information system through [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods];”

7.2.1.227.1.5. SI-4c.¶

Description: “Deploys monitoring devices:”

7.2.1.227.1.6. SI-4c.1.¶

Description: “Strategically within the information system to collect organization-determined essential information; and”

7.2.1.227.1.7. SI-4c.2.¶

Description: “At ad hoc locations within the system to track specific types of transactions of interest to the organization;”

7.2.1.227.1.8. SI-4d.¶

Description: “Protects information obtained from intrusion-monitoring tools from unauthorized access, modification, and deletion;”

7.2.1.227.1.9. SI-4e.¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY

7.2.1.228.1. SI-5¶

SI-5 : SECURITY ALERTS, ADVISORIES, AND DIRECTIVES

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) generates security alerts and advisories to maintain situational awareness across the federal government. Security directives are issued by OMB or other designated organizations with the responsibility and authority to issue such directives. Compliance to security directives is essential due to the critical nature of many of these directives and the potential immediate adverse effects on organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation should the directives not be implemented in a timely manner. External organizations include, for example, external mission/business partners, supply chain partners, external service providers, and other peer/supporting organizations.”

Related Controls:SI-2

7.2.1.228.1.1. SI-5a.¶

Description: “Receives information system security alerts, advisories, and directives from [Assignment: organization-defined external organizations] on an ongoing basis;”

7.2.1.228.1.2. SI-5b.¶

Description: “Generates internal security alerts, advisories, and directives as deemed necessary;”

7.2.1.228.1.3. SI-5c.¶

Description: “Disseminates security alerts, advisories, and directives to: [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]; [Assignment: organization-defined elements within the organization]; [Assignment: organization-defined external organizations]]; and”

7.2.1.228.1.4. SI-5d.¶

Description: “Implements security directives in accordance with established time frames, or notifies the issuing organization of the degree of noncompliance.”

7.2.1.228.2. SI-5 (1)¶

SI-5 (1) : AUTOMATED ALERTS AND ADVISORIES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization employs automated mechanisms to make security alert and advisory information available throughout the organization.” Supplemental Guidance: “The significant number of changes to organizational information systems and the environments in which those systems operate requires the dissemination of security-related information to a variety of organizational entities that have a direct interest in the success of organizational missions and business functions. Based on the information provided by the security alerts and advisories, changes may be required at one or more of the three tiers related to the management of information security risk including the governance level, mission/business process/enterprise architecture level, and the information system level.”

Related Controls: .. _header_SI-6:

7.2.1.229. SI-6¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY

7.2.1.229.1. SI-6¶

SI-6 : SECURITY FUNCTION VERIFICATION

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The information system:” Supplemental Guidance: “Transitional states for information systems include, for example, system startup, restart, shutdown, and abort. Notifications provided by information systems include, for example, electronic alerts to system administrators, messages to local computer consoles, and/or hardware indications such as lights.”

Related Controls:CA-7,CM-6

7.2.1.229.1.1. SI-6a.¶

Description: “Verifies the correct operation of [Assignment: organization-defined security functions];”

7.2.1.229.1.2. SI-6b.¶

Description: “Performs this verification [Selection (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined system transitional states]; upon command by user with appropriate privilege; [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]];”

7.2.1.229.1.3. SI-6c.¶

Description: “Notifies [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] of failed security verification tests; and”

7.2.1.229.1.4. SI-6d.¶

Description: “[Selection (one or more): shuts the information system down; restarts the information system; [Assignment: organization-defined alternative action(s)]] when anomalies are discovered.”

7.2.1.229.2. SI-6 (1)¶

SI-6 (1) : NOTIFICATION OF FAILED SECURITY TESTS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-6].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.229.3. SI-6 (2)¶

SI-6 (2) : AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR DISTRIBUTED TESTING

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system implements automated mechanisms to support the management of distributed security testing.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:SI-2

7.2.1.229.4. SI-6 (3)¶

SI-6 (3) : REPORT VERIFICATION RESULTS

Priority:

SI-7 (13) : CODE EXECUTION IN PROTECTED ENVIRONMENTS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization allows execution of binary or machine-executable code obtained from sources with limited or no warranty and without the provision of source code only in confined physical or virtual machine environments and with the explicit approval of [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].” Supplemental Guidance: “This control enhancement applies to all sources of binary or machine-executable code including, for example, commercial software/firmware and open source software.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.230.15. SI-7 (14)¶

SI-7 (14) : BINARY OR MACHINE EXECUTABLE CODE

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “This control enhancement applies to all sources of binary or machine-executable code including, for example, commercial software/firmware and open source software. Organizations assess software products without accompanying source code from sources with limited or no warranty for potential security impacts. The assessments address the fact that these types of software products may be very difficult to review, repair, or extend, given that organizations, in most cases, do not have access to the original source code, and there may be no owners who could make such repairs on behalf of organizations.”

Related Controls:SA-5

7.2.1.230.15.1. SI-7 (14)(a)¶

Description: “Prohibits the use of binary or machine-executable code from sources with limited or no warranty and without the provision of source code; and”

7.2.1.230.15.2. SI-7 (14)(b)¶

Description: “Provides exceptions to the source code requirement only for compelling mission/operational requirements and with the approval of the authorizing official.”

7.2.1.230.16. SI-7 (15)¶

SI-7 (15) : CODE AUTHENTICATION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to authenticate [Assignment: organization-defined software or firmware components] prior to installation.” Supplemental Guidance: “Cryptographic authentication includes, for example, verifying that software or firmware components have been digitally signed using certificates recognized and approved by organizations. Code signing is an effective method to protect against malicious code.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.230.17. SI-7 (16)¶

SI-7 (16) : TIME LIMIT ON PROCESS EXECUTION W/O SUPERVISION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization does not allow processes to execute without supervision for more than [Assignment: organization-defined time period].” Supplemental Guidance: “This control enhancement addresses processes for which normal execution periods can be determined and situations in which organizations exceed such periods. Supervision includes, for example, operating system timers, automated responses, or manual oversight and response when information system process anomalies occur.”

Related Controls: .. _header_SI-8:

7.2.1.231. SI-8¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY

7.2.1.231.1. SI-8¶

SI-8 : SPAM PROTECTION

Priority: P2

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Information system entry and exit points include, for example, firewalls, electronic mail servers, web servers, proxy servers, remote-access servers, workstations, mobile devices, and notebook/laptop computers. Spam can be transported by different means including, for example, electronic mail, electronic mail attachments, and web accesses. Spam protection mechanisms include, for example, signature definitions.”

Related Controls:AT-2,AT-3,SC-5,SC-7,SI-3

7.2.1.231.1.1. SI-8a.¶

Description: “Employs spam protection mechanisms at information system entry and exit points to detect and take action on unsolicited messages; and”

7.2.1.231.1.2. SI-8b.¶

Description: “Updates spam protection mechanisms when new releases are available in accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures.”

7.2.1.231.2. SI-8 (1)¶

SI-8 (1) : CENTRAL MANAGEMENT

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization centrally manages spam protection mechanisms.” Supplemental Guidance: “Central management is the organization-wide management and implementation of spam protection mechanisms. Central management includes planning, implementing, assessing, authorizing, and monitoring the organization-defined, centrally managed spam protection security controls.”

Related Controls:AU-3,SI-2,SI-7

7.2.1.231.3. SI-8 (2)¶

SI-8 (2) : AUTOMATIC UPDATES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The information system automatically updates spam protection mechanisms.” Supplemental Guidance:

SI-10 (1) : MANUAL OVERRIDE CAPABILITY

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system:” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:CM-3,CM-5

7.2.1.233.2.1. SI-10 (1)(a)¶

Description: “Provides a manual override capability for input validation of [Assignment: organization-defined inputs];”

7.2.1.233.2.2. SI-10 (1)(b)¶

Description: “Restricts the use of the manual override capability to only [Assignment: organization-defined authorized individuals]; and”

7.2.1.233.2.3. SI-10 (1)(c)¶

Description: “Audits the use of the manual override capability.”

7.2.1.233.3. SI-10 (2)¶

SI-10 (2) : REVIEW / RESOLUTION OF ERRORS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization ensures that input validation errors are reviewed and resolved within [Assignment: organization-defined time period].” Supplemental Guidance: “Resolution of input validation errors includes, for example, correcting systemic causes of errors and resubmitting transactions with corrected input.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.233.4. SI-10 (3)¶

SI-10 (3) : PREDICTABLE BEHAVIOR

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system behaves in a predictable and documented manner that reflects organizational and system objectives when invalid inputs are received.” Supplemental Guidance: “A common vulnerability in organizational information systems is unpredictable behavior when invalid inputs are received. This control enhancement ensures that there is predictable behavior in the face of invalid inputs by specifying information system responses that facilitate transitioning the system to known states without adverse, unintended side effects.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.233.5. SI-10 (4)¶

SI-10 (4) : REVIEW / TIMING INTERACTIONS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization accounts for timing interactions among information system components in determining appropriate responses for invalid inputs.” Supplemental Guidance: “In addressing invalid information system inputs received across protocol interfaces, timing interactions become relevant, where one protocol needs to consider the impact of the error response on other protocols within the protocol stack. For example, 802.11 standard wireless network protocols do not interact well with Transmission Control Protocols (TCP) when packets are dropped (which could be due to invalid packet input). TCP assumes packet losses are due to congestion, while packets lost over 802.11 links are typically dropped due to collisions or noise on the link. If TCP makes a congestion response, it takes precisely the wrong action in response to a collision event. Adversaries may be able to use apparently acceptable individual behaviors of the protocols in concert to achieve adverse effects through suitable construction of invalid input.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.233.6. SI-10 (5)¶

SI-10 (5) : RESTRICT INPUTS TO TRUSTED SOURCES AND APPROVED FORMATS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization restricts the use of information inputs to [Assignment: organization-defined trusted sources] and/or [Assignment: organization-defined formats].” Supplemental Guidance: “This control enhancement applies the concept of whitelisting to information inputs. Specifying known trusted sources for information inputs and acceptable formats for such inputs can reduce the probability of malicious activity.”

Related Controls: .. _header_SI-11:

7.2.1.234. SI-11¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY

7.2.1.234.1. SI-11¶

SI-11 : ERROR HANDLING

Priority: P2

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The information system:” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations carefully consider the structure/content of error messages. The extent to which information systems are able to identify and handle error conditions is guided by organizational policy and operational requirements. Information that could be exploited by adversaries includes, for example, erroneous logon attempts with passwords entered by mistake as the username, mission/business information that can be derived from (if not stated explicitly by) information recorded, and personal information such as account numbers, social security numbers, and credit card numbers. In addition, error messages may provide a covert channel for transmitting information.”

Related Controls:AU-2,AU-3,SC-31

7.2.1.234.1.1. SI-11a.¶

Description: “Generates error messages that provide information necessary for corrective actions without revealing information that could be exploited by adversaries; and”

7.2.1.234.1.2. SI-11b.¶

Description: “Reveals error messages only to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].” .. _header_SI-12:

7.2.1.235. SI-12¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY

7.2.1.235.1. SI-12¶

SI-12 : INFORMATION HANDLING AND RETENTION

Priority: P2

Baseline-Impact: LOW,MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The organization handles and retains information within the information system and information output from the system in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and operational requirements.” Supplemental Guidance: “Information handling and retention requirements cover the full life cycle of information, in some cases extending beyond the disposal of information systems. The National Archives and Records Administration provides guidance on records retention.”

Related Controls:AC-16,AU-5,AU-11,MP-2,MP-4

7.2.1.236. SI-13¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY

7.2.1.236.1. SI-13¶

SI-13 : PREDICTABLE FAILURE PREVENTION

Priority: P0

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “While MTTF is primarily a reliability issue, this control addresses potential failures of specific information system components that provide security capability. Failure rates reflect installation-specific consideration, not industry-average. Organizations define criteria for substitution of information system components based on MTTF value with consideration for resulting potential harm from component failures. Transfer of responsibilities between active and standby components does not compromise safety, operational readiness, or security capability (e.g., preservation of state variables). Standby components remain available at all times except for maintenance issues or recovery failures in progress.”

Related Controls:CP-2,CP-10,MA-6

7.2.1.236.1.1. SI-13a.¶

Description: “Determines mean time to failure (MTTF) for [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] in specific environments of operation; and”

7.2.1.236.1.2. SI-13b.¶

Description: “Provides substitute information system components and a means to exchange active and standby components at [Assignment: organization-defined MTTF substitution criteria].”

7.2.1.236.2. SI-13 (1)¶

SI-13 (1) : TRANSFERRING COMPONENT RESPONSIBILITIES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization takes information system components out of service by transferring component responsibilities to substitute components no later than [Assignment: organization-defined fraction or percentage] of mean time to failure.” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.236.3. SI-13 (2)¶

SI-13 (2) : TIME LIMIT ON PROCESS EXECUTION WITHOUT SUPERVISION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “[Withdrawn: Incorporated into SI-7 (16)].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.236.4. SI-13 (3)¶

SI-13 (3) : MANUAL TRANSFER BETWEEN COMPONENTS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization manually initiates transfers between active and standby information system components [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] if the mean time to failure exceeds [Assignment: organization-defined time period].” Supplemental Guidance:

Related Controls:

7.2.1.236.5. SI-13 (4)¶

SI-13 (4) : STANDBY COMPONENT INSTALLATION / NOTIFICATION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization, if information system component failures are detected:” Supplemental Guidance: “Automatic or manual transfer of components from standby to active mode can occur, for example, upon detection of component failures.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.236.5.1. SI-13 (4)(a)¶

Description: “Ensures that the standby components are successfully and transparently installed within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and”

7.2.1.236.5.2. SI-13 (4)(b)¶

Description: “[Selection (one or more): activates [Assignment: organization-defined alarm]; automatically shuts down the information system].”

7.2.1.236.6. SI-13 (5)¶

SI-13 (5) : FAILOVER CAPABILITY

Priority:

Control Family: SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY

7.2.1.238.1. SI-15¶

SI-15 : INFORMATION OUTPUT FILTERING

Priority: P0

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system validates information output from [Assignment: organization-defined software programs and/or applications] to ensure that the information is consistent with the expected content.” Supplemental Guidance: “Certain types of cyber attacks (e.g., SQL injections) produce output results that are unexpected or inconsistent with the output results that would normally be expected from software programs or applications. This control enhancement focuses on detecting extraneous content, preventing such extraneous content from being displayed, and alerting monitoring tools that anomalous behavior has been discovered.”

Related Controls:SI-3,SI-4

7.2.1.239. SI-16¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY

7.2.1.239.1. SI-16¶

SI-16 : MEMORY PROTECTION

Priority: P1

Baseline-Impact: MODERATE,HIGH

Description: “The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards] to protect its memory from unauthorized code execution.” Supplemental Guidance: “Some adversaries launch attacks with the intent of executing code in non-executable regions of memory or in memory locations that are prohibited. Security safeguards employed to protect memory include, for example, data execution prevention and address space layout randomization. Data execution prevention safeguards can either be hardware-enforced or software-enforced with hardware providing the greater strength of mechanism.”

Related Controls:AC-25,SC-3

7.2.1.240. SI-17¶

Control Family: SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY

7.2.1.240.1. SI-17¶

SI-17 : FAIL-SAFE PROCEDURES

Priority: P0

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The information system implements [Assignment: organization-defined fail-safe procedures] when [Assignment: organization-defined failure conditions occur].” Supplemental Guidance: “Failure conditions include, for example, loss of communications among critical system components or between system components and operational facilities. Fail-safe procedures include, for example, alerting operator personnel and providing specific instructions on subsequent steps to take (e.g., do nothing, reestablish system settings, shut down processes, restart the system, or contact designated organizational personnel).”

Related Controls:CP-12,CP-13,SC-24,SI-13

7.2.1.241. PM-1¶

Control Family: PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

7.2.1.241.1. PM-1¶

PM-1 : INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM PLAN

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Information security program plans can be represented in single documents or compilations of documents at the discretion of organizations. The plans document the program management controls and organization-defined common controls. Information security program plans provide sufficient information about the program management controls/common controls (including specification of parameters for any assignment and selection statements either explicitly or by reference) to enable implementations that are unambiguously compliant with the intent of the plans and a determination of the risk to be incurred if the plans are implemented as intended. The security plans for individual information systems and the organization-wide information security program plan together, provide complete coverage for all security controls employed within the organization. Common controls are documented in an appendix to the organization�s information security program plan unless the controls are included in a separate security plan for an information system (e.g., security controls employed as part of an intrusion detection system providing organization-wide boundary protection inherited by one or more organizational information systems). The organization-wide information security program plan will indicate which separate security plans contain descriptions of common controls. Organizations have the flexibility to describe common controls in a single document or in multiple documents. In the case of multiple documents, the documents describing common controls are included as attachments to the information security program plan. If the information security program plan contains multiple documents, the organization specifies in each document the organizational official or officials responsible for the development, implementation, assessment, authorization, and monitoring of the respective common controls. For example, the organization may require that the Facilities Management Office develop, implement, assess, authorize, and continuously monitor common physical and environmental protection controls from the PE family when such controls are not associated with a particular information system but instead, support multiple information systems.”

Related Controls:PM-8

7.2.1.241.1.1. PM-1a.¶

Description: “Develops and disseminates an organization-wide information security program plan that:”

7.2.1.241.1.2. PM-1a.1.¶

Description: “Provides an overview of the requirements for the security program and a description of the security program management controls and common controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements;”

7.2.1.241.1.3. PM-1a.2.¶

Description: “Includes the identification and assignment of roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance;”

7.2.1.241.1.4. PM-1a.3.¶

Description: “Reflects coordination among organizational entities responsible for the different aspects of information security (i.e., technical, physical, personnel, cyber-physical); and”

7.2.1.241.1.5. PM-1a.4.¶

Description: “Is approved by a senior official with responsibility and accountability for the risk being incurred to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, and reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation;”

7.2.1.241.1.6. PM-1b.¶

Description: “Reviews the organization-wide information security program plan [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];”

7.2.1.241.1.7. PM-1c.¶

Description: “Updates the plan to address organizational changes and problems identified during plan implementation or security control assessments; and”

7.2.1.241.1.8. PM-1d.¶

Description: “Protects the information security program plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.” .. _header_PM-2:

7.2.1.242. PM-2¶

Control Family: PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

7.2.1.242.1. PM-2¶

PM-2 : SENIOR INFORMATION SECURITY OFFICER

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization appoints a senior information security officer with the mission and resources to coordinate, develop, implement, and maintain an organization-wide information security program.” Supplemental Guidance: “The security officer described in this control is an organizational official. For a federal agency (as defined in applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, or regulations) this official is the Senior Agency Information Security Officer. Organizations may also refer to this official as the Senior Information Security Officer or Chief Information Security Officer.”

Related Controls:

7.2.1.243. PM-3¶

Control Family: PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

7.2.1.243.1. PM-3¶

PM-3 : INFORMATION SECURITY RESOURCES

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Organizations consider establishing champions for information security efforts and as part of including the necessary resources, assign specialized expertise and resources as needed. Organizations may designate and empower an Investment Review Board (or similar group) to manage and provide oversight for the information security-related aspects of the capital planning and investment control process.”

Related Controls:PM-4,SA-2

7.2.1.243.1.1. PM-3a.¶

Description: “Ensures that all capital planning and investment requests include the resources needed to implement the information security program and documents all exceptions to this requirement;”

7.2.1.243.1.2. PM-3b.¶

Description: “Employs a business case/Exhibit 300/Exhibit 53 to record the resources required; and”

7.2.1.243.1.3. PM-3c.¶

Description: “Ensures that information security resources are available for expenditure as planned.” .. _header_PM-4:

7.2.1.244. PM-4¶

Control Family: PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

7.2.1.244.1. PM-4¶

PM-4 : PLAN OF ACTION AND MILESTONES PROCESS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “The plan of action and milestones is a key document in the information security program and is subject to federal reporting requirements established by OMB. With the increasing emphasis on organization-wide risk management across all three tiers in the risk management hierarchy (i.e., organization, mission/business process, and information system), organizations view plans of action and milestones from an organizational perspective, prioritizing risk response actions and ensuring consistency with the goals and objectives of the organization. Plan of action and milestones updates are based on findings from security control assessments and continuous monitoring activities. OMB FISMA reporting guidance contains instructions regarding organizational plans of action and milestones.”

Related Controls:CA-5

7.2.1.244.1.1. PM-4a.¶

Description: “Implements a process for ensuring that plans of action and milestones for the security program and associated organizational information systems:”

7.2.1.244.1.2. PM-4a.1.¶

Description: “Are developed and maintained;”

7.2.1.244.1.3. PM-4a.2.¶

PM-9 : RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGY

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “An organization-wide risk management strategy includes, for example, an unambiguous expression of the risk tolerance for the organization, acceptable risk assessment methodologies, risk mitigation strategies, a process for consistently evaluating risk across the organization with respect to the organization�s risk tolerance, and approaches for monitoring risk over time. The use of a risk executive function can facilitate consistent, organization-wide application of the risk management strategy. The organization-wide risk management strategy can be informed by risk-related inputs from other sources both internal and external to the organization to ensure the strategy is both broad-based and comprehensive.”

Related Controls:RA-3

7.2.1.249.1.1. PM-9a.¶

Description: “Develops a comprehensive strategy to manage risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation associated with the operation and use of information systems;”

7.2.1.249.1.2. PM-9b.¶

Description: “Implements the risk management strategy consistently across the organization; and”

7.2.1.249.1.3. PM-9c.¶

Description: “Reviews and updates the risk management strategy [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] or as required, to address organizational changes.” .. _header_PM-10:

7.2.1.250. PM-10¶

Control Family: PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

7.2.1.250.1. PM-10¶

PM-10 : SECURITY AUTHORIZATION PROCESS

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Security authorization processes for information systems and environments of operation require the implementation of an organization-wide risk management process, a Risk Management Framework, and associated security standards and guidelines. Specific roles within the risk management process include an organizational risk executive (function) and designated authorizing officials for each organizational information system and common control provider. Security authorization processes are integrated with organizational continuous monitoring processes to facilitate ongoing understanding and acceptance of risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.”

Related Controls:CA-6

7.2.1.250.1.1. PM-10a.¶

Description: “Manages (i.e., documents, tracks, and reports) the security state of organizational information systems and the environments in which those systems operate through security authorization processes;”

7.2.1.250.1.2. PM-10b.¶

Description: “Designates individuals to fulfill specific roles and responsibilities within the organizational risk management process; and”

7.2.1.250.1.3. PM-10c.¶

Description: “Fully integrates the security authorization processes into an organization-wide risk management program.” .. _header_PM-11:

7.2.1.251. PM-11¶

Control Family: PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

7.2.1.251.1. PM-11¶

PM-11 : MISSION/BUSINESS PROCESS DEFINITION

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization:” Supplemental Guidance: “Information protection needs are technology-independent, required capabilities to counter threats to organizations, individuals, or the Nation through the compromise of information (i.e., loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability). Information protection needs are derived from the mission/business needs defined by the organization, the mission/business processes selected to meet the stated needs, and the organizational risk management strategy. Information protection needs determine the required security controls for the organization and the associated information systems supporting the mission/business processes. Inherent in defining an organization�s information protection needs is an understanding of the level of adverse impact that could result if a compromise of information occurs. The security categorization process is used to make such potential impact determinations. Mission/business process definitions and associated information protection requirements are documented by the organization in accordance with organizational policy and procedure.”

Related Controls:PM-7,PM-8,RA-2

7.2.1.251.1.1. PM-11a.¶

Description: “Defines mission/business processes with consideration for information security and the resulting risk to organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation; and”

7.2.1.251.1.2. PM-11b.¶

Description: “Determines information protection needs arising from the defined mission/business processes and revises the processes as necessary, until achievable protection needs are obtained.” .. _header_PM-12:

7.2.1.252. PM-12¶

Description: “To facilitate ongoing security education and training for organizational personnel;”

7.2.1.255.1.2. PM-15b.¶

Description: “To maintain currency with recommended security practices, techniques, and technologies; and”

7.2.1.255.1.3. PM-15c.¶

Description: “To share current security-related information including threats, vulnerabilities, and incidents.” .. _header_PM-16:

7.2.1.256. PM-16¶

Control Family: PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

7.2.1.256.1. PM-16¶

PM-16 : THREAT AWARENESS PROGRAM

Priority:

Baseline-Impact:

Description: “The organization implements a threat awareness program that includes a cross-organization information-sharing capability.” Supplemental Guidance: “Because of the constantly changing and increasing sophistication of adversaries, especially the advanced persistent threat (APT), it is becoming more likely that adversaries may successfully breach or compromise organizational information systems. One of the best techniques to address this concern is for organizations to share threat information. This can include, for example, sharing threat events (i.e., tactics, techniques, and procedures) that organizations have experienced, mitigations that organizations have found are effective against certain types of threats, threat intelligence (i.e., indications and warnings about threats that are likely to occur). Threat information sharing may be bilateral (e.g., government-commercial cooperatives, government-government cooperatives), or multilateral (e.g., organizations taking part in threat-sharing consortia). Threat information may be highly sensitive requiring special agreements and protection, or less sensitive and freely shared.”

Related Controls:PM-12,PM-16

7.3. Indices and tables¶

8. Help¶

The SIMP team is here to help!

Please see the following for a list of resources.

8.1. Frequently Asked Questions¶

This chapter addresses some of the frequently asked questions (FAQ) about SIMP.

8.1.1. SIMP Version Guide¶

The SIMP versioning system has caused some confusion over time and this document serves as the authoritative reference for clarification.

8.1.1.1. Top-Level SIMP for 6.X+¶

Note

This is the version number that you get when you run rpm -q simp

The top level SIMP version for SIMP releases from 6.0.0 onward will be following Semantic Versioning 2.0.0.

In short, this means (from the reference):

Given a version number MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH, increment the:

#. MAJOR version when you make incompatible API changes
#. MINOR version when you add functionality in a backwards-compatible manner
#. PATCH version when you make backwards-compatible bug fixes

8.1.1.2. Top-Level SIMP for SIMP before 6.X¶

Note

This is the version number that you get when you run rpm -q simp

The top level SIMP version for SIMP releases prior to the 6.0.0 release have the following structure given the format MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH:

#. MAJOR version when the version of EL changes
#. MINOR version when you make incompatible API changes
#. PATCH version when you add functionality in a backwards-compatible manner
#. FIXES version when you make backwards-compatible bug fixes

The last releases mapped in this manner are as follows:

5.X => EL 7
4.X => EL 6

8.1.1.3. Sub-Component Versioning¶

For all versions of SIMP, sub-components follow Semantic Versioning 2.0.0.

8.1.2. What is the Password Complexity for SIMP?¶

The following is the default password requirements for a standard SIMP system. This is based off of an amalgam of various password policies and may vary based on individual policies that are set for your installation.

The default complexity is enforced in both PAM and LDAP.

8.1.2.1. Complexity Rules¶

14 Characters or greater

1 Upper case letter

1 Lower case letter

1 Number

1 Special character

No more than 2 repetitions of the same character

No more than 4 characters in a monotonic character sequence

Must not be one of the last 24 passwords that you have used

Note

Locked out accounts will unlock automatically after 15 minutes for non-root users and one minute for the root user.

8.2. Public Resources¶

Many resources are available for getting help with SIMP. For FOSS support, as the community can handle it, you can use one of the following resources.

8.2.1. Live Chat¶

SIMP Project HipChat
- No account is required for this room. However, if you are going to participate regularly, please consider signing up for a HipChat account as it will allow you to receive offline messages.
- If you choose to sign up, we recommend using a modifier to your email address such as yourname+simp@gmail.com since HipChat binds your account to the group that you join.

8.2.2. Mailing Lists¶

SIMP Q&A Board

A Question and Answer board for the general community

SIMP Users Mailing List

General user discussion

SIMP Developers List

Discussion about development

SIMP Announcement List

Announcements about changes to the SIMP environment

SIMP Security List

A post-only list for alerting the SIMP team to security issues

8.2.3. Bug Tracking¶

If you find a bug, we’d like to encourage you to file a bug in our JIRA Bug Tracking system. That said, we’re happy to hear about issues in whatever manner is easiest for you.

8.3. Commercial Resources¶

Full commercial support and consulting services are availble for SIMP and the underlying components!

Details and contact information are available on the SIMP Project Homepage.

8.4. Indices and tables¶

9. License¶

9.1. Legal Notice¶

Per Section 105 of the Copyright Act of 1976, these works are not entitled to domestic copyright protection under US Federal law. The US Government retains the right to pursue copyright protections outside of the United States. The United States Government has unlimited rights in this documentation and all derivatives thereof, pursuant to the contracts under which it was developed and the License under which it falls.

Material submitted by entities outside the United States Government may pursue copyright enforcement on those portions to which they hold copyright. These portions are explicitly marked within the source of this documentation.

This material may only be distributed subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the latest version is available at the Apache License website.

The SIMP Development Team makes no representation about the suitability of the SIMP product for any purpose. It is provided “as is” without expressed or implied warranty. If SIMP is modified in any way, except for designed customization, please identify the new copy as a variant of SIMP.

Additional products are distributed as part of the SIMP suite. By using SIMP, the user agrees to abide by the licenses for the included products.

10. Contact¶

If you have questions please contact the SIMP team. simp@simp-project.org

11. Glossary of Terms¶

Note

Many terms here have been reproduced from various locations across the Internet and are governed by the licenses surrounding the source material. Please see the reference links for specifics on usage and reproducibility.

ACL

Access Control List

A list of permissions attached to an object. An ACL specifies which users or system processes are granted access to objects, as well as what operations are allowed on given objects. Each entry in a typical ACL specifies a subject and an operation.

AIDE

Advanced Intrusion Detection Environment

An intrusion detection system for checking the integrity of files under Linux. AIDE can be used to help track file integrity by comparing a snapshot of the system’s files prior to and after a suspected incident. It is maintained by Rami Lehti and Pablo Virolainen.

Auditd

The userspace component to the Linux Auditing System. It is responsible for writing audit records to the disk. Viewing the logs is done with the ausearch or aureport utilities. Configuring the audit rules is done with the auditctl utility. During startup, the rules in /etc/audit/audit.rules are read by auditctl. The audit daemon itself has some configuration options that the admin may wish to customize. They are found in the auditd.conf file.

Beaker

An acceptance testing harness, written in Ruby, by the Puppet team.

Source: Beaker Source Repository:

BIOS

Basic Input/Output System

A type of firmware used to perform hardware initialization during the booting process (power-on startup) on IBM PC compatible computers.

Source: Wikipedia: BIOS

CA

Certificate Authority

An entity that issues X.509 digital certificates.

CentOS

Community Enterprise Operating System

An Enterprise-grade Operating System that is mostly compatible with a prominent Linux distribution.

CLI

Command Line Interface

A means of interacting with a computer program where the user (or client) issues commands to the program in the form of successive lines of text (command lines).

Source: Wikipedia: Command Line Interface

CPU

Central Processing Unit

A central processing unit (CPU) is the electronic circuitry within a computer that carries out the instructions of a computer program by performing the basic arithmetic, logical, control and input/output (I/O) operations specified by the instructions

Source: Wikipedia: Central Processing Unit

DAC

Discretionary Access Control

A type of access control defined by the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria “as a means of restricting access to objects based on the identity of subjects and/or groups to which they belong. The controls are discretionary in the sense that a subject with a certain access permission is capable of passing that permission (perhaps indirectly) on to any other subject (unless restrained by mandatory access control)”.

Source: Wikipedia: Discretionary access control

DHCP

Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol

A network protocol that enables a server to automatically assign an IP address to a computer.

DNS

Domain Name System

A database system that translates a computer’s fully qualified domain name into an IP address and the reverse.

Docker

Docker containers wrap a piece of software in a complete filesystem that contains everything needed to run: code, runtime, system tools, system libraries – anything that can be installed on a server. This guarantees that the software will always run the same, regardless of its environment.

Source: Docker: What is Docker?

DoS

Denial of Service

Denial of Service Attack

An attempt to make a machine or network resource unavailable to its intended users, such as to temporarily or indefinitely interrupt or suspend services of a host connected to the Internet.

Source: Wikipedia: Denial-of-service attack

EL

Enterprise Linux

In the context of SIMP, EL is a generic term for Enterprise Linux and covers both RHEL and CentOS as well as other RHEL derivatives such as Oracle Linux.

Elasticsearch

A distributed, RESTful search and analytics engine capable of solving a growing number of use cases. As the heart of the Elastic Stack, it centrally stores your data so you can discover the expected and uncover the unexpected.

Source: Elasticsearch Homepage

ELG

An acronym for Elasticsearch, Logstash, and Grafana

ENC

External Node Classifier

An arbitrary script or application which can tell Puppet which classes a node should have. It can replace or work in concert with the node definitions in the main site manifest (site.pp).

The Puppet Enterprise Console and The Foreman are two examples of External Node Classifiers.

Source: External Node Classifiers

EPEL

Extra Packages for Enterprise Linux

A Fedora Special Interest Group that creates, maintains, and manages a high quality set of additional packages for Enterprise Linux, including, but not limited to, Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL), CentOS and Scientific Linux (SL), Oracle Linux (OL).E

EPEL packages are usually based on their Fedora counterparts and will never conflict with or replace packages in the base Enterprise Linux distributions. EPEL uses much of the same infrastructure as Fedora, including buildsystem, bugzilla instance, updates manager, mirror manager and more.

Source: EPEL Homepage

FIPS

Federal Information Processing Standard

Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publications are standards issued by NIST after approval by the Secretary of Commerce pursuant to the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA)

The particular standard of note in SIMP is FIPS 140-2

Source: FIPS Publications

FOSS

Open Source

Following an Open Source Initiative approved License.

See: The Open Source Definition

FQDN

Fully Qualified Domain Name

A domain name that specifies its exact location in the tree hierarchy of the DNS. It specifies all domain levels, including the top-level domain and the root zone. An FQDN is distinguished by its unambiguity; it can only be interpreted one way.

GPG

GnuPG

Gnu Privacy Guard

A complete and free implementation of the OpenPGP standard as defined by RFC4880 (also known as PGP).

Source: GnuPG Homepage

Grafana

A system of pluggable panels and data sources allowing easy extensibility and a variety of panels, including fully featured graph panels with rich visualization options. There is built in support for many of the most popular time series data sources.

Source: Grafana Homepage

GUI

Graphical User Interface

A type of interface that allows users to interact with electronic devices through graphical icons and visual indicators such as secondary notation, as opposed to text-based interfaces, typed command labels or text navigation.

Source: Wikipedia: Graphical User Interface

HDD

Hard Disk Drive

A device for storing and retrieving digital information, primarily computer data.

Hiera

A key/value lookup tool for configuration data, built to make Puppet better and let you set node-specific data without repeating yourself.

Source: Hiera Overview

IMA

Integrity Management Architecture

The integrity subsystem is to detect if files have been accidentally or maliciously altered, both remotely and locally.

Source: IMA Sourceforge Page

initrd

The Initial RAMDisk. A complete environment that is loaded at boot time to enable booting the rest of the operating system.

IP

IP Address

Internet Protocol Address

A numerical label assigned to each device (e.g., computer, printer) participating in a computer network that uses the Internet Protocol for communication.

Source: Wikipedia: IP Address

IP6Tables

Internet Protocol 6 Tables

A user space application that provides an interface to the IPv6 firewall rules on modern Linux systems.

IPTables

Internet Protocol Tables

A user space application that provides an interface to the IPv4 firewall rules on modern Linux systems.

ISO

ISO 9660

A file system standard published by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or optical disc media.

Source: Wikipedia: ISO_9660

KDC

Key Distribution Center

Part of a cryptosystem intended to reduce the risks inherent in exchanging keys. KDCs often operate in systems within which some users may have permission to use certain services at some times and not at others.

Kerberos

A computer network authentication protocol that works on the basis of “tickets” to allow nodes communicating over a non-secure network to prove their identity to one another in a secure manner.

LDAP

Lightweight Directory Access Protocol

A protocol for querying and modifying LDAP directory services including information such as names, addresses, email, phone numbers, and other information from an online directory.

LDIF

Lightweight Directory Interchange Format

A standard plain text data interchange format for representing LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) directory content and update requests. LDIF conveys directory content as a set of records, one record for each object (or entry). It also represents update requests, such as Add, Modify, Delete, and Rename, as a set of records, one record for each update request.

Source: Wikipedia: LDAP Data Interchange Format

Logstash

An open source, server-side data processing pipeline that ingests data from a multitude of sources simultaneously, transforms it, and then sends it to your favorite “stash.”

Source: Logstash Homepage

LUKS

Linux Unified Key Setup

The standard for Linux hard disk encryption.

See: The LUKS Homepage

MAC

MAC Address

Media Access Control

Media Access Control Address

A unique identifier assigned to network interfaces for communications on the physical network segment.

Source: Wikipedia: MAC address

Mandatory Access Control

A type of access control by which the operating system constrains the ability of a subject or initiator to access or generally perform some sort of operation on an object or target.

Source: Wikipedia: Mandatory access control

NAT

Network Address Translation

The process of modifying IP address information in IP packet headers while in transit across a traffic routing device.

NFS

Network File System

A distributed file system protocol that allows a user on a client computer to access files over a network in a manner similar to how local storage is accessed.

NIST

National Institute of Standards and Technology

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) was founded in 1901 and now part of the U.S. Department of Commerce. NIST is one of the nation’s oldest physical science laboratories.

Source: NIST - About NIST

NIST 800-53

NIST SP 800-53

NIST Special Publication 800-53

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations

See: SP 800-53

NIST SP

NIST Special Publication

A set of publications that provide computer/cyber/information security and guidelines, recommendations, and reference materials.

See: NIST Special Publications

OpenSCAP

The OpenSCAP project provides tools that are free to use anywhere you like, for any purpose. Availability of the code results in greater portability – anyone can send patches to add support for their platform of choice.

Source: OpenSCAP Features

OS

Operating System

System software that manages computer hardware and software resources and provides common services for computer programs. All computer programs, excluding firmware, require an operating system to function.

Source: Wikipedia: Operating system

PAM

Pluggable Authentication Modules

A mechanism to integrate multiple low-level authentication schemes into a high-level application programming interface (API). It allows programs that rely on authentication to be written independent of the underlying authentication scheme.

PEM

Privacy Enhanced Mail

An early standard for securing electronic mail. This is the public-key of a specific certificate. This is also the format used for Certificate Authority certificates.

PERL

Practical Extraction and Report Language

A high-level, general-purpose, interpreted, dynamic programming language. PERL was originally developed by Larry Wall in 1987 as a general-purpose Unix scripting language to make report processing easier.

PKI

Public Key Infrastructure

A security architecture that has been introduced to provide an increased level of confidence for exchanging information over an increasingly insecure Internet. PKI enables users of a basically insecure public networks, such as the Internet, to securely authenticate to systems and exchange data. The exchange of data is done by using a combination of cryptographically bound public and private keys.

PSSH

Parallel Secure Shell

A tool that provides parallel versions of OpenSSH and other related tools.

Puppet

An Open Source configuration management tool written and maintained by Puppet Labs. Written as a Ruby DSL, Puppet provides a declarative language that allows system administrators to provide a consistently applied management infrastructure. Users describes system resource and resource state in the Puppet language. Puppet discovers system specific information via facter and compiles Puppet manifests into a system specific catalog containing resources and resource dependencies, which are applied to each client system.

PXE

Preboot Execution Environment

An environment to boot computers using a network interface independently of data storage devices (like hard disks) or installed operating systems.

Rake

Ruby Make

A Make-like program implemented in Ruby.

Source: Rake Homepage

RAM

Random Access Memory

A form of computer data storage. A random access device allows stored data to be accessed in nearly the same amount of time for any storage location, so data can be accessed quickly in any random order.

Red Hat

Red Hat®

Red Hat®, Inc.

A collection of many different software programs, developed by Red Hat®, Inc. and other members of the Open Source community. All software programs included in Red Hat Enterprise Linux® are GPG signed by Red Hat®, Inc. to indicate that they were supplied by Red Hat®, Inc.

SIMP 4.3.0 RHEL External RPMs¶
RPM Name	RPM Source
BackupPC-3.2.1-10.SIMP.4.el6.x86_64.rpm	https://dl.bintray.com/simp/4.2.X-Ext/BackupPC-3.2.1-10.SIMP.4.el6.x86_64.rpm
activemq-5.9.1-2.el6.noarch.rpm	http://yum.puppetlabs.com/el/6/dependencies/x86_64/activemq-5.9.1-2.el6.noarch.rpm
activemq-info-provider-5.9.1-2.el6.noarch.rpm	http://yum.puppetlabs.com/el/6/dependencies/x86_64/activemq-info-provider-5.9.1-2.el6.noarch.rpm
bitmap-console-fonts-0.3-15.el6.noarch.rpm	Red Hat Optional Repository
bitmap-fangsongti-fonts-0.3-15.el6.noarch.rpm	Red Hat Optional Repository
bitmap-fonts-compat-0.3-15.el6.noarch.rpm	Red Hat Optional Repository
bitmap-miscfixed-fonts-0.3-15.el6.noarch.rpm	Red Hat Optional Repository
chkrootkit-0.49-9.el6.x86_64.rpm	http://mirror.symnds.com/distributions/fedora-epel/6/x86_64/chkrootkit-0.49-9.el6.x86_64.rpm
clamav-0.98.7-1.el6.x86_64.rpm	http://mirror.symnds.com/distributions/fedora-epel/6/x86_64/clamav-0.98.7-1.el6.x86_64.rpm
clamav-db-0.98.7-1.el6.x86_64.rpm	http://mirror.symnds.com/distributions/fedora-epel/6/x86_64/clamav-db-0.98.7-1.el6.x86_64.rpm
clamav-devel-0.98.7-1.el6.x86_64.rpm	http://mirror.symnds.com/distributions/fedora-epel/6/x86_64/clamav-devel-0.98.7-1.el6.x86_64.rpm
clamav-milter-0.98.7-1.el6.x86_64.rpm	http://mirror.symnds.com/distributions/fedora-epel/6/x86_64/clamav-milter-0.98.7-1.el6.x86_64.rpm
clamav-unofficial-sigs-3.7.1-7.el6.noarch.rpm	http://mirror.symnds.com/distributions/fedora-epel/6/x86_64/clamav-unofficial-sigs-3.7.1-7.el6.noarch.rpm
clamd-0.98.7-1.el6.x86_64.rpm	http://mirror.symnds.com/distributions/fedora-epel/6/x86_64/clamd-0.98.7-1.el6.x86_64.rpm
clamsmtp-1.10-6.el6.x86_64.rpm	http://mirror.symnds.com/distributions/fedora-epel/6/x86_64/clamsmtp-1.10-6.el6.x86_64.rpm
dejavu-lgc-sans-fonts-2.33-1.el6.noarch.rpm	Red Hat Base Repository
dejavu-lgc-serif-fonts-2.33-1.el6.noarch.rpm	Red Hat Base Repository
dracut-004-388.el6.noarch.rpm	Red Hat Base Repository
dracut-fips-004-388.el6.noarch.rpm	Red Hat Base Repository
dracut-fips-aesni-004-388.el6.noarch.rpm	Red Hat Optional Repository
dracut-kernel-004-388.el6.noarch.rpm	Red Hat Base Repository
elasticsearch-2.3.5.rpm	https://download.elastic.co/elasticsearch/release/org/elasticsearch/distribution/rpm/elasticsearch/2.3.5/elasticsearch-2.3.5.rpm
elasticsearch-curator-1.1.1-0.el6.noarch.rpm	https://dl.bintray.com/simp/4.2.X-Ext/elasticsearch-curator-1.1.1-0.el6.noarch.rpm
facter-2.4.6-1.el6.x86_64.rpm	http://yum.puppetlabs.com/el/6/products/x86_64/facter-2.4.6-1.el6.x86_64.rpm
fping-2.4b2-10.el6.x86_64.rpm	http://mirror.symnds.com/distributions/fedora-epel/6/x86_64/fping-2.4b2-10.el6.x86_64.rpm
freeradius-ldap-2.2.6-4.el6.x86_64.rpm	Red Hat Base Repository
freeradius-utils-2.2.6-4.el6.x86_64.rpm	Red Hat Base Repository
ganglia-3.7.1-2.el6.x86_64.rpm	http://mirror.symnds.com/distributions/fedora-epel/6/x86_64/ganglia-3.7.1-2.el6.x86_64.rpm
ganglia-devel-3.7.1-2.el6.x86_64.rpm	http://mirror.symnds.com/distributions/fedora-epel/6/x86_64/ganglia-devel-3.7.1-2.el6.x86_64.rpm
ganglia-gmetad-3.7.1-2.el6.x86_64.rpm	http://mirror.symnds.com/distributions/fedora-epel/6/x86_64/ganglia-gmetad-3.7.1-2.el6.x86_64.rpm
ganglia-gmond-3.7.1-2.el6.x86_64.rpm	http://mirror.symnds.com/distributions/fedora-epel/6/x86_64/ganglia-gmond-3.7.1-2.el6.x86_64.rpm
ganglia-gmond-python-3.7.1-2.el6.x86_64.rpm	http://mirror.symnds.com/distributions/fedora-epel/6/x86_64/ganglia-gmond-python-3.7.1-2.el6.x86_64.rpm
glibc-2.12-1.166.el6_7.1.x86_64.rpm	Red Hat Updates Repository
glibc-common-2.12-1.166.el6_7.1.x86_64.rpm	Red Hat Updates Repository
glibc-devel-2.12-1.166.el6_7.1.x86_64.rpm	Red Hat Updates Repository
glibc-devel-2.12-1.166.el6_7.1.i686.rpm	Red Hat Updates Repository
glibc-headers-2.12-1.166.el6_7.1.x86_64.rpm	Red Hat Updates Repository
glibc-static-2.12-1.166.el6_7.1.x86_64.rpm	Red Hat Updates Repository
glibc-static-2.12-1.166.el6_7.1.i686.rpm	Red Hat Updates Repository
glibc-utils-2.12-1.166.el6_7.1.x86_64.rpm	Red Hat Updates Repository

SIMP 5.2.0 RHEL External RPMs¶
RPM Name	RPM Source
activemq-5.9.1-2.el7.noarch.rpm	http://yum.puppetlabs.com/el/7/dependencies/x86_64/activemq-5.9.1-2.el7.noarch.rpm
activemq-info-provider-5.9.1-2.el7.noarch.rpm	http://yum.puppetlabs.com/el/7/dependencies/x86_64/activemq-info-provider-5.9.1-2.el7.noarch.rpm
apr-util-1.5.2-6.el7.x86_64.rpm	Red Hat Optional Repository
apr-util-ldap-1.5.2-6.el7.x86_64.rpm	Red Hat Optional Repository
boost-regex-1.53.0-23.el7.x86_64.rpm	Red Hat Updates Repository
cfacter-0.3.0-1.el7.x86_64.rpm	http://yum.puppetlabs.com/el/7/products/x86_64/cfacter-0.3.0-1.el7.x86_64.rpm
chkrootkit-0.50-4el7.x86_64.rpm	https://dl.bintray.com/simp/5.1.X-Ext/chkrootkit-0.50-4el7.x86_64.rpm
clamav-0.99-2.el7.x86_64.rpm	http://lug.mtu.edu/epel/7/x86_64/c/clamav-0.99-2.el7.x86_64.rpm
clamav-data-0.99-2.el7.noarch.rpm	http://lug.mtu.edu/epel/7/x86_64/c/clamav-data-0.99-2.el7.noarch.rpm
clamav-data-empty-0.99-2.el7.noarch.rpm	http://lug.mtu.edu/epel/7/x86_64/c/clamav-data-empty-0.99-2.el7.noarch.rpm
clamav-devel-0.99-2.el7.x86_64.rpm	http://lug.mtu.edu/epel/7/x86_64/c/clamav-devel-0.99-2.el7.x86_64.rpm
clamav-filesystem-0.99-2.el7.noarch.rpm	http://lug.mtu.edu/epel/7/x86_64/c/clamav-filesystem-0.99-2.el7.noarch.rpm
clamav-lib-0.99-2.el7.x86_64.rpm	http://lug.mtu.edu/epel/7/x86_64/c/clamav-lib-0.99-2.el7.x86_64.rpm
clamav-scanner-0.99-2.el7.noarch.rpm	http://lug.mtu.edu/epel/7/x86_64/c/clamav-scanner-0.99-2.el7.noarch.rpm
clamav-scanner-systemd-0.99-2.el7.noarch.rpm	http://lug.mtu.edu/epel/7/x86_64/c/clamav-scanner-systemd-0.99-2.el7.noarch.rpm
clamav-scanner-sysvinit-0.99-2.el7.noarch.rpm	http://lug.mtu.edu/epel/7/x86_64/c/clamav-scanner-sysvinit-0.99-2.el7.noarch.rpm
clamav-server-0.99-2.el7.x86_64.rpm	http://lug.mtu.edu/epel/7/x86_64/c/clamav-server-0.99-2.el7.x86_64.rpm
clamav-server-systemd-0.99-2.el7.noarch.rpm	http://lug.mtu.edu/epel/7/x86_64/c/clamav-server-systemd-0.99-2.el7.noarch.rpm
clamav-server-sysvinit-0.99-2.el7.noarch.rpm	http://lug.mtu.edu/epel/7/x86_64/c/clamav-server-sysvinit-0.99-2.el7.noarch.rpm
clamav-update-0.99-2.el7.x86_64.rpm	http://lug.mtu.edu/epel/7/x86_64/c/clamav-update-0.99-2.el7.x86_64.rpm
elasticsearch-2.3.5.rpm	https://download.elastic.co/elasticsearch/release/org/elasticsearch/distribution/rpm/elasticsearch/2.3.5/elasticsearch-2.3.5.rpm
elasticsearch-curator-1.1.1-0el7.noarch.rpm	https://dl.bintray.com/simp/5.1.X-Ext/elasticsearch-curator-1.1.1-0el7.noarch.rpm
facter-2.4.6-1.el7.x86_64.rpm	http://yum.puppetlabs.com/el/7/products/x86_64/facter-2.4.6-1.el7.x86_64.rpm
grafana-3.1.1-1470047149.x86_64.rpm	https://packagecloud.io/grafana/stable/packages/el/7/grafana-3.1.1-1470047149.x86_64.rpm
gweb-2.1.8-1.noarch.rpm	https://dl.bintray.com/simp/5.1.X-Ext/gweb-2.1.8-1.noarch.rpm
haveged-1.9.1-1.el7.x86_64.rpm	http://lug.mtu.edu/epel/7/x86_64/h/haveged-1.9.1-1.el7.x86_64.rpm
hiera-3.0.5-1.el7.noarch.rpm	https://dl.bintray.com/simp/5.1.X/hiera-3.0.5-1.el7.noarch.rpm
hmaccalc-0.9.13-4.el7.x86_64.rpm	Red Hat Updates Repository
incron-0.5.10-8.el7.x86_64.rpm	http://lug.mtu.edu/epel/7/x86_64/i/incron-0.5.10-8.el7.x86_64.rpm
kernel-3.10.0-229.14.1.el7.x86_64.rpm	Red Hat Updates Repository
libarchive-devel-3.1.2-7.el7.x86_64.rpm	Red Hat Optional Repository
libconfuse-2.7-7.el7.x86_64.rpm	http://lug.mtu.edu/epel/7/x86_64/l/libconfuse-2.7-7.el7.x86_64.rpm
libev-4.15-3.el7.x86_64.rpm	http://lug.mtu.edu/epel/7/x86_64/l/libev-4.15-3.el7.x86_64.rpm
libevent-2.0.21-4.el7.x86_64.rpm	Red Hat Updates Repository
libreswan-3.15-5.el7_1.x86_64.rpm	Red Hat Optional Repository
libselinux-2.2.2-6.el7.x86_64.rpm	Red Hat Updates Repository
libselinux-python-2.2.2-6.el7.x86_64.rpm	Red Hat Updates Repository
libselinux-ruby-2.2.2-6.el7.x86_64.rpm	Red Hat Updates Repository
libselinux-static-2.2.2-6.el7.x86_64.rpm	Red Hat Optional Repository
libselinux-utils-2.2.2-6.el7.x86_64.rpm	Red Hat Updates Repository